BOETIVS
DE CONSOLATIONAE philosophiæ.

¶ The boke of Boe-
cius, called the comforte of philosophye, or
wysedome, moche necessary for all men to read and know,
wherein suche as be in aduersitie, shall fynde muche conso-
lation and comforte, and suche as be in great worldly pros-
peritie may knowe the vanitie and frailtie therof, and con-
sequently fynde eternall felycytie. And this boke is in ma-
ner of a dialoge or communication betwene two persones,
the one is Boecius, and the other is Philosophy, whose di-
putations and argumentes do playnly declare the diuersi-
tie of the lyfe actiue, that consisteth in worldly, temporall,
and transitory thynges, and the lyfe contemplatyue, that
allwayes dyspyseth the worlde, and all thinges therin, and
beholdeth almyghtye GOD, and all heauenlye thynges.
Translated out of latin into the Englyshe tounge by
George Colusle, alias Coldewel, to thintent that such
as be ignoraunt in the Latin tounge, and can rede
Englyshe, maye vnderstande the same. And to
the mergentes is added the Latin, to the end
that suche as delyghte in the Latin tonge
may rede the Latin, accordynge to
the boke of the translatour,
whiche was a very olde
prynte.

Anno. M.D.LVI.

¶ To the hygh, and myghty pryncesse, ou
Souereigne Ladye, and Quene, Marye by th
grace of God, Quene of Englande, Spayne, Fraunce
both Cicilles, Jerusalem, & Ireland, defender of the faith
Archeduches of Austrie, Duches of Myllayne, Bur-
gundye, and Brabante, Countesse of Haspurge,
Flaunders, and Tyroll. Your humble, and
obedient subiecte, George Coluile, *alias*
Coldewell, wysiheth all health,
honoure, and pro-
speritie.

Here as manye thin
ges (mooste gracio
soueraigne Ladye) b
wryten both learnel
ly, and wysely, by th
sage Philosophers i
theyr bookes, yet m
thinketh there is on
thinge alone, amon
gest so many dyuers
and sondry thynges
to be had chiefelye i
remembraunce, th
is to saye: to pray th
a hole reasonable body, may haue an hole and perfyt min
or wytte. For both the same beynge hole and perfyt, may
iustely be called health, whiche consisteth in the ryght, an
fyrme constitution, and temperaunce both of the body an
mynd. And where as the heal[illegible] perfection of the min
or wyt (which is the chiefest and best part of a naturall an
reasonable bodye, well fourmed in all partes of the same
wanteth, can there be any felicitie in the same? Also if na
ture (as it happeth often tymes) hath geuen an impotent
weke bodye, to a fresshe, lusty, and quycke mynde or wytt
there the same mynde beynge as a thynge bound, constra
ned in, or languysshynge, can nether exercyse and vse h
prop

proper vigore and strength, nor yet profytte her selfe anye thynge accordyng. A certayne Philosopher (when he complayned on the wekenes of his owne body) sayde (after my iudgement) very well thus: O nature, yf thou haddeste geuen me a bodye lyke vnto my mynde, it myghte haue done whatsoeuer it desyred. Nowe whether that nature, or almyghty God hath geuen vnto your moost excellente maiestie (gracious Lady and Quene) both a perfyte mynde, and also a body accordyng to the same: yet for so much as there can be no suche health of body in this present lyfe, but that it may otherwhyles degenerate and fall into the contrary parte, youre maiestye is worthye for youre singuler vertue and goodnes to haue, not onely prosperous, but also continuall health both of your mynde and bodye, that you maye longe reygne, rule, and gouerne in hygh felicitie this your realme, and the common wealth of the same, whereof you are oure cheife heade, and soueraygne comforte. And as I thoughte it no lesse but my bounden duetie to declare my good wyll and mynde towardes youre grace, whiche hath alwayes accepted all mennes good hartes not vnthankefully, pretendyng goodnes vnto you: where as it fortuned in my studies, I redde ouer the noble worke of Boecius, called, the comfort of phylosophy, or wysedome, as muche necessary for all kynde of vertuous people, as others: I (of my selfe vnworthy, both for lacke of wytte and eloquence) toke vpon me after my rude maner, to translate the same worke out of Latyn, into the Englysshe tounge, and so to dedicate the same vnto youre hyghnes, not thynkynge it a thynge worthy for your grace, beynge so rudelye done, but that I, and also my translation, myghte obtayne more fauour of the readers, vnder the protectiō and sauour of your name. And if any man receaueth any profyt therby, I shall desyre him to geue thankes therefore vnto youre maiestie, whose moost royall person I beseche almyghtye God, longe to preserue amongest vs to raygne, and to sende you moost prosperous succesſe in the same. Amen.

The argumente or summe of thys booke and whereof it treatyth.

Here was a noble man, a consul of Rome named Boecius, this man was a catholike man and dysputed for the faith in the comon counsayle agaynste the herytykes Nestorius and Euticen, and confuted them, as it appeareth by a booke that he made, wherein he proueth two natures in Chryste. Thys Boetius was a greate ruler in the courte of Theodorik kynge of the gotes, in so much that he (when he sawe the kyng aboute to oppresse the Romaynes with hys accustomed tirannye) resysted hym by hys polytyke and godly counsayle, and perswaded hym from it more then all other of the counsayl dyd, and soo delyuered the people (not without greate daunger of hys owne person) from the tyrannicall rauyn of kynge Theodoryke. The kyng Theodoryk (partly perceyuyng of hym selfe, and partely by other flatteryng counsalours who alwaies dispised Boecius and hys godly wysdome, that hys tirannicall commaundementes coulde take no place by reason and meanes of the great wysedom of Boecius that alwayes destroyed the euyl opynyon and folyshe myndes of the kyng, and suche as fauored hys vngodly and vncharytable inuentions) imagined falsly without iust cause to distroy Boecius after thys sort. He Surmised that Boecius dyd interrupt and kepe backe a certayne man that should haue brought letters vnto the kyng, wherein were contayned certayne accusations of the Senatours of Rome concernyng great hurt and domage done by them agaynst the kynges most royall Maiesty. He also surmysed that Boecius had wrytten certayne letters vnto the Emperoure of Constantynoble to requyre hys ayde and helpe to restore the Romaynes to theyr former lyberty and to be delyuered from the tirannical subiection of the kyng Theodoryke. Upon these two causes falsely surmysed by the kyng, Boecius was accused by vile and slaunderus persons hired for mony, and beyng neuer put to aunswer, was vniustly founde gylty, and adiudged by the kynge to auoyde hys Countryes, and to remayne in a Citye called *Papia* as a ba-

nysher

nyshed man, and to lose all hys landes and goodes for euer. Boecius being thus banyshed from hys landes goodes and kynred, consideryng hys formor prosperytye passe, and the present aduersite that he was in, made thys presente booke calledde the comforte of wysedome, agaynste the mutable chaunces of fortune, wherby a man (although he be banyshed or depryued of worldely possessions, goodes, riches dignities or any other worldlye felycitye or pleasure) myghte receiue comfort agaynst such aduersitye (commyng by fortune): wyth phylosophy or wysedome, whyche teachyth a man to dyspyse worldly thynges, and to loue vertue, and to labor to attayne vnto the hygh perfect felicite or soueraigne good that is almyghtye God, in whome onely is all abundaunce and suffysaunce, nothynge wantyng that canne be worthely desyred, and neuer subiect to fortunes chaunces.

And by wysedome a man maye learne to knowe God to knowe hym selfe and the world, and so nether to reioyse in worldly prosperytye, nor to be sory in aduersitye of worldly thynges, as for the losse of wyfe, chyldren, landes, goodes, ryches, or dygnytyes. And as I haue declared before, thys booke is a dialoge or communycation of two personnes togethers, the one is Boecius bewaylyng hys misery for hys losses temporal: the other is Philosophy or wisdome which doth comforte hym in all hys trybulations. Boecius vseth in thys boke somtyme prose, in the whyche he sheweth reasons of greate comforte, and also he vseth some tyme myter or versys delectable to cause a man to forgette hys heuynes and greke in heryng of them, moreouer this boke is deuided into fyue partes. In the fyrst parte or booke Boecius complayneth vpon hys myserable chaunces. In the seconde he deuyseth comfortable remedies for aduersites. In the thyrd he determyneth what is the perfyt felycyte and in whom it is. In the fourth boke he moueth certayne questions to phylosophy or wisedome. And in the fyfte and laste boke he treatyth of goddes purueians or prouidens, of destiny chaūces and fre wyl, and what diuersites be betwene them, and so endyth hys worke no lesse famous then profytable.

The

¶ The Prologe of George Colvile, Alias Coldewell to the reader.

Considerynge wyth my selfe, the shorte and vncertaine course of thys transitory lyfe, the vanities of the worlde, and the mutable chaunces of fortune, with her flatteryng and deceyueable gyftes. I do much meruayle that the mooste parte of men (hauinge wytte, reason, and vnderstandynge, whereby they should excell other brute beastes) do so ernestly folowe the gyftes of fortune, and chaunce (being so variable) as they should do such thinges wherin perfyt felicytie or sufferaygne good, stedfastly dwellyth, when they see daylye before their eyes, that there is noo certaintie nor stedefastnes therein, I meane that men forsake the wayes of god, and al vertues, that be alwayes fyrme and neuer fayleth, and followeth the worlde, the deuyll and the flesshe, that darkenyth the wytte and vnderstandyng with theyr vanyties and pleasures, as with ryches, possessions, honors, dignities, power, aucthoritie, fame, & suche other, that turnyth vpsydowne in one momente of an houre, vanysheth awaye, and commeth to noughte, and seynge that therin is no perfyt felycitie, for they content no man that haue thē, but euer they wante and couette more and more, and when they thynke them selfe most sure of them, then they be mooste vnsure, for experience sheweth that in one instant eyther man is seperatyd from them, by deathe, or els they be taken from man by the chaunce of fortune, whereby it semeth that euyll fortune is better then good fortune, for euyll fortune, sheweth her self as she is in dede without flatterye, maketh a man to know God, the worlde and hymselfe. And good fortune deceiueth a man with her gyftes that seme both pleasaunte and permanente, and be not so in dede. O howe many wyse and wel learnyd men haue wrytten ryghte fruytefull doctrynes, to the intent that men myght lerne to knowe the troubles, the veracyons, the vnquyetnes and the vncertaynte of thys vayn worlde

worlde, and of all thinges worldly and temporall, that no man shuld pretend any inheritaunce, contynuance, or certaynte in them, any longer then it shal please fortune, that is mystres and ruler of them: Socrates was the fyrste begynner and worshypper of wysdome, and when he coulde fynde no certayne ende of goodnes in naturall thynges, he gaue hys hole mynde and studye to the contemplation of vertue. And he seyng the myndes of men vehementlye inclyned to errours and to transitorye thynges, instituted, and taught the people, so that they myght knowe and perceyue that god almyghtye, was and is the hygh soueraign good or perfyt felicitie. After hym followed Plato, who (emongest dyuers other godly workes) made a brydell to restrayne the pleasures and sensualitie of the body, he chaunged the ignorannce, the feblenes & negligence of yong men vnto diligẽce strẽgth & vertue. Then cam vp poetes whych (for theyr eloquens, rethorike & many fayned tales and inuentions) were much to be comended, some of thẽ did wryt the noble liues & dedes both of heuenly & worldly creaturs: some wrote of Emperours and of shamefull loue out of all good order for euyll and lasciuious lyuyng: Some did writ of the myserable fall of kynges and prynces, for theyr wicked vyces, And other of them seynge younge people enclyned to all kynde of euyll, reprefued the same playnelye in theyr wrytynges, with out fauour or flatterye, haunyng respect to no degre from the lowest to the hyghest. Al these wryters, dyd thus of a godly zeale that they had to subdue vyce and to stere vp men vnto wysedome and vertue, and to cause men to be abashed and ashamed of their euyll lyuynge. These worthy wryters, these diligent myndes and hartes eschewed Idlenes, obteyned greate worshyppe and immortall fame for their godlye labors, and lefte great cõmoditie and example to all men that shoulde come after them. Alas why do not men now a dais lerne to bere away their counsayle, & shew it in their conuersation and liuing But sythen in theie our dayes there be so many neglygent ignorant, and folyshe people, that dispyseth vertue and

earnestly

ernestlye foloweth and enbrasythe the blynde vanytyes of thys worlde, and estemeth them as thynges most certaine, most sure, and perfyt sufferaygne good, I mooste vnworthy baren of eloquence, and very rude haue taken vpon me to translate thys noble boke of Boecius, out of the Latyn into the Englyshe toungue, wherein the errours of all men for the most parte, be touchyd, that do put their truste in temporall thynges, and do so feruently labour for them wyth no smal daunger of theyr conscyence, and leueth the hygh way to god, whych is the perfit and most sure felycitie & sufferayne good in dede, the onely comforte both of ye bodye and soule, in whom is al thynge that can be wel desyred, and nothynge wantynge, and beyonde the whyche nothyng can be thoughte good and lawefull, or worthye to be wysshed or required. And gentle readers, I pray you perdon me, if for lacke of wytte by ignoraunce or neglygence I haue omytted any thynge, or haue erred in the trãslatyon, and consyder that my onelye purpose was nether for prayse of men, nor for any reward, but to contente the myndes of the wise, and to instructe the ignoraunt vnlearned people with the holesome doctryne of Philozophye, or wysedome, that is conteyned in this boke, and soo to cause men to cesse, and leue of and gape no more soo gredylye as they do for worldlye and transytorye thynges, but to ensue and folowe vertue in godly lyuynge, and fynallye to ascẽd from thys lyfe actyfe in thys worlde, vnto the lyfe contemplatyfe whych neuer shal fayle, where the elect and blessed soules do raygne wyth god the father, god the son, and god the holye ghoste, world wyth oute ende. Amen.

Metrum primum.

Armina qui quondã studio florente peregi:
Flebilis heu mestos cogor inire modos.
Ecce mihi lacere dictant scribenda camenæ:
Et veris elegi fletibus ora rigant.
Has saltem nullus potuit prosumere terror:
Ne nostrum comites prosequerentur iter.
Gloria felicis olim viridisq; iuuente:
Solantur mesti nunc mea fata Senis.
Venit enim properata malis inopina senectus,
Et dolor ætatem iussit inesse suam.
Intempestini funduntur vertice cani,
Et tremit effeto corpore laxa cutis.
Mors hominum felix quæ se nec dulcibus annis:
Inserit & mestis sæpe uocata uenit.
Heu heu quam surda miseros auertit aure:
Et flentes oculos claudere seuerat.
Dum leuibus malefida bonis

Boecius speaketh.

That in tyme of prosperite, & flowrysshing study, made pleasaunte and delectable ditties, or verses: alas nowe beyng heauy and sad ouerthrowen in aduersitie, am compelled to fele and taste heuines and greif. Behoulde the muses Poeticall, that is to saye: the pleasure that is in poetes verses, do appoynt me, and compel me to write these verses in meter, and ye sorowfull verses do wet my wretched face with very waterye teares, yssuinge out of my eyes for sorowe. Whiche muses no feare without dout could ouercome, but that they wold folowe me in my iourney of exile or banishment. Sometyme the ioye of happy and lusty delectable youth dyd comfort me, and nowe the course of sorowfull olde age causeth me to reioyse. For hasty old age vnloked for is come vpon me with al her incommodities and euyls, and sorowe hath commaunded and broughte me into the same old age, that is to say: that sorowe causeth me to be olde, before my time come of olde age. The hoer heares do growe vntimely vpon my heade, and my reuiled skynne trembleth my flesh, cleane consumed and wasted with sorowe. Manes death is happy, that cometh not in youth, when a man is lustye, & in pleasure or welth: but in time of aduersitie,

The poetes do faine that ther be .ix. Muses, that do geue ye Poetes science to make versis in meter, and ye same muses be called camene, that is to saye, synging swetlye, for that they do muche delyte men by reason of suche meter, & they cause men to delyte in ye vayne hyections of poetes, and in the vayn pleasures of the worlde.

when it is often desyred. Alas Alas howe dull and deffe be the eares of cruel death vnto men in misery that would fayne dye: and yet refusythe to come and shutte vp theyr carefull wepyng eyes. Whiles that false fortune fauoryd me with her transitorye goodes, then the howre of death had almost ouercom me. That is to say deathe was redy to oppresse me when I was in prosperitie. Nowe for by cause that fortune beynge turned, from prosperitie into aduersitie (as the clere day is darkyd with cloudes) and hath chaungyd her deceyuable countenaunce: my wretched life is yet prolonged and doth continue in dolour. O my frendes why haue you so often bosted me, sayinge that I was happy when I had honor possessions riches, & authoritie whych be transitory thynges. He that hath fallen was in no stedefast degre.

Boecius speaketh.

Whyles that I considerydde pryuyly with my selfe the thynges before sayd, and described my wofull complaynte after the maner and offyce of a wrytter, me thought I sawe a woman stand ouer my head of a reuerend countenaunce, hauyng quycke and glysteryng clere eyes, aboue the common sorte of men in lyuely and delectable coloure, & ful of strength, although she semed so olde that by no meanes she is thought to be one of this oure tyme

The discriptiō of Philosophy or wysedome, whyche for the goodlye resons thereof is compared to the beautye of a fayre womā, and the depe knowlege of wisedome is

fortuna faueret?

Pene caput tristis merserat hora meum.

Nunc quia fallacem mutauit nubila uultum:

Protrahit ingratas impia uita moras.

Quid me felicem tociens iactastis amici:

Qui cecidit stabili non erat ille gradu.

Prosa prima.

Hæc dum mecum tacitus ipse repularem, querimoniamq; lacrimabilem stili officio designarem, astitisse michi supra uerticem uisa est mulier reuerendi admodum uultus, oculis ardentibus, et ultra communem hominum ualentiam, perspicacibus colore uiuido atq; inexhausti uigoris, quamuis in ea ipleno foret, ut nullo mo

do nostræ crederetur ætatis, staturæ discretionis ambigue. Nam nunc quidem ad communem sese hominum mensuram cohibebat. Nunc uero pulsare cœlum summi uertícis cacumine uidebatur. Quæ cum altius caput extulisset, ipsum etiam cælũ penetrabat, sese respicientiumq; hominum frustrabatur intuitu. Vestes erant tenuissimis filis, subtili artificio indesolubili materia perfectæ, quas uti post (eadè prodente) cognoui, suis manibus texuerat.

Quarum speciem, ueluti fumosas imagines solet, caligo quædam neglectæ uetustatis obduxerat. Harum in extremo margine .P. græcum, in supremo uero .T. legebatur in textum. Atque inter hæc quæ literas, in scalarũ modum gradus quidam insigniti uidebantur, quibus ab inferiore ad superius elementum esset assensus. Eandè tamen uestem nolentorum quorundam sciderant manus, & particulas, quas quisque potuit, abstu-

tyme, her stature is of doutefull knowledge, for nowe she she wethe her selfe at the commen length or stature of men, and other whiles she semeth so high, as though she touched heuẽ with the crown of her hed. And whe she wold stretch fourth her hed hygher, it also perced thorough heauen, so that mens syghte coulde not attaine to behold her. Her vestures or cloths were perfyt of the fynyste thredes, & subtyll workemanshyp, and of substaunce permament, whych vestures she had wouen with her owen hands as I perceyued after by her owne sayynge. The kynde or bea wtye of the whyche vestures, a certayne darkenes or rather ignorannce of oldenes forgotten hadde obscuryd and darkened, as the smoke is wont to darken Images that stand nyghe ỳ smoke. In the lower parte of the sayde vestures was read the greke letter .P. wouen whych signifyeth practise or actyfe, and in the hygher part of the vestures the greke letter .T. whyche standeth for theorica, that signifieth speculacion or contemplation. And betwene both the sayd letters were sene certayne degrees, wrought after the maner of ladders, wherein was as it were a passage or waye in steppes or degrees from the lower part wher the letter .P. was which is vnderstand from practys or actyf, vnto the hygher parte wher the letter .T. was whych is vnderstand speculacion or contemplacion. Neuer-

of doughtefull vnderstandyng albeit it is conuersaunt emõgeste menne in earthly science and retcheth vp into heauen by ỳ vertues therof.

By the vestures of subtyll thredes is vnderstande the science of wysedome which is lyke a smokye ymage to ignoraunt persons.

Practise consisteth in ỳ worke of the bodye about worldlye thinges, contẽplation consisteth in vertuous occupying of the mynd in vertues & godly thinges, contempnynge the worlde.

The peces of ye vesturs be such partes of wysedome as euery man hath learned and retayneth, the lyttle bookes be the partes of wysdome, the scepter sygnyfieth the rule of the comon welth, whiche is euer well obserued by wysedome. These craftye harlots, be the muses or delite that worldelye pleasures doo tangle mennes myndes with all, that seme pleasaunte for the tyme.

theles the handes of some vyolente persones had cut the sayde vestures and had taken awaye certayne pecis thereof, such as euery one coulde catch. And she her selfe dyd bare in her ryght hand litel bokes, and in her lefte hande a scepter, whych fore sayd Phylosophy (when she saw the muses poetycall present at my bed, spekyng sorowful wordes to my wepynges) beyng angry sayd (with terrible or frownynge countenaunce) who suffred these crafty harlottes to com to thys sycke man? whych can help hym by no means of hys greife by any kind of medicines, but rather increse the same with swete poyson. These be they that doo dystroye the fertile and plentious commodytyes of reason & the fruytes therof wyth their pryckynge thornes, or barren affectes, and accustome or subdue mens myndes with sickenes, and heuynes, and do not delyuer or heale them of the same. But yf your flatterye had conueyed or wythdrawen from me, any vnlernyd man as the comen sorte of people are wonte to be, I coulde haue ben better contentyd, for in that my worke should not be hurt or hynderyd. But you haue taken and conueyed from me thys man that hath ben broughte vp in the studyes of Aristotel and of Plato But yet get you hence maremaides (that seme swete vntyll you haue brought a man to deathe) and suffer me

lerant. Et dextra quidem eius libellos, sceptrum uero sinistra gerebat. Quæ ubi poeticas musas uidit nostro assistētes thoro, fletibusque meis uerba dictātes commota paulisper, ac toruis inflammata luminibus. Quis inquit has sænicas meretriculas ad hunc ægrū permisit accedere? quæ dolores eius non modo ullis fouerēt remedijs, uerum dulcibus insuper alerent uenenis. Hæ sunt enim, quæ infructuosis affectuum spinis, uberem fructibus rationis segetem necant, hominumque mentes assue faciunt morbo, non liberant.

At si quem prophanum (uti uulgo solitum) nobis blāditiæ uestræ detraherent, minus molleste ferendum putarem. Nihil quippe in eo nostræ operæ læderentur. Hunc uero Eleaticis, atq; Academicis studijs enutritum. Sed abite potius Sirenes usque in exitium dulces: meis que eum Musis curandum, sanandumq; relinquite. Hiis illæ corus increpitus, deiecit humi mestior multum confeßusq; rubore uerecundiam, limen tristis excessit.

At ego, cuius acies lacrimis mersa caligarat, nec dinoscere possem, quae nam haec esset mulier tam imperiosa authoritatis, obstupui, uisuq; in terram defixo, quidnam de inceps esset actura, expectare tacitus cœpi. Tũ illa propius accedens, in extrema lecti mei parte consedit, meumq; que intuens uultum lectu graue, atque in humum merore dejectum, hiis uersibus de uestræ mitis perturbatione conquesta est.

Metrum Secundum.

HEu quàm præcipiti mersa profundo
Mens habet, & propria luce relicta
Tendit in externas ire tenebras,
Terrenis quoties flatibus acta
Cressit in immensum noxia cura.

me to heale thys my mans wyth my muses or scyences that be holsome & good. And after that philosophy had spoken these wordes the sayd companye of the musys poeticall beynge rebukyd and sad, caste downe their countenaunce to the grounde, and by blussyng confessed their shamfastnes, and went out of the doores. But I (that had my syght dull and blynd wyth wepyng, so that I knew not what woman this was hauyng soo great authoritie) was amasyd or astonyed, and lokyng downe ward, towarde the grounde, I began priuylye to loke what thyng she would saye ferther, then she had said. The she approchyng and drawynge nere vnto me, sat downe vpon the vttermost part of my bed, and lokyng vpon my face sad with weping, and declynyd toward the earth for sorow, bewayled the trouble of my minde wyth these sayinges solowynge.

Philosophy speketh.

ALas how much is the minde of this man dulled being drowned in the depe care of worldlye and transytorye thynges, and lesynge her owne clerenes of vnderstandynge, wandryth in outwarde darkenes of ignorannce as often as it is mouid with erthly blastes. The care of temporall thinges that is so hurteful increasyth out of measure.

Thys

This man beyng ſometyme fre from cure of worldlye thinges to whome the heuen beyng open that is to saye hauynge knowledge of heuenly thinges by lernynge, was wonte to goo into the heuenly wayes by science of astronomy, and dyd behold ỹ sonne beames ỹ be so red, & did se the sterres or constellacions of the cold mone. And he beynge a man that with scyence had ouercom ignorannce, had euery sterre comprehended in nũber, that is to saye, knewe the number of the sterres, and dyd knowe what sterres dyd kepe and vse dyuers erraticall or wanderynge courses, and mouyd in dyuers and sundry eirdes of the zodiake. And also he was wont to serche out the naturall causes, why the greate wyndes do trouble the plaine waters of the sea, And what spirite or power turnyth the stedefaste and hole fyrmament: And whye the sterre called hesperus risyth in the resplendent est, and goeth downe in the occydent sea, And who temperith the pleasaunte tyme of Ver, when all growyng thinges springeth forthe, that decketh the earthe wyth freshe reddy flowers. And who hath caused the frutefull autumpne in a plentyfull yere, to brynge forthe the full clusters of grapes, And also thys mã was wont to declare the secret causes of naturall thynges, and nowe he lyeth ouerthrowne as a man that hath no intellygence or wytte, hauinge

Hic quondam celo liber aperto
Suetus in æthereos ire meatus.
Cernebat roſci lumina ſolis,
Viſebat gelidæ ſydera lunæ,
Et quæcunque uagos ſtellæ recurſus
Exercet, uarios flexa per orbes,
Compreſſam numeris uictor habebat.
Quin etiam cauſas unde ſonora
Flamina ſollicitant æquora ponti:
Quis uoluat ſtabilem ſpiritus orbem:
Vel cur heſperias ſydus in undas
Caſurum, rutilo ſurgat ab ortu:
Quis ueris placidas temperet horas
Vt terras roſeis floribus ornet:
Quis dedit ut pleno fertilis anno
Autumnus grauidis inſtaret uuis,
Rimari ſolitus, atque latentis
Naturæ uarias reddere cauſas.

The poetes do fayne, that the ſonne and the ſterres that do ryſe in the eaſt, do go downe in the weſte, and be drowned in the ſea called ỹ occean ſea that lyeth in ỹ weſt

Nunc iacet effeto lumine mẽtis,
Et pressus grauibus colla catenis,
Decliuemq; gerens pondere uultum,
Cogitur heu stolidam cernere terram.

Prosa secunda. Philos.

Sed medecine inquit potius tempus est quam querele. Bo. Tum uero totis in me intenta luminibus. Tu es ne ille ait, qui nostro quondam lacta nutritus, nostris educatus alimentis, in uirilis animi robur euaseras? Atque talia contuleramus arma, quæ nisi prius abiecisses, inuicta te firmitate tuerentur. Agnoscis ne me? qd taces? Pudere, an stupore siluisti? mallẽ pudore sed te, ut uideo, stupor oppressit. Cumq; non modo tacitum, sed elinguem prorsus me, mutumq; uidisset, admouit pectori meo leniter manum. Et nihil ĩquit, periculi est: lethargum patitur communem illusarum immentium morbum. Sui paulisper oblitus est. Re-

uynge his necke thrust downe with heuye chaynes, that is to say: with passions and veracyons of the mind beryngе hys face downeward with great wayte or heuynes, for the losse of temporall goodes. Alas, he is constrayned to beholde the folyshe erthe that is to saye, the folyshe and vayne thinges on the erth.

Philos.

But he hath nowe more nede of medycyn then of anye bodyẽ to bemone or lamente hym.

Boe. Then truelye she beholdynge me stedefastlye sayth, Arte not thou the same man that somtyme in thy youth was broughte vp wyth my learnyng, and nouryshed with my doctryne, and becam than a stronge man therein? And did not I giue the suche knoweledge and instructions whiche (yf thou hadst not forgotten) woulde haue kept the safe and sound from thys aduersitie? knoweste thou not me? why speakeste not? Doeste thou holde thy peace for shame or for that thou art amasyd or astonyed? I had leuer thou were ashamed. But as me semeth thou art astonyed, and when she sawe me not onely as one that had no tounge, but also vtterly domme, she put her hand softelye vnto my brest to fele me, And sayde: I can perceyue no daunger about this man, he hath a lythargye, that is to saye, he is forgettefull or dull, the commen syckenes of myndes that be

deceiued.

deceyued, he hath a lytel whyles forgotten hymself, but he shall easely & sone remember hym self again, if he hath knowen me heretofore. And to thintent ẏ he may know me: let me wype hys eies a litel from the darkenes of mortall thinges. These thinges she sayde, and with her clothes gathered together she wyped and dried my eyes drowned with wepyng, for the losse of worldlye goodes and such vayne temporall and transytorye thynges.

cordabitur facile sui, si quid nos ante cognouerit. Quo ut possit agnoscere, paulisper lumina eius mortalium rerum nube caligantia, tergamus. Hæc dixit, oculosq; meos fletibus inundantes, contracta in rugam ueste, siccauit.

Boecius.

Then the darkenes left me, whē the nyghte was gone, and my former strengthe of vnderstandyng came agayn euyn so as (by example thus) the sonne lyothe hydde when the sterres be couered wyth cloudes of the swyfte wynde named chorus, and the fyrmament standeth closyd and coueryd with thicke showers, so that the nyght spredeth from aboue ouer all the earthe when that the sterres cannot be seene in the firmament. If then the wynde that is called Boreas do blowe from hys den in the country of Trace putting awaye the nyght, that is to saye, the clowdes and darkenes, and openyth the daye, that before was shut vppe, & the son fortifyed with hys sodeyne lyght, dothe shyne and stryke into men eyes wyth hys beames meruailynge at the same.

Metrum tertium. Boe

Tvnc me discussa liquerunt nocte tenebræ,
Luminibusq; prior rediit uigor,
Vt cum præcipiti glomerentur sydera coro,
Nymbosisq; polus stetit imbribus
Sol latet, ac nondum cœlo uenientibus astris
Desuper in terram non funditur.
Hanc si Thraicio Boreas emissus ab antro
Verberet, & clausum referet diem,
Emicat, & subito uibratus lumine phœbus,
Mirantes oculos radijs ferit.

Prosa tertia. Boe.

Haud aliter tristitiæ nebulis dissolutis, hausi cœlum, & ad cognoscendam medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos, intuitumq; defixi, reseptio nutricem meam, in cuius ab adolescentia laribus obuersatus fuerã Philosophiam. Et quid, inquã, tu in hæc exilij nostri solitudines, o omniũ magistra uirtutum à superno cardine delapsa uenisti? An ut tuquoque mecum reã falsis criminationibus agites uis? P. An inquis, te alũne desererem? nec sarcinam quã mei nominis exliuore sustulisti, communicato tecum labore partirer? Atsque philosophiæ fas non erat incomitatum relinquere innocentis meam si criminationem uereretur, & quasi nouũ aliquid acciderit per horrescerẽ? Num enim primum censes apud improbos mores lasessitas periculis esse sapientiam? Nonne apud ueteres quoq; ante nostri Platonis ætatem, magnum sæpe certamẽ cum stulticiæ temeritatæ certauimus?

Boetius.

Euen so the clowdes, that is to saye the causes of my sorow, being put awaye by the comfort of Philosophy, I lokyd vp toward heuen, and receyued my wytte and reason to beholde the face of my phisicion. And so whẽ I had turnyd myne eyes and behelde her aduysedlye, I perceyued that she was my norysh, in whose scoles I was brought vppe, and conuersaunt from my youth, and sayde vnto her. O thou mysteryes of all vertues descended from ỳ heuenlye seat. Art thou come into these solitarye places of my eryle? Arte thou come to be accompted gyltye wyth me, of false accusacions? Phil. O thou my chyld Boece, nourished vp by me, shuld I forsake the now? and be no partaker with the of thy burden which thou hast susteyned for malyce and enuye of my name? Certes it were not mete for me Philosophy to leue the, being innocent and wyth oute blame and to suffer the alone in thy iourneye if I feared myne owne faute, for yf I shoulde, I shoulde quake for feare lest ỳ some other newe thinge should happen vnto the?
Thynkest thou that Philosophy is the fyrst that hath bene in peryll of wicked men? haue not I strouen longe a goe syrslye before the tyme of my Disciple Plato agaynst the fondenes of folyshenes or folye? and the same Plato, being a lyue, hys mayster Socrates vniustlye deserued vyctory of death, whyles that

Socrates was putte to deathe for hys wyſedom, and yet he was no perfyt philoſopher.

The Epicuriens and Stoicians toke thē ſelues perfitte philoſophers, when they had learned but a lyttle philoſophy.

By the cloths is vnderſtand wyſedome.

I ſtode by. The inherytaunce of which Socrates, that is to ſaye: lernynge conſernynge felycitie or happynes, when the people of Epycuryens and Stoicyence, and dyuers others went about to take awaye vyolentlye, euery man for hys part what he luſtyd, of the doctrine of Socrates, to defend and maintayne their opinion therein. And when they would haue drawen me Phyloſophye that is to ſaye: wyſedome in ſtede of a praye crying out and reſiſting the ſame opinion, they cutte the clothes that I had made wyth mine owne handes.

The ſteppes of philoſophye is wyſedome.

And with the pecys that they had cutte of, they went away thynking that they had, had me wyſedome holye awaye with them, in the whiche Epycuryens and Stoiciens, for bycauſe there apperyd ſome ſteppes of myne habyte or doctryne, the ignorannte common people thought that the ſayde Epicuriens and Stoiciens were my famylyer ſcolers, and peruertyd and turnyd ſome men by the errour of the vnlearned multytude of them, That is to ſaye: by cauſe they ſemyd wyſe and were no Philoſophers or wyſe men in dede, they were purſuyd to death. And yf thou haſt not knowen the banyſhemēt of Anaragorras, nor the poyſonyng of Socrates, nor the tormentes of Zeno, becauſe theſe things, be ſtraunge, yet thou myghteſte haue knowen the Canios, the Scenecas and the Sorranos, whoſe fame is not verye olde nor with out prayſe. Wyych men none

Canios, Scenicas, and Sorranos wer noble Romayns knowght by in

Eodemq; ſuperſtitiæ pr
ceptor eius Socrates ini
ſte uictoriam mortis me
ſtante promeruit? Cui
hereditatem, cū deince
Epicureū uulgus, ac Stoi
cum cæteriq; pro ſua quiſ
q; parte, raptum ire moli
rentur, meq; reclamante
renitentemq;, uelut in pa
tem prædæ traherent, ut
ſtem quam meis texuera
manibus diſciderunt, arre
ptuſq; ab ea panniculis tu
tam me ſibi ceſſiſſe crede
tes: abiere. In quibus qui
niam, quædam noſtri habi
tus veſtigia uidebantur,
meos eſſe familiares in
prudentia rata, nonnulla
eorum prophanæ multitu
dinis errore peruertit.

Quod ſi nec Anaxagor
fugam, nec Socrates ue
nenum, nec Senonis tor
menta, quoniam ſunt pe
rigrina: nouiſti ac Canio
atq; Senecas, ac Soranos,
quorum nec pernetuſta
nec incælebris memori
eſt: ſciro potuiſti. Quo
nihil aliud in cladem de
traxit, niſi quod noſtri
moribus inſtituti ſtudiſ
in

improborum dissimilimi videbantur. Itaq; nihil est quod admireris, si in hoc uitæ salo, circumflantibus agitemur procellis, quibus hoc maxime propositum est pessimis displicere. Quorum quidem tametsi numerosus exercitus, spernendus tamen est, quonia̅ nullo duce regitur, sed errore tantum temere ac passim lymphante raptatur. Qui si quando contra nos aciem struens ualentior incubuerit, nostra quidem dux copias suas in arcem contrahit. Illi uero circa diripendas inutiles sarcinolas occupantur. At nos desuper irridemus, uilissima quæq; rerum rapientes securi tocius furiosi tumultus eoq; uallo muniti, quo grassanti stulticiæ aspirare phas non est.

none other thing was the cause of their death but that they beyng instructed in my doctryne, semed vnlyke to the techynge of the wycked, soo that there is no cause that thou shouldest marueyle thoughe we be tossyd in thys vale of mi serye wyth aduersities on euerye syde, whose purpose is chyefelye to dysplease wycked people, whose companye (be they neuer so great a multytude) is not to be regardyd, for it is gouernyd by no wysedome or reason, but rauyshed folyshelye euerye where by wilful errour onelye, whych althoughe they stand at any tyme agaynst vs stoute and strong reysyng batel, that is to saye: although the wycked and folishe people stryue agaynst the wyse, truelye oure captayne reson or wysedome, gatherith together his company, that is to say: aboundāce of vertues into the towre of heauenlye knowledge, where as they that be euill and folyshe be occupyed in gatherynge vp lytell fardelles of worldlye thynges much vnprofitable, and we that be aboue, wyse in heuenly vertues, doo deryde and laughe at the folyshe people that do gather vp the most vilest thinges (that is to say temporal thinges) being safe and sure from all the hole furyous rowte and tumultes of the folyshe and wycked folkes, and defēded with such a bulwarke of wysedome whervnto it is not lawfull for the folysh people that would assaute vs, to come.

wysedom, and by the vnlearned for malyce of theyr wysedome wer put to death.

wise men that beholdeth heauenly thinges folowing vertue for hope of good thynges after this lyfe, neuer feleth aduersitie of temporall thinges but ouercometh ỳ world, and the vanites thereof.

Phylos.

HE that is vertuous and sober in hys lyuynge, and hathe trodden downe vnder his fete, and ouercome the proude fortune that is to saye fortunes chaunces, & beholdinge good fortune and euyll fortune, that is to sai hath knowen aduersitie and prosperytye indifferētly, and can kepe his mind so, that he neither reioise in prosperitie nor be sad and sorye in aduersitie: the ragynge floudes of the sea ỳ the heate of the son sterreth vp & causyth, to boile from the very bottom of the same, nor the vnstable hyll called Uesenus as often as it thrustyth oute the smokye flames of fyer out of his chynes or cliftes, nor the brennynge lyghtynge that is wonte to stryke vpon high towres, can moue that mā. Therfore why do wretchyd men meruayle onely and fere cruell tyrauntes that rageth without strēgthe of heuenly vertues. Trust not vp on the goodes of fortune, nor feare thou for any aduersitie. And then thou shalt mytigate and make weke the furye of the impotent tyraunt. But whoso that quaketh and fereth for ỳ losse of worldly thynges, or do wysshe for temporall goodes, is not stedfast nor at lybertye, but hathe forsaken his buckeler of defence and safegarde, and is remouyd from his place of securitie, and maketh a chayne whereby he may be drawen, that is to say: makyth a snare of sorow or care to wrappe his mynde into.

Lechery is lik the floud of ỳ sea, & boylinge of the same, for it rageth in de fyre, and ỳ act thereof is fylthye. Couetise brenneth, and ceaseth not, as the hill Uesenus. Pryde is lyke vnto the lightening, for it beareth the mynde so high as thoughe it passed men of the earth, and yet it can not reache ỳ heuē.

Metrum quartum. Phi

QVisquis compositi
to serenus æuo,
Fatū sub pedibu
egit superbum,
Fortunam tuens utrāq
rectus,
Inuictum potuit tenere
uultum.
Non illum rabies mineq
ponti,
Versus funditus agitant
æstum,
Nec ruptis quociens ua
gus caminis,
Torquet fumificos ætnes
nus ignes.
Haud celsas soliti ferire
turres,
Ardentis uia fulminis mo
uebit.
Quid tantum miseri sæ
uos tyrannos,
Mirantur sine uiribus fu
rentes.
Nec speres aliquid nec ex
timescas,
Exarmaueris impotentis
iram.
At quisquis trepidus pa
net uel optat,
Quod non sit stabilis suiq
iuris,
Abiecit clipeum locoq; mo
tus,
Nectit qua ualeat trahi
cathenam.

Proſa quarta. Philoſo.

SEntis ne, inquit, hæc, atque animo illabuntur tuo? Expers es lyræ? Quid ſtes? quid lacrymis manas? Confitere mihi ne occultes. Si opem medicantis expectas, oportet ut vulnus detegas tuum.

B. Tum ego collecto in uires animo, An ne adhuc eget admonitione, nec per ſe ſatis eminet fortunæ in nos ſeuientis aſperitas? Nihil ne te ipſa facies loci mouet? Hæccine eſt Bibliotheca, quam certiſſimam tibi ſedem in noſtris laribus ipſa delegeras? in qua mecum ſæpe reſidens, de humanas rerum, diuinarumque rerum ſcientia diſſerebas?

Talis habitus, talisq; vultus erat cum tecum naturæ ſecreta rimarer? cum mihi ſiderum uias radio diſcriberes? cum mores noſtros totiusque uitæ rationem, ad cœleſtis ordinis exemplar formares? Hæccine præmia referimus tibi obſequentes? Atque tu hanc ſententiam Platonis ore tenuiſti: Beatas fore reſpublicas, ſi eas uel ſtudioſi ſapientiæ regerent, uel ſtu

Phylos.

PErceyueſt thou not thoſe thynges that be ſpoken, & be they not pyȝnted and well fyred in thy mynde? Art thou no moȝe apt to vnderſtand thē then an aſſe to play on the harpe? Wt hy wepeſt? Wt hy ſhedeſt thou teres? Tell me thy gryfe, hide it not. If thou wylte haue helpe of the phiſicion, it behoueth the to ſhewe thy greiſe. Boec. Then I takynge vnto my ſelfe a good harte oȝ mynde ſayde. Doith not the crueltye of foȝtune ſuffycyently appere agaynſt me nedeth it anye otȝer inſtruction? Doth not this place, that is to ſay: this perſon ſhewe the? Is this the place of ſtudy ẏ I had in the countraye wherein thou dydſt choſe the ſureſte ſeate foȝ thy ſelfe in our ſcoles, in the whych thou ſitting wyth me often tymes, diſputeſt of godly and woȝldelye thynges? Had I than ſo vyle habyt, and ſuche ſoȝowful countenaunce? Wt hen I dyd ſerch out with ths, the ſecret cauſes of nature? Wt hen thou dyddeſt declare vnto me the courſe of the ſterres with a Wirge oȝ rodde of geometry? Wt hen thou dyddeſt foȝme my maners and dyſpoſicion of lyfe to ẏ ſymylytude and lykenes of the heuenly oȝder? be not theſe the rewardes due vnto them that folowe the? Certes thou haſt confyȝmyd thys ſentence by ẏ mouthe of Plato. Bleſſed is the commenaltye that is ruled by wiſe mē, oȝ if it happen that the rulers of commennaltyes do ſtudye wyſedome. Thou haſte lyke

wyſe

wyse confyrmed and sayde by the mouthe of the sayde Plato, that it is necessarye that the commonaltye be gouernid by wise men, lest that the gouernment thereof committed to wycked and euyl cityzens, should hurte the good people. I therefore folowyng the same sayinge that I lernid of the, emongest my secret and solitarye lesures, wysshed to practyse the same in the administracion of the commen welth. God and thou (whiche haue instructe and taughte them ẏ be wyse) be my wytnes, that nothinge mouyd me for to beare rule but for the common welthes sake, and for ẏ cause I hadde verye greuous and contynuall enmyte and hatred wyth wicked men: for my conscyence hath suche libertye ẏ I more louid the ministracion of iustice then I regarded the anger of gret men. How often haue I wythstande the mā named Canygast, that stroue to hinder euery pore mannes welth? How often haue I tourned the man Tryguyll, prouost of the kynges house from the wrōges that he had begon to doo, and more that he purposed to do to pore mē? how often haue I defended poore men that were wrapped in infynyte miseries, by the couitousnes of cruel straungers vnponyshed, whereby I was in daunger to lose myne autoritye? There was neuer anye manne that coulde drawe me from iustyce to do wronge. When I sawe the goodes of the people of the prouynces spoyled or taken awaye, ey-

Libertie of cōscience, is to feare no mā to do iustice.

Canigast was a tyraunte and an officer of kyng Theodorike.

Triguyl was the kinges seruaunt a cōmō extorcioner.

ther

uel earū rectores stude
sapientiæ contigisset. T
eiusdem uiri ore hanc sap
entibus capessūdæ reipu
licæ necessariam causa
esse monuisti, ne improb
flagitiosisq; ciuibus vrb
relicta gubernacula, pe
bonis, ac perniciem infe
rent. Hanc igitur autho
tatem secutus, quod à te
ter secreta ocia didicera
transferre in actum pu
licæ administrationibus
taui. Tu mihi, & qui
sapientum mentibus inse
uit deus, conscij estis, n
lum me ad magistratu
nisi commune bonor
omnium studium detu
lisse. Inde cum improb
graues, inexorabilèsq
discordiæ fuere, & qu
conscientiæ libertas hab
pro tuendo iure spreta
tentum semper fuit offe
sio. Quociens ego Co
gastum imbecillis cuius
fortunas impetum facie
tem obuius excepi? Qu
ciens Triguillam reg
propositum domus ab i
cepta ppetrataq; iā pro
sus iniuria deieci? Quo
ens miseros quos infini
calumniis impunita barb
rorū semper auaritiaue

bat, obiecta periculis auto ritate protexi? Nunquam me a iure ad iniuriam quis q; detraxit. Prouincialiũ fortunas, tum priuatis ra pinis, tũ publicis uectigas ibus peßundari, non aliter quam qui paciebãtur indo lui. Cum acerbe famis tem pore grauis atq; inexplica bilis indicta coemptio pro ßligatura inopia Campaniã prouinciam uideretur: cer tamen aduersum præfectũ prætorij cõmunis commo di ratione ßuscepi, rege co gnoscente contendi, & ne coẽptio exigeretur euici. Paulinum consularem ui rum cuius opes palatini ca nes iam spe atq; ambitione deuorassent, ab ipsis hians tium fancibus retraxi, ne Albinum consularem uirũ præiudicate accusationis pœna corriperet, odijs me Cipriani delatoris oppo sui. Satis ne in me magnas rideor exacerbasse discor dias? Sed esse apud cete ros tucior debui, amore iu stitiæ nihil apud aulicos quo magis ocium tucior obseruaui. Quibus autem deferentibus perculsi ſu nus. Quorum unus Basili us olim a regis depulſus

eyther by pryuye robbery or by commõ trybutes, I was as sory for it as they that suffred the wronge. When a gre uous order was made there in the time of greate honger or scarsitie, whyche would haue impouerysshed gretelye the prouynce of Campanye, I stroue a gaynste the prouoste of the pretory (that appoynted that order) for the loue of cõ men welth, and I laboured agaynst it, the kynge Theodoryke knowyng the same, so that I ouercame and caused ỹ the order toke none effecte. Paulyn a noble counsayler of Rome (whose ry ches the hounde of the Palace, that is to say, the kinges gredy officers wold haue deuouryd by desyre and ambiciõ) I delyuered and dzelwe out of theyr ra uynynge gapynge mouthes. I dydde put my selfe in daunger of the malyce of the false accusar Cipzian the kyngs seruaunte, that the payne of the accusa tion before adiudged shuld not wrong fullye punyshe Albyne a counsayloure of Rome. Haue I not brought my selfe into troubles ynoughe? But I ought e to be more sure emongest other whom I haue proffited then emongest ỹ kings seruauntes whome I haue ben against alwais for the loue of iustice, by whose accusacion (that is to say by the kinges seruauntes, my familyer felowes, that haue accusyd me) I am banished: of the whyche accusars Basilius was one, ỹ sometyme was dryuen out of the kinges seruyce for hys malyce and wycked

nes

The order was that in a dere yeare the kyngs barnes beynge full of corne, no man should byanye corne but of ỹ kinge at a dere pryce, suche as was appoynted by the king and his cruell officers.

Albyne was falsely iudged to be punyshed before he was accused, & found worthy punyshement.

ues, and nowe brought in agayne for to accuſe me for nede of other mēs monye and reward. Opilion and Gaudēcius, (certes) were other two of my accuſars, whyche when the kyng Theodoryke for theyr manyfolde deceytes & falſehed had banyſhed, they would not obey hym, but refuſed and defended thē by takynge ſanctuarye, and when the kyng herd of it, he comaunded ỳ except they departed and went awaye from ỳ Citye of Rauenna within a certayne tyme appoynted, that they ſhoulde be marked on the forehed with a hote Irō & dryuen awaye. What crueltie might ſeme more then this? For the ſame day was I falſely accuſed by the very ſame accuſers. What may be ſayd to thys? Hath my ſtudy and learnyng deſerued this? or hath my dampnacion or iudgement made the accuſars true? Oughte not fortune to be aſhamed of thys? Although fortune were not aſhamed that I was vniuſtlye accuſyd, yet ought ſhe to be aſhamyd of the vyle gayne of the accuſers. But perchaūce thou woldeſt know the cauſe wherof I am accuſed. It is ſayde that I wuld haue ſaued the ſenators. And thou wouldeſte knowe howe and after what maner I am accuſed. It is noiſed that I ſtopped ỳ meſſenger and woulde not ſuffer hym to bryngе hys letters of accuſation vnto the kyng, wherebythe ſenatours ſhold haue bene founde gyltye of treſon commytted agaynſte the kynges royal maieſtie.

miniſterio, in delatione noſtri nominis alieni eri neceſſitate compulſus eſt. Opilionem uero atq; gaudentium, cum ob innumeras atq; multiplices fraudes ire in exilium regia cō ſura decreuiſſet, cumq; illi parere nolentes, ſacrarum ſeſe ædium defenſione tuerentur, compertumq; id regi foret, edixit, vt niſi infra preſcriptū diem à Rauenna urbe diſcederent, per notas inſigniti frontibus pellerētur. Quid hoc ſeuerati poſſe aſtrui uidetur? Atquæ eodem die deferentibus eiſdem, nominis noſtri delatio ſuſcepta eſt.

Quid igitur? Noſtræ nō artes ita meruerunt. An illos accuſatores iuſta, fecit præmiſſa damnatio? Itane nihil fortunam puduit? Si minus accuſati innocentiæ, at accuſantium uilitas pudori eſſe debuiſſet. At cuius criminis nos cauſa arguimur, ſummam queris? Senatum dicimur ſaluum eſſe uoluiſſe. Hoc dum deſyderas? delatorem ne documenta deferret, quibus ſenatum læſæ maieſtis rerum facere et impe

diuiſſe

dluisse criminamur. Quid igitur o magistra censes. Inficiabimur crimen, ne tibi pudore simus? At nolui. nec unq̃ uelle desistam fatebimur. Sed impediendi delatoris opera cessabit. An optasse illius ordinis salutem nephas uocabo? Ille quidem fatis de me decretis uti hoc nephas esset effecerat, sed sibi semper mẽtiens imprudentia rerum merita non potest immutare. Nec mihi Socratico decreto phas esse arbitror, uel occuluisse ueritatem, uel concessisse mendacium. Verum id quomodo sit, tuo sapientiumq̃ iudicio estimãdo relinquo. Cuius rei seriem atq; ueritatem ne latere posteros, queat stilo etiam memoriæ commendaui. Nam de compositis falso litteris, quibus libertatem urgebor sperasse Romanos, quid attinet dicere, quarum fraus aperta fuisset, si nobis ipsorum confessione delatorũ, quæ in omnibus negocijs maximas habet uires uel licuisset. Nam quæ speraui reliqua libertas potest.

Atq;

iestye. O mysters Philosophy what thinke you herein, shall I denye it, lest that I should shame the? Truelye I do confesse that I haue desyred to saue the senate: And I confesse that I wyll neuer cesse to doo the same. But as to wchyng that I did stoppe the message of the messynger, it shal cesse, for it is not treue. Shall I call it a wronge or treason to wyshe the preseruation of the order of the senate? Certes the same senate that consented to my dampnation dyd thys by theyr decrees iudiciall, as thoughe it were not lawefull to desire theyr helth. But foly that alwaye wotyth her own destructiõ cannot chaũge the mewte of thynges. And I thynke by the iudgement of Socrates that it is not lawefull for me to hyde the truthe, nor to consent to lesynges. But howsoeuer it be, I referre it to thy iudgment, and to them that be wyse, to iudge, for the truthe and order of thys thing cannot be hyd from our successoures, for I haue put it in wrytyng and in memory. For what auayleth me to speake of the letters falsely surmysed to be made by me (whereby I am accused) to haue hoped for the delyuerance of the Romaynes from the handes of the kynge Theodoryke. The craft of whyche letters shoulde haue ben knowen yf I myght haue ben present before myne accusors which is a thynge most expedyent and necessary in all causes of iudgement, and what other fredom may me-

It was surmised that Boecius dyd wryte letters vnto Themperour of Constantinople against kynge Theodoryke, to haue the Romaynes delyuered from the Terannye of thes Kynge.

loke for? Certes I woulde there were some other thinge, I would then haue answered wyth the wordes of one Canius (which whē he was accused of one Gaius, Cesars cosyn germayne sonne, that he was gylty of a coniuracion or conspiracy made agaynst hym) the said Canius aunswered Gaius thus. If I had knowen it, thou shuldeste not haue knowen it, I would haue wrought so warelye. In whyche thinge before spe cyfyed that I am vniustelye accusyd of euyll men, sorowe hath not soo dulled my sensis or wytte, that I do only com playne that the wycked folke do goo aboute and inuente wycked thynges agaynste vertuous folke, but I do marvayle gretlye howe they can brynge to passe the thynges that they haue takē in hande. For to wyll to doo euyll and wycked thyngs perchaunce is through our owne faulte: but it is lyke a monster before god to do such euyll and wickyd thynges, that euery wycked persō hath conceyued in hys mynde to doo agaynst an innocent, wherof one of thy famylyers that is to say a Phylosopher demaunded iustly this question. True lye he sayth if there be a god frō whēce commeth euyll thynges? And yf there be no God, from whence cometh good thynges? But if it were lawefull, that wycked folke (that desyrethe the deathe of all good folke and of all the senate) wolde go aboute to distroye me, whom they haue sene to defende good folke, & the

Atq; utinam posset ulla. Respondissem Canijuerbo qui cum a Gaio Cæsare Germanici filio conscius contra se, facte coniuratis onis fuisse diceretur, si ego (inquit) scissem: tu nes scisses. Qua in re non ita sensus nostros meror hebis tauit, ut impios sceleratas contra uirtutem quer rar esse molitos, sed ea quæ sperauerint effecisse uehementer admiror. Nā deteriora uelle nostri fuerit fortasse defectus. Posse autem contra innocentiam, quæ sceleratus quisq; conceperit, inspectante deo, monstro simile est. Vnde haud iniuria tuorum quidam familiarium quesiuit. Si quidem deus inquit est, unde mala. Bona uero unde, si non est. Sed si phas fuerit nepharios homines, qui bonorum omnium tociusq; Senatus sanguinem petunt, nos etiam quos propugnare bonis Senatuiq; uiderant, perditum ire uoluisse? Sed num idem de pribus quoq;

quoq; merebanur?
Meminiſti ut opinor, quos
niam me dicturum, quid
factuum ue, preſens ipſa
ſemper dirigebas.
Meminiſti inquam Vero
ne, cum rex auidus com
munis exitij, maieſtatis
crimen in Albinum dela
tum, ad cunctum Senatus
ordinem transferre moli
retur, uniuerſi ſenatus in
nocentiam quantemei pe
riculi ſecuritate defende
rim. Scis me, hæc & uera
proferre, & in nulla unq̃
mei laude iactaſſe. Minuit
enim quodammodo ſe pro
banti conſcientiæ ſecre
tum, quotiens oſtentando
quis factum, recipit famæ
prætium. Sed innocentiam
noſtram, quis exceperit
euentus, uides. Pro uerę
uirtutis præmijs, falſi ſce
leris pœnas ſubimus. Et
cuius unquam facinoris
manifeſta confeſſio ita iu
dices habuit in ſeueritate
concordes, ut non aliquos
uel ipſe ingenij error hu
mani, uel fortune condi tio
cunctis mortalibus incer
ta ſubmitteret. Si inflam
mare ſacras ædes uoluiſſe,
ſi ſacerdotes impio iugu
lare

the ſenate, whether thynkeſt thou that I had deſerued the ſame of the ſenate: that is to ſaye: that the ſenate ſhoulde wyll my diſtruction. Thou doeſt remẽbre (as I thynke) when that I was a boute to ſaye or do any thynge, thou be inge preſent didſt alwayes rule me. Thou remembreſt (I ſaye) at the Cytye of Ueron when the kynge Theodorike gredy and deſyrous of commen deſtruc tion, and to diſtroy al the ſenate, went aboute to impute vnto all the hole or der of ſenatoures, the treaſon and gylte of hys royall Maieſtye, wherof Albyne the ſenatoure was accuſyd, with how greate peryll of my ſelfe dyd I defende the innocentye of the ſayd ſenate: thou knoweſt that I ſaye truth, and neuer boſtyd nor reioyſed for anys prayſe to my ſelfe. For a man demynyſheth in maner the ſecretes of hys conſcience as often as he in prayſynge hymſelfe receiueth any renoumme of hys dedes emonge ſt men. But thou ſeyſte what chaũce or ende I haue for my innocencye. I do ſuffer paynes of falſe gyltie or felony, wythoute deſerte for a rewarde of my vertues. What opẽ confeſſion of fe lonye had iudges euer ſo accordynge in crueltye: but that eyther the errours of manes wit, or the chaunce of fortune (that is vncertain vnto al mortal men) hath turnyd ſome of the ſame iudges to compaſſion and pytye, ſauynge in my accuſation. For althoughe I had bene accuſyd that I ſayde I woulde brenne

churches, & strangle pristes with cruell swerde, and distroy all good folke, yet shulde not the iudge condempne me, excepte I were present and conuict of the offence vpon my confession therof: but I being absent the space of fyue hundred myles in great study, and hauing no knowledge that I was accusyd of any gylte or felonye, was adiudged by ẏ senate to deathe of prescription. O wel be they worthy prayse (it is spoken ironice that is to vnderstande they be euil worthy prayse) that for my kyndenes haue thus iudged me, none of thē could be so iudged of lyke cryme after the maner as I was whan I was present, as they were present at my iudgment, the innocencye of the whyche my offence they that haue accusyd me, haue seene and do knowe. Whyche innocencye to hyde & couer with som faut, they haue surmysed that I haue hurte and pollutyd my conscience with sacryledge, or Nygromancy, in doinge sacrifyse to deuyls for ambicion or desyre of dignitie. But certainely thou Philozophy being in me, dyddest put awaye all desyre of mortal thynges from my mynd, so that there was no place left for sacryfyse to deuyles in thy syght.

And thou diddest pour into mine eares and mynde daylye the sayinge of Pytagoras which is, that god must be serued and not Goddes. Nor it was not conuenyent for me, to requyre helpe of vnclene spyrytes or deuyles, whome thou haddyst

Prescripcion, is a iugemēt ẏ a man shoulde haue his name stryken oute of the table of brasse in the whiche the names of noble & famous men were wont to be wryttē for a perpetuall fame or memorye.

lare gladio, si bonis omnibus necem struxisse dicerem ur, præsentem tamen sententia confessum coniunctumq; me punisset. Nunc uero quingentis fere passuum milibus procul moti atq; indefensi ob studium propensius in senatum morti prescriptioni damnamur. O meritos de simile crimine neminem posse conuinci, cuius dignitatem reatus ipsi etiam qui detulere uiderunt. Quam uti alicuius sceleris admixtione fustarent, ob ambitum dignitatis sacrilegio me conscientiam meam poluisse mentiti sunt. Atq; tu insita nobis omnem rerum mortalium cupidinem de nostri animi sede pellebas, & sub tuis oculis sacrilegio phas locum esse non erat. Instillabas enim auribus cogitationibusq; quotidiæ meis Pitagoricum illud Euoy Heuon, Deo & non dijs seruiendum. Nec conueniebat uilissimorum me spirituum præsidia captare, quem tu in hanc excelsam

lentiam componebas ut conſilem Deo faceres. Prætereà pœnetral innocens domus, honeſtiſſimorum cætus amicorum, ſocer Simachus etiam ſanctus, et æque actu ipſo reuerendus, ab omni nos criminis huius ſuſpitione defendunt. Sed ò Nephas, Ille uero de re tanti criminis capiunt fidem, atq; hoc ipſo uidemur affines fuiſſe maleficio, quia tuis inſtitutis moribus imbuti diſciplinis ſumus. Itaq; non eſt ſatis nihil mihi profuiſſe tuam reuerentiam, niſi ultro tu potius mea offenſione lacereris. At uero hic etiam noſtris malis cumulus accedit, quod æſtimatio pluriorum non rerum merita, ſed fortunæ ſpectat euentum, eaq; tantũ indicat eſſe prouiſa quæ fœlicitas commendauerit. Quo fit ut æſtimatio bona deſerat infelices. Qui nunc populi rumores, quã diſſone multiplices q; ſententiæ piget reminiſci. Hoc tantum dixerim ego, ultimam eſſe aduerſe fortunæ

haddeſt made of ſuch excellency by wiſdome, that thou wouldeſte haue made me lyke vnto god by vnderſtandynge. Furthermore my innocent wyfe of my howſe, and a multitude of my honeſte frendes, and my father in law namyd the holy & reuerend Symachus in thys behalfe do defende me from all ſuſpicion of ſuch offence. But o thou malyce, thoſe wycked that accuſyd me doo take wytnes of the (O Phyloſophye) of my crime and accuſation, for they thought that I haue had affinite or occaſyon to inchauntment, becauſe I am brought vp and inſtructyd in thy doctryne and informyd in thy maners. And it is not ſufficyent that thy reuerẽce do nothing profit me, but that thou rather willingly are contented to be blamed of them for my offence, and accuſacion. But yet beſydes all my harmes I haue thys more hurt, that the iudgement of many of the commen people do not conſyder the meryt and deſyre of thyngs, but onelye the chaunce of fortune, and doo iudge that onely ſuch thynges be ordeyned of god, that worldelye felycytye or delyte commendeth, which is as much to ſay: that (after the iudgement of the common people) yf a man haue welthe he is a good man, and worthy to haue it. And if he hath aduerſitie, that he is an euyll man & worthy to haue it, and that God hath forſaken hym. And ſo there vpon it folowethe that wretchys and vnhappye or poore folke, be not regarded

garded, or eſtemed. For whyche cauſe it greueth me to remember what vnſit tynge rumors and dyuerſe layinges be emongeſt the people of me. And this I dare be bolde to ſay, that the laſt bourden of euyll fortune is thys, that when my accuſacion is imputed to wretched folke, it is thought that they haue deſerued the ſame that they doo ſuffer. And certes I that am expulſyd from al good folke, ſpoyled of my dignities, and ſpotted in my eſtymacion by falſe accuſacion, in ſtede of rewarde haue receyued ponyſhment, me thynketh that I do ſe the wyckyd companye of felonowes folke abounde in ioye and gladnes, and euery vnthryft lye in a wayte to accuſe good folke with newe fraudes. And I do ſe the good people lye oppreſſed for fere of my peryll and ponyſſhement. And I do ſe euery vnthriftie perſon bolde to cõmyt ſynne, vnponyſſhed beynge procured therto for money. Alſo I do ſe the Innocẽtes not onely without ſuccur, but alſo without defence. Therfore I am forced to crye vnto god of heuyn in this maner.

O Thou maker of the fyrmamente that bereth the ſtarres, that art toyned to the eternall ſeat, Thou doiſt turne the firmamẽt alwaies with ſwyfte mouynge, and makeſte the ſtarres to kepe a due courſe, ſo that ỹ moone ſomtyme ſhynynge with her fulle lyght when ſhe is in the full, ſet dyrectlye

tunæ ſarcinam, quid dum miſeris aliquod crimen aſſigitur, quæ perferum meruiſſe creduntur. Et egoſquidem bonis omnibus pulſus, dignitatibus exutus, eſtimatione fœdatus, ob beneficium: pertuli ſuppliciũ. Videre autem uideor nepharias ſceleratorum officinas gaudio letitiaq; fluitãtes, perditiſſimum quemq; nouis delationum fraudibus imminentem, iacere bonos, noſtri diſcriminis terrore proſtratos, flagicioſum quèq; ad audiendum quidem ſontinus impunitate, ad efficiendum uero premijs incitari, in fontes autem non modo ſecuritate, uerum ipſa etiam defenſione priuatos. Itaq; libet exclamare ad deũ cœli.

Metrum quintum.

STelliferi conditor orbis,
Qui perpetuo nexum ſolio,
Rapido celum turbine uerſas,
Legemq; pati ſidera cogis,
Vt nũc pleno lucida cornu,
Totis fratris obuia flãmis,
Cõdat ſtellas luna minores

lye

Nunc obscuro pallida cornu,
Phebo propior lumina perdat,
Et qui prime tempore nocti,
Agit algentes hesperus ortus,
Solitas iterum mutet habenas
Phœbi pallens lucifer ortu
Tu frondifluæ frigore pruinæ
Stringis lucem breuiore mora.
Tu cum feruida uenerit estas,
Agiles noctis diuidis horas
Tua uis uarium temperat annum,
Vt quas Boreæ spiritus auferr
Reuehat mitis zephirus frondes.
Quæq; Arcturus semina uidit,
Sirius altas uret segetes.
Nihil antiqua lege solutũ,
Linquit propriæ stationis opus.
Omnia certo fine gubernas
Hominum solos respuis actus.
Merito rector cohibere modo.
Nam cur tantas lubrica uersat

ly euyn agaynst her brother the sonne, shyning with his beams obscureth and taketh away the lyght of the starres by reason of the great lyghte of the same. And lykewise thou causiste the moone other whyles pale of lyght approchyng nere vnto the sonne, doo lose her lyght. And thou causyste the euenynge sterre called Hesperus, that bryngeth in the colde in the begynnynge of the nyght, to change his olde course commynge agayne in the morynge (at the sonne ryssynge) very pale, and is then called Lucyfer. Thou makest the daye shorter in the wynter time when the hoare frosts be on the ground, that maketh the leaues of trees to fall, Thou deuydest and makest the nyghtes shorte in sommer season. Thy myghty power hathe appoynted diuers partes of the yeare, so that the gentel wynde Zephirus that is to saye: Wer tyme, bryngeth againe the grene leues that the wynde Boreas, that is to saye: the wynter toke awaye. And whatsoeuer sedes were sowen in the tyme of the sterre named arcturus, are become longe corne and ripeth in the hote tyme of the sterre named Syrius in harueste. Nothyng is free from the olde lawe or order of gods purueyance or prouydēce nor leuith the worke of hys place appoynted. O Lorde God thou gouernist all these forsayde thinges to a certayne ende, whye refusyste thou to gouerne mans actes or dedes in due order? Why rulyste not thyppery

The further the Moone is from the son, the more lyght she geueth, the nere the sonne the lesse lyght. as it appereth in the oppositi on and coniunction of them. The sterre Hesperus foloweth the Sonne in the euening and in the morning goeth before the Son, and is called Lucifer.

There be foure partes of the yere, Wer, Sommer, Autūpne and Wynter.

foꝛtune that cauſyth ſo muche baryete oꝛ chaunge of thinges, ſhe ponyſſheth Innocentes not giltie, with poniſſhement due foꝛ the wicked, and exalteth hygh, men of wycked maners, whyche treade vnder foote the neckes of good folkes vniuſtlye. The vertuous man lieth in darkenes and is not ſet by. The iuſt man beryth the blame of the wyckyd, periury couered with falſhedde is not ponyſhed. But when the wycked perſons (whome the moſte parte of the people do feare) lyſteth to exercyſe their powꝛe, they reioyſe to ſubdue myghty kynges, that is to ſaye: good and wyſe men. O god what ſoeuer thou art that knytteſt to gether the bondes of things in due oꝛder, loke vpõ wꝛetched people dwellynge on the earth that be not the vileſt parte of thy woꝛke, ſoꝛe troubled with the bytternes of foꝛtune, wythdꝛawe the greate aſſaultes therof, and knyt faſt, oꝛ rule the good and ſtedefaſt men of the earth, wyth lyke bondes as thou knytteſt and rulyſte the hygbe heuen, that they be not tooꝛmentyd wyth foꝛtune, that is neuer ſtedfaſt but euer baryable.

Good & wyſe men ought to rule in a common weithe & not tyꝛañtes & wycked perſons.

Fortuna uices, premit ho
ſontes,
Debita ſceleri noxia pœn
At peruerſi reſident celſo
Mores ſolio, ſanctaq; cul
cant.
Iniuſta uice colla nocẽtes.
Latet obſcuris condita uir
tus
Clara tenebris, iuſtusq; tu
lit
Crimen iniqui.
Nil piuria, nil nocet ipſu
Fraus, mendaci compta co
lore.
Sed cum libuit uiribus uti,
Quos innumeri metuũt
populi
Summos gaudent ſubdere
reges.
O iã miſeras reſpice terra
Quiſqs rerũ federa neſci
Operis tanti pars non ulla
Homines, quantimur foꝛ
tunæ ſalo.
Rapidos rector comprim
fluctus,
Et quo cœlum regis immo
ſum.
Firma ſtabiles fœdere tem
ras.

AFter that I had barckyd oute oꝛ raſhly ſpoken theſe things vnaduyſedly my ſoꝛowe remayned yet ſtyll, Philoſophy with a quyete countenaunce beynge nothynge moued oꝛ angrye at my complayntes, ſayde vnto me thus. Phyl. When I ſawe the ſad and

Proſa quinta.

HÆc ubi continuem
dolore delatrauit,
illa uultu placido,
nihilq; meis queſtibus mo
ta. Ph. Cum te inquit me

ſtum lachrimantemq; uidiſ
ſem, illico miſerum exu-
lemq; cognoui. Sed id quã
longinquum eſſet exiliũ:
niſi tua prodidiſſet oratio
neſciebam. Sed tu quam
procul a priã, non quidem
pulſus es, ſed aberraſti. At
ſi te pulſum exiſtimari ma
uis: te potius ipſe pepuli-
ſti. Nam id quidem de te
nunquam cuiquã phas fu-
iſſet. Si enim cuius oriun-
dus ſed priem reminiſcaris
non uti Athenienſium quõ
dam multitudinis imperio
regitur, ſed unus dominus
eſt, & unus rex, unus &
princeps, qui frequentia
ciuium, non de pulſione l e
tatur. Cuius agi frenis ar-
q; obtemperare iuſticiæ,
ſumma libertas eſt. An ig-
noras illam tue ciuitatis
antiquiſſimam legem? qua
ſanxitum eſt ei ius exulare
non eſſe quiſquis in ea ſe-
dem fundare maluerit.
Nam qui uallo eius ac mu-
nimine continetur, nullus
metus eſt, ne exul eſſe me-
reatur. At quiſquis inha-
bitare eam ualle deſierit,
pariter deſinit etiam me-
reri. Itaq; non tam me loci
huius quam tua facies mo-
uet

and wepyng, I knewe by and by that
thou were a wretche, and a banyſhed
man, but howe farre of thou were exi-
led or banyſhed I knewe not but by thy
owne ſayinge. But yet thou art not ba
nyſhed farre from thy countray, that is
to ſaye, farre from thy owne reaſon or
iudgemente, but thou haſt ſtrayed out
of the waye or erred a litel. But if thou
woldeſt rather accompt thy ſelfe bany-
ſhed from thy countraye, then I ſaye
thou rather haſte baniſhed thy ſelf. For
certes to baniſhe the it was not lawful
for any man at any tyme, if thou remẽ-
bryſte what countrye thou were borne
in. Whyche countreye is not rulyd by
the gouernment of many, as the cytye
of the Attheniens ſometyme was go-
uerned. For of thy countrye is but one
lord, one kyng, and one prynce, whych
is almyghtye God, that more reioyſeth
at the quyete conuerſation of manye
Cytezens together, then of theyr eryle
and banyſhement, By whoſe precepts
to be ruled, and to obeye hys iuſtyce, is
very hygh lybertye.
Haſt thou forgotten the old lawe of thy
Citie? wherin it is eſtabliſſed for a law
that who ſoeuer had determyned ther-
in to dwell may not be banyſſhed from
thens. But who ſoeuer hath no deſyre
therein to dwel hath not deſerued to be
therein. Yea the diſpoſition and maner
of this place of eryle doth not ſo muche
moue me, as thy face onelye whyche is
the inwarde diſpoſition of thy mynd. I

He is exiled out of his cõtreye that hath loſt hys wyte, and is madde. and he ſtraieth out of his cõtreye, that followeth not reſon, and hathe hys wytte.

do not requyre the walles of thy lybrari deckyd with Iuoyre and glaſſe, rather thē the quietnes of the inward thought of thy mynde, wherin I do not ſet and lay bokes, but wiſe ſentences that maketh the bookes to be preyous or eſteemed. And Certes Boecius, thou haſte ſayd and declared the truth of thy dedes done for the common vtilitie and profyt of the people. But thou haſt declared lytell of the commoditie that thou haſt had, by the multytude of thy actes and dedes. And thou haſte recyted thinges manifeſt to all men, of the honeſty, that is to ſaye: of the ſaluation of the ſenate, or of the falſehead, that is to ſai: of the forgyng of letters to the emperor, imputyd to the and layd to thy charge. The wyckednes and deceyts of thy accuſars thou haſt touchyd playnely, and verye ſtrayte, albeit the thyngs might haue bene better ſpoken of & more fully by voyce of the cōmē people that knew it. Thou haſt much blamed the acte of the vniuſte ſenate, and hathe lamented for my blame, and thou haſte bewayled the loſſe of thy good name. Laſte of all thou haſte complayned vpon fortune, that rewardes be not equally diſtrybuted to men accordyng to their deſertes. And in the ende of thy ſuryous meter, thou haſt prayed that the ſame peace of the dyuyne purueyans or prouydence, may rule men on earth as it ruleth the heuen. But for bycauſe that manye paſſions, and trybulatyōs haue greuid

uet. Nec Bibliothece potius comptos ebore ac uitro parietes, quam tuæ mētis ſedem requiro, in qua non libros, ſed id quod libris præcium facit: librorum quondā meorum ſententiās collocaui Et tu quidem de tuis in commune bonum meritis uera quidē, ſed pro multitudine geſtorum tibi pauca dixiſti. De obiectorum quidem tibi uel honeſtate uel falſitate cunctis nota memoraſti. De ſceleribus fraudibuſq; delatorum rectæ tu quidem ſtrictimq; attingendum putaſti, quod ea melius uberiuſq; recognoſcentis omnia uulgi ore celebrentur. Increpuiſti etiam uehementer iniuſti factum ſenatus, de noſtra etiam crimination̄ doluiſti. Leſæ quoq; opinionis damna fleuiſti. Poſtremo uero aduerſus fortunam dolor incanduit, conqueſtusq; non æqua meritis præmia compenſari. In extremo muſæ ſeuientis ut quæ cœlum, terras quoq; pax regeret uota poſuiſti. Sed quam pluribus tibi affectum tumultus incubuit,

diuers

diuerſumq; te dolor, ira, meror, diſtrahunt uti nunc mentis es: non dum te ualidiora remedia contingũt. Itaq; leuioribus pauliſper utemur, ut quæ in tumorẽ perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt ad acrioris uim medicaminis recipiendam, tactu blandiore molleſcant.

greuyd the, and that dolor anger and heuynes turneth thy mynd dyuerſly as it appereth nowe: Therefore as yet thou ſhalt not taſt the ſtronge medicine in thy weakenes, but ſuche as be ſomewhat eaſy, whereby the thynges that by longe increaſe of corruption & paine haue growen vnto an hard ſwellynge, by ſofte handelynge of lenytyue medycynes may be diſſolued and made more apte to ſuffer the vyolence of ſtronger remedyes.

Metrum ſextum.

Cvm phœbi radijs grauæ
Cancri ſidus ineſtuat.
Tu qui larga negantibus
Sulcis ſemina credidit,
Eluſus cereris fidæ
Quernas pergat ad ambores?
Nunquam purpureum nemus
Lectures uiolas petas,
Cum ſeuis aquilonibus
Stridẽs campus inhorruit.
Nec queras auida manu
Vernos ſtringere palmites,
Vuis ſi libeat frui.
Autumnus potius ſua
Bachus munera contulit.
Signat tempora proprijs
Aptans officijs deus.

HE that ſoweth anye ſedes in the grounde when that the ſonne is in the ſygne of Cancer (whyche is in the monethe of June, when that ſygne wareth hote with the ſonne beames) maye eate acorns of the oke tree, for any hope of corne that he is lyke to haue growinge of ſuche ſowyng of his ſeades. And let no man ſeke to gather violettes in the florylhyng wodes, whē the fieldes ſowndyng wyth the blufterynge cold wynd named Aquilo, bryngyth fourth no flowers at all. Nor let any man loke to gather grapes in the ſprynge tyme called Ver, when al thinges do begyn fyrſt to budde and growe. For the god of wyne called Bachus (after the faynynge of poetes) bryngethe forth his fruytes, that is to ſay: grapes rather in Autumpne, whych is the end of ſommer. For God hathe appoynted the tymes of the year, and hathe directed them euerye one to hys proper of-

fyce and hath ſo eſtablyſhed them, that he wyll not ſuffer them to be altred, ỹ the tyme ordeined for one offyce, ſhall ſerue for a nother. The thing therfore that chaungethe hys due order, neuer hath good ende thereof.

Phil.

O Boecius, before I geue the any medycine, tell me fyrſt whether thou wylte ſuffer me to demaũd of the certayne queſtyons for to knowe the ſtate of thy mynd, whereby I may the better vnderſtand howe to cure the of thy dyſeaſe? Boeci. I saye aſke me whatſoeuer pleaſe the that I may anſwere the. Phil. Then the sayde phyloſophye sayde: Thynkyſt thou that the worlde is gouernyd by folyſhe and by caſuall chaunces? or beleuyſt thou that it is rulyd by reaſon, that is to saye: by gods puruiaunce? B. Truly I say ỹ I neuer thought by any maner of means that ſuche certayne thynges ſhould be rulyd by the folyſhe happe of fortune. But I doo knowe that almyghty God the creatoure of things rulith his owne worke, and I neuer sawe the tyme that coulde turne me from the truth therof. P. It is euẽ ſo, for thou saideſt ſo a lytle before, and lamenteded that mankinde was not gouerned by the dyuyne puruyans of God, not doubtynge but that other creatours were ruled by the saide diuine ordinaunce, But O, I do gretly wonder why thou art ſycke for ſo moch as thou art ſet in ſo good opinion. Neuertheleſſe

Nec quas ipſe coerenit
Miſceri patitur uices.
Sic quod præcipiti uia
Certum deſerit ordinem,
Lætos non habet exitus.

Proſa ſexta. Phi.

PRimum igitur, pateris ne me pauculis rogationibus ſtatum tuæ mentis attingere, atq; tentare? ut qui modus ſit tuæ curationis intelligam. Bo. Tu uero arbitratu, inquam, tuo quæ uoles ut reſponſurum rogato. P. Tum illa. Huncine, inquit, mundum temerarijs agi, fortuitiſq; caſibus putas? An ullum credis ei ineſſe regimẽ rationis? B. Atq;, inquam nullo exiſtimauerim modo, ut fortuita temeritate tam certa mouerentur. Verum operi ſuo conditorem præſidere deum ſcio, nec unq̃ fuerit dies, qui me ab hac ſententiæ ueritate depellat. Ph. Ita eſt, inquit. Nam id etiam paulo ante ceciriſti, hominesq; tantum diuinæ exortes curæ eſſe deploraſti. Nam de cæteris quin ratione regerentur, nihil mouebare. Papæ autem uehementer admiror, cur in

tam

tam ſalubri ſententia locas tus, ægrotes. Verum aliius preſcrutemur, neſcio quid abeſſe coniecto. Sed dic mihi, quoniam à deo mundum regi non ambigis, quibus etiam gubernaculis regatur aduertis? Boe. Vix, inquam, rogationis tuæ ſẽtentiam noſco, nedum ad inquiſita reſpondere queam. Ph. Num me, inquit, fefellit abeſſe aliquid per quod uelut hianti ualli robore, in animum tuum perturbationum morbis irrepſerit. Sed dic mihi, meminiſti ne quis ſit rerum finis? quò ue totius naturæ tendat intentio? B. Audieram inquam, ſed memoriam mœror hebetauit. Ph. Atq; ſcis unde cuncta proceſſerint? B. Noui inquam, deumq; eſſe reſponsi. P. Et quid fieri poteſt ut principio cognito, quis ſit rerum finis ignores? Verum hij perturbationũ mores, & ea ualentia eſt ut mouero quidem loco hominem poſſint, euollere autem ſibiq; totum extirpare non poſſint. Sed hoc quoq; reſpondeas uelim, hominem ne te eſſe memineriſtiq; B. Quidni, inquam

nertheles, let vs ſerche deper: I do thynke that ſome thynge is yet amyſſe with the, but I can not tell what it is. Saye to me Boecius (for as moch as thou doutiſte not but that almyghtye god ruleth the worlde) doeſt thou knowe howe he gouerneth it? Boe. I do ſcarſely vnderſtande what thou menſt by thy queſtion, and as yet I cannot anſwere the to the ſame queſtion. Phil. I was not deceyued in that I ſayd ſom thyng was amyſſe wyth the, for the ſyckenes of perturbacion or trouble hathe crepte into thy mynd as by an open way that hath no impediment, or ſtoppe. But tel me, doſt thou remember what is the ende of all thynges naturall? Boe. I haue harde it, but heuynes hath cauſyd me to forget it. Phil. Knoweſt thou of whõ al things haue taken they? beginninge? Boe. I saye I haue knowen and haue anſwered, that God is the begynnynge of al thinges. Phil. Then howe maye it be that (ſynce thou knoweſt the begynnynge of all thynges) thou knoweſt not the ende of the ſame? But ſuche be the maners of troubles, and ſuch be they? ſtrengthe that they maye cauſe a man to forgette partelye, but cannotte plucke awaye from hym all together. But I woulde that thou ſholdeſt anſwere me to thys queſtion. Remẽberſt thou that thou art a man? Boe. Why ſhould I not remember it? Phi. Canſte thou tell than what thynge a man is? Boeci. Aſkiſte me thys? Or whether

that?

that I do knowe that I am a resonable and a mortall beste? I do knowe & confesse that I am so. Phil. Knowest thou whether thou were any other thynge? Boe. None other thynge. Phil. Nowe knowe I another great cause of thy disease. Thou haste forgotten to knowe thy selfe, what thou arte. Wherefore I haue found fully the cause of thy sicknes, or els the maner and wayes how to recouer the of the same. For bycause thou haddest forgotten thy selfe what thou art, therefore thou hast complayned that thou art both a banyshed mā, and spoyled and robbed of thy own proper goodes, and ryches, temporall. And no meruayle it is, for thou wotyst not what is the ende of al thyngs, and thou thynkest that euyll men and wicked be myghtye and happye. And why so? because thou hast forgotten by what meanes the worlde is gouernyd. And thou thynkest that these mutaciōs and chaunces of fortune, do wander wythout anye gouernoure. Whyche be the greate causes not onelye of syckenes, but also of vtter destruction and death. But thou art bounde to geue thankes to the Author of helthe, that nature is not cleane extynct in the, but that some strength yet remayneth. And I haue a great restoritie towardes thy healthe, that is to say: the trew vnderstanding of the worlds gouernaūce in that thou beleuyst that it is not gouerned by the solishe chaunces of fortune, but subiect

to

meminerim. P. Quid igi tur homo sit, poteris n proferre? B. Hoccinæ in terrogas? An esse me sci rationale animal atq; mor tale? Scio, & id me esse cō fiteor. P. Et illa. Nihil n te aliud esse nouisti? B. Ni hil. P. Iam scio inquit mor bi tui aliam uel maxima causam, quis ipsi sit nosce desijsti. Quare plenissime uel ægritudinis tue ratio nem, uel aditum reconsili ande sospitatis inueni. N quoniam tui obliuione cō funderis, & exulem te, & expoliatum proprijs bon esse doluisti, quoniā uer quis sit rerum finis ign ras, nequam homines at nepharios, potentes fo cesq; arbitraris. Quon uero quibus gubernacu mūdus regatur oblitus e has fortunarum uices æ mās sine rectore fluitar Magnæ non ad morbū m do uerum ad interitū qu q; cause. Sed sospitatis a ctori grates, quod te n dum totum natura desti it. Habemus maximum t fomitem salutis ueram d mundi gubernatione se tentiam, quod eam nō e

suu

ſuum temeritati, ſed diui-
ne rationi ſubditam credis
Nihil igitur pertimeſcas,
iã tibi ex hac minima ſcin-
tillula uitalis calor illuxe-
rit. Sed quoniã firmioribus
remedijs non dũ tẽpus eſt,
uti, & eam mentiũ cõſtat
eſſe naturam, ut quociens
abiecerint mentes ueras,
falſis opini omnibus indu-
antur, ex quibus orta per-
turbationum caligo, ueriũ
illum confundit intuitum.
Hanc pauliſper lenibus me
diocribuſq; fomentis atte-
nuare temptabo, ut dimo-
tis fallatium affectionum
tenebris ſplendorem uere
lucis poßis agnoſcere.

Metrum ſeptimum.

NVbibus atris
Condita nullum,
Fundere poſſunt,
Sydera lumen.
Si mare uoluens,
Turbidus auſter,
Miſceat æſtum:
Vitrea dudum,
Parq; ſerenis
Vnda diebus,
Mox reſoluto
Sordida cœno
Viſibus obſtat.
Quiq; uagatur
Montibus altis

to goddes ordynaunce. Therfore feare not, for of this lytle ſparke of truth, the lyuely heate ſhall reuyue & recouer his olde ſtrength agayne. But forasmoche as now, it is no time to vſe ſtronger medicines, & that the nature of mens mindes is ſuche, that when they haue forſaken trewe opynyons, they receyue falſe opinions and errours, whereof ſpryngeth the darkenes of perturbacion, or trouble of the minde that taketh away the treue lyght of vnderſtanding of the ſame. But I wyll proue to remoue a lytell the ſame darkenes with eaſy and moderate medicynes. That after that the darke cloudes of falſe affectes be taken or remoued awaye, thou mayſt beholde and knowe the cleare lyght of the verye truethe.

AS the ſterres, beynge couered with darke cloudes, can giue no lyghte to the earth. And as the troblous wynde named Auſter, moueth the ſea with heat, and cauſeth the water (that before was clere as glaſſe, and lyke the cleare day) to become foul and thycke by reaſon of the mudde, or fylthe, that is dyſolued and ſtyrred vp from the bottom, ſo that a man can not ſe, any thynge within the water. And lykewiſe as the ſtone, fallen from ſome hyghe Rockes, into the water, dothe let and trouble the water courſe, that renneth from the hyghe hyll: Euen ſo, ioye, feare, hope, and dolour, do interrupte

cupte, and tourne the mynde of man,	*Defluens animũ,*
from knowledge of the truth. For the	*Sæpe reſiſtit*
mynd that is troubled, w̃ any of theſe	*Rupe ſoluti*
thynges, is darked and bounde, as it	*Obice ſaxi.*
were in bondes or chaynes. Therfore	*Tu quoque ſi uis*
yf thou wilt ſe the trueth, with a cleare	*Lumine claro*
ſyght, and come to the knoledge of the	*Cernere uerum,*
treuth, by a ryghte pathe: Joye not in	*Tramite recto*
worldlye, or temporall thynges, put a-	*Carpere callem,*
waye feare of euyll fortune to come.	*Gaudia pelle,*
Truſte not in good fortune, and be not	*Pelle timorem,*
ſorye for the loſſe of worldlye goodes,	*Spemq; fugato,*
For the mynd is darked and bound, as	*Nec dolor adſit:*
it were in bondes, where theſe thinges	*Nubila mens eſt,*
do reygne.	*Vinctaq; frenis*
	Hæc ubi regnant.

Here endeth the fyrſte Booke.

Finis libri primi.

Prosa prima.

Post hæc paulisper obticuit, atq; ubi attentionē meam modesta tacitur intate collegit: Sic exorsa est. Ph. Si pœnitus ægritudinis tue causas habitumq; cognoui, fortunæ prioris affectu desiderioq; tabescis, ea tantum animi tui statum sicuti tibi fingis mutata peruertit. Intelligo multiformes illius prodigij fucos, & eo usq; cum hijs quos eludere nititur blandissimam familiaritatem exercit, dum intollerabili dolore confundat eos quos insperata reliquerit. Cuius si naturam, mores, ac meritum, reminiscare, nec habuisse te in ea pulcrum aliquid, nec amisisse cognosces. Sed ut arbitror haud multum tibi hæc in memoriam reuocare laborauerim. Solebas enim præsentem quoq; blādientem, uirilibus incessere uerbis, eamq; de nostro aditu prolatis insectabare sen-

Boecius.

After this phylosophy held her peace a lytel whyle, and then she by a modeste stylines perceyuing me, dylygent and intentyfe to heare her speake: said as folowethe. Phil. Forasmuche as I haue knowen and founde out the originall causes, and the disposition of thy syckenes, O Boecius, that is to saye: that thou arte sycke for the losse of thy former fortune that was prosperous, & nowe beyng chaungyd as thou furmysest, hath chaunged and turnyd the disposition of thy mynde. I do wel know the manyfolde deceytes of the sayde fortune, for so long she vsyth hyr famylier flatterye, with them whom she intendethe to deceyue, vntyl she hathe ouerthrowen them sodenly with intollerable greife and sorowe, whome she hath forsaken and left in dyspayre of any cōforte agayne. Whose nature maners & dygnytie, yf thou do consyder, thou shalt perceyue that nether thou haddest in her, nor hast lost by her, anye good thinge at all. But I thynke I shall not laboure muche to brynge these thinges of fortunes goodnes into thy remembraunce. For thou were wonte to rerebuke wyth sharpe wordes the same fortune both beyng present and flatteryngе, and thou didest argue or dispute agaynste her wyth sentences, drawen

out of my doctryne or informacion. But truly euery ſodein mutacion or chaunge of thynges cometh not wythoute ſome trouble of the mynde. So it is done and commeth to paſſe, that thou art fallen a lytel from the quietnes of thy mynde that thou were in before. But it is tyme that thou do receiue and taſte ſom eaſye and pleaſaunt thynge, which after that it is entred into the inwarde partes of thy mynde, it may prepare a waye for ſtronger medycynes. Therefore behold the perſwaſion of the ſwetnes of Rethorike is preſente, that goeth forwarde, then onely in the ryghte way, when ſhe followeth my precepts. And with Rethorike is a mayd of my houſe, named Muſyke, that ſyngeth nowe lyghter meſures, & now greater meſures. What thynge is it therfore, (O thou man,) that hath caſte the into heuynes, and wepynges? I beleue that thou haſt ſeene ſome ſtraunge thinge. If thou doſt thynke that fortune is turned agaynſt the: thou art therin deceyued, for ſhe is not chaunged, theſe were her maners alwayes, this is her proper nature, to be nowe proſperous and nowe contrarye. And ſhe hathe rather kept her owne nature and conſtancy a-boute the in this her mutabylite. Truelye ſhe was alwaies ſuch when ſhe flattred the, & decеyued the, with the delite of falſe proſyte. Thou haſt knowen the doubtfull countenaunce of that blynde goddes fortune, which although ſhe do hyde

ſententijs. Verum omnis ſubita mutatio rerum non ſine quodam quaſi conſilij ictu contingit animorum. Sic factum eſt ut tu quoq; pauliſper a tua tranquillitate deceſſeris. Sed tempus eſt haurire te aliquid ac deguſtare molle atq; iocundum, quod ad interiora tranſmiſſum ualidioribus hauſtibus uiam ſecerit. Adſit igitur rhetoricæ ſuadela dulcedinis, quæ tunc tantum calle recto procedit, cum noſtra inſtituta non deſerit. Cũq; hanc muſica laris noſtri uernula, nunc leuiores, nunc grauiores modos ſuccinnat.

Quid eſt igitur (o homo) quod te in mœſtitiam luctumq; dejecit. Nouum credo aliquid inuſitatumq; uidiſti. Tu ſi fortunam putas erga te eſſe mutatã: erras, hij ſemper eius mores ſunt, iſto natura. Seruauit circa te propriã potius in ipſa ſui mutabilitate conſtantiam. Talis erat cum blandiebatur cum tibi falſæ illecebris fœlicitatis alluderet, deprehendiſti cæci numinis ambiguos uultus, quæ ſeſe ad-

bue

hyde her ſelfe vnto ſome men, in pro-
uyng them proſperyte: hath ſhewed her
ſelfe manyfeſtlye and holye as ſhe is to
the, that is to ſaye: inconſtaũt. If thou
allow her: vſe her maners, and cõplain
not. If thou feare her falſehed: refuſe
her, forſake her, as one whoſe paſtime
is perillous and hurtfull. For fortune,
whiche nowe is the cauſe of thy greate
heuines and greif: ought to be the cauſe
of thy quyetnes and reſte. But certes
ſhe hath forſaken the, as ſhe hath done
other. For neuer man yet was ſure of
her. Accompteſt thou that thynge hap-
py and proſperous that wyll not tarye
and remayne? And is fortunes preſence
ſo precious to the, that is ſo ſlipperye
and wil not tary? And alſo when ſhe de-
parteth from the, ſhe bringeth in heuy-
nes and mornyng? Therfore ſyns that
fortune can not be retayned as a man
wolde haue her, and when ſhe depar-
teth ſhe maketh men carefull, what
other thynge is ſlypperye fortune but a
certain token of wretchednes to come?
And it is not ſufficiente to beholde the
thinge preſente, but it is wyſedome to
conſyder the ende of all thynges, & the
chaungynge from one thynge to ano-
ther, maketh that the threatnynges of
fortune are not to be feared, nor her flat
terynges to be deſyred. Moreouer thou
oughteſt to ſuffer pacientlye all thinges
ỹ be done within the compaſſe, & boun-
des of fortune, that is to say: al worldly
thynges, ſyns thou haſt ſubmytted

thy selfe to her yoke by desyre of temporall thyngs. But if thou wilt prescribe a lawe to Fortune to tarye or departe hence, whome thou of thyne owne free wyll, hast chosen for thy lady: thynkest thou not that thou doeste her wronge therein? And that by thy impacyence thou makest her wrouth and angrye? Whom thou canste not chaunge other wyse then she list her selfe. If thou commytte the sayles of thy shyppes, to the wyndes, thou goyst not whyther thou wouldeste thy selfe, but whyther the wynde dryuethe the. If thou sowe thy sedes in the feldes, thou muste consyder that the yeres be somtyme plentious, & otherwhyles scarse or baren, so that it is not in thy powre, to order & rule the yeare as thou lystethe. Lykewyse thou haste submytted thy selfe to fortunes gouernaunce, therfore it behoueth the to obeye the maners of her beynge thy lady and mystres. Certes thou laborest to staye her tournynge whele. O, thou fole of al foles mortall, if fortune begā to be stedefaste and not mutable, she myght not be called fortune.

miseris. Quod si manendi abeundiq; scribere legem uelis, quam tu tibi dominam sponte elegisti, nonne iniuriosus fueris, & impatientiam tuam sortem exacerbabis, quam permutare non poßis? Si uentis uela committeres, non quo uoluntas peteret, sed quo flatus impelleret promouereris. Si aruis semina traderes, fertiles inter se annos sterilesq; pensares, fortunæ te regendum dedisti, duem moribus oportet obtemperes. Tu uero uoluentis rotæ impetum retinere conaris. At omnium mortalium stolidißime, si manere incipit, sors esse desistit.

Phyl.

When ẏ fortune with her proude ryght hande, causyth mutatyon aswel of aduersytie as of prosperytye. And when she is caryed aboute as the boylynge floud named eurype. Then she beynge cruell deposyth kynges, that sometyme were fearefull to other,

Euripe is a flode of the sea that floweth dyuersly some

Metrum primum.

Hæc cū superba uerterit uices dextra,
Æstuātis more fertur euripi;
Dudum tremendos seua proterit reges,
Humilesq; uicti sublenat fallax

fallax uultum.
Nō illa miseros audit, haud curat fletus.
Vltroq; gemitus dura quos fecit, ridet.
Sicq; illa ludit, sic suas probat uires.
Magnumq; suis monstrat ostentum.
Si quis uisatur, una stratus ac felix hora.

other: & exalteth the pore & simple, that were subdued and ouercome. She regardith not the carefull that wepythe, nor heryth the wretched that wantith. She is so hard hartid that she laughith at the mourninges, of such as she hath made carefull. Suche is her pastyme, thus she proueth her power and strēgth She sheweth a great bost or fayre face to her seruaūtes that gapeth for worldlye thinges, when a man is sene ouerthrowen and exaltyd in one howre. These be the wonderous workes of fortune, when a man shalbe vp and doune in a shorte tyme, that is now in auctorytie and nowe not estemed or abiecte.

time this way and anon, that that way clen contrary.

Prosa secunda.

¶ Philosophy talketh with Boecius in the stede of fortune sayenge.

Philo.

Vellem autē pauca tecum fortunæ ipsius uerbis agitare. Tu igitur an uis postulet animaduerte. Quid tu ò homo ream me quotidianis agis querelis? Quam tibi fecimus iniuriā? Quæ tibi tua detraximus bona? Quo uis iudice de opum, dignitatumq; mecum possessiōe contende. Et si cuiusquam mortalium proprium quid horum esse monstraueris, ego ea tua fuisse, que repetis

Phi.

I Wolde sayne talke with the (Boecius) a few wordes (with the sayenges of fortune, or in the stede of fortune) therfore take thou good hede whether that she asketh the thynge, that is right and lawfull. O thou man, wherfore makest thou me a wronge doer and gilty, with thy contynuall complayntes? What wronge haue I done the? what goodes haue I taken from the? Reason with me before what Judge thou wilt, of possessions, riches or other dignites, whether that any man lyuynge, can clayme any of theym to be his owne. I wyll gyue the gladlye suche that thou

prouyst

prouist to be thi owne proper. For whē nature brought the out of thy mothers wombe, I receyued the all naked, with out any thyng, and cherisshed the with myne owne goodes, and was redye to norishe the more mekely of mine owne gentlenes, & I endned the with aboundaūce, & with the beaute of all thinge ẏ I had, which thinges maketh the now so angry and cruel agaynst me. Now it pleseth me to withdraw my hand, thou oughtest to thāke me for vsing of goods that were none of thyne. Thou hast no iust cause to complaine as though thou haddest loste thy goodes vtterly. Therfore why mournyst thou? I haue done the no wronge. Ryches, Honour, and suche lyke, be myne owne, and they beyng my seruauntes, do knowe me for their ladye and mystres, they do come wyth me, and do go awaye wyth me. I dare boldely say, that yf those things that thou complaynyst to be lost, were thyne: thou could not haue loste them by anye meanes. Should I alone be defended to vse my owne ryght? It is lawfull for the firmamente to make cleare bryght daye, and after that to shadowe the same againe with the darke night. It is also lawefull for the yere to decke the grounde sometyme (as in the Ver) with flowers, other whyles (as in sommer) with corne, and to dystroye the same agayne (as an Antumpne & wynter) with rayne and colde. It is lawfull for the sea, (in a caulme) to be playne & smothe

tis, sponte concedam. Cum te matris utero natura produxit, nudum rebus omnibus, in opemq; suscepi, te meis opibus foui, & quod te nunc impatientē nostri facit, fauore prona indulsi gentius educaui: omniumq; quæ mei sunt iuris, affluentia, & splendore circūdedi. Nunc mihi retrahere manum libet: habe gratias, uelut usus alienis. Non habes uis querelæ, tanquam tua prorsus perdideris. Quid ergo ingemiscis? Nulla tibi à nobis illata est uiolentia. Opes, honores, cæteraq; talium mei sunt iuris: dominam famulæ cognoscunt, mecum ueniunt, mecum discedunt. Audacter affirmē, si tua forent, quæ amissa conqueris, nullo modo perdidisses. An ego solus meum ius exercere prohibeor? Licet cœlo proferre lucidos dies, eosdemq; tenebrosis noctibus condere. Licet anno terræ uultum nunc floribus, frugibusq; redimere, nunc nimbis, frigoribusq; confundere. Ius est mari nūc strato æquore blandire, nunc procellis ac fluctibus īhorrescere. Nos

ad

ad constantiam, nostris mo-
ribus alienam, in expleta
hominum cupiditas alliga-
bit? Haec nostra uis est, huc
continuo ludum lubimus.
Rotam uolubili orbe uersa
mus, infima summis, summa
infimis mutare gaudemus.
Ascende si placet, sed ea
lege, ne uti cum ludicri mei
ratio posset, descendere in
iuriam putes. An tu mores
ignorabas meos? Nescie-
bas Cresum Regem Lido-
rum? Ciro paulo ante for-
midabilem, mox deinde mi
serandum rogi flammis
traditum nisso celitus im-
bre? defensum? Num te
praeterit Paulum Persi re-
gis a se capti calamitati
bus pias impendisse lacri-
mas? Quid tragediarum
clamor, aliud deflet, nisi
indiscreto ictu fortunam
felicia regna uertentem?
Nonne adolescentulus duo
dolia, unum quidem ma-
lum, aliud autem bonum,
in iouis limine iacere didi-
cisti? Quid si uberius de
bonorum parte sumpsisti?

Quid

smothe, and in tyme of tempeste, to be
roughe and raginge, with floudes and
stormes. Shoulde the insaciate couetu-
ousnes of man, bynde me to be stedfast
agaynst my nature? This is my power
and this is allways my play. I do turne
the wauerynge whele rounde aboute,
that neuer ceassith. I do reioise to chaūg
lo in thynges, that is to say: aduersitie,
with high things, ỹ is to sai, prosperytie.
Clyme vpon my whele if thou wilt
but vpon this conditiō, that thou shalte
not iudge that I do the anye wrong, yf
thou fall or come downe, when I lyste
to play. Knewest not thou my maners?
Knewest not thou Cresus kynge of the
Lydeens, of whome Cyrus the kynge
of Persiens, was sore afferd, a lytel be
fore that Cyrus toke Cresus, in batel,
and led hym to the fyer to be brennyd,
but that a raygne fell from heuen, and
sauyd hym, whereby he escaped. And
hast thou forgotten howe that Paulus
a consull of Rome, wepte for the my-
serye of the kynge of Persyens, whom
he had taken prysoner and captyue.
What other thynge causyth the excla-
mation, and lamentation of tragidies?
But onelye that Fortune, sodenly by
my rashe stroke, haue subuertyd noble
kyngedomes that were sometyme pro-
sperous. Hast thou not learnyd (when
thou were a younge man) that there
laye in the entrye at Iuppters house
two tunnes of wyne, the one full of
good wine, thother ful of euil wine, of

the

Tragedie is a
wryting bla-
mynge vyces,
whiche to de-
gyn with pro-
prytie e ende
with mysterie.

Iupiters hou
se is the worl
de the two tun
nes of wyne,
betokenith

prosperite and aduersitie, whereof all ẏ lyuein ẏ worlde muste neades tast.

of the whyche euery man (that entred) must nedes tast? What cause hast thou to complayne, if thou hast taken more parte of the good (that is to say) of prosperitie) then of aduersitye? And what and I am not clene gone frō the? What and my vnstedefastnes be a iuste cause for the, to hope for better thynges? dyspayre the not therefore, and desyre not to lyue after thy owne mynde, & wyll, although thou be placyd in the worlde whyche is commen and indifferent for all lyuyng thynges.

Quid si à te non tota de-cessi? Quid si hæc ipsa mu-mutabilitas, iusta tibi cau-sa est sperandi meliora? Tu-ne animo contabescas, & intra commune omnibus regnum locatus, propri-iure uiuere desyderas.

Fortune speaketh.

The ful horne is a fable sygnyfyeng plentie, or prosperite. For Harcules wrastlyng with Achileus (whiche was transformed into a bul tooke hym by the horne and brake it and filled it ful of apples and swete stowers, and dyd sacryfyce therwith too fortune, and so when it is ful, it is taken for prosperite, and whē it is emptie it is taken for aduersitie.

If that Fortune (whom the gentils do call the goddes of plenty) woulde geue wyth a full horne, that is to sai aboundauntlye, as much ryches as the water of the sea turnyth vppe grauell, when it is tossed and mouid with the ragynge wyndes. And would geue asmuche Ryches as there be starres, shynyng in the firmamēt in a clere bright nyght, when the sterres do appere and shyne. And woulde neuer wythdrawe her hands, but powre downe and geue ryches continuallye: yet for al that mā kynde would not cesse wepynge and cō playning. And although that god, that is so ryche of gold, would gladely here mans desyres and requestes, and geue them neuer so plentiouslye, and decke the couetous men with hygh honour: yet are they not contentyd. But it semyth vnto thē, as they had gotten no-

Metrum secundum. For.

Si quantas rapidis flatibus incitus
Pontus uersat arenas
Aut quot stelliferis edita noctibus
Cœlo sydera fulgent,
Tantas fundat opes, nec retrahat manum
Pleno copia cornu,
Humanū miseras haud ideo genus
Cesset flere querelas.
Quamuis uota libens excipiat deus
Multi prodigus auri,
Et claris auidos ornet honoribus,
Nil iam parta uidentur.
Sed quæsita uorans sæua rapacitas,
Altos pandit hiatus.

Que iam præcipiteu fre-
na cupidinem,
Certo fine retentent,
Largis cum potius mune-
ribus fluens:
Sitis ardeſcit habendi,
Nunquam dmes agit, qui
trepidus gemens,
Sefe credit egentem.

thinge. Suche is their inſaciate couetus, deuouring that, ỹ they haue gotte and euer gapyng, redy to receyue moze and moze. Therefoze, what bzydel can holde to any ſtedefaſt ende, the gredye couytuouſnes of men? when that the moze they abounde in ryches, the moze they thyrſt and deſyre to haue: Soo he that fearyth that he ſhall lacke, and is not contented with that he hath, but ſo roweth foz moze, accompting him ſelfe poze, hath neuer ynough, and ſo is not ryche, but pooze.

Proſa tertia. Phil.

His igitur ſi pro ſe tecum uerbis fortuna loqueretur, quid profecto contrahiſceres non haberes. At ſi quid eſt quo querelam tuam iure tuearis, proferas oportet, dabimus tibi dicendi locum. Bo. Tum ego ſpecioſa quidem iſta ſunt inquam, oblitaq; rhetoricæ ac muſicæ melle dulcedinis, tum tantum cum audiuntur oblectant. Sed miſeris malorum altior eſt ſenſus. Itaq; cum hæc auribus inſonare deſierint, inſitus animã meror pregrauat. Phil. Et illa, ita eſt inquit, Hæc enim non dum morbi

Phyloſophy ſpeketh

Therefoze, yf that foztune ſpake wyth the foz hyr ſelfe after thys maner befoze ſayde, Certes thou haddeſt nothinge to anſwere her wyth all. And yf thou haddeſt anye thyng to defende rightfully thy complaynt wyth all, it behouyth the to ſhewe it.

Boe. Then I ſaye, that the thynges that foztune hath ſayde be goodly, and made ſwete with the pleaſure of Rhetozike and muſike, and then onely they delyghte men, when they be harde. But yet the felinge of ſozo we & greifes is moze depe, & paynfull vnto the diſeaſed, and wzetched people, then the ſayd pleaſaunte wozdes can helpe and caſe. Foz when the wozds of foztune do leue of to ſound in myne eares, the formergreife commeth againe, and ouermuch greuyth my mynde. Phil. And thou ſai eſt ryght ſoth. Foz the ſayd wozdes of

fortune be no medicyns for thy disease, but rather nourysshynges agaynste the cure of thy greife. For the medycynes, that shulde serche vnto the very botom of thy sores, and take away the prima tyue cause thereof, I wyl declare vnto the, when tyme shall requyre. Neuerthelesse, esteme not thy self a wretche, or clene forsaken. Hast thou forgotten the number and maner of thy prosperitye? I do passe ouer, and nede not shewe howe that the noble men of the Cytye of Rome, whyche were Consulles, toke charge of the, beynge an orphant withoute father and mother, and that thou were chosen and elect into the affinite of Princes of ỹ Cytye. And thou begannyst rather to be dere and welbe loued, then a neyghboure, the whiche is the most precyous kynd of Aliaunce What man would not iudge the most happye, that haddyst suche a father in lawe, such a chast wyfe, and such good chauntes of thy men chyldren as thou haste? And besydes this (I am disposed to passe ouer commen thynges) I doo not speake of the dygnytyes that thou haddest in thy youth, whych are denyed to old folke that is to say, scarse any olde folke coulde attayne vnto anye suche. For nowe it delyghtethe me to come vnto, and remember the singuler aboundaūce or hepe of thy prosperities So that if any fruit of worldly and trā sitorye thinges, myght be accountyd felycytye, or prosperitie, myghteste thou forgette (for any hurte that myght hap

morbi tui remedia, sed adhuc contumacis aduersus curationem doloris fomenta quædam sunt. Nā quæ in profundum sese penetrent, cum tempestiuum fuerit, mouebo. Verumtamen ne te miserum existimari uel an numerum mortalium; tuæ felicitatis oblitus es? Taceo quod desolatum parente summorum te uirorum cura suscepit, dilectusq; in affinitatem principum ciuitatis, quod præciosissimum propinquitatis genus est, primo charus quam proximus esse cœpisti. Quis non te felicissimum cum tanto socerum dore socerum, tum coniugis pudore, cum masculæ quoq; prolis opportunitate prædicabit. Præterco, libet enim præterire communia assumptas in adolescentia negatas senibus dignitates, ad singularem felicitatis tuæ cumulum recognire delectat. Si quis verū mortalium fructus ullum beatitudinis pondus habet poterit ne illius memoria lucis quantalibet ingruentis

entium malorum mole deleri? cum duos pariter consules liberos tuos domo prouehi sub frequentia patrum, sub plebis alacritate uidisti? cum eisdem in curia culures insidentibus tu regiæ laudis orator, ingenij gloriam facundie meruisti, cum in circo duorũ medius consulum, circufusse multitudinis exspectationem triumphali largitione satiasti, dedisti ut opinor uerba fortunæ dum te illa demulcet, dum te ut suas delitias foueret. Munus quod nulli unquam priuato commoderauerat: abstuliſti. Vis ne ergo cum fortuna calculum ponere? Nunc te primum linienti oculo perstrinxit. Si munerum, modumq; lætorum tristiúmue consyderes: adhuc te felicem negare non possis. Quodsi idcirco te fortunatum esse non æstimas, quoniam quæ tunc læta uidebantur, abierunt: nõ est quo te miserum putes, quoniam quæ nunc mœsta creduntur: præterierunt.

An

pen) the day that thou sawiste thy two sonnes made Consuls, and ladde together from thy house with so greate assemble of Senatoꝛs, & wyth so greate Joy of the people? And whan thou sawest them set in the courte, in the Chayꝛes of hygh dignitie and iudgement, thou thy selfe beinge an oꝛatoꝛ, oꝛ speaker of kynges laude and pꝛaysynges, dyddyst deserue gloꝛy of wytte and eloquence, when that thou (syttyng in the middes of thy two sonnes beyng consules) diddyst satysfye and please the expectatyon of the multytude of the people that was aboute the, wyth tryumphante laude and pꝛayse of vyctoꝛye? Thou then (as I thynke) didest deceyue Foꝛtune with thy gloꝛyous woꝛdes, when that she thus fauoꝛed the, and cherysshed the as her owne derlynges. Thou dydest beare awaye from foꝛtune, such a gyft and reward, that she neuer gaue to any pꝛyuate man. Wylt thou call Foꝛtune to accompte nowe foꝛ anye thynge: She hath nowe kirste wynkyd vpon the, wyth her frowynynge oꝛ cruell countenaunces oꝛ lokynge. And yf thou couldest consider the number and maner of myꝛthe and soꝛowe, that is to saye: of thy pꝛosperitie and aduersitie, thou cannyste not denye but that thou art yet happye. Foꝛ if thou countist thy selfe therfoꝛe vnhappye, by cause those thinges be gone that semyd happye & good: yet thou oughteste not to esteme thy selfe a wꝛetche oꝛ an abiecte. Foꝛ

the thinges that nowe seme vnhappye and sorowfull, do passe awaye. Arte thou the fyrst that art become a sodeine geste into the shadowe of thys lyfe, or thynkest ỹ that ther is any certayntie or stedfastnes in worldelye thynges? When ỹ the swyft hour of deth taketh awaye the same man, that is to saye mans lyfe? For although there is seldome any hope that the goddys of fortune wolde contynue, yet is the latter daye of mans lyfe in maner a death to fortune. What matter is it therfore as thou thynkeste, whether that thou dyinge, forsake fortune, or she fleinge awaye, forsake the? That is to saye: Whether thou by death of thy bodye, forsake fortune, or Fortune by flyinge from the, forsake the? Surely no matter or difference it is.

An tu in hanc uitæ scenam nunc primum subitus hospes q; ueniſti? Vllam ne humanis rebus ineſſe conſtantiam reris? Cum ſæpe ipſum hominem uelox hora diſſoluat? Nam et ſi rara eſt fortuitis manendi fides, ultimus tamen uitæ dies, mors quædam fortunæ eſt etiam manentis. Quid ergo referre putas. Tu ne illam moriendo deſeras? an te illa fugiendo deſerat?

Phil.

When the sonne begynnythe to send or geue forthe hys lyghte, with his bryght glysteryng red charetes, then the bryghte daye sterre, beyng obscuryd, dymmed, or dullyd in her beautie and countenaunce, becomyeth pale and wan, & loseth her cleare lyght, by the greate bryghtenes of the sanne. And when the woode warethe freshe, gaye, and redde with rosye or redde flowers, in the fyrst sommer season, with the blowynge of the warme wynde named Zephirus: If the cloudye wynde named Auster do begynne to blowe boysteously and roughelye: then

Metrum tertium. Phi.

Cvm polo phœbus roſeis quadrigis,
Lumen ſpergere ceperit,
Pallet albentes hebitata uultus,
Flammis ſtella præmentis bui.
Cum nemus flatu zephiri tepentis,
Vernis irrubuit roſis,
Spirat inſanum nebuloſus auſter,
Iam ſpinis abeat decus.
Sæpe tranquillo radiat ſereg

reno,
Immotis mare fluctibus.
Sæpe ſeruentes aquilo procellas,
Verſo concitat æquore,
Rara ſi conſtat ſua forma mundo.
Si tantas uariat uices,
Crede fortunis hominum caducis,
Bonis crede fugacibus,
Conſtat æterna poſitumq; lege eſt.
Vt conſtat genitum nihil.

then the beautie of the freſhe flowres do clene vanyſhe awaye from the thornes. The ſea is ofte ſmothe and calme when the ſloudes be not mouyd. And ofte the ſtormye wynde Aquilo, ſtereth horrible tempeſtes, and ouerturnythe the ſea, If the forme of thys worlde be ſo ſeldom ſtedefaſt, and turnythe wyth ſo many alteracions & chaunges: why then wylte thou put confydence in the vnſtedefaſt fortunes of men? Or wylte thou truſt to the goodes of fortune, that be vncertayne and tranſitorye? It is manyfeſt and eſtablyſhed by gods law, perdurable, that nothynge gotten or engendred, is alwayes ſtedefaſte and ſtable.

Proſa quarta. Boe.

TVm ego, uera, inquã commemoras ò uirtutum omnium nutrix, nec inficiari poſſum proſperitatis meæ uelociſſimum curſum. Sed hoc eſt, quod recolentem uehementius coquit. Nam in omni aduerſitate fortunæ, infeliciſſimum genus infortunij eſt, fuiſſe felicẽ. P. Sed quid tu, inquit, falſæ opinionis ſuppliciũ luis, id rebus iure imputare non poſſis. Nam ſi te hoc inane nomen fortuitæ felicitatis mouet, quàm plurimis, maximisq; abun-

Boe.

OThou norryce of al vertues, thou ſayeſt treuthe. I cannot deny the ſwyfte courſe of my proſperytye. But thys is the thynge that moſte greuyth me, when that I doo remember ỳ I was happye or in proſperitye. For in all aduerſitie of Fortune, the mooſte greiſe of aduerſitie, is to remember, that I haue bene in proſperitie. Phil. But what thoughe ỳ thou ſuffereſt poniſhmẽt of falſe opinion, thou mayſte not impute the ſame to the lacke of thynges, as though thou haddeſt nothynge. For thou haſt many thynges leſte yet. For yf the vaine name of cauſuall proſperyte, do moue the: it is mete that thou accompt and reken with me, how

howe moche & howe great ryches thou
hast yet in store. If therfore the thynge
that thou hadst, & dyd possesse, most pre
cious and best in all the treasure of thy
fortune, be reserued yet vnto ỹ by gods
grace vnspotted and inuyolate, mayst
thou ryghtfullye complayne vpon the
myschaunce of fortune, hauynge styll
thy best thynges? Certes the same pre-
cious worthyp of mankind, Symachus
thy father in lawe, is in good helthe, a
wyse man, & a vertuous man for whose
sake thou wouldyst be redye to ieopard
thy lyfe if nede were, he beynge a man
sautles, is sorye for thy iniuryes. Thy
wyfe also lyueth, both sober of wytte,
and excellent in clenes of chastite, and
shortely to conclude all her vertues, she
is lyke her father Symachus'. She ly-
ueth, I saye, to the, and she beynge
wery of her lyfe, kepyth her lyfe for thy
sake, being ouercome with weppynge,
and sorowe, for lacke of the. In the
whyche one thyng I must nedes graũt
that thy felicitie is mynyshed. What
shall I saye of thy two sonnes beynge
Consulles, in whom there shynyth the
wysedome of theyr father, and of theyr
graundefather, as muche as is possy-
ble to be in chylders of theyr age, but
yet the cheyfe cure of al men lyuyng is
to conserue theyr owne lyfes. O thou
man yf thou remember thy selfe, the
goodes that thou hast yet remaynyng,
do make the happye. What hyche goodes,
no man douthtyth, but that they be de-

abundes mecum reputes li
cet. Igitur si, quod in omn
fortunæ tuæ censu pretio
sissimum possidebas, id tib
diuinitus illæsum adhuc, i
uiolentúmque seruatur,
poteris ne meliora quæque
retinẽs, de infortunio iure
causari Atquæ uiget inco
lomis illud precioſißimum
humani generis decus. Sy
machus socer: et quod uita
pretio non segnis emeret,
uir totus è sapientia & ub
turibus factus, suarum sc
curus, tuis ingemiscit in
iurijs. Viuit uxor ingen
modesta, pudicitiæ pudor
præcellens: et, ut omn
dotes eius breuiter inclu
dam, patri similis. Viuit,
inquam, tibiq; tantum uita
huius exosa, spiritum ser
uat. Quoq; uno felicitate
minui tuam uel ipsa cone
serim, tui desiderio lachry
mis, ac dolore tabeßit.
Quid dicam liberos consu
lares, quorum iam, ut in i
ætatis pueris, uel paterni
uel auici specimen eluce
ingenij? Cum igitur pre
cipuus sit mortalibus uita
curaretinendæ, ò te, si tu
bona cognoscas, felicem,
cui suppetunt etiam nun

rer qua

que uita nemo dubitat eſſe chariora. Quare ſicca iam lachrymas, nõdum eſt ad unum te omnis exoſa fortuna. Nec tibi nimium ualida tempeſtas incubuit: quoniam tenaces hærent anchoræ, quæ nec præſentis ſolamen, nec futuri ſpẽ temporis abeſſe patiãtur. B. Et hæreant, inquã, præcorillis nanq; manentibus utcunq; ſe res habeant, hũa ne enatabimus. Sed quantũ decus ornamẽtis noſtris deceſſerit uides. Phi Et illa, promouebimus, inquit, ali quãtulũ, ſi te nondũ totius tuæ ſortis piget. Sed deliciis tuas ferre non poſſum qui abeſſe aliquid tuæ beatitudini tam luctuoſus, atque anxius conqueraris. Quis eſt enim tam compoſitæ felicitatis, ut non aliqua ex parte cum ſtatus ſui qualitate rixetur? Anxia enim res eſt humanorum conditio bonorum, & quæ uel nunquam tota proueniat, uel nunquam perpetua ſubſiſtat. Huic cenſus exuberat, ſed eſt pudori degener ſanguis. Hunc nobilitas notum facit, ſed anguſtia rei familiaris

rer and more to be eſtemyd, then thy owne lyfe. Therefore nowe wype thy eyes and wepe no more, for fortune is not all agaynſte the, nor the ſtronge tempeſt of aduerſitie hath yet touchyd the, for thy ankers, that is to ſaye: thy frendes do lyke faſt to the, whych will not ſuffer the to wante comforte of the tyme preſente, nor hope of the tyme to come. Boe. And I do wyſhe that they maye cleue faſt, and abyde, for whyles that they doo remayne, howe ſoeuer thynges be, or howſoeuer the worlde goeth, I ſhal eſcape and do wel. But thou ſeyſt howe that thapparell, and outewarde goodes that I had be nowe gone Phil. But I haue ſomwhat comfortyd the, yf thou forthinke the not of all thy hole fortune, for thou haſt ẏ beſt goods ſtyll. But I maye not ſuffer thy delyces or tendernes, that thou wepynge and ſorowfull, complaynyſt that thou lackyſt ſomewhat of thy proſperytie. For what man is ſo full of proſperytie, that doth not complayne, or is not pleaſyd wyth ſome parte of hys eſtate or degree? For the eſtate & condition of worldlye goodes, is ſo carefull a thynge, that eyther is commeth neuer to a man together holye, or ells it neuer contynueth ſtyll wyth him. For although one man hath aboundaunce and plentye of monye, yet he lackyth another thyng that is to ſaye, he is aſhamed of his ignoblytie, that he is no gentylman borne. And another man is well knowen for

a gentyll man; but yet he is so nedye & poore that he had leuer be vnknowen of his gentyles bloude. Another hathe both aboundaunce of goodes, and is noble, and yet he bewaylethe hys chaste lyfe, that he maye not marye a wyfe. Another is happely maryed and hathe no chyldren, and gathereth treasure for a straunge heyre. Another is happye wyth chyldren, but he beyng sorowful for the synes and offences of hys sonne or doughter, weppyth. Therfore no mā (for the most parte) is contentyd wyth hys estate or degre of fortune. For euerye man hath some thinge, that (being not prouyd) he knoweth not, or beynge prouyd, he ferythe. And adde thereto that euerye welthye man hath such delycate felynge, that (except he hath all thynges at his commaundement) he is so impacient in aduersitie, that he is ouerthrowen, and dysplesyd wyth euery lytel thynge. And very small things they be in aduersytye, that draweth awaye the cheyfe perfection of prosperitie from them that be moste fortunate. How many men (thinkest thou) wolde thynke them selfe nerte vnto heauen, ỹ is to saye: welthy, yf that they myghte haue but the lest parte of the residue of thy fortune that remayneth with the. This place that thou callest an eryle: is a countrie to them that dwell therin. So that no man is wretched or abiect, but he that iudgeth hymself so. And contrary wyse, all fortune is good to hym that

liaris inclusus, esse malles ignotus. Ille utroq; circumfluus, uitam celebē deflet. Ille nuptijs felix, orbus liberis, alienū censum nutrit hæredi. Alius prole lætus, filij, filiæ ue delicti mœstus illacrymat. Ideireo nemo felicē cum fortunæ suæ conditione concordat.

Inest enim singulis, quod inexpertus ignoret, experti exhorreat. Adde quod felicissimi cuiusq; delicatissimus sensus est, et nisi ad nutum cuncta suppetant, omnis aduersitatis insolēs, minimis quibusq; prosternitur, adeo perexigua sunt quæ fortunatissimis summa beatitudinis detrahunt.

Quam multos esse conijectas, qui sese cœlo proximos arbitrentur, si de fortunæ tuæ reliquijs pars cui minima contingat? Hic ipse locus, quem tu exilium uocas, incolentibus patria est.

Adeo nihil est miserum, nisi cum putes. Contraq; beata fors est omnis æquanimitate tolerantis.

Qui

Quis eſt ille quem fœlix, qui cum dederit impatientie manui: ſtatum ſuũ mutare non optet. Quam multis amaritudinibus humane felicitatis dulcedo, reſperſa eſt, quæ ſi etiam fruenti eſſe iocunda uidentur, tamen quo minus cum uelit, abeat, retineri non poſſit. Liquet igitur quã ſit mortalium rerum miſera beatitudo, quæ nec apud equanimos perpetua perdurat, nec anxios tota dilectat. Quid igitur, o mortales extra petitis, infra uos poſitam felicitatẽ, error uos iuſtitiaq; confundit. Oſtendam tibi breuiter ſummæ cardinem felicitatis. Eſt ne aliquid tibi teipſo precioſius? Nihil inquies. Igitur ſi tui compos fueris, poſſidebis quod nec tu amittere unquam uelis, nec fortuna poſſit auferre. Atq; ut agnoſcas in his fortuitis rebus beatitudinem conſtare non poſſe: Sic collige, Si beatitudo eſt ſummum naturæ bonum ratione degentis, nec illud eſt ſummum bonum quod eripi ullo modo poteſt, quoniam precellit id

that is contẽted. What man is he that is ſo welthy, but wold wiſhe to chaũge his eſtate, when he is not contẽted ther withalle? How moch bytternes is mixed with the ſweetnes of mans proſperite, which proſperite, although it ſeme pleſaunt to hym that hath it, can not be ſo kept as a man wolde haue it, but when it lyſteth, it gothe awaye. Therfore, it appereth howe wretched is the proſperytie of mortall thynges, which do not alwayes contynue with theym that be pacient, & contented, nor deliteth hooly the wretched man, impacient. O you mortall men, wherfore ſeke you in out ward thynges, the felicitie that is eſtabliſſhed within you? Errour and ignoraunce confoundeth you. I ſhall ſhewe the ſhortlye, the rote of hye felicitie in this lyfe. Is there any thyng more precious to the, then thyne owne ſelfe. Thou wylt anſwere & ſay naye. Then yf that thie mynde be quyet and hoole, thou ſhalt poſſeſſe the thynge that thou woldeſt not leſe at any tyme, nor fortune can take it from the. And to thentent that thou mayſt knowe, that felycitie can not ſtand in fortunes thinges, or worldly things, þ maiſt thus gather and vnderſtand therof. If that felicitie be the ſouereygne bountie or goodnes of nature, lyuyng by reaſon, truly that can not be ſouerayne good, that maye be taken awaye by any meanes: but that thynge is more excellent, that can not be taken awaye. Than it is playne

There be two maners of felycitie the one is a quyet mynde in this lyfe naturall, & the ſame is vnperfyte, the other is in the lyfe euerlaſtynge, and the ſame is perfyte.

that vnſtedfaſtnes of fortune maye not attayne to receyue beatytude, that is to ſay: perfyte felycitie. Moze ouer, that man, that this tomblynge oz rollynge vnperfyte felycitie, oz goodnes, caryeth aboute, eyther knoweth that it is mutable, oz els he knoweth it not. If he knoweth it not: what bliſſed oz good foztune may be to the blindnes of ignoraũce? And if he knoweth that it is mutable, then he oughte to feare ỹ he looſe not that thynge that he doweteth not, but that he maye loſe it, therfoze contynuall feare wyll not ſuffre hym to be bliſſed oz happy. If he do looſe it, that is to ſaye: yf he loſe tempozal felycitie, oz ryches of foztune, and do lytle oz nothing eſteme it, thẽ is it of ſmale valour that a man can take in good wozthe, whẽ it is loſt. And foz bycauſe I knowe, that thou thy ſelfe art the man, to whõ it hath ben perſwaded and declared by many reaſons & demonſtracions, that the ſoules of mankynde, be in no wyſe moztal oz do dye: And ſyth alſo it is manyfeſt, that foztunes felycitie is ended by the death of the body humayne, oz of mankynde, it maye not be doweted (yf this foztunes felicite myght take away perfyte felycitie oz bliſſednes) but that all mankynde in the ende of death, falleth into myſerie & wzetchednes. And foz ſo moche as I do knowe, that many holy men haue ſought foz the fruyte of perfyte felycitie, not onely by the death of theyz bodyes, but alſo by paynes and po-

id quod nequeat auferri, manifeſtum eſt quod ad beatitudinem percipiendam, fortune inſtabilitas aſſpirare non poßit. Adhæc, quem caduca iſta nebu: uel ſcit eam, uel neſcit eſſe mutabilẽ. Si neſcit, quæ nam beata ſors eſſe poteſt ignorantiæ eecitati? Si ſcit metuat neceſſe eſt ne amittat quod amitti poſſe non dubitat. Quare continuus timor non ſinit eſſe felicẽ, uel ſi amiſerit, negligendum putat. Sic quoq; per exile bonũ eſt, quod a quo animo feratur amiſſum. Et quoniam tuidẽ es, cui perſuaſum eſt atq; inſitum permultis demonſtrationibus, ſcio mentes hominum nullo modo eſſe mortales. Cunq; clarum ſit, fortuitam felicitatem corporis, morte finiri, dubitari nequit ſi hæc auferre beatitudinem poteſt, qui omne mortalium genus, in miſeriam mortis fine, labatur. Quod ſi multos ſcimus, non morte ſolum, uerum etiam doloribus ſupplicijs q; beatitudinis fructum

queſiſſe, quo nam modo preſens uita facere beatos poteſt, quæ miſeros tranſacta non efficit.

Metrum quartum.

Q Viſquis uolet per hemem
Cautus ponere ſedem,
Stabilisq; nec ſonori
Sterni flatibus euri,
Et fluctibus minantem
Curat ſpernere pontum
Montis cacumen alti
Bibulas uitet arenas
Illud proternus auſter
Totis uiribus urget,
Hæ pendulum ſolute
Pondus ferræ recuſant
Fugiens periculoſam
Sortem ſedis amene,
Humile domum memento
Certus figere ſaxo
Quamuis tonet ruinis
Miſcens æquora uentus
Tu conditus quieti
Fœlix robore nulli
Duces ſerenus euum.
Ridens ætheris iram.

ponyſſhementes, by what meaynes then may this mortall lyfe preſent, garnyſſhed with fortunes felycitie: that is to ſaye: with worldlye thynges, make men bleſſed, whiche when it is paſte & ended, can not make theym wretched.

Whoſoeuer is wyſe and ſtedefaſt, and would appoynt hymſelfe a firme and ſuerſete or houſe that wyll not be ouerthrowen wyth the troblous blaſtes of the winde named Curas, and careth howe to auoyde the ſea threatnyng with hys floudes. Let hym forſake and not buylde vpon the toppe of an high hyll nor vpon the moyſt grauell or ſandes. For the fell wynde named Auſter troubleth the hyll top. And the moiſt grauell or ſand will beare no ſlydyng wayghte. Therefore yf thou wylte flie and auoyde the perylous chaũces of pleaſaunt dwellyng: Remember certaynely to faſten & buylde thy houſe vpon a lowe rocke. For then althoughe the wynde beinge troubelſome wythe his ouertourning blaſtes troubleth the ſea, thou being happye and quyetly ſet in a lowe vaillye of ſuertye aud defence ſhalt leade a clere lyfe, caryng nothing for the furious ayer or wynde. By this metyr is ment that it is better for a mã to leade a meane lyfe then to couet to high or to lowe for in high proſperytie dignitie and auctoritie is great iobardy, for it draweth to it enuy of the nobilite. And extreme pouerty is to be eſchewed, for nede compelleth a man to

The toppe of the hyll, ſygnifyeth proſperytie.

The fell wynde Auſter ſygnyfyeth enuy, and the poſwer of Noble men that aſſauteth hygh proſperite. The moyſt graueil of ſande, ſygnyfyeth pouertie whiche can not ſuffre the ſlyding wayte that is to ſaye, indygence, & nede of thinges neceſſarie.

The lowe rocke ſignifyeth the meane lyfe.

begge or or steale. And the meane betwene bothe is most suer and quyet, & consequently of them that be wyse, to be delyred.

Phil.

BUt forasmuche as the medicynes, of my resons aforesayd, do begyn to enter into the, I do now thynke it tyme to vse more stronger medycins that is to say: stronger reasons. Come of and harken vnto me. If that ỹ gifts of fortune were not bryttell, frayle, and transytorie, what thing is in them that may be thyne at any tyme, or that wareth not vile, fylthye and foule yf it be well perceyued and consydered. Be ryches of their owne nature precyous? or by the that vsyth them? whether is ỹ more precious of these, ỹ is to say riches golde, or a great hepe of monye gathered together? Certes, ryches shynethe more and causeth more prayse to be geuen vnto men in dystributinge, then in horedynge vp and keping of ỹ same. For the couitousnes of them that kepe it: causeth them to be hated, and the liberalitie of them that do dystribute it, maketh them renomyd and to haue an honest reporte. If the thing that is conueyed and delyuered from one to another, maye not remayne styll with any manne? Then is moneye a precyous thynge, when it is conueyed from one to another by the vse of gyfte, and cesseth to be kepte styll with anye man:

Trompee.

Prosa quinta. Phil.

SEd quoniam rationis iam in te mearum fomenta descendunt, paulo ualidioribus utendum puto. Age enim, si iam caduca & momentanea fortunæ dona, nonessent, quid in eis est, quod aut uestrum unquam fieri queat, aut non perspectum consideratumq; uilescat. Diuitiæne, uel uestri uel sui natura præciosæ sunt? Quid harum potius amorum ne, an uis coniecte pecunie? Atq; he effundendo, magis quam coacerua ndo melius nitent. Si quidem auaritia semper odiosos, claros largitas facit. Quod si manere apud quemquam non potest, quod transferatur in alterum, tunc est preciosa pecunia cum translata in alios usu largiendi desinit possideri. At eadem si apud unum quãta est ubiq; gens

It

gentium congeratur, cete
ros sui inopes fecerit.
Et nox quidem tota pari
ter, multorum replet au
ditum. Vestre uero diuitie
nisi comminute, in plures
transire non possunt
Quod cum factum est,
pauperes necesse est ut
faciant, quos relinquit.
O igitur angustas imo
pesq; diuitias, quas nec
habere totas pluribus li
cet, & ad quemlibet siue
ceterorum paupertate nõ
ueniunt. An gemmarum
fulgor oculos trahit?
Sed si quid est in hoc splen
dore præcipui, gemma
rum est lux illa, non homi
num. Quas quidem mirari
homines, uehementer ad-
miror. Quid est enim cas
rens animæ motu, atque
membrorum compage,
quod animatæ, rationabi
liq; naturæ pulchrum es
se iure uideatur? Quæ tã
etsi conditoris opera, suiq;
distinctione, postremi alis
quid pulchritudinis tra
hunt, infra uestram tamen
excellentiam collocatæ,
admirationem uestram
nullo

It is spoken in mockage, that muste be
vnderstande, monye is not precious for
the causes alledged. And yf all the mo-
nye in the worlde were gathered toge-
ther and in one mans possessyon, other
folke that lacked monye shoulde haue
nede therof. Also one hole voyce sylleth
at one tyme the eares of muche people
that heryth it, But riches can not passe
vnto many or fyll manye, excepte they
be dempded into percelles and portions
And when it is so done it maketh them
poze that do forgoo it. Therfore I may
saye O troublesome and nedy ryches,
whych many men cannot haue al hole
together to them selfe: And commethe
to no man without impouerysshyng o-
ther. Do the shynynge or glysteryng of
pearles and precious stons draw mens
eyes that is to sai cause mẽ to desire thẽ
But yf there be any goodnes in theyr
shynyng, it is the clerenes and beautie
of the stones & not of mens eyes. Wher
fore I doo marualye greatlye at men,
that they shoulde so wonder at theym,
and desyre to haue them. What thyng
is there that (wantynge mouynge of
the soule and ioynynge of membres of
the bodye to gyther as these stones doo
want) semyth goodly to a lyuing & rea-
sonable creature. Whiche precious
stones (albeit that they gather vnto thẽ
selfe somwhat of the latter beautie of
this worlde, by the dylygence of theyr
maker, & theyr dystyncte nature): haue
not deserued by any meanes of thẽ self,

that

that men shuld meruayle at them, they beynge subiecte and put vnder mans dignitie or gouernaūce. Do not ỹ freshe beautie of the feldes delyght you? Bo. What els. For it is a fayre portion of a goodly worke in this world, & so are we somtyme glad at the syght of the calme sea, and so likewise and by lyke reason, we do meruayle at the heauen or fyrmamēt, Sterres, Sonne, and Moone. Ph. Do any of the same thinges, apperteyne to the? Darest thou reioyce, and glory in the shynynge of any of theym? Arte thou decked with the flowers of Veer which is the spryng time, when somer fyrst begynneth? Do thy plentyousnes, increase by sommer fruytes? What, art thou rauyshed with vayne ioyes? what, dost thou embrace straūge goodes for thyne owne? Fortune can neuer make the same goodes thyne, ỹ the nature of thynges hath made none of thyne, or estraunge to the. As the fruites of the earth, ought to be ỹ foode of beastes, and not thyne. But yf thou wylt gyue nature that she nedeth, and replenish her to ỹ ful, then is it no nede for the to seke for the abundaūce of fortune, for nature is contenyd with veye lytle thynges. And yf thou wylte choke nature wyth to muche, eyther ỹ thou geuyst wilbe vnpleasaunt, or hurtfull vnto the. Thynkyst thou thy selfe goodly or more to be esteemed for thy gay apparell? Of the whych yf the beawtie thereof be fresh and pleasaūt to behold:

nullo modo mirabantur. An uos agrorum pulchritudo delectat? Boe. Quid ni? Est enim pulcherrimi operis pulchra portio. Sic quondam sereni maris facie gaudemus, sic cœlum, sydera, solem, lunamq; mirramur. Ph. Num te horum aliquid attingit? Num audes alicuius talium splendore gloriari? An uernis floribus ipse distingueris, an tua in æstiuos fructus intumescit ubertas? Quid inanibus gaudiis raperis? Quid externa bona pro tuis amplexaris?

Nunquam tua faciet esse fortuna, quæ à te naturæ rerum fecit aliena. Terrarum quidem fructus animantium procul dubio debentur alimentis. Sed si quod naturæ satis est replere indigentiam uelis, nihil est quod fortunæ affluentiam petas. Paucis enim, minimisq; natura contenta est. Cuius satietatem si superfluis urgere uelis, aut iniocūdum quod insuderis fiet, aut noxium. Iam uero pulcrum uarijs fulgere uestibus putas? Quarum si grata intuitu species est,

aut materiæ naturarũ, aut ingenium mirabor artificis

An uero te longus ordo ſanulorum facit eſſe feliciẽ? Qui ſi uitioſi moribus ſint, perniciosa domus ſarcina, & ipſi dõino uehementer inimica. Si uero probi ſint, quoniam modo in tuis opibus aliena probitas numerabitur? Ex quibus omnibus nihil horum, quæ tu in tuis computas bonis, tuũ eſſe bonum liquido mõſtrabitur. Quibus ſi nihil ineſt appetendæ pulcritudinis, quid eſt quod amiſſis doleas, uel læteris retentis?

Quod ſi natura pulcra ſunt, quid id tua refert? Nam hæc per ſe, à tuis quoque opibus ſequeſtrata, pulcriſſent. Neque enim idcirco ſunt preciosa: quod in tuas uenire diuitias, ſed quoniam preſiosa uidebãtur, tuis ea diuitijs anteponere maluiſti. Quid autem tanto fortunæ ſtrepitu deſyderatis? Fugare credo indigentiam quæritis copia, atq; hoc uobis in cõtrariũ euenit. Pluribus quippe adminiculis opus eſt ad tuendam pretioſæ ſupplectilis uarietatem. Verumq; eſt illud, per multis indi-

I woulde rather maruayle at the ſubſtaunce therof, or the craft of the worke man that made it, then at the. Do a longe rowe of ſeruauntes goyng in order wayting vpon the, make the happye and good: whyche yf they be euyll mancrd, then be they aperilous charge to they houſe, and a vehemẽt greuous bourden to the, beynge their mayſter. But yf they be honeſte and good: ſhall they? goodnes be accountid or imputed to the? So that by all the things before ſayde, it apperyth that none of them is thy goodnes. In whyche thynges yf there be no goodnes to be deſyred that maye be aſcrybed to the: wherefore art thou ſorye for the loſſe of them? or why ſhouldeſt thou be glade to kepe them? But if they be good of their owne kind what is that to the? For although thei were taken from the, yet they ſhoulde be good of themſelfe, without the. For they are not therfore precious, for that they cam emongeſt thy ryches, but bycauſe they ſemyd precyous vnto the, therefore thou haddyſt leuer accompte them for thy owne ryches. But what thynge deſyreſt thou with ſo greate exclamatyon of fortune. Truely I think thou ſekyſt to expell neceſſytye, wyth aboundaũce of ryches. But ſurely this happeth to the, far other wiſe & cõtrary. For certes a man hath nede of muche to beare the great charge of good houſe kepynge. And treiwe it is that many thinges they haue nede of, that haue

muche

muche. And contrarye wyse they haue lytell nede, that mesuryth theyr aboun daunce and desyre with necessitie of nature, and not with theyr insaciate couitousnes, that is to saye, that couetythe no more but that is cōuenient for their present necessitie. O you men, haue ye no goodnes proper and naturall sette within yourselfe, but that you do seke for your goodnes in outewarde things seperate from you? Surelye the condycion of thynges be so chaungid that mā beyng a godly beast, by meanes of reason, thynketh himselfe nothynge estemed, but he be sene a man by possession of worldelye goodes, that haue no life. And where as other beastes be contented wyth suche beawtye and goodnes, as nature hath geuen thē, you creaturs that be lyke vnto god by your reason or soul: do seke ẏ beauty of your excellent nature, in the lowist or meanist things that is to saye: in worldelye goodes, as though that they were better thē your reason, that is moste bewtyfull, and ye do not consyder what iniurye you doo vnto almyghtye God youre maker and creatoure. He woulde that mankynde were more excellent, and shoulde passe all erthlye thynge, but you doo thruste downe your dignytye emongest al low thynges, estemynge them more then your selfe. For yf euery good thyng, is more precyous then the thynge that is owner therof, when that you do iudge the vylest thynges (as worldly goodes) to

gere eos, qui multa possi dent. Contraq; minimo ma digere, qui abundantiā suā naturæ necessitate, non am bitus sui superfluitate meti antur. Itane autem nullum est proprium uobis atq; in fitum bonum ut in externis ac sepositis rebus bona ue stra queratis? Sic rerum uersa conditio est, ut diui num merito rationis ani mal, non aliter sibi splen dere nisi in animate sup pellectilis possessione ui deatur. Et alia quidam su is rebus contenta sunt, uos autem deo mente consiles, ab rebus infimis excellen tis naturæ ornamenta ca ptatis nec intelligitis quā tam conditori uestro facia tis iniuriam. Ille genus ho manum terrenis omnibus prestare uoluit, uos dign tatem uestrā infra queq; infima detruditis. Nam si omne cuiusq; bonum eo cu ius est constat esse præci osius cum uilissima rerum uestra bona esse indicatis, eisdē uosinet ipsos uestra existi

existimatione submittitis, quod quidem haud immerito cadit. Humane quippe naturæ ista conditio est, ut tum tantum cæteris rebus cum se cognoscit: excellat. Eadem tamen infra bestias redigatur si se nosce desierit. Nam cæteris animantibus se ignorare natura est, hominibus uero uitio uenit. Quam uero late patet uester hic error, qui ornari posse aliquid ornamentis existimatis alienis. At id fieri nequit. Nam si quid ex appositis luceat: ipsa quidem quæ sunt apposita laudantur, illud uero his tectum atq; uelatum in sua nihil omnius feditate perdurat. Ego uero nego illud esse bonum, quod noceat habẽti. Num id mentior? Minime inquies. Atq; diuitie poßidentibus persepe nocuerunt. Cum peßimus quisq; eris alieni auidus, quicquam usquam auri gemmarumq; est, se solum qui habet, dignißimum putat. Tu igitur qui nunc contum gladiumq; pertimescis, si uite huius cal-

lem

to be your goodes, thẽ do you submytte your selues vnder them. Which certes happethe not withoute a cause, for suche is thee naturall condycion of man, that then onely he excelleth all other thynges, when he knoweth hym selfe, and when he knoweth not hym selfe, then he is taken amonge beastes, as a beaste. For the nature of all other beastes (man onelye excepte) is not to knowe them selfe. But yf a man know not hym selfe, it cõmeth by some vyce that is in hym, & not of nature. O thou mankynde, howe great is this thy errour, that thynkest that any thyng can be made gaye, with other mens apparell or goodes. But it cannot be so. For if a man shyneth by the thinges that be put vpon hym, and not of hymself: thẽ be those things praised and not he. For the thynge that is hydde and coueryd with the same shynynge things, remaynyth styll in hys fylthynes. And I denye that the thinge is good, that hurtyth hym that hath it. Doo I make a lye or saye otherwyse than I thynke? Thou wylte say naye. Certes, ryches hath often tymes hurt them that had it forasmuche as euerye wycked man is more gredye and desyrous of other mẽs goodes wheresouer they be, whether it be gold or precious stons, and thinketh hym most worthy, that hath it. But for all that, thou man that hast tẽporal riches now, thou feryst the sharp speare and sworde, where as if thou haddest

 entred

entred and walkyd in the way or path of thys lyfe, as a wayefarynge manne pore and without monye: thou mayste synge before the thefe without feare of robbyng and without hurte of spere & swerde. O precious felicitie of Ryches temporall, which whan thou hast gotten it, thou canst not be sure thereof & kepe it.

This is spoken Ironice, that is to saye, there is no felicitie in riches.

There be .iiii. ages of the worlde, after the cōmon sayenge of the Poetes. The fyrste was of gold whē men were symple, good, and contented with a lytle. The second was sylver when men beganne to be sotteli and inuentife, of tyllage of howses, and planted vyneyardes. The thyrde, was of brasse whē mē began to be angrie, & to hepe vp to thē selfe, and to exclude others. And ẏ fourth is of yron, when all malyce and coueytousnes raygneth, and neyther fayth, nor charytie.

The first age of mā was much happye that was contented with such as ẏ fields brought forth without labor of man, and was not hurte wyth great excesse of metes & drynkes, they were wont to satysfye theyr long hunger wyth lytell acorns of the oke, that is to say, they sought not for deynetye meates, and knewe howe to myng the wyne with honye, that is to saye: they knewe not pleasaunt drynks, nor how to dye the white fleses of woll of Seria (a countrey so called) with the Uenim of tyre, that is to saye: to make purple coloure wyth the bloude of shell fyshes of Tyre, a countrye where there be manye suche fyshes, but were contentyd wyth such colors as the shepe did bere. They could then be contentyd to take holesom slepes vpon the grasse & knew no beddes of downe, and drynke fayre rennyng water for lacke of wyne and ale, and also dwell vnder the shadowe of the hygh pyne tree, for lacke of curyous howses. Then had no straunger or merchaunt sailed on the seas with ship nor

lem uacuus uiator intrasses, coram latrone securus cantares. O præclara opū mortalium beatitudo, quā cum adeptus fueris, securus esse desistis.

Metrum quintum.

Felix nimium prior ætas,
Contenta fidelibus aruis
Nec inerti perdita luxu:
Facile qui sera solebat
Ieiunia soluere glaude
Nec bachica munera norat,
Liquido confundere melle
Nec lucida uellera serum
Thireo miscere ueneno.
Somnos dabat herba salubres
Potum quoq; lubricus annis
Vmbras altißima pinus
Non dum maris alta secabat
Nec mercibus undiq; lectis.
Noua littora uiderat hospes
Tunc claßica seua tacebant.
Odijs neq; fusus acerbis

Cruor horrida tinxerat arma.
Quid enim furor hosticus ulla
Vellet prior arma mouere
Cum vulnera seua videret?
Nec præmia sanguinis ulla.
Vtinam modo nostra redirent,
In mores tempora priscos.
Sed seuior ignibus Æthnæ,
Feruens amor ardet habendi.
Heu quis primus fuit ille,
Auri qui pondera tecti:
Gemmasq; latere uolentes
Præciosa pericula fodit.

nor ſene ſtraunge coſtes to conuey their merchaundiſe to diuers countries and places. The ỹ cruel trompets of warre made no noyſe to cal men to battel, nor ſhedyng of blond with mortal hate had imbrewid the fearefull armour, that is to ſay: then was there no warre. What crewell enemye would fyrſt moue war before he ſawe crewell woundes, or ſawe ſome profyt by battell and warre that is to ſaye: then was there no cauſe to fyght. I would our conditions were turnyd againe into thoſe olde maners. But the greate gredye couytouſnes to catche and haue ryches, brennyth more feruently then the hyll callyd Ethna. Alas who was he that fyrſte doluyd vp the peces of golde that laye hyd in the earth, and the precyous ſtons that wer contentyd to haue leyen hid and vnknowen. Surely he dygged vp precious peryls, for many daungers mankynde do ſuffer for the ſame.

Ethna is an hyll in the ſea, that euer brenneth moſt feruently, and neuer ceſſeth, nor ſwalleth, or dymynyſſheth.

Prosa sexta.

Quid autem de dignitatibus potentiaq; differã, quas uos uere dignitatis ac poteſtatis inſcij, cœlo æquatis. Que ſi in improbiſſimum quemq; ceciderint, quæ incendia flammis Æthnæ eructuantibus, quod diluuium, tantas ſtrages dederint. Certe (ut memis

Phil.

What ſhall I ſpeake of dignities and power, whyche you that knowe not the trewe dignitie & power, do liken or compare it vnto heuen. And if theſe dignities and power ſhoulde happen vnto any wycked man they do as much hurte as the brenning hyll Ethna with all his flames of fyer, brallynge out of the ſame. Ans no deluge or flode that drowneth the countries doth ſo much annoiaūce. Truly I

Ignorant folke, do iudge after their owne affection, or deſyre, and not accordynge to the trueth.

There be two maners of dignyties, & power, one consysteth in thynges temporal, wherin is no felycitie, for they be transytorye. The other, is spyrytuall, whiche standeth in lernynge, & vertue, ẏ can not be ouercom wt vyce, aduersytie, or prosperytie, & therin is fylysytie.

Honour is not dewe to any person for his dygnytie, but for his vertue.

thynke ẏ hast not forgotten that youre forefathers the Romaines dyd couet to put downe the rule and aucthoritie of Consuls for theyr pryde, which rule of Consules was the begynnyng of their lybertye, whyche foresayd Romaynes before that, dyd put awaye from the cytye the name of kynges, for the lyke pryde. But certes yf power and dygnitye be geuen vnto good folkes, (as it seldome happeth) what goodnes is in dignitye and power, but onelye the goodnes of them that vse them. Soo it commeth to passe that honor commeth not to vertu by dignityes but it cōmeth to dignitie by vertue of them that vse the dignitie. But what is that same your noble powr that ye so much desyre and loke for? Doo you not consyder the erthly bestes ouer whome you seme to haue premynence? If thou sawest a mouse emongest other myse chalēging vnto hym selfe a ryght and power ouer other myse? How much wouldest thou laughe therat? that is to say: temporal power is such that it extendeth but onlye vnto the bodye. For yf thou loke vpon the body of a man, what thing shalt thou fynde more weke and feble then mankynde, whome either the bytynge of lytell wormes or some serpente that crepeth into their secrete partes, often tymes kylleth. Certes howe may a mā execute Justyce vpon another, but vpon hys bodye, or vpon fortune, that is to saye: vpon hys goodes and possessyons. Mayst thou at anye tyme rule or

meminisse te arbitror) cōsulare imperium (quod libertatis principium fuerat) ob superbiam consulum, uestri ueteres abolere cupierunt, Qui ob eandem superbiam prius regium de ciuitate nomen abstulerant. At si quando (quod pararum est) probis honores deferantur, quid in eis aliud quam probitas utentium placet? Ita fit ut non uirtutibus ex dignitate sed ex uirtute dignitatibus honor accedat. Quæ uero est ista uestra exspectibilis ac præclara potentia? Nonne terrena animalia cōsideratis, quibus præsidere uideamini? Num si inter mures uideres murem aliquem ius sibi ac potestatem præ ceteris uendicantem, quanto moueris cachinno? Quid uero si spectes corpus, imbecillius homine reperire queas. Quos sæpe muscularum quoq;, uel morsus, uel in secreta quæq; reptantium necat introitus. Quo uero quisquam ius aliquod in quempiam nisi in solum corpus, & quæ est infra corpus fortunam

pos-

posset exercere? Nũquid unquam libero imperabis animo? Num mentem sibi ratione coherentem, de statu proprie quietis amouebis? Cum liberũ quendam uirum supplicijs se quidam tirannus adactu rum putaret, ut aduersum se facte coniurationis conscios prodent, linguam ille momordit atq; abscidit, et in os seuientis tiranni abiecit. Ita cruciatus quos putabat tirannus materiam crudelitatis, uir sapiens fecit esse uirtutis.

Quid autem est quod in alium quisquam possit facere, quod sustinere ab alio ipse non possit? Busiridem accepimus necare hospites solitum, ab hospite Herculæ fuisse mactatum. Regulus plures Pœnorum bello captos in uincula cõiecerat, sed mox ipse uictorum catenis manus præbuit. Vllam ne igitur eius hominis potentiam putas, qui quod ipse in alio potest, ne id in se alter ualeat, efficere non possit? Ad hæc. Si ipsis dignitatibus, ac potestatibus inesset aliquid naturalis, ac proprij boni,

commaunde a sely thought? Wylt thou remoue the mynde or thought that cleuyth to it selfe, by good reason, from the state of her owne quyetnes? When a certayne Tyraunt thought once to cõpell with ponyshment and tormentes, a certayne sely man called a philosopher to accuse other men of confederacye of treason had e moued agaynst the saide Tyraunt: the sayd philosopher did bite of his owne tounge, and did cast it into the face of the cruell tyraunt. Soo that the tormentes that the cruell Tyrante thought should haue bene the cause of crueltye to be executyd vpon others: The wyse man that is to say the philosopher turnyd it to a matter of vertue. What thyng maye anye man do to another, that he maye not receyue the lyke of hym. We haue harde saye that Busyrys a Tyraunt, dyd vse to kyll his gestes, and that he was lyke wyse kylled of Hercules, beinge then his geste. Regulus, a noble consull (whiche had cast into bandes, or chaines many prysoners that he had take in the batteyle of the Carthagyneins) was at the laste taken hym selfe, and his handes boũde in chaynes, by theym that he hadde taken before tyme, of the Carthagyens. Thynkest thou, that he is myghtye, that can do nothynge to another, but such as he may do the like to him? Moreouer, yf there were any naturall or good thynge in dygnytie and power, they wolde neuer come to wycked, and

The mynde of thought of mã is fre, frõ mãs iudgement, & ponyshement.

The wyse mã is neuer ouercome with ponyshement.

euyll

euyll folke. For thynges contraryous, be not wonte to agre, & associate theym selfe togyther. And nature dysdayneth that contrary thynges, be ioyned or copled togyther. Therfore, for bycause it is certayne, that wycked persons (for the moste parte) do beare rule, it appereth truely, that the same dignites and power, be not good of thē selfe, by their owne nature, syns they be contented, to contynew with wycked folke. Whiche thyng, I may most worthely iudge by the same dygnytie, and power of all the giftes of fortune, that doo chaunge moste abundauntlye, to many wycked and shrewed folke. Of the which gooddes of fortune, one thynge I thynke oughte also to be consyderyd, that no man dowtyth but that he is stronge in whom he seith strength, and that he is swyft in whom swyftnes apperyth, so by lyke reason, musyke makyth musicions, physyke phisicions and rethoryke makyth retricyons. For euery natural thing workyth his owne propertye, & is not minged with any effects contrary to the same, but of it selfe puttyth a waye and resysteth thynges contraryous to it selfe. And Ryches cannot satysfye the Ragyng aueryse and couitousnes of men, nor power or dygnitie contentyth or ruleth a myghtye man, whome inordynate ambicion or desire of much honor holdyth boūd in stronge chaynes. And dygnyties geuen vnto wycked folke, do not make them worthye,

Dygnytes power auctorytie ryches nor any goods of fortune or temporall, be good of theym self, but by thē that do vse thē well, and that is properlye good wherof no euyll ensueth but resysteth euyll, as a good man wyll do no euyll, a stronge man is not weke & a swyfte man is swyft.

nunquam peßimis peruenirent. Neq; enim sibi solent aduersa sociari. Natura respuit ut contraria quæque iungantur. Ita cū peßimos plerunq; dignitatibus fungi dubium nō sit, illud etiam liquet, natura sui bona non esse, quæ se peßimis hærere patiantur. Quod quidem de cunctis fortunæ muneribus dignius existimari potest, quæ ad improbißimum quenq; uberiora perueniunt? De quibus etiam illud consyderandum puto, quod nemo dubitet esse fortem, cui fortitudinē inesse conspexerit. Et cuicūq; uelocitas adest, manifestum est esse uelocem. Sic Musica quidem musicos Medicina medicos, Rhetorica rhetores facit. Agit enī cuiusq; rei natura quod propriū est, ne cōtrariarum rerū miscetur effectibus, sed ultro quæ sunt aduersa, depellit. Atq; nec opes inexpletam exstinguere auaritiam queunt. Nec potestas sui compotem facit, quem uisiosæ libidines insolubilibus astrictum retinent catenis. Et collata improbis dignitas,

non

non modo efficit dignos, sed prodit potius, & ostentat indignos. Cur ita prouenit? Gaudetis enim feseres aliter habentes falsis compellere nominibus, quæ facile rerum ipsarum redarguntur effectu. Itaq; nec illæ diuitiæ, nec illa potestas, nec hæc dignitas iure appellari potest. Postremo idem de tota fortuna cōcludere licet: in qua nihil expetendum, nihil naturæ bonitatis inesse manifestum est. Quæ nec bonis semper adiungit se, & bonos quibus fuerit adiuncta non efficit.

thy, but shewethe and declareth them rather vnworthy. And whye soo? For you men do reioyse in thynges that appere otherwyse then they be in dede, ye geue and attribute to them wronge names, that be easily repreuid by their effect and dedes. So that Riches ought not be called ryghtfully riches, nor power called iustly power, nor dygnitie well called dignitye. For nether of thē maye cause any man to be contentyd, but euer desyrous of more the like thinges. And fynally I maye lyke wyse say of all the gyftes of fortune, in the whiche it is manifest, that there is no goodnes of it selfe, or of hys owne nature, to be desyred or lokyd for. For they neuer ioyne themselfe to good folke alwayes or for the most parte, nor make them alwayes good, that they be ioyned or copled vnto.

Ryches power auctorytie & all the goodes of fortune, be wrong named for riches stinteth not coueytousnes, power can not rule it selfe, nor dignytie maketh a man digne or worthy, nor honoure maketh a man honorable. But vertue maketh a man worthy and honorable

Metrum Sextum. Ph.

Nouimus quantas dederit ruinas
Vrbe flammata, patribusq; cæsis,
Patre qui quondam ferus interempto
Matris effuso maduit cruore
Corpus & uisu gelidum pererrans
Ora nō tinxit lacrymis: sed esse
Censor extincti potuit decoris,

Phil.

We haue wel knowē what hurte kynge Nero dyd in his tyme, he brennid ẏ noble Citie of Rome he slewe all the fathers the counsalors and senators, he in his wodenes, slewe his owne brother. He imbrewed or bathed hym selfe in his mothers bloude whome he kylled. He beholdyng euery parte of her colde deade body or corpus dyd neuer wete hys face wyth teares, that is to saye neuer wepte, he was soo hard hartyd, that it dyd not greue him to beholde as a huge, her goodlye dead corpus. Yet he rulyd wyth his scepter

Nero brenned the Cytie of Rome to lerne therby, howe the Cytie of Troy brēned. He killed his brother to thē tente he hym selfe myghte raygne, without any doubt of hym, he kylled his mother and ripped her belye, to se the place wherin he was conceyued and laye.

Hic

royall

royall, all the people, whome the Sonne dydde shine vppon, or geue lyght vnto, from the farthest rysynge thereof vnto the place where the sonne hydeth his beames vnder the waters, that is to say, he ruled from the est vnto the west, he ruiyd also wyth his scepter all the people that the .vii. cold sters do oppresse with colde, that is to saye: all the Northe. And he lykewyse ruiyd all them that the wynde called Nothus beynge vyolent, dryeth with his heate dreylynge the hote grauell or sandes, that is to saye: he ruled all the Southe parte. Yet coulde not all his great hygh power chaunge or cesse the woodnes, rage and cruelty of the same kyng Nero. Alas it is a heuye & dolorous chaūce as often as a wycked swerde or power is ioyned to cruell madnes, that is to saye wycked cruelty ioyned with authority.

Hic tamen sceptro populos regebat,
Quos uidet condens radios sub undas
Phœbus extremo ueniens ab ortu:
Quos premunt septem gelidi triones:
Quos notus sicco uiolentus æstu
Torret, ardentes recoquens arenas.
Celsa non tandem ualuit potestas
Vertere trani rabiem Neronis?
Heu grauem sortem, quoties iniquus
Additur sæuo gladius ueneno.

The malice or goodnes of a man is best shewed when a man is in authoryte.

Boetius.

When I saye O Philosophy, thou knowest that the desyre of mortall and transitorye thynges, neuer had rule ouer me, or dyd ouercome me. But I haue desyred to here rule in causes of the common welth, that vertue shoulde not wax olde or be forgotte in me, for lacke of exercyses. Phil. For sothe that is a thynge that may allure and drawe mens myndes, that be excellent by nature (but not yet brought to the full perfection of vertue) that is to saye

Prosa Septima. Boe.

Vm ego. Scis, inquam, ipsa, minimi nobis ambitionem mortaliū rerum fuisse dominatam. Sed materia gerendis rebus optauimus quo ne uirtus tacita consenesceret. Ph. Atilla. Atq; hoc unum est quod præstantes quidem naturæ mentes, sed nondum ad extremam manum uirtutum

per

perfectione perductas alli cere posſit, gloriæ scilicet cupido & optimorum in rempublicam fama meritorum. Quæ quam sit exilis & totius ponderis uacua, sic considera. Omnẽ terræ ambitũ sicuti astrologicis demonstrationibus acceptisti ad cœli spacium, puncti obtinere rationem, id est, ut si ad cœlestis globi magnitudinem conferatur, nihil spacij prorsus habere iudicetur. Huius igitur tam exigue in mundo regionis, quarta fere portio est (sicut Ptolomeo probante didicisti) quæ a nobis cognitis animantibus incolatur. Huic quarte, si quanta maria, palus desq; præmunt, quantumq; siti uasta regio distendiuur, cogitatione subtraxeris, uix angustissima inhabitandi hominibus area relinquetur. In hoc minimo igitur puncti quodam puncto circunsepti atq; concluſi, de peruulganda fama, de proferendo nomine cogitatis. At quid habet amplum magnificumq; gloria tam angustis exiguisq; limitibus artata?

saye: desyre of renowme or glorye, and the fame of good admynistration in the commen wealth, and to doo good and profytable thynges for the same, whych fame and renoume, how lytell and voyde of estimatyon it is, cõsyder as followeth. Thou hast learnyd by the demonstrations of astronomy, that all the circuite or compasse of the earthe is by reason, as a pricke or lytle tytle in respect to the compasse of heuẽ that is to say: of the fyrmament. Or yf all the earth wer compared to the gretnes of the celestiall globe or compasse, it should be iudged as nothynge in respecte thereof. Of the whyche earthe or worlde being so lytell a thynge, scarse the fourth parte thereof is inhabyted, of lyuyng creatures that we do know, as thou haste learned of Ptolome that prouyth the same. And if thou haddyst abatyd in thy mynde from thys forthe part, howe muche the seas and marshe groundes do contayne, and lykewyse ỳ quantitie of the dry wast grounds, the woodes, desertes and sands: then shuld there remayne scarsly a very litle place for men to inhabyte in. Therefore you nõ being inuironed or compassed with in the lest part of the sayd pryeke or tytle, of the erth, do you thinke that your fame or renowme be spred abrode? And howe great and notable is your glorye and fame, that is dryuen into so narow a place? And adde thereto that manye nacyons beyng of dyuers languages,

of dyuers maners and of ſondry reaſon of lyuynge doo inhabyte and dwell in thys lytell compaſſe of the erth inhabitable, vnto whome nether the fame of all men, nor the fame of cityes cã come for the dyfficultye of wayes, for the dyuerſitie of ſpeache, for the lacke of the vſage and entercourſe of marchaũdiſe For in the time of Marcus Tullius (as he hymſelfe in a certayne Booke dothe wryte) the fame and renoune of the cõmen welth of Rome had not paſſed or come than vnto the hyll named Caucaſus, and yet was Rome an olde Cytye and fearyd of the parthiens & of other inhabytynge there aboute. Seyſt thou not nowe in howe narrowe and lytell romyth is the glory and fame brought that thou goyſt aboute and labory ſt to delate and ſpred abrode? Canne the fame and glorye, of one Romayne, extende and ſpred thyther that the fame and glorye of the hole cytye of Rome, coulde not come? And what ſayeſt thou to thys, that the maners and lawes of dyuers people do not accorde emonge them ſelfe, ſo that the ſame thynge that ſome do prayſe, other do diſprayſe and iudg worthy of ponyſhmẽt, where by it commeth to paſſe that yf any man delyteth to haue glory and renoune, It behoueth hym that it be not ſhewed in any wyſe emongeſt dyuers people. Let euerye manne therefore be contented to haue an honeſte prayſe and reporte emongeſt hys neyghboures. And lette the

The Syrians do take it for a prayſe, to eate theyr parẽtes, when they be deed, rather then wormes ſhoulde. The Ieſwes to marie, the next of their kin. The Tryualles to kyll their Father, when he is. lx. yeares olde, and bren hym.

Adde quod hoc ipſum breuis habitaculi ſeptum plures incolunt naciones, lingua, moribus, rocius uitæ ratione diſtantes, ad quantum difficultate itinerum, tum loquendi diuerſitate, tum commercij inſolentia, non modo fama hominum ſingulorum, ſed ne urbium quidem peruenire queat. Ætate deniq; Marci Tulli (ſicut ipſe quodam loco ſignificat) non dum cauca ſum montem Romanæ reipublice fama tranſcenderat, & erat tunc adulta parthis, etiam cæteriſq; id locorum gentibus formidoloſa. Vides ne igitur quam ſit anguſta quam cõpreſſa gloria quam dilatare ac propagare laboratiſt An ubi Romani nominis tranſire fama nequit, Romani hominis gloria progredietur? Quid quod diuerſarũ gentiũ mores ĩter ſe, atq; inſtituta diſcordãt ut qđ apud alios laude apũ alios ſuppliciũ dignum iudicetur. Quo fit, ut ſi quẽ fame prædicatio dilectet, huic in plurimos populos nomen proferre nullo modo conducat. Erit igitur

per

peruagata inter ſuos glo
ria quiſq; contentum, et in
ter unius gentis terminos
præclara illa fame immor
talitas coartabitur. Sed q̃
multos clariſſimos ſuis tẽ
poribus uiros ſcriptorum
inops deleuet obliuio.
Quamquam quid ipſa ſcri
pta proficiunt, quæ cum
ſuis autoribus præmit lon
gior atq; obſcura uetuſtas
Vos uero immortalitatem
uobis propagare uidemis
ni cum futuri famam tem
poris cogitatis, quod ſi ad
eternitatis infinita ſpacia,
pertractes, quid habes
quod de nominis tui diu
turnitate læteris? Vnius
enim horæ momenti ſi de
cem milibus conferatur
annis, quoniam utrunq;
ſpatium diffinitum, mini
mum licet, habet tum ali
quam proportionem. At
hic ipſe numerus annorum
eiuſq; quantumlibet mul
tiplex ad interminabilem
diuternitatem, nec compa
rari quidẽ poteſt. Et enim
funtis ad ſe inuicem, fue
rit quædam, infiniti uero
atq; finiti, nulla unquam
poterit eſſe collatio. Ita
fit, ut quanticunq; prolixi
tem

the ſayde immortall fame and glorye be
ſhute vp cloſe wythin the bondes of peo
ple of one nation where thou dwelleſt.
But how many men (that in their time
were noble and famous) be nowe clene
forgotten and out of memory, for lacke
of wryters, or by neglygente wryters.
And albeit that ſuch wrytinges of mēs
fame and glorye do ſum what proſytte,
yet in proceſſe of tyme beyng olde and
longe paſt, the ſayd wrytynges and al-
ſo the actors and wryters, do conſume.
But yet you men do thynke to get vn-
to youre ſelfe an immortall and perdu-
rable name when you do thynke vpon
the fame to come, or that youre fame
ſhall endure alwayes emongeſt men,
whoſe tyme of contynuaunce, yf thou
compare it with the time infinite, that
is eterne, or euerlaſtynge, what haſte
thou to reioyſe in the continuaunces of
thy fame? For if one momēt of an hour
were compared vnto tenne thowſands
yeares, bothe the ſame tymes haue an
ende, and the moment hath ſome por-
tion of tyme, thoughe it be verye lytel.
But yet the ſayde noumber of yeares,
and as manye more, howe manye
ſoeuer they be added together thereto,
maye not be compared to the tyme
euerlaſtynge that hath noo ende. For
comparyſon maye be made of thinges
that haue an ende emongeſt them ſelfe
But noo comparyſon coulde euer be
made of thynges that haue no ende, to
thynges, that haue an ende. And ſoo it

happeth, though that fame be neuer ſo longe of tyme as thou canſt thynke, yf thou compare it with the tyme euerlaſtyng, it ſemeth not onely verye lytell, but alſo none at all. But you thincke that you know nothyng well done, or that you can do nothyng wel, but yf it be to pleaſe the peoples eares, or for the vayne prayſe of the worlde. And you requyre and ſeke for the prayſe of other mens ſmale ſayinges, and leue clerely the excellencye of your owne conſcience and vertue. Conſyder howe gloriouſly one man moketh another in ſuch lightnes of Arrogancye. For when a certayne tyraunt began to ſpeake angerly vnto another man, whych falſely vſurpyd and toke vpon hym the name of a Phyloſopher, not for vertues ſake, but for a vayne glorye.

And when the Tyraunte ſayde that he wouldе knowe whether he were a philoſopher, for he woulde then ſuffer patientlye all wronges done vnto hym. The man that named hymſelfe a phyloſopher, ſuffered and tooke pacyence a lytell whyle, and after he had receyued rebukes of the tyraunte, he at the laſt ſtryuyng and impacyent, ſayde vnto the tyraunt: knowſt thou not that I am a phyloſopher? Then the tyraunte anſwered and ſayde roughely: I had taken the for a philoſopher, if thou hadeſt holden thy peace. But what is thys to theſe notable vertuous mē that ſeke for glorye by vertue, for of ſuch do I ſpeke nowe

temporis fama: ſi cum ineexhauſta eternitate cogitetur, non parua ſed plane nulla eſſe uideatur. Vos autem niſi ad populares aures inanesq; rumores recte facere neſcitis, & relicta conſciētie uirtutisq; præſtantia, de alienis præmia ſermunculis poſtulatis. Accipe in huiuſmodi arrogantie lenitate quam feſtine aliquis illuſerit. Nam cum quidam adorſus eſſet hominem contumeliis, qui non ad uere uirtutis uſum, ſed ad ſuperbam gloriam, falſum ſibi Philoſophi nomen induerat: adieciſſetq; ſe iam ſciturum an ille Philoſophus eſſet, ſiquidem illatas iniurias leuiter patienterq; tolleraſſet. Ille patientiam paliſper aſſumpſit, acceptaq; contumelia uelut inſultans, iam tandem inquit, intelligis me eſſe Philoſophum. Tum ille nimiū mordacitur, intellexeram inquit, ſi tacuiſſes. Quid autem eſt quod apud præcipuos uiros (de hijs enim ſermo eſt) qui uirtute gloriam petunt, quid inquam eſt quod ad hos de fama poſt

post resolutam morte suprema corpus attineat? Nam si (quod nostri rationes credi uetant) toti moriuntur homines, nulla est omnino gloria, cum is cuius ea esse dicitur non extet omnino: Sin uero bene sibi mens conscia terreno carcere resoluta cœlum libera petit, nonne omne terrenum negocium spernet? quæ se cœlo fruens terrenis gaudet exemptam?

nowe, what is fame (I saye) to them after the body is once dede? For yf mē do dye all hole aswell the soule as the bodye (whych thyng oure reason denyeth to beleue) then is there no glorye at al, when there is no man to whome glorye is sayde to belonge. And if the soule (hauynge knowledge of it selfe and delyuered from the person of the earthely body and beyng also fre) goeth to heuē, Do it not dyspyse all erthly thinges, & beynge in heuen, dothe shee not reioyse that she is seperate from all worldelye busynes, that is to saye: caryth nether for glory, renoune, riches, power, dygnytie nor aucthorytie of thys worlde.

Metrum septimum. Phi.

Quicunq; solam mēte præcipiti petit
Summumq; credit gloriam.
Late patentes ætheris cernat plagas,
Artumq; terrarum situm,
Breuem replere non ualentis ambitum,
Pudebit aucti nominis.
Quid o superbi colla mortali iugo,
Frustra leuare gestiunt?
Licet remotos fama per populos means
Diffusa linguas explicet,
Et magna titulis fulgeat claris domus.

Mors

Philosophi.

Who so euer with hasty thought, desyreth only glory, & renoune, and beleueth that it is ẏ cheyfest thynge, that can be desyred. Let hym beholde the partes of heauen or fyrmament, both large and open, or apparāt, and lykewyse the small and narrowe compasse of the earth, & compare them together, and then he shalbe asshamed, of his glorye, and fame, that it can not fyll the lytle space of the earth. Therfore, oh to what intent do proude men, exalt theyr neckes in vayne, with the yoke of mortall fame & glory, although it be spred, and passeth by people, and nacyons farre of, and thoughe it be spoken of by mens tounges. And thoughe thy noble house do shyne wyth ercellent

cellente tytles, that is to saye, thoughe thou be a noble man, commen of noble byrthe, and famous with hyghe laude and prayse. Yet death settyth nought by such hygh glorye renounce & fame, & death wrappyth vp the pore man, the ryche & noble man together. And death makyth the lowest thynges equal with the hyest and greatest thynges. Where be nowe the bones of faythfull Fabricius? what is become of Brutus, and of wyse Cato? A lytell and smale fame of them yet remaynyng declareth their vayne name in a fewe letters. And although we haue knowen the goodlye wordes wrytten of theyr fame: do wee knowe them that be consumed and dede out of thys worlde, longe before oure dayes? ye do lye therfore as men vnknowen when you be dede, & your fame doth not make you to be knowen. If that you do thynke that your lyfe endureth the longer by fame of a worldely name that is to saye: by the glorye of mortall fame, when that the laste day shal take from you the same mortall fame, then commeth vnto you the seconde deathe.

Fabricius was a noble consull, of Rome, and so faythfull, that beyng a Captayne agaynst Kynge Pyrrus, neyther golde, nor syluer, could corrupt him, to be false to Rome Brutus, was a famous consull of Rome, which did many thinges for liberte & iustyce, for ye shame done to Lucretia. And he fought manny battayles for ye Romaynes. Cato, was a wyse and vertuous man. & here be here noted two deathes, one of the body, another of worldly fame, which dyeth wyth the body, therfore it is not to be desyred, but vertue neuer dyeth.

Mors spernit altam gloriã
Inuoluit humile pariter et
celsum caput,
Æquatq; summis infima.
Vbi nunc fidelis ossa Fa
bricij manent?
Quid Brutus aut Rigidus
Signat superstes fama te
nuis,
Pauculis inane nomen lit
teris Cato?
Sed quid decora nouimus
uocabula?
Num scire consumptos da
tur?
Iacetis ergo prorsus igno
rabiles,
Nec fama notos efficit,
Quod si putatis longius
uitam trahi,
Mortalis aura nominis,
Cum sera uobis rapiet hoc
etiam dies:
Iam uos secunda mors ma
net.

Philosophy.

But that thou shalte not thynke ye I wyll hold cruell battaile against fortune. Thou shalte vnderstande that the same false and sotyll fortune sometyme deseruyth some goodnes at mens handes, at such tyme as she do o-penly shewe her selfe and vncouer her face

Prosa Octaua. Phi.

Sed ne me inexorabile contra fortunam bellũ gerere putes, est aliq; quando, cum de hominibus illa fallax non nihil bene me reatur, tum scilicet, cum se aperit, cum frontẽ detegit mores q;

moresq; profitetur. Non dum forte quod loquor intelligis. Mirum eſt quod dicere geſtio, eoq; ſententiam uerbis explicare uix queo. Etenim plus reor hominibus aduerſam, quam proſperam prodeſſe fortunam. Illa enim ſemper ſpecie felicitatis cum uidetur blanda, mentitur. Hæc ſemper uera eſt, cum ſe inſtabilem mutatiõe demonſtrat. Illa fallit, hæc inſtruit. Illa mendatium ſpecie bonorum mentes fruẽtium ligat, hæc cognitione fragilis felicitatis, abſoluit. Itaq; illam uideas uentoſam, fluentem, ſuiq; ſemper ignoram: hanc ſobriam, ſuccinctamq;, & ipſius aduerſitatis exercitatione prudentem. Poſtremo felix à uero bono deuios blãditiis trahit, aduerſa plerunq; ad uera bona reducens, uelut unco retrahit. An hoc inter minima æſtimandum putas, quod amicorum tibi fidelium mentes hæc aſpera, horribiliſq; fortuna detexit. Hæc tibi certos ſodalium ultus ambiguoſq; ſecreuit. Diſcedens enim ſuos abſtulit, tu-

face, by ſhewyng her falſehed or aduerſitie, & declareth her vnſtable maners. Perchaunce thou knoeſt not yet what I doo ſpeake. For it is a meruaylous thynge that I entend to ſaye, ye and I can ſcarſe expreſſe the ſentẽce with my wordes. For I do thynke that euyl fortune do more profytte men then good fortune. For when ſhe ſemethe good & gentyll with proſperitie and welth thẽ ſhe lyeth falſely. But euyll fortune is alwayes trewe, when ſhe ſheweth her ſelfe mutable by her vnſtedfaſtnes. Good fortune deceyueth, and euill fortune teachyth. Good fortune byndethe wyth the bealwtye of her goodes the hartes or thoughtes of them that hath them. Euyll fortune vnbyndeth mens hartes and thoughtes by knowlege of her frayle felycitie. And thou ſeiſt good fortune proude prodigall and not knowinge herſelfe, Euyll fortune is ſober meke and wiſe, by exercyſe of her aduerſitie. Furthermore good fortune wyth her flatterynge drawethe men that be wauerynge, from felycitie or perfytte good whych is god. Euyll fortune for the moſt parte bryngethe men agayne to perfyt felycitie, drawethe them as yt were with a hoke. Doeſte thou eſteme this for a ſmale thynge: that this ſharp and euyll fortune, hath ſhewed vnto ẽ very myndes and thoughts of thy faithfull frendes: The ſayde euyll fortune hath diſcouered vnto the both the open playne and doutefull countenaunce of thy

A mans frend is knowen beſt, in aduerſytie, and not in proſperitie.

Good fortune maketh a man forgette bothe God, and hym ſelf, by reaſon of proſperytie. Euyl fortune, maketh a man to knowe both God, and hym ſelfe, by aduerſytie, and ſo to come to vertue and deſpiſe the worlde.

thy felowes. Good fortune going from the, take away her owne frends, and left the thyne owne frendes, and none of hers. When thou were in prosperitye and ryche as thou thoughteste thy selfe to be, what wouldyste thou haue geuen to haue knowen this thynge all hole together. that is to saye: thy frend from thy foe: Ceste thou nowe therefore to complayne for the losse of thy worldely ryches, synce thou hast found thy trewe frendes whych is the moste precyous kynde of all ryches.

Philosophy.

The loue of God that gouernythe both the land and the sea, and like wyse commaundethe the heuen, and keppyth the world in due order and good accorde, that is to saye: causythe ỹ due seasons of the yere to come successyuely accordyng to their nature. And that the sedes, that is to saye: the Elementes beyng contrary one to a nother do holde contynuall peace and vnytye, one with another, so that one doth not corrupte and hurt another. And that ỹ sonne in hys bryghte golden chariote, bryngeth forth the clere freshe daye. And that the mone gouerne the nyght that the sterre Hesperus, called the euenyng sterre, hath brought in. And that the ragynge sea do kepe in his floudes, to a certayne ende that they extende not theyr vttermoste course & ouerflowe the earth. If thys dyuine or godly loue shuld

The sedes be the Elemētes, of whome all naturall thynges do come, as all herbes do come of sedes, and al bodyes mixed, do come of the Elementes.

tuos reliquit. Quantibus inriger, et ut uidebaris tibi fortunatus, emisses? Desine nunc amissas opes queri, quod pretiosissimum diuitiarum genus est, amicos inuenisti.

Metrum Octauum. Phi.

Quod mundus stabili fide
Concordes uarias uices,
Quod pugnantia semina
Fœdus perpetuum tenent,
Quod phœbus roseum diem
Curru prouehit aureo,
Vt quas duxerat Hesperus
Phœbe noctibus imperet,
Vt fluctus auidum mare
Certo fine coerceat
Ne terris liceat uagis
Latos tendere terminos,
Hanc rerum seriem ligat,
Terras, ac pellagus regens
Et celo imperitans amor.
Hic si frena remiserit,
Quicquid nunc amat inuicem

Bellum

Bellum continuo gerit:
Et quam nunc ſocia fide
Pulchris motibus incitant,
Certant ſoluere machinã.
Hic ſãctos populos quoq;
Iunctos fœdere continet:
Hic & coniugij ſacrum
Caſtis nectis amoribus:
Hic fidis etiam ſua
Dictat iura ſodalibus.
O felix hominum genus
Si ueſtros amicos amor
Quo cælum regitur regat.

Finis libri ſecundi.

ſhuld ſlacke the bridell, that is to ſaye: ſhuld take no cure to gouerne, whatſoeuer thynge now louyth together, and agreith, would be at contynual varyance and diſcorde, and would ſtriue to diſtroye and loſe the engyn of ỹ world that keppyth them in mutuall amite, in their goodlye ordynate mouynges. This loue of god conſerueth vertuous folke, and ſuche as be ioyned together in the bond of frendſhip. And this loue knytteth together the ſacramẽt of wedlocke, with chaſt loue betwene man & wyfe. Thys loue alſo ſettith his lawes whych is trewe frendeſhipe to faythful frendes and felowes. O howe happye were mankynd yf this loue of god that rulyth heuen, myght rule and gouerne theyr myndes, that is to ſay: that they myght ſo agre together in ſuch perfyte frendeſhyp, that one myght loue another, and agre as the elemẽts do agre.

Here endeth the ſecond boke.

Boecius.

Now when Philosophy had ended her songe, and that the swetenes of her metyr had confyrmyd me beynge desyrous to heare wyth open eares, and meruaylynge at her wordes I (a lytle after) sayde. O philosophye, whych art the very comforte of werye myndes, howe much haste thou cherysshed me with the grauitie of thy sentences, and with the pleasauntenes of thy syngynge. In so much that I do thinke that frō hencefoorth, I am able to wyth stand the assaultes of foortune. Soo that the medycines that thou a lytell before saydest were very sharpe, I do not onelye nothyng feare, but I beyng very desyrous to here them, do vehemently or ernestlye often requyre them. Phil. I well perceyued the same, when thou being styll makynge no noyse and herkenyng, receyuydest my wordes. And that I had erpected or reuocate the habite of thy mynde, that thou hast now, (or that is more true) that I had perfyted the habite or maner of thy mynde. And certes the residue of the thinges that do remayne be suche, that when they be tasted, truely they do byte or be vnpleasaunte, But when they be receyued inwardly: they taste swetely. But for by cause thou sayest thou art so desyrous to here them, Oh howe muche woldyst

Prosa prima. Boetius.

Iam cantum illa finierat cum me auidendi auidum, stupēdumq; arrectis adhuc auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. Itaq; paulo post, o inquam, summum lassorum solamen animorum quantum me uel sententiarum pondere, uel canendi etiam iocunditate refouisti, adeo ut me iam post hac imparem fortune ictibus non arbitrer. Itaq; remedia que paulo ante acriora esse dicebas, non modo non perhorresco sed audiendi auidus uehementer efflagito. Ph. Tum illa, sensi inquit, cum uerba nostra tacitus attentusq; rapiebas, cunq; tue mentis habitum uel expectaui, uel quod est uerius ipsa perfeci. Talia sunt quippe quæ restant, ut degustata quidem mordeant, interius etiam recepta dulcescant. Sed quod tu te audiendi auidum dicis: quanto ardore flagrares, si quonā te ducere aggrediamur agnos

agnosceres. Bo. Quonam inquam. Ph. Ad ueram inquit simplicitatem quam tuus quoq; somniat animus sed occupato ad imagines uisu, ipsam illam non potes intueri. Boe. Tum ego, fac obsecro, & quæ sit illa uera, siue cunctatione demonstra P. Faciam inquid illa tui causa libenter, sed que tibi causa notior est, eam prius designare uerbis atq; informare conabor, ut ea perspecta, cum in contrariam partem flexeris oculos, uere specimem beatitudinis poßis agnoscere.

wouldyste thou brene with desyre, yf thou knewest whether I wold lede the Boe. I saye, whyther wouldyste thou leade me. Phil. To the trewe felycitie, that thy mynde dreameth of. But thy syghte beyng occupyed with fantasies and immagynations, that is to saye: with temporall or worldely thynges: thou mayst not beholde and loke vpon the same true and perfyt felycitie. Boe. Then come of and shewe me I beseche the, without anye taryinge, whyche is the same trewe felicitie. Phil. I wyll doo it gladelye at thy request, but fyrst I wil go about to mark and appoynte out by my wordes, that false felycytie, that is better knowen to the, that after thou haste sene her, when thou hast turnyd thy eyes on the contrarye parte, that is to saye: from false felicitie vnto trewe felicitie, thou mayst the better knowe the similytude and beawtie of the same trew felicitie.

Metrum primum.

Qvi serere ingenuũ uolet agrũ
Liberat arua prius fruticibus,
Falce rubos, silicemq; resecat,
Vt noua fruge grauis ceres eat.
Dulcior est apium mages labor.
Si malus ora prius sapor edat.

He that wyll sowe a goodly felde wyth corne, fyrst he must ryd the same felde of shrubes and thorns and cutte awaye the bushes and ferne with his hoke or syth, ẏ the newe corne may grow and encrease with ful eres. The laboure of the bees, that is to sai: the honye, is swete to the mouth, that hath tastyd some euyl tast or bytternes before. And after that the south wynde called Nothus, cesseth to geue his sheury blastes, then do the sters shyne more

Fyrste vyce must be auoyded, from a mã before, that vertue can entre.

plesaunt and bryght. And after that ỹ day sterre called Lucifer hath chased awaye the darkenes of the nyght. Thẽ the bryght daye ledyth fourthe the shinyng horser of the sonne, that is to sai: after the darke nyght the clere day shineth more plesaunt. So lykewyse thou fyrst beholdyng false goods, that is to saye: false felycytie of worldely things begynne thou to wyth drawe thy neck from the yoke of the sayd false felicitie or worldely thynges. And after that, trewe goodes, that is to saye: vertue, or trewe felicitie wyll enter the better into thy mynde.

Gracius astra uitent, ubi nothus,
Desinit imbriferos dare sonos,
Lucifer, ut tenebras pepulerit,
Pulcra dies roseos agit æquos.
Tu quoq; falsa tuens bona prius
Incipe colla iugo retrahere,
Vera dehinc animum subierint.

Boecius.

THen Philosophy lokynge downewarde a litle, and remembrynge her selfe as one that had her wits to seke, or put vp into the narow seate of her mynd, beganne to speake after thys maner. P. Al ỹ cure of mortal folk how we manye maners of wayes soeuer they do labour and trauell, yet they all do laboure (although it be by dyuers and sondry meanes) to come vnto one ende of felycitie, or blessednes. Truely that thynge is good (whyche whena man hath obteyned it) that nothynge can be desyred ferther besydes it, which thinge certes is the soueraygne good of all thynges, and contayneth in it selfe all good thynges. To the whych good thynge yf any thyng shoulde be awaye or wantynge: it cannot be sufferaigne and

Prosa secunda. Boe.

TVm defixo paululũ uisu & uelut in angustam sue mentis sedem recepta, sic cœpit.

Ph. Omnis mortalium cura, quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet diuerso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur peruenire. Id autem est bonum, quo quis adepto nihil ulterius desiderare queat. Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorũ, cunctaq; intra se continẽs bona. Cui si quid abforet, summum bonum esse non posset,

The dyffynition of perfyte felycitie.

posset, quoniam relinqueretur quod posset optari. Liquet igitur esse beatitudinem statum bonorum omniũ aggregatione perfectum. Hunc uti diximus diuerso tramite mortales omnes conantur adipisci. Est enim mentibus hominum ueri boni naturaliter inserta cupiditas, sed ad falsa denius error abducit. Quorum quidem alij summum bonum esse nihilo indigere credentes, ut diuiti is affluant elaborant. Alij uero summũ bonum quod sit dignissimum ueneratione iudicantes, adeptis honoribus reuerẽdi ciuilibus suis esse nituntur. Sũt qui summum bonum in summa potẽtia esse cõstituant: Hi uel regnare ipsi uolũt, uel regnantibus adherere cõnãtur. At quibus optimum bonũ claritas uidetur, hij uel belli, uel pacis artibus glorioſum nomẽ propagare festinant. Plurimi uero boni fructum gaudeo, letitiáq; metiuntur: hij felicissimum putant uoluptate diffluere. Sunt etiam qui horum

and perfyt good, for by cause sonr thing is left behynd or forgottẽ that maye be desyred. Therfore it appereth ỳ felicitie is a perfyt state by gatherynge together of all good thynges. The same perfytte state, or felicitie (as I haue sayde) al mẽ lyuynge do labor to optayne and gette dyuers wayes. For the desyre of felycitye or blessednes, is naturally plantyd in mens myndes and hartes, but that wandryng error ledyth them out of the way to false gods, that is to say: worldlye thynges, of the whyche men, some (certes thynkyng that the perfytte felycitie and goodnes is to haue nede of nothynge) doo labour to habounde in ryches. Other men (iudging good that thyng, that is most worthy honour) do strynue to be honorable emongest their citizens & neyghbours after they haue gotten honors. There be other that do determyne that soueraygne felycitye is in high power, & they them self will raygne or rule, or do labour to be nere vnto suche as doo rule or raygne. But other to whome fame semeth perfytte felycitie and goodnes, do make haste to optayne a glorious name by feates of warre or armes, or by the meanes of peace makyng. But many do measure the fruyte of perfytte felicitie, wythe myrth and gladnes, that is to saye: doo thynke that perfytte felicitie standythe in ioye and gladnes. They do thynke it the most perfytte felicitie, to haue abõdaũce of corporal pleasure. Also ther be soms

They that do erre from perfyte felycitie, do take these. v. thynges for it, as ryches, honoure, power, glorye, and pleasure, whiche be the false goodes of fortune.

The lacke of any good thyng causeth mē to desyre the same.

some men that do chaunge or ioine the endes and causes of thynges one wyth another, as they that do desyre to haue ryches, for to haue power and pleasure or they desyre power bycause they wold haue monye or fame and renoune. Soo in these thinges and suche lyke, the intente and purpose of all mens actes, & desyres be occupied: as noblenes and fauoure of the common people whych semeth to geue vnto all men a certayne glorye and prayse. And lyke wyse wife and chyldren, that men desyre for the cause of pleasure and myrth. But frendes which is the most holy thyng, may not be acountyd emonges the goods of fortune, (whych consysteth in worldly & trāsytory thynges) but in vertu. But al the other thynges that cometh of fortune, be taken eyther for the loue of offyce or power, or of pleasure, and delyghte. And truely it is mete to referre al goodes temporall, and transytorye, vnto ỹ other goodes of fortune, aboue named. For strength and gretnes of bodye semeth to geue powre: fayrenes & swyftnes, to geue glory and prayse: & helthe of bodye, to geue pleasure, and delyght. In all whych thynges it apperyth that blessednes and felicytye is desyred. For that thynge that anye man requyreth or desyreth aboue all other thynges, the same he iudgeth to be soueraygne good or felicitie. But I haue dyffyned that soueraygne good is perfytte

Frendshyp is a vertue and none of fortunes goodes.

Riches, power, honour, glorye, pleasure, and all other transytorye goods, or pleasures temporall be the goodes of fortune.

Felicitie is adiudged of dyuers men, in diuers goodes of fortune accordynge to theyr seuerall dyspolycions.

horum finis, causaq; alterutro permutant, ut qui diuitias ob potentiam, uoluptatesq; desyderant: uel qui potentiam seu pecunie causa, seu proferendi nominis petunt. In hiis igitur, ceterisq; talibus humanorum actuum, uotorumq; uersatur intentio, uelut nobilitas, fauorq; populoris, quæ uidentur quādam claritudinem comparare: uxor ac liberi, que iocunditatis gratia petuntur: amicorum uero quod sanctissimum quidem genus est, non in fortuna, sed in uirtute numeratur. Reliqua uero uel potentiæ causa, uel delectatiōis assumitur.

Iam uero corporis bona promptum est, ut ad superiora referantur. Robur enim, magnitudoq;, uidetur præstare ualentiam: pulchritudo, atq; uelocitas celebritatem, salubritas uoluptatem. Quibus omnibus solam beatitudinem desyderare liquet. Nam quod quisq; præ ceteris petit, id summum esse iudicat bonum. Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse diffinimus. Quam be-

beatum iudicat esse statū, quem præ cæteris quisq; desyderat. Habes igitur ante oculos propositam fore formam felicitatis humanæ, opes, honores, potentiam, gloriam, uoluptates. Quæ quidem sola considerans Epicurus, consequenter sibi summum bonū uoluptatem esse constituit, quod cætera omnia iocunditatem animo uideantur afferre. Sed ad hominum studia reuertur, quorum animus, etsi caligante memoria, tamen summum bonū repetit: sed ueluti ebrius, qui domū, quo tramite reuertatur, ignorat: Num enim uidentur errare hij, qui nihilo indigere nituntur? Atq; non est aliud, quod æque perficere beatitudinem possit, quam copiosus bonorum omnium status, nec alieni egens, sed sibijpsi sufficiens. Nū uero labūtur hij, qui quod sit optimum, id etiam reuerentiæ cultu dignissimū putant? Minime. Neq; enī uile quiddam, contemnendumq; est, quod adipisci omnium fere mortalium laborat intentio.

fyt felycitie. For euerye man demeth that state to be blessed, that he desireth aboue other thynges. Therefore thou hast before thine eyes shewed and declared the proposed fortune and maner of mannes felicitie, that is ryches, power, honour, glorye and plesures, which thynges truelye the Epicurus onelye considering and beholding, esteemid cōsequentlye with hymselfe, that plesure was soueraygne good or perfyt felycitie, forsomuch as all the other thinges semyd to reioyse the harte and mynde, but none so much as plesure, after hys iudgment. But now I returne againe to mens studyes and ententes, whose mynde and harte seketh the soueraygne good or perfite felycitie, although it be with an imperfette and dull memorye drowned in desyre of worldely goodes, wandryng as a dronken man that knoeth not whych way to go home to hys house. Seme they to erre and goo oute of the waye that labouryth to haue ynoughe and to haue nede of nothynge: noo truelye. Certes there is nothynge that more performeth & geueth blessednes then a plenteous estate of al goods hauyng ynough hymselfe of his owne and nede of none other mans. Do they erre from felycitie, that do thynke that thynge moste worthy reuerence and honor ỹ is best? No truely: For that thing is not vyle and to be dyspysed that the entente of all men lyuyng (almoste) laboureth to optayne. Is not power, to

An be

be nombred in ryches? What ells? Is the thynge to be estemyd weke and seble without strength, that semethe to be more worthye and stronger then all other thyngs? no truely. Is glory fame and renoune nothyng estemyd? no not so. For it cannot be denyed but that all thyng, that is most excellent, semythe to be moste gloryous, and clere. For it is manyfest that blessednes is not carefull and sadde, nor subiect to doloures, and greifes, but full of pleasures and gladnes, what should a man say more when in the leste thynges that can be, some thynge is desyred that delytethe a man to haue, and to enioye as hys owne. And these be the thynges that menne woulde wisshe to haue, and for thys cause they doo seke for and desyre ryches dignities, rule, glory, and pleasures, that by them they do thynke that they shal haue suffisans, reuerēce, power, renoune, fame, myrth, and gladnes. Therefore that thinge muste nedes be good, that men do aske and seke for soo manye dyuers and sundrye wayes. In the which sekyng it is lyghtly shewed, and euydentlye it apperyth, how great the power and strengthe of nature is, that thoughe the sentences and iudgementes of men be dyuerse one contrary to another: yet for all that in louynge & desyryng the ende of good and blessednes, they do agre and be of one mynde and iudgemente.

They seke felycytie, & blyssednes, ẏ seke suffysaunce, euyn so, they ẏ seke for riches dygnyte, rule, glory, fame, renome, & delyte for suffisiaūce: they do seke therin felycite and blsseednes For felicite is suffysaunce, & wanteth nothyng, for yf it dyd want any thinge, it wanteth suffysaūce and consequētly it could not be called iustly felycytie.

An in bonis non est numeranda potentia? Quid igitur? Num imbecillum et sine uiribus estimandum est, quod omnibus rebus constat esse præstantius. An claritudo nihili pendenda est? Sed sequestrari nequit quin omne quod excellentissimum sit, id etiam uideatur esse clarissimum. Nā non esse anxiam, tristemq; beatitudinē, nec doloribus molestijsq; subiectā, quid attinet dicere, quando in minimis quoque rebus id appetitur, quod habere, fruiq; delectet. Atq; hæc sunt quæ adipisci homines uolunt, eaq; de causa diuitias, dignitates, regna, gloriam, uoluptatesq; desyderant: quod per hæc sibi sufficientiam, reuerentiam, potentiam, celebritatem, letitiam credunt esse uenturam. Bonum est igitur, quod tam diuersis studijs homines petunt. In quo quanta sit naturæ uis, facile monstratur: cum licet uariæ, dissidentesq; sententiæ, tamen in diligendo boni fine consentiunt.

Metrum secundum. Phi.

QVanas rerũ fles
ctat habenas,
Natura potens:
quibus immensum,
Legibus orbẽ prouida ser
uet,
Stringatq; ligans irreso
luto,
Singula nexu, placet argu
to
Fidibus lentis promere cã
tu.

Quamuis pœni pulchra
leones
Vinc̃la gestent, manibus
q; datas
Capiant escas, metuantq;
trucem
Soliti uerbera ferre magi
strum,
Si cruor horrida tinxerit
ora
Residesq; olim redeunt ani
mi,
Fremituq; graui memines
re sui:
Laxant nodis colla solutis,
Primuq; lacer deme cru
ento
Domitor rabidas imbuit
iras.

Quæ canit altis garrus
la ramis
Ales, caueæ clauditur an
tro,
Huic licet illita pocula

Philosophy.

IT pleaseth me to shew, with a sow
nynge longe, vpon softe strynges,
by what raynes or meanes, that is
to say: by what naturall inclinacions,
myghtie nature ruleth. And by what
lawes nature beynge prouydente and
circumspecte conserueth and kepythe
the hole greate worlde. And by what
lawes nature kepeth in and fastenyth
all thynges with a fast and sure knot,
that cannot be loosed. Although the
lions of Libia, hauing goodly chaines
aboute their neckes doo take mete at
their maysters handes. And although
they feare their cruell mayster and be
wont to suffer beating, yet if the blood
of beastes that the same lyons haue
deuoured do moist or tast in their mou
thes, that is to saye: if they once taste
bloude: then their corages that before
was forgotten for lacke of vse, cometh
agayne to his olde nature and kynde.
And with gret roryng they breke their
chaynes from their neckes, and fyrste
of all their mayster that kept them as
tame, felyth their rauenyng rage be
yng rente into peces with their blody
teethe, that is to saye: they fyrste kylle
their mayster, that kept thẽ. Likewise
the syngyng byrde that syngeth vpon
the hygh boughes in the woode, if she
be taken and put into a strayte cage,
although the dilygent cure of men de
lytynge in her, geueth her swete drin
kes and dyuers meates wyth pleasaunt

laboure: yet yf ſhe chaũſe to eſcape out of the ſtrayt cage and ſeith the pleſant ſhadowes of the woodes, bryng ſorye of her ſtrayt kepyng, ouerthrow with her metes and treadeth thẽ vnder her fete and flyethe vnto the woodes, & there ſyngeth & warbleth with ſwete notes and ſonges. Alſo the ſprigge or bough of a tree by greate vyolence made croked boweth downe the toppe, but whẽ the hand of him that boweth it, letteth it go at lybertye, it holdethe the toppe vpryght towarde heuen, that is to ſai: it returnyth to his olde naturall courſe The ſonne lykewyſe that at euen before night fallyth (as the poetes faine) into the weſterne waters: by a ſecrete path retourneth his charyot, to his accuſtomed ryſing. So that all thynges naturall do returne and come agayne, to their naturall courſes. And all naturall thynges reioyſeth at theyr returne to their owne nature. And nothynge hath any other preſcribed order but that onelye that hath ioyned the begynnyng to the ende. And hath ſo eſtablyſhed the worlde of it ſelfe: that it ſhall not chaunge from hys naturall courſe.

CErtes, O you erthly men, you do knowe vnperfetly or as it were in a dreme, your owne begynnyng and the verye ende of true felicitie, although you do ſe it by a thynne or ſlender imagination or fantaſye. And therfore

melle,
Largaq; dapes dulci ſtudio
Iudens hominum cura miniſtret,
Si tandẽ arto ſaliens tecto
Nemorum gratas uiderit umbras,
Sparſas pedibus proterit eſtas,
Siluas tãtũ meſta requirit
Siluis dulci uoce ſuſurrat.
Validis quõdã uirgã actã
Pronum flectit uirgã cacumen,
Hanc ſi curuans dextrare miſerit.
Recto ſpectat uertice celũ
Cadit Heſperias Phebus in undas
Sed ſecreto tramite rurſus
Currum ſolitos uertit ad ortus
Repetunt proprios queq; recurſus,
Reddituq; ſuo ſingula gaudent (do
Nec manet ulli traditus ordo
Niſi qd̃ ſimi iunxerit ortũ
Stabilẽq; ſui fecerit orbẽ.

Proſa tertia.

VOs quoq; o terrena animali tenui licet imagine ueſtrũ tamen principium ſomniatis, uerumq; illum beatũ

tudis

tudinis finem, licet minime perspicaci qualicunq; tamen cogitatione perspicitis, eoq; uos ad uerum bonum naturalis ducit intentio, et ab eodem multiplex error abducit. Considera namq; an per ea quibus se homines adepturos beatitudinem putant, ad destinatum finem ualeant peruenire. Si enim uel pecunia uel honores ceteraq;, tale quid afferant, cui nihil bonorum abesse uideatur, nos quoq; fateamur fieri aliquos horum adeptione felices. Quod si neq; id ualent efficere quod promittunt, bonisq; pluribus carent, nonne liquido falsa in eis beatitudinis spes deprehenditur? Primum igitur teipsum qui paulo ante diuitijs affluebas interrogo, inter illas habundantissimas opes nunquam ne animum tuũ concepta exqualibet iniuria confudit anxietas? Bo. Atq; inquam tam libero me fuisse animo quin aliquid semper augeret remisci nequeo. P. Nonne tibi aberat quod abesse non uelles, uel aderat quod adesse noluisses? Boe. Ita est

fore your naturall intent and purpose ledeth you to the true good or blessednes, and much error with draweth you from the same. Consyder nowe than Boecius whether that men may com to that perfyt ende and blessednes by such thyngs as mẽ thought they shuld come by nature, that is to say, yf that ryches or honors and suche temporall thynges can brynge a man anye suche thinge that hath suffisaunce and wantyth nothynge at all. For then I wold thynke that some men were blessed & happye by opteynyng of these foresaid thinges, that is to saye: that hath the sayde goodes of fortune all redye. But and yf those thynges, that is to saye: worldely goodes cannot do the things that they do promysse, and do wante muche goodes, Is not then the kynde of false felicitie apprehended and knoen openly by them? Therefore I aske the Boecius fyrste of all (whyche not longe agoo diddest habound in riches) whether that care dyd not trouble thy mynde for euery wronge done emongest all those aboundaunt ryches. Boe. Certes I doo saye that I cannot remember that I was euer of so quiet mynde, but that somethynge dydde alwayes greue me. Phil. Dyddyst not thou want some thynge that thou woldest haue had, or thou haddest sõthing that thou wouldest not haue hadde? Boe. I saye it is euen soo. Phil. Then thou desyreddeste to haue the thynge

Ryches cannot gyue suffysaunce, but bryngeth in nede of some thynge, and so theris no perfyte felycite in ryches.

 that

that thou dyddest lack, & to lacke that thou haddest. Boe. I saye I do confesse no lesse. Phil. Then there nedeth some thynge that euery man desyrethe, that is to saye: Then euery man hath nede. Boe. I graunt that euery man laketh Phi. Then he that hath nede of anye thinge, is not thoroughly suffised and contented. Bo. I saye the same, P. So then thou lackeddest suffisaũce, when thou haddyst aboundaunce of ryches, Boe. I saye what ells. Phil, Then ryches cannot make a man haue Inough or to be contented, whyche that hee hath, whyche was the thing that they semed to promise. And certes this thing I do thynke cheifelye to be considered, that mony by his owne nature & kynde hath nothynge that it cannot be taken fromme theym that haue it, agaynste theyr wyll, that is to saye: that it hath nothyng in it, but may be taken away whether they wyll or not that haue it. Boe. I do knowledge, that it is so. Phil. Why shouldest thou not confesse it, when the stronger folke takethe it awaye dayly, from the weaker againste theyr wyll: For els whence commethe all these complayntes in courtes, but that mony is taken awaye, from folke agaynst theyr wyll, eyther by force or by crafte and deceyte. Boe. I saye it is soo. Phil. Than euerye man shal haue nede of some outwarde helpe, whereby he maye kepe hys monye. Boe. Who wyl deny that. P. Certes he shuld haue no

inquam. Ph, Illius igitur præsentiam, huius absentiam desyderabas. B. Confiteor inquam. P. Eget uero inquit eo quod quisq; desyrat. Bo. Eget inquam. P. Qui uero eget aliquo, non est usquequaq; sibiipse sufficiens. B: Minime inquam. P. Tu itaq; hanc insufficientiã plenus, inquit opibus sustinebas. B. Quid ni inquam. P. Opes igitur nihilo indigentem sufficientemq; sibi facere nequeunt, & hoc erat quod promittere uidebantur. Atq; hoc quoq; maxime considerandum puto, quod nihil habeat suapte natura pecunia ut hijs a quibus possidetur inuitis nequeat auferri. Bo. Fateor inquam. P. Quid ni, inquit, fateare cum eam quotidie ualentior aliquis eripiat inuito? Vnde enim forenses querimoniæ, nisi quod uel ui, uel fraude a nolentibus pecuniæ repetuntur ereptæ? B. Ita est inquam. P. Egebit igitur, inquit, extrinsecus petito præsidio, quo suam pecuniam quisq; tueatur. B. Quis id inquã neget? P. Atq; non egeret eo

nisi

niſi poſſideret pecuniam, quam poſſet amittere.

B. *Dubitari inquã nequit.*

P. *In contrarium igitur relapſa res eſt. Nam quæ ſufficientes ſibi facere putabantur opes, alieno potius præſidio faciunt indigentes. Quis autem modus eſt, quo pellatur diuitijs indigentia? Num enim diuites eſurire nequeunt? Num ſitire non poſſunt? Num frigus hybernum pecunioſorum membra non ſentiunt? Sed adeſt, inquies, opulentis, quo famen ſatient, quo ſitim frigusq; depellant. Sed hoc modo conſolari quidem diuitijs indigentia poteſt, ſed auferri penitus non poteſt. Nam ſi hæc hians ſemper, acq; aliquid poſcens opibus expletur, maneat neceſſe eſt quæ poſſit explere. Tacco quod naturæ minimũ, qđ auaritiæ nihil ſatis eſt. Quare ſi opes nec ſummouere indigentiam poſſunt, ſed eam faciunt, quid eſt quod eas ſufficientiam præſtare credatis?*

no nede therof, but for that he hath mony, that he maye leſe. Boe. I ſay there is no doute thereof. Phil. Therefore the matter of monye is otherwyſe, thẽ men do thinke it is. For ỹ ryches that were thought to make men to haue ſufficiſaunce and to be contented, maketh theym rather to haue nede of other mennes helpe. What waye is there whereby indigence and nede maye be put away and ſatyſfied with riches? Canne not ryche men be hungerye? Canne not ryche men be thyrſtye? Doo the members and lymes of ryche men, fele no wynter colde? But thou wylte ſaye that ryche men haue Inoughe, to ſlacke they⁊ hũger to quench ther thirſt and to kepe them from cold. Certes by this waye nede and powertie maye be eaſed by ryches. But it cannot be clene taken away. For yf thys indigence & nede, alwayes gapyng and deſyrynge riches, might be ſatiſfied with riches, then it behoueth that there remayne & be ſuch a nede and indigence, that may be fulfylled and ſatyſfyed. But I holde my peace and wyll not tell that a lytell thynge ſuffyſeth nature, but nothynge is Inoughe or ſuffyſeth couetouſnes. Wherefore if ryches cannot put away indigence and nede, but doo cauſe and make indigence and nede: how may it be, that ye can beleue that ryches geneth and bryngeth to any man ynough or ſuffyſaunce.

Nature is ſuffyſed with a lytle, but couetouſnes can neuer be ſatiſfyed.

Thoughe

THoughe a couetuous ryche man, had a ryuer euer flowynge golde contynually, and dyd neuer ceſe, yet coulde it neuer ſtaunche or ſatyſſye his gredy couetouſnes. And although he had as many precyous ſtones of the red ſea, as his necke coulde beare, And althoughe he doth eare hys fruytefull felde with an hundrede oxen, yet thys gredy and inſaciable cure of couetouſnes, wyll neuer lene hym whyles he is a lyue. And his frayle ryches wyll not go with hym when he is dede.

Metrum tertium.

QVamuis fluente
diues auri gur
gite
Non expleturas cogat au
rus opes,
Onoretq; baccis colla ru
bri littoris,
Ruraq; centeno ſcindat o
pima bone,
Nec cura mordax deſer
ſuperſtitem,
Defunctumq; leues non co
mitantur opes.

Philoſophy.

Honoure is a reuerence gyuen to another for a teſtymonye of his vertue Arist. 4. Eticorum.

BVt, do dignities make him honorable & reuerend, that hath them? Is there ſuch vertue in dignyties, that they maye put vertues in the myndes of them that haue dignities and expell vyce? Truelye they be not wonte to expell vyce and wyckednes, but rather to augment the ſame. Wherefore I haue dyſdayne that dignyties ſhould ſo often happen vnto wycked and vitious men. For whyche thinge Catulus that was a vertuous wiſe mã in Rome (Seinge Nonius a vicyous man, ſyttinge in the place of dignitie and iudgmente) called hym a ſwellynge full of corruption (that is to ſaye) a man haunge an hepe of vyces, in hys breſte. As the ſwellynge in the necke called Struma, is ful corruption impoſtumed ſo was he full of vyce and wyckednes. Seyſt thou not howe grete ſhame and vylanye dignities bryngeth to wicked folke,

Reuerẽce is a decent, and cõuenyente gratytude or thankes. Tullius.

Proſa quarta. Phil.

SEd dignitates honorabilem, reuerendumq; eui prouenerint, reddunt. Num uis ea eſt magiſtratibus, ut utentium mentibus uirtutes inſerãt uitia depellant? Atq; non fugare, ſed illuſtrare potius nequitiam ſolent. Quid fit ut indignemur eas ſæpe nequiſſimis hominibus contigiſſe. Vnde Catulus, licet in curili Nonium ſedentem, ſtrumam tamen appellat. Vides ne quantum dedecus malis adijciant dignitates? Atq; minus eorum

po

patebit indignitas, si nullis bonoribus clarescant.

Tu quoq; num tandem tot periculis adduci potuisti, ut cum Decorato maiestratum gereres, cum in eo mẽtem nequissimi scurræ, delatorisq; respiceres? Non enim possumus ob honores reuerẽtia dignos iudicare, quos ipsis honoribus iudicamus indignos. At si quẽ sapientia præditum uides res, num posses eum uel reuerentia, uel ea, qua preditus est sapientia, non dignum putare? B. Minime. Philo. Ineſt enim dignitas propria uirtuti, quam protinus in eos, quibus fuerit adiuncta, transfundit.

Et quia populares facere nequeunt honores, liquet eos propriam dignitatis pulchritudinem non habere. In quo illud est animaduertendum magis.

Nam si eo abiectior est quo magis à pluribus quisque contemnitur, cum reuerendos facere nequeat, quos pluribus ostentat, despectiores potius improbos dignitas facit. Verum non impune. Reddũt nãq; improbi parem dignitatibus

folke? Truelye the vnworthines or malyce of them shuld lesse appere, yf they were not honored. O Boecius myghtest thou be brought to so greate perylles, that thou wouldeste thynke or be contented to bere office or be felowe in office with the man named Decorate, when thou sawest in hym the hart and mynde of a wycked knaue and accuser of men? Certes I cannot iudge them, worthy reuerẽce for their honors, whõ I deme vnworthy to haue such honors. But yf thou sawest a man ful of wysdome, myghtest thou thynke him, vnworthy of reuerence, or of the wysdom that he hath? Boe. No truely. Phylo. Certes dygnyties be properly incident to vertue. And vertue gyueth dygnyties anone to them, to whom dignities shalbe ioyned. And for bycause that honours, that the people do gyue to men, can not make men worthye suche honours: it appereth that honours haue no proper beautie, or similitude of dignytie of it selfe. In whiche thynge the same thynge aboue sayde, is to be consydered. For yf a man be so moche the lesse estemed, bycause he is dyspysed of many? When that dygnytie can not make euyll men reuerende: then dygnitie maketh yeuill folke, be rather dyspraysed, then praysed, which disprayse dignytie sheweth to many. And truely not without a cause. For the wycked do reuenge them selfe vpon dygnytie, when they defowle it, with theyr vilanys

Decoratus was a mã put in office, by kynge Theodoryke, to rule the cõmenaltie whiche was an euyll man, a promotor or an accuser, & for that Boecius wold not be associate with hym. Honour folowethe vertue. 4. Eticorum euyl people be worthy no honoure.

Vertue maketh a gentylman, or noble man, and not power, or ryches.

nye and wyckednes. And that thou mayst knowe that the same trewe reuerence can not happen to any man by these shadowy, or transytorie dygnyties, vnderstande thus. If a man had vsed to haue moch dygnytie in the Cõsul ship, and by chaũce came emongest straunge nacions, shulde his honoure of the consull shyp, make him to be honoured amongest the straungers? But and yf this honoure, were a naturall geste to dygnyties, they myght neuer cease any where, amongest people frõ doynge theyr office and dutie, as the fyre in euery countrye neuer ceaseth to heate and warme. But for bycause, to be reuerenced and honourable cõmeth not to anye of the proper nature and strength in it selfe, but mans false and vayne opinion causeth it: anone when they come there vnto them that esteme not the same dygnyties, they: honours immedyatlye vanysshe awaye & cease. But thou maist say, ỳ it is so amongest straũge nacions. Do not the dignyties endure alwaies amongest thẽ, where they first began? Understand no. Truly the dygnyte of the prefectory, was somtyme a great power, amonge the Romaynes, whiche nowe is nothyng els, but a vayne name, and the dygnytie of the senatours, that somtime was esteemed an hyghe honoure is nowe a great burden or charge. And yf a man had the office to take hede of corne and other vytayle of the people, he was taken

bus uicem, quas sua contu-
gione commaculant. Atq;
ut cognoscas ueram illam
reuerentiã per has umbra-
tiles dignitates non posse
contingere, sic collige. Si
quis multiplici consulatu
functus, in Barbaras natio-
ones forte deuenerit, ue-
nerandúmne Barbaris ho-
nor faciet? Atq; si hoc natu-
rale, munus dignitatibus
foret, ab officio suo quos
quo gentium nullo modo
cessarent. Sicut ignis ubi-
que terrarum, nunquam
tamen calere desistit. Sed
quoniam id est nõ propri-
uis, sed hominum fallax o-
nectit opinio, uanescun
illico, cum ad eos uenerin
qui dignitates eas esse no
existimant. Sed hoc apud
exteras nationes. Interea
uero, apud quos ortæ sun
non perpetuo perdurant.
Atq; prefectura mag
olim potestas, nunc inan
nomen, & senatorij censu
grauis sarcina. Si quis qui
dam populi curasset annon
nam, magnus habebatur.
nunc ea prefectura qui
abiectis

abiectius? Vt enim paulo ante diximus, quod nihil habet proprij decoris, opinione utentium nunc splẽdorem accipit, nunc amittit. Si igitur reuerendos facere nequeunt dignitates, si ultro improborum contagione fordescunt, si mutatione temperũ splendere desinunt, si gentium estimatione uilescũt, quid est quod in se expetendæ pulchritudinis habeant, nedum alijs prestent.

ken for a greate man. Nowe what is lesse esteemed then the said prouoltship: Certes as I sayde a lytell before, the thynge that hath no proper beawtye, or worshype of it selfe, receyueth some tyme renoune and some tyme loseth renoune by meanes of the vsage of the thinge. If therefore dignities cannot make men reuerende: If by their own meanes, they were foule, & by the vice of wicked folke: If they lose their bewtye and vertue by mutacion of tymes: And if they become detestable & foule, in mens estimacion: what goodnes is in them to be desyred, and cannot geue the same vnto other: vnderstand none at all.

Metrum quartum. Ph.

QVamuis se tyro, superbus ostro
Comeret, & niueis lapillis,
Inuisus tamen omnibus uigebat,
Luxurie Nero seuientis.
Sed quondam dabat improbus uerendis,
Patribus indecores curules.
Quis illos igitur putet beatos,
Quos miseri tribuunt honores.

Philosophy.

ALthough the proud Nero, with all hys detestable and furious lechery, decked and adorned himselfe wyth fayre purple of the country of Tyre, and also wyth white stones, called pearles, yet for all that he liued disdained and hated of al men. And he hauynge great segnorye and lordshyp gaue to the reuerende fathers, the senators of Rome, reuerent seates, and roumes, of dignities in courtes. Who therefore would thynke and take such honours or roumes of dignitye good that such wretches do geue: vnderstãd no man.

It is called reuerent setes and romes, þ wycked men do gyue.

Philosophy.

CAn kyngdomes and the acquaintaunce or fauoure of kinges, make a man myghtye? Ye aunswerith himselfe in mockynge (called Ironice) what elles, when that their power enduryth euer? But surely olde tyme past, and thys our presente age, and tyme, is full of examples ỹ kyngs haue chaungyd their felicitie, into sorowe and calamyte. And philosophye sayth agayne Ironice, O full noble & hyghe excellent is that power, whyche is not founde sufficient ynoughe to preserue & defend it selfe. And if the power of kynges be the cause of blessednes or felicitie, if the same power fayleth in any part, do it not diminisshe felicitye, and bryngeth in wretchednes and miserye? But yet although the empire, & rule of mankynde be spred very wyde, and brode, It behouethe that there be many people lefte, and remaynynge, ouer whome euerye kynge hath not dominion. So that, on whatsoeuer syde, power wanteth, that shuld make men blyssfull and happye, on the same syde entreth weakenes or lacke of power that maketh men wretches. So that by this meanes it must nedes be, that there is in kynges more wretchednes and infelicitie: then blessednes and felycitie. A certayne Tyraunte that hadde experience of the peryll of his estate and fortune, dyd declare & shewe the feare and dreade of his kyngedome by the terroure of a swerde hangynge ouer

No man lyueth alwaies in felicitie, but sometyme, he taysteth of aduersytie.

There was a kynge of Sycil, named Dionysyus that was euer sad, his kamplyer asked him why he was not merye: therupon

Prosa quinta. Phi.

AN uero regnates gumq; familiaritas efficere potentem ualent? Quid ni, quando eorum felicitas perpetuo perdurat? Atq; plena est exemplorum uetustas, plena etiam præsens ætas, qui reges felicitatem calamitate mutauerint. O preclara potentia, quæ nec ad conseruationem quidem sui, satis efficax inuenitur Quod si hæc regnorũ potestas beatitudinis auctor est, nonne si qua parte defuerit felicitatem minuat miseriamq; importet? Sed quamuis latis humana tendantur imperia plures necesse est gentes relinqui, quibus regnum quisq; non imperet. Qua uero parte beatos faciens desinit potestas, hac impotentia subintrat, quæ miseros facit. Hoc igitur modo maiorem regibus inesse necesse est miseriæ porcionem. Expertus sortis sue periculorum tirannus, regni metus pendentis supra uerticem gladij terrore similes

milauit. Quæ est igitur, hæc potestas quæ solicitudinum morsus expellere nec formidenum aculeos uitare nequit. Atq; uellèt ipsi uixisse securi, sed nequeunt. Dehinc, de potestate gloriantur? An tu potentem censes quem uidere uelle quod non possit efficere? Potentem censes qui satellite latus ambit? Qui quos terret ipse plus metuit? Qui ut potens esse uideatur in seruientium manu situs est? Nam quid ego de regum familiaribus disseram, cum regna ipsa tante imbecillitatis plena demonstrem. Quos quidè regia potestas sæpe incolumis, sæpe autem lapsa prosternit. Nero Senecam familiarem præceptoremq; suum ad elegendæ mortis coegit arbitrium. Papinianum diu inter aulicos potentem, militum gladijs Antonius obiecit. Atq; uterq; potentiæ suæ renũciare uoluerunt, quorum Seneca opes etiam suas tradere Neroni, seq; in ocium conferre, conatus est, sed dum ruituros moles ipsa trahit,

ouer the heade of one of hys familyer frendes. What is therefore this power that cannot put away the bytinge of carefulnes, nor auoid the prickings of feare. Certes these kynges woulde fayne lyue safely and sure, but they cãnot. Paye they therefore from hencefoythe reioyse of theyr power? Doest thou iudge hym myghtye whom thou seyst would do that thynge that he cãnot do? Doest thou esteme him myghtye that hath many men of armes, aboute hym? That more fearythe them that feareth him? how semeth he mighty that is put in the handes of hys seruauntes? For what shal I say of them that be in the fauour of kynges, when that I my selfe haue shewed the, that the same kyngedomes of themselfe be vnsure and mutable. And that often tymes the power of kynges, when it decayethe and fayleth, ouer throweth such as it auaunsed whẽ it flouriſhed and was in prosperitie. Kynge Nero constrayned Seneke his familiar maister that taughte hym, to chose what death he woulde dye. Antonius, commaunded Papinion, that hadde bene longe a valiaunt man in ỹ court, to be slayne with the swordes of knyghtes. And both of them, that is to saye: Senecke, and Papinion, would haue forsaken and haue yelded vp their power and auctoritie yf they myght. Of the whyche two notable menne, Senecke labored to geue vnto Nero his riches, to haue his fauour and to go himselfe

he made a damket, and caused his familyer to syt therat, & a naked swerd hangyng ouer his head, by a small threde. The man seyng the swerd coulde not bemery for feare, to whõ Dionysius sayde such is my life, euer in feare, yet ỹ thoughte ste it happy, & suche ts the lyfe of kinges, alwayes in feare of some euil chaũce, for in hyest Auctority, is moste iobardy. this Dionysyus feared so moche Barbours that his dawghters were taughte to shaue hym, and to clyppe his heare. Senecke was a famous learned man, and taught Kynge Nero in his chyldehode. Papinius was one most in fauoure with the tyraunt Anthonius Themperoure.

into exile alone. But whyles that the same aucthoritie and power of kynges ruleth men redye to fall, and in suche indignation, nether of them, that is to saye: of Seneke and Papinion, myght do that he woulde. Therefore what is this power, whych when men haue it, that they be aferde of: whych whē thou wouldst haue it, thou art not suer of it, And when thou wouldest leue it, thou cannest not eschewe it. Be they more thy frendes at nede, that fortune, and not vertue getteth? But surelye whom good fortune maketh thy frende, euyll fortune maketh thine enemye and foe. And certes what pestylence is stronger to hurt, then a famylyer enemye or fo? Understand surely none at al.

trahit, neuter quod uoluit effecit. Que est igitur ista potentia quam pertimescunt habentes? quam nec cum habere uelis, tutus sis & cum deponere cupias, uitare non poßis. An præsidio sunt amici, quos non uirtus, sed fortuna conciliat? Sed quem felicitas amicum fecit, infortunium faciet inimicum Quæ uero pestis efficatior ad nocendum, quam familiaris inimicus.

Philosophy.

He is myghty that can subdu sensualitye in hymselfe & folowe reason.

HE that wylbe myghtie, must subdue and mayster his cruell desirs and appetytes, and may not put his necke vnder (as one ouercome) to ẏ foule raygnes and libertye of lecherye or vicious mocions. Although thy power and aucthoritie extendethe so farre, as the grounde and countrey of India, trembleth and fereth thy lawes, and cō maundementes. And albeit, that the ferthest Ile in the sea called Thile, doth serue and obeye the: Yet if thou cannest not put awaye the foule darke cares, & auoyde wretched complaynts from the that do happen by euyll fortune, thy power is nothing, or thou hast no power

Thile is an Ilande in the sea beyonde Britain wher the sonne is in the hyghest in somer and goeth not beyōde the same Ilād

Metrum quintum. Phil.

Qui se uolet esse potentem,
Animos domet ille feroces:
Nec uicta libidine colla
Fœdis submittat habenis.
Etenim licet indica longe
Tellus tua iura tremiscat,
Et seruiet ultima Thyle,
Tamen atras pellere curas
Miserasq; fugare querelas
Non posse, potentia non est.

Prosa

Prosa sexta. Phil.

GLoria uero quàm fallax sæpe, & quã turpis est? Vnde nõ iniuria Tragicus exclamat O gloria gloria millibus mortaliũ nihil aliud facta, nisi auriũ inflatio magna. Plures enim magnum sæpe nomen falsis uulgi opinionibus abstulerunt: quo qd turpius excogitari potest? Nam qui falso prædicãtur suis ipsi necesse est laudibus erubescant. Quæ si etiam meritis conquisitæ sint, quid tamen sapientis adiecerint conscientiæ? Qui bonum suum non populari rumore, sed conscientiæ ueritate metitur. Quod si hoc ipsum, propagasse nomen, pulcrum uidetur, consequens est, ut fœdum non extendisse iudicetur. Sed cum (uti paullo ante disserui) plures gẽtes necesse sit esse, ad quas unius famæ hominis nequeat peruenire, fit, ut quem tu existimas glorioſũ esse, pro maxima parte terrarũ uideatur inglorioſus. Inter hæc uero popularem gratiam nec commemoratione quidem dignam puto, quæ nec

er at all worthy to be esteemed.

Philosophy.

BUt how deceyueable is glory oftẽ tymes, wherupon (not without cause) a certayne poete (that vsed to make dities) cried oute and sayde. O glory glorye, emongeste thousandes of men, thou art nothyng ells but a great swellynge or fillynge of mens eares. For certes manye men, haue receyued and had often grete fame, by the false opinion of the people. And what thing may bethought more feble, then suche fame of the people: For they ỹ be praysed vnworthelye, ought to be ashamed of their prayse, whyche prayses if they be iustly deserued, what thinge hath it augmentyd to the conscience of a wise mã, that mesureth not his good by the rumour of the people, but by the truth of hys conscience. And yf this thing be goodly to haue a fame spredde abrode, then is it a consequence that it is a foul thinge to be kept close, And as I sayde a lytell before, that it muste neades be that there be manye people, to whome the fame of one man cannot come, it followeth then that he whome thou estemest to be famous and renomed semeth not glorious nor famous, in the moste parte of the worlde. And truelye emongest these thynges, I do not thynke the fauour or prayse of the people worthye to be remembred, that commeth not by wyse and iuste iudgement, nor firmely endureth

Glorye is a common fame with laud and prayse.

Fame is the knowledge of a man for hys actes & deades as wel farre of as nyghe.

A foole setteth his mynd, vpõ glorye, a wise man, vpon his conscience.

If thou bee sayze thanke nature. If thou be noble, of blode, thanke thy parentes. If thou be vertuous, prayse god. If thou be ryche, thãke fortune.

endureth or continueth euer. Nowe truely, what man seith not how vaine and slipperie the name of nobilitie and gentlesse is: Which if it be referred to glorye & renoune of lynage, it is none of theirs that soo do glorye therin. For nobilitie or gentlesse semeth to be a certayne prayse, commynge by the deserts of their auncetoures. And if laude and praysynge maketh nobilitie or gentelesse, then muste they be nedes noble and gentyll, that be praysed. Therfore another mans glorye, nobilitie, or gentelles, maketh not the noble or gentle, yf thou haue no nobilitie or gentlesse of thy selfe, commynge by thine owne desertes. But Certes yf ther be any good in noblesse or gentles, I thynke it semeth to be as a thynge of necessitie ioyned to noblesse and gentles, that they do not degenerate or vary from the vertue of their noble, or gentle progenitours and auncestours.

nec iudicio uero prouenit, nec unquam firma perdurat. Iam uero quàm sit insane, quam futile dignitatis nomen quis non uideat? Quæ si ad claritudinẽ referatur aliena est. Videtur namq; esse nobilitas quædam de meritis ueniẽs laus parentum. Quod si claritudinem prædicatio facit, illi sunt clari necesse est, qui prædicantur. Qua re splendidum te, si tuam non habes, aliena claritudo non efficit. Quod si quid est in nobilitate bonum, id esse arbitror solum, ut imposita nobilibus necessitas uideatur, ne a maiorum uirtute degenerent.

Philosophy.

Nobylytie, is an excellencye, taken from the fyrste begynnynge, that is to saye: from God that gyueth the soule to the mortall body.

ALL mankynde lyuynge in thys worlde commeth of one and like byrth. For Certes one alone is the father of thynges. And there is one alone that mynistreth and geuethe all thynges, he gaue to the sonne his beames, he gaue to the mone her hornes, ỹ is, to be sharp at both endes in ỹ wane, he gaue vnto mankynde the earth, and the sterres vnto the firmament, he inclosed the soule of man with members of

Metrum sextum. Ph

OMne hominum genus
Simile surgit aborsu.
Vnus enim rerũ pater est,
Vnus qui cuncta ministrat
Ille dedit phœbo radios
Dedit & cornua lunæ.
Ille homines etiam terris
Dedit & sidera cœlo.
Hic clausit membris animos

Celsa sede petitos.
Mortales igitur cunctos
Edit nobile germen.
Quid genus & proauos strepitis,
Si primordia uestra
Auctoremq; deum spectes
Nullus degener extat
Ni uicijs peiora fouens,
Proprium deserat ortum.

of the body, which soule came from the high sete of heuen. Therefore all mortall men came of noble sede or begynnyng, that is to saye, from god. Whye then do you bost your selfe of your kinred and auncetors. For yf you beholde god, your begynnyng and maker, then is there none degenerate, that is to say vnnoble or vngentell of byrthe, except he forsake God, hys begynnynge, geuing hymselfe to vyces.

Prosa septima Phi.

QVid autem de corporis uoluptatibus loquar? Quarum appetentia plena est anxietatis, satietas uero pœnitentiæ. Quantos illæ morbos, quam intolerabiles dolores, quasi quendam fructum nequitiæ, fruentium solent referre corporibus, quarum motus quid habeat iocunditatis ignoro. Tristes uero esse uoluptatum exitus quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum uolet, intelliget. Quæ si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causæ est, quin pecudes quoq; beatæ esse dicantur, quarũ omnis ad explendã corporalem lasciuiam festinat intentio. Honestißima quidem

Philosophy.

But what shall I saye of corporall plesures, the desire whereof is full of carefulnes, and the satisfyenge thereof is ful of payne and sorow, how great sycknes and intollerable dolours be these pleasures wonte to brynge to the bodyes of suche as do vse them, as a certayne fruyte of such wyckednes, of the whyche pleasures, what delectacion their motions and effectes haue, I know not. For whosoeuer wil remẽber hymselfe of his pleasurs, he shall well knowe that the endes thereof be sorow full and greuous. Whyche pleasures temporall if they coulde make men blessed and happye, then is there no cause but that brute beastes may also be called blessed, whose hole intent and purpose, hasteth to fulfyll their bodelye plesure. The reioysynge also of wyfe and chyldren should be honest, but it is said much agaynst nature and kynde, that some haue had chyldren ẏ haue ben tormentors

A harlot asked Demosthenes the Philosopher a. C. talẽtes, for once to companye with her carnaly, but he lokig vpwarde towarde heauen sayde, he would not bye so gret paine so deare

There be two maner of pleasures, the one intellectuall, that consisteth in heauenlye thinges, the other is temporall, that cõsisteth, ĩ worldly, and transytorie thynges.

The fathers mother, be carefull for theyr Chyldren, yf they be good, for feare of euil, yf they bee not good, they be sorye for theyr euyll.

mentors to their parentes, but I doo not knowe howe many, of the whiche chyldren, howe bytynge and carefull euery conditiõ is, it is no nede to shewe the, that hast proued it alredy. Nor yet to moue the beinge carefull nowe for the same. In whych thing I do allowe the sentens of my dyscyple Euripydis that sayde, he is happye by mischaunce that hath no chyldren.

Lecherye is a shorte pleasure bryngynge in longe payne. for it distroyeth vertue, it shorteneth the life, and commonly dystroy the bodye and shortenyth the lyfe.

ALl pleasure temporall hathe thys thinge in it. That is to saye. It vereth and troubleth all thẽ that vse it, which prickes or sorowe. And it is like to the stingynge of bees sleyng aboute. After that the bee hath put out his swete honye, he sleyth and stingeth with ouerlonge paine the hartes of thẽ that be stinged. That is asmuch to sai, as the anguyshe and payne that folowe-eth after temporal plesure, is farre longer, then the pleasure thereof. Or as a man woulde saye: for a lytle pleasure, longe payne. Or thus: the honye is not somuche delycyous and sweete, but the payne of stynging of a bee, is much more dolorous, to hym that tastethe bothe.

Philosophy.

THerefore there is no doughte but that these wayes, be certayne byewayes vnto felicitie or blessednes and cannot bryng anye man thyther as they do promisse to bryng thẽ. But wyth

dem coniugis, liberorumq; foret iocunditas, sed minus è natura dictum est, nescio quem, filios in uenisse tortores. Quorum quàm sit mordax quæcũq; conditio, neq; alias expertũ te, neq; nunc anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam probo, qui carentem liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem.

Metrum septimum.

HAbet hoc uoluptas omnis
Stimulis agit frementes,
Apiumq; par uolantum
Vbi grata mella fudit,
Fugit, & nimis tenaci
Ferit icta corda morsu.

Prosa octaua. Philo.

NIhil igitur dubium est, quin hæ ad beatitudinẽ uiæ deuia quædam sint, nec perducere eò quenquam ualeant, ad quod se perductu-ras esse promittunt. Quan-

til

tis uero implicitæ malis sint breuißime monstrabo. Quid enim, pecuniam ne congregate conaberis? sed eripies habenti. Dignitatibus fulgere uelis? danti supplicabis, & qui præire cæteros honore cupis, posscendi humilitate uilescet. Potentiam ne desyderas? subiectorum insidijs obnoxius periculis subiacebis. Gloriam petis? sed per aspera quæq; distractum secum esse desistis. Voluptariã uitã degas? sed qs nõ spernat, arq; abijciat uilissimæ fragilißimeq; rei corporis seruitium? Iam uero qui bona præ se corporis ferunt, quam exigua, quã fragili possessione nituntur? Num enim elephantes mole, thauros robore, superare poteritis? Num tigres uelocitate præibitis? Respicite cœli spatium firmitudinem, celeritatem & aliquando desinite uilia mirari. Quod quidem cœlum non hijs potius est, quam sua qua regitur ratione mirandum. Forme uero nitor ut rapidus est, ut

with howe great perylles and euyls, they be wrapped, I wil shew you shortlye. Certes what thynge of these folowing is without peryll. Thou shalte not goo aboute to gather monye, but thou shalte take it awaye from some man that hathe it, If thou wouldeste shyne wyth dignities, thou must make petition to hym that geueth them: If thou desirest to excell others in honoure, thou makest thy selfe subiecte, by humble askynge of them. If thou desire power: thou shalt be in daunger of besegingor layinge in awayte of them that be inferiors to the: If thou aske glory, thou being troubled wyth euery aduersitie, cãnest not be quyet. And if thou woldest lede a voluptuouse lyfe, euery mã wold dispise the and cast in thy teth, the thrall dome and bondage of thy bodily actes, and dedes, most vyle and byrttell, that is to saye: that thou art a bondeman to the vile pleasures of thy bodye. Nowe than, they that desyre corporall goodes aboue them selfe, that is to saye: aboue reason, howe lytell and fraile possessyon do they labour for? Cannyst thou excell the elephantes in greatenes, or the bulles in strenghte? mayste thou surmoũt the tyger in swiftnes? loke vpon the space and compasse of the firmamẽt the stedfastnes and swyftenes thereof, and than cesse to wonder at these vile inferior worldly thinges. Whych fyrmament certes is not rather to be wondred at for these thynges, but for the

He that is full of mony, is violent to other, from whom he had it.

He that folowth pleasures of the body is seruaunt of his body.

Alcibiades was the fayreſt woman, that coulde be ſeen, in Ariſtotelles tyme, in ſo moche that his ſcolers brought her to Arystotell, to loke vpon, & beholde.

ſelf ſame reſon wherby it is gouerned. But howe ſwyftly paſſynge away and tranſitorye and howe fletynge & more ſwyfter fadynge awaye, is the beawty of the body, thē ỹ mutabilitie or chaūge of the ſommer flowers. And (as Ariſtotle ſayth) if that men had eyes as quick as a beaſt named Lynx, ſoo that their ſighte myghte ſe thorowe or penetrate the bodies that they doo ſee, ſhoulde not that bodye of Alcibiades that was mooſte fayre without fourthe, ſeme moſt foule within to them that ſawe ỹ in trayles, or inner partes thereof? And ſo therefore thy owne nature cauſethe not the to ſeme fayre, but the wekenes of the eyes, that loketh vpon the, cawſeth it. But eſteme thou the goodes or fayrenes of the bodye as much as thou wylt, ſo that thou doeſt knowe that the ſame goodes or fayrenes, whatſoeuer it be that thou meruaileſt at, or ſo eſteemeſt, maye be deſſolued and clene takē awaye, with the heate of a feuer, that laſteth but three dayes. Of all whyche thynges before ſayd, a man may gather breyfely that theſe worldely thynges, that cannot perfourme the goodnes that they promes or ſeme to haue in thē nor be yet perfytte by heppynge vppe of goodes they (I ſay) be not as ways and pathes to brynge men to felycitye and bliſſidnes, nor can make men happy or bleſſed.

A feuer of three daies is a peſtilent feuer, that for the mooſte parte, kylleth the patient in that ſhort time

ut uelox & uernadium florū mutabilitate fugatior. Quod ſi (ut Ariſtoteles ait) linceis oculis homines uterentur, ut eorum uiſus obſtantia penitraret, nonne introſpectis uiſceribus, illud Alcibiadis ſuperficie pulcherrimum corpus turpiſſimum uideretur? Igitur te pulchrum uideri nō tua natura, ſed oculorum ſpectantium reddit infirmitas. Sed æſtimare quam uultis nimio corporis bona, dum ſciatis hoc quodcunq; miramini triduanæ febris igniculo poſſe diſſolui. Ex quibus omnibus illud etiam in ſummam rem digere licet, quod hec que nec preſtare quæ pollicentur bona poſſunt, nec omnium bonorum congregatione perfecta ſunt, ea nec ad beatitudinem quaſi quidam calles ferunt, nec beatos ipſa perficiunt.

Phi-

Metrum octauum. Ph.

HEu heu quam mis
serostramita denio
Abducit ignorātia
Non aurum in uiridi que
ritis arbore,
Nec uitæ gemmas carpitis
Non altis laqueos monti
bus abditis,
Vt pisce ditetis dapes.
Nec uobis capreas si libe
at sequi,
Thirrena captatis uada.
Ipsos quin etiam fluctibus
abditos,
Norunt recessus equoris.
Quæ gemmis niueis unda
feratior,
Vel quæ rubētis purpure,
Necnon quæ tenere pisce
uel asperis
Præstent echinis littora.
Sed quoniam lateat quod
cupiunt bonum,
Nescire ceci sustinent
Et quod stelliferum trans
abijt polum,
Tellure diuersi petunt.
Quid dignum stolidis men
tibus imprecer?
Opes honores ambiant.
Et cum falsa graui mole
parauerint,
Tunc uera cognoscant bo
na.

Prosa

Phylosophy.

ALas, alas, what ignorannce le
dethe wandringe wretches in a
wronge waye clene contrary frō
felicitie, and perfet goodnes. Ye seke
not golde, vpon the grene tree, nor ga
ther perles vpon the vyne tree, ye hyde
not your engynce or nettes to take fysh
vpon the hyghe mountaignes to make
rych feastes of fyshe, And ye goe not to
the waters Therene, when you lyst to
hunt the goote or roo. Yea do knowe
the secrete ebbynges, crekes, & cauer
nes in the flouds of the sea, and which
shore of the sea is full of whyte perles,
or whych shore aboundith most with a
shell fyshe, that serueth to dye red pur
ple with all. And whyche costes of the
see hath aboundaunce of tender fishes,
or of sharp fyshes called Echynes. But
men do make themselfe so blynde, that
they force not to knowe wher the sayd
perfytte goodnes and felicitie, lyethe
hidde, that they seke for, and doo couet
or desyre. And dyuers of them do seke
in the erth, that perfyt felicitie, & sur
mounteth the fyrmament, that beryth
the sterres. What maye I desyre wor
thy for the folyshe thoughtes & myndes
of men. They seke for ryches and ho
nor, and when they haue gotten suche
false goodes with great trauell: Then
I would wyshe that they myght knowe
the trewe and perfyt goodes and felp
citie.

Vada Therena est mare Tyr
renū in Italia.

Philosophy.

HEtherto it suffyseth that I haue shewed the maner and forme, of false felicite or blessednes, which if thou beholdeste perfetlye, it restythe to declare from henceforthe, whyche is the very true felicitie, Boe. Truelye I do se, that ryches cannot be satisfied with suffysaunce, nor power wyth kyngedomes, nor reuerence with dygnities, nor glory with nobilitie or gētles, nor myrth with pleasures.

Phil. And hast thou perceyued the causes why it is so? Bo. Certes me semeth that I see them as it were thorowe a thynne or narrowe chyn or clyfte, that is to saye: not very perfytlye, but I had leuer knowe them more apparauntly of the. Phil. Truely the redye waye to knowe them is very perfytte. For that thinge, that by nature is symple plaine and inseperable, mans errour deuideth and seperatith the same, and leadethe it from the true and perfyt good or felicitie, vnto false and vnperfyt good, & in felicitie. But thynkest thou thys, that a man hath nede of nothinge, that nedeth power? Boe. I say nay. Ph. Trulye thou sayest well, for if there be anye thing that in any matter is of weke power, in that behalfe, it is nedefull that it wanteth and lacketh the helpe of som other. Boe. I saye it is euen so.

Phil. Therefore suffysaunce and power be both one and lyke by nature and kynde. Boe. So it semethe. Phil. And doest thou think that such thynges, as suffy-

Prosa nona.

HActenus mendacis formam felicitatis ostendiße suffecerit, quam si perspicaciter intueris, ordo est deinceps, quæ sit uera monstrare. B. Atq; uideo inquam, nec opibus sufficientiam, nec regnis potentiam, nec reuerentiam dignitatibus, nec celebritatem gloriam, nec letitiam uoluptatibus, posse contingere. Ph. An etiam causas cur id ita sit deprehendisti? B. Tenui quidem ueluti rimula mihi uideor intueri, sed ex te apertius cognoscere malim. P. Atq; promptißima ratio est. Quod enim simplex est indiuisumq; natura, id error humanus seperat, & à uero atq; perfecto, ad falsum imperfectumq; traducit. An tu arbitraris hoc (quod nihilo indigeat) egere potentia? B. Minime inquam. P. Recte tu quidem, nam si quid est quod in ullare imbecillioris ualentie sit, in hac præsidio necesse est egeat alieno. B. Ita est inq̄ P. Igitur sufficientie potētieq;, una eademq; est natura. Bo. Sic uidetur.

P. Quod uero huiusmodi sit, spernendum ne esse cẽses, an contra, rerum omnium ueneratione dignissimum. B. At inquam, nec dubitari quidem potest. P. Addamus igitur sufficientie potentieq; reuerentiam, ut hæc tria unum esse iudicemus. B. Addamus siquidem uera uolumus confiteri. Ph. Quid igitur inquit, obscurũ ne hoc atq; ignobile censes esse, an omni celebritate clarissimũ? Considera uero ne quod nihilo indigere, quod potẽtissimum, quod honore dignissimum esse concessum est, egere claritudine, quã sibi præstare non possit, atq; ob id aliqua ex parte uideatur abiectius?

Bo. Non possum, inquam, quin hoc uti est, ita etiã celeberrimum esse confitear. Phi. Consequens igitur est ut claritudinem superioribus tribus nihil differre fateamur. B. Consequitur inquam. P. Quod igitur nullius egeat alieni, quod suis cuncta uiribus possit, quod sit clarum atq; reuerendũ, nõne hoc etiam constat esse læ

suffisaunce, and power be, are to be dispysed, or contrarye wyse, that they be most worthy reuerence aboue all thinges. Boe. I saye it is worthy reuerence and it may be no doute thereof.

Phil. Let vs therefore conferre reuerence, to suffysaunce and power, that we may iudge these three thynges, all one thynge. Boe. Let vs adde them together as one thynge, yf we wyll confesse the truthe. Phil. What thynkest thou than, dooste thou iudge that to be an obscure and ignoble thynge, that is suffysaunt, myghty and reuerend, or els right clere and excellent by al fame and renoune? And consider also whether that thinge, that hath nede of nothynge, that is moste myghtye, that is most worthy honor (as it is afore graũted) and hath nede yet of fame, and renoune, whyche it cannot geue vnto it selfe, shoulde it seeme for that more abiecte or lesse estemed of any parte?

Boe. I can not denye it, but I muste nedes confesse it, as it is in dede, ryght famous of renoune and noblenes.

Phil. Then it is a consequence, that we confesse and graunt that glory and renoune nothynge differethe from the other three, that is to say: from ryches, suffysaunce and power. Boe. I saye it folowethe. Phil. Than the thinge that hath no nede of any other, that canne do all thinges of his owne myght, that is clere noble and reuerend: do not this truely appere to be a thynge moste ioy-

full

full. Boe. I saye I cannot certaynelye tell or thynke from whence any sorowe maye happen to any such thynge.

Phil. Then it is nede that we muste graunt this thinge to be full of gladenes, if the forsayd thynges remayne true. And also we must nedes graunte that the names of sufficiaunce, power, nobleste reuerence and gladnes, be dyuers and sondry thynges, but ther substaunce is all one, without any dyuersitie. Boe. I saye it must nedes be euen so. Phil. Then the selfe same thynge that is all one and symple or pure of nature, and cannot be deuyded, the wyckednes of men deuydeth it, and when they labour to get part of a thyng that hath no partes, they nether gette anye porcion of the thynge, nor yet the selfe same thynge that they desyre. Boe. I saye after what maner do men deuyde the thynges. Phil. He that seketh ryches, to auoyde and defende pouertie, he laboureth not to get power, but had leuer be accounted nedy vyle and pore, and also forgo and lose many naturall pleasures, then he wold lose the mony that he hath gotten. But by this meanes he that lacketh power, he that is greued, he that is vile or out caste, and he that is of noo fame or of no reputation, hath no suffysaunce. And truelye he that onely desyreth power, spendeth and wasteth riches, dispiseth pleasures and honoure wythoute power, and setteth not by glorye.

Gladnes is a quyetnes, or cõtentacion of a mans appetyte, or delyte in anye good thynge that he hath gotten.

He that desyreth moch one thynge onelye, amongeste other worldlye thynges: Semeth to dyspyse al other, but onelye that he so feruentlye desyreth. & yet he hath nede of manye other thynges, that be necessarie to hym.

lætissimum? Bo. Sed unde huic, inquam, tali mœror ullus obrepat, nec cogitare quidem possum. P Quare plenum esse lætitiæ (si quidem superiora manebunt) necesse est confiteri. Atq; illud quoq; per eadem necessarium est, sufficientiæ, potentiæ, claritudinis, reuerentiæ, iocunditatis, nomina quidè esse diuersa, sed nullo uero modo discrepare substantiam. Bo. Necesse est, inquam.

P. Hoc igitur quod est unũ simplexq; natura prauitas hominum dispertit, & dũ rei, quæ partibus caret, partem conatur adipisci, nec portionem ullã nec ipsã quã affectat assequitur B. Quonam modo inquã? P. Qui diuitias, inquit, petit penuriæ fuga, de potentia nihil laborat, uilis obscuruq; esse mauult. Multas etiam sibi naturales quoq; subtrahit uoluptates, ne pecuniam, quam parauit, amittat. Sed hoc modo nec sufficientia quidem contingit ei, quem ualentia deserit, quem molestia pungit, quem uilitas abiecit, quem recondit obs

But

ſcuritas. Qui uero ſolum poſſe deſyderat, proſtigat opes, deſpicit uoluptates, honoremq; potentia carẽtem, gloriamq; nihilipendit. Sed hinc quoq; quam multa deficiant uides, ſit enim ut aliquando neceſſarijs egeat, ut anxietatibus mordeatur. Cunq; hæc depellere nequeat, etiam id quod maxime petebat, potens eſſe deſiſtat. Similiter ratiocinari de honoribus, gloria, uoluptatibus licet, Nam cum unumquodq; horum idem, quod cætera ſit, quiſquis horũ aliquid ſine cæteris petit, necillud qdẽ qđ deſiderat, apprehẽdit.

B. Quid igitur inquam? Si quis cuncta ſimul cupiat adipiſci, P. Summam qui dẽ beatitudinis uellet, ſed num in his eam reperiet, quæ demonſtrauimus, id quod pollicẽtur, non poſſe conferre? B. Minime inquã P. In his igitur quæ ſingula, quædam expetendorum præſtare creduntur, beatitudo nullo modo inueſtiganda eſt. B. Fateor inquã et hoc nihil uerius dici poteſt. Ph. Habes igitur, inquit, & formam falſæ felicitatis, & cauſas: deflecte

But certes thou ſeyſt that he wanteth many thynges, and yet happethe that he hath ſometyme nede of thynges neceſſarye, and is bitten or greued wyth care and anguyſhe. And when he cannot put awaye theſe thyngs, he ceſſeth and is not myghtye, whyche is ỹ thing that he mooſte cheyfely deſyred. And lyke wyſe a man may reſon and ſpeake of honors, glorye, and pleaſuers, as of power, and ſuffyſaunce. For when euerye one of them is the ſelfe ſame, & lyke the other, whoſoeuer ſeketh to get any one of them wout the others, certes he hath not that he deſyrethe. Boe. I ſaye what than, yf a man coueteth to gette all thẽ to gether. Phil. Certes I wolde ſay that he wouldе get hym ſoueraigne felicitie and bleſſednes. But ſhoulde he fynde the ſame ſoueraygne felicitie, in thynges, that I haue ſhewed that cannot geue and performe that thing that they do promes? Boe. I ſaye they cannot. Phil. Therefore bleſſednes or perfyt felicitie ſhould be ſought for, in noo wyſe in the thynges that are thoughte to geue but one thing ſingulerly, of all thynges that are to be deſyred. Bo. I ſaye I confeſſe the ſame and nothynge can be ſayde more true then that.

Phil. Therefore haſte thou bothe the forme and the cauſes of falſe felicitie. Nowe turne the inwarde thoughte of thy mynde, vnto the contrary, for there thou ſhalt ſee anone the ſame true and perfyt felicitie and bleſſednes, that I

haue

haue promyſed. B. Truly I ſay this is very playne and euident, & it were to a blyndman, and thou dyddyſt ſhew the ſame trewe and perfyt felicitie a lytell before, when thou dyddyſte laboure to ſhewe me the cauſes of falſe felicitie. For (except I be deceyued) the ſame is the treue and perfyt felicitie or bleſſednes that perſourmeth in mã ſuffiſance power, reuerence, nobleſſe, & gladnes.

Perfyte felycitie, or bleſſednes.

And that thou mayſte knowe that I do perceyue the ſame inwardely I do confeſſe vndoutedlye that the ſame is the full and perfyt felicitie or bleſſednes, that maye truely perfourme one of the ſayd thynges, for by cauſe they all be one, and the ſelfe ſame thynge, and not dyuers thynges in ſubſtaunce, that is to ſay, ſuffyſaunce, power, reuerence, nobleſſe, and ioye or gladnes. Phyl. O my chyld Boece I perceue thou art happye or bleſſed in thys opinion, yf thou wylte put thereto this, that I ſhal ſay. Boe. I saye what is that. Phi. Thynkeſt thou that there be anye thynge in theſe worldly and tranſitorye thynges ỹ may bring in or ſhew any ſuch ſtate. Boe. I ſay I thinke not. For thou haſt ſhewed that nothynge can be deſyred, aboue perfytte felicitie. Phil, Therfore theſe worldlye thynges, that is to ſaye worldelye ſuffiſaunce, power reuerẽce nobles and pleaſures, ſemethe to geue vnto men the ſymylitudes or lykenes, of true good, or ells to geue certaine vnperfit and fained goodes: for truly they can-

nunc in aduerſum mentis intuitum, ibi enim ueram quam promiſimus, ſtatim uidebis. B. Atq; hæc, inquam, uel cæco perſpicua eſt: eamq; tu paulo ante monſtraſti, dum falſæ caliginis aperire conabaris. Nã, (ni fallor) ea uera eſt, et perfecta felicitas, quæ ſufficientem, potentem, reuerendum, celebrem, lætumq; perficiat. Atq; me interius animaduertiſſe cognoſcas, quæ unum horum (quoniã idem cũcta ſunt) ueraciter preſtare poteſt, hanc eſſe plenam beatitudinẽ ſine ambiguitate cognoſco. P. O te alumne hac opinione felicem cenſio, ſi quidem hoc (inquit) adieceris. B. Quidnã inquam Ph. Eſſe ne aliquid in his mortalibus caducisq; rebus putas, quod huiusmodi ſtatum poſſit afferre? B. Minime inquam puto, atq; à te nihil ut amplius deſyderetur oſtenſum eſt. P. Hæc igitur uel imagines ueri boni, uel imperfecta quædam dare bona mortalibus uidentur, uerum autem, atq; perfectum bonum conferre non poſſunt.

Boe.

B. Assentior inquam.
P. Quoniam igitur agnosti, quæ uera illa sit, quæ autem beatitudinem mentiantur, nunc superest, ut unde ueram hanc petere possis, agnoscas. B. Id quidem inquam iam dudum uehementer expecto.
P. Sed cum uti in Thimeo Platoni inquit nostro placet, in minimis quoq; rebus diuinum auxilium debet implorari, quid nunc faciendum censes, ut illius summi boni sedem, reperire mereamur. B. Inuocandum inquam omnium rerum patrem, quo prætermisso, nullum rite fundatur exordium. Ph. Recte inquit, ac simulata modus haec est.

Metrum nonum. Phi.

QVi perpetua mundum ratione gubernas,
Terrarum cœliq; satur, qui tempus ab æuo,
Ire iubes, stabilisq; manens das cuncta moueri.

cannot geue the true and perfyt good. Boe. I say I graunt the same. Phil. Now for bycause thou hast knowen whyche is the same verye true & perfytte felicitie, and whyche fayneth, or dissymulythe the same, that is to saye, that sheweth the false felicitie, thenne we it resteth that thou mayst knowe where thou mayste seke for this trewe felicitie. Boecius. Certes that thynge I saye, I greately loked for nowe of late. Phylosophy. But forsomuch as it pleseth my scoler Plato, in his boke, named Thimeo, he saith that in the lest thynges of all, the helpe of God, ought to be required. What thynkest nowe to be done, that we maye deserue to fynde the sete or place of the same soueraygne good? Boe. I saye, we must call vpon the father of all thynges, that is to saye, almyghtye God, wythout whō no begynnynge is well and perfytelye made. Phil. Thou sayeste truely. And wythout taryenge she, that is to saye: phylosophy, made her prayer vnto god, euen thus as foloweth.

Philosophy.

O Father and maker of heuen, and erth, that gouerneth the worlde wyth thy perpetual prouidence, And causest ỹ time to passe forth, frō thy age perdurable. Thou beyng alwayes fyxme and stable, causest all thynges to be moued, whome no out warde causes

Quem

haue brought out, to make a worke of flowyng fletynge or wauerynge matter. But the inwarde forme of thy inestimable goodnes, without enuye or malyce, hath moued the thereto frely. Thou bryngest forthe al thinges from thy godly example aboue, beyng moste fayre of all other, beryng in thy remembraunce the goodly hole worlde, accordynge to the lykenes, as it was conceiued and formed in thy thought before thou commaundeste the sayde worlde, (beyng made perfyt) to hold absolutely his perfyt partes, that is to say: the elementes and all thynges made of them. Thou byndeste the elementes by nomber accordyngely, so that the colde thinges maye agre with the hote thinges, and the drye thynges with the moost. That the fyer that is moste pure flye not to hye, nor the heuynes or wayte of the erth drawe downe the same ouerlowe. Thou god, deuidest by membres conuenyente and consonante the soule of the worlde, that is to saye: the bodyes or planetes aboue, being meane betwene god and mannes soule, that is also of a three folde operacion, mouyng all thinges here in this worlde, by there influence and myghtye power. Which soul or planetes being deuided hath gathered or engendryd a mouing by operacion, into two worldes circles or speres, that is to say. The spere that fyrst moueth, and the spere of the planettes. And the same soule or planetes returned

Quem non externe pepulere fingere cause
Materiæ fluitantis opus,
uerum insita summi,
Forma boni liuore carens,
tu cuncta superno,
Ducis ab exemplo pulcer
pulcherrimus ipse
Mundum mente gerens,
similiq; imagine formans,
Perfectaq; iubeus perfectum soluere partes.
Tu numeris elemẽta ligas,
ut frigora flammis
Arida conueniant liquidis
ne purior ignis,
Euolet, aut mersas deducant pondera terras.
Tu triplicis mediam naturæ cuncta mouentem,
Connectens animam, per consona membra resoluis.
Quæ cum secta duos motum glomerauit in orbes,
In semet reditura meantemq; profundam.
Circuit, & simili conuertit imagine cœlum.
Tu causis animas paribus uitasq; minores
Prouehis, & leuibus sublimes curribus aptans.
In cœlum terramq; seris,
quas lege benigna,

Al

Ad te conuersas reduci fas
eis igne reuerti.
Da pater augustam menti
conscendere sedem,
Da fontem lustrare boni,
da luce reperta
In te conspicuos animi des
figere uisus.
Dissice terrenæ nebulas,
& pondera molis:
Atq; tuo splendore mica,
tu nanq; serenum,
Tu requies tranquilla pijs
te cernere finis,
Principium, uector, dux,
semita, terminus idem.

ned agayne, goeth into it selfe by intelligence, whiche is one operacion, and compasseth the profounde and depe thought by knowyng of god, whych is another operacion. And so it mouethe the heuen by like ymage or intelligēce whyche is the thirde operation. Thou bryngest forth the soules of men, and the lesse lyues, that is to saye, lyuynge brute beastes, and all growyng things by lyke maner and causes. And shapest the reasonable soules of men, to the lyght cartes, that is to say: to the sterres of heuen. Thou sowest the soules in heuen, and in the earth, that is to say, in to aungeles in heuen, and into bodyes of mankind on the erth whyche soules of mankynde, when they be conuertyd vnto the, by thy benygne or gentle law thou causest them so to retourn, by thy turnynge fyer, of charitable loue. O father, graunt that mans thought maye ascende vp into that strayte and noble sete of hygh and perfytte goodnes, and graunt that it maye fynde the foūtaine of goodnes, and graunt also (that after the light is founde) to fasten her cleare syght in the. Put away the cloudes, & waytes or burdens of the delyghte of worldely thinges. And shine thou with thine owne bryghtnes. For thou arte cleare and resplendaunte, and a quyet rest to meke myndes and thoughtes. To loke on the, is the ende of al things thou beinge the selfe and the same one onely, art the begynnyng, the bearer, the leder, the path, and terme or ende,

The lyghte Cartis, be the sterres, or reason, or vnderstandyng, that shulde guyde the Soule. Beastes trees, or plantes, be of lesse lyfe, thē mannes soule, that is immortall, & all the other be mortal. The soule is a dyuyne thyng, and had her begynnyng fyrst in heauen of god, frō whom all Godly thinges do come. God is onre berer to grace, our leder from erroure, to truethe.

beyonde the whyche, there can be nothinge iustly thought or desyred.

Philosophy.

For by cause thou hast sene whiche is the forme of perfytte good, and whych also is the forme of imperfette good. Nowe I thynke it mete to declare wherein thys perfytte good or felicitie is set. In the which I do iudge to inquyre fyrste, whether anye suche perfit good (as the same that thou a litel before dyddyst defyne or determine) myght be in the nature of thynges, that no vayne imagination or shadowe deceyue vs, and put vs out of the treweth of the thynge or matter, that we be aboute to talke of. And it cannot be denyed, but that there is parfytte good: And the same good is the fountayne of al good. For why? euery thyng that is called vnparfytte, the same is taken vnperfit by diminishing of ỳthing that is perfytte. Wherby it commethe to passe, that yf (in any kynde of thynge) any thing is sene to be vnperfytte, therin, it is necessary that somthyng be also parfytte. For yf parfection be taken awaye, certes it cannot be imagyned from whence that thynge is, that is adiudged vnparfytte. For the nature of thynges toke neuer any begynnynge of thynges dymynished and vnparfitte but procedynge from hole and parfytte thynges, came downe or descended into these lower and baren thynges. And as

Prosa decima. Ph.

Quoniã igitur quę sit imperfectique ueram perfectiq; boni forma uidisti, nunc demonstrandum reor, quonã hæc felicitatis perfectio constituta sit. In quo illud primum arbitror inquirendum, an aliquod huiusmodi bonum (quale paulo ante definisti) in rerum natura poßit existere, ne uana præter rei subiectæ ueritatem cassa cogitationis imago decipiat. Sed quin existat, sitq; hoc uelut quidam omnium fons bonorũ negari nequit. Omne enim quod imperfectum esse dicitur, id minucione perfecti imperfectũq; esse perhibetur. Quo fit, ut si in quolibet genere imperfectum quid esse uideatur, in eo perfectum quoq; aliquid esse necesse sit. Etenim perfectione sublata, unde illud quod imperfectum perhibetur exiterit ne fingi quidem potest. Neq; enim ab diminutis inconsummatisq; natura rerum cœpit exordium, sed a integris absolutisq; procedens, in hæc extrema atq;

effectu dilabitur. Quod si (uti paulo ante monstrauimus) est quædam uana fragilis imperfecta felicitas, esse aliquam solidam perfectamq; non potest dubitari. B Firmissime inquam, uerissimeq; conclusum est. P. Quo uero inquit habiter, ita considera. Deũ rerum omnium principẽ bonum esse, communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil deo melius excogitari queat, id quo melius nihil est, bonum esse quis dubitat? Ita uero bonum esse deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoq; in eo bonũ esse conuincat. Nam ni tale sit, rerum omniũ princeps esse non poterit. Erit enim eo præstantius aliquid, perfectum possidens bonum, quid hoc prius atq; antiquius esse uideatur. Omnia namq; perfecta minus integris priora esset clarues rum. Quare ne in infinitũ ratio prodeat, confitendũ est summum deum, summi perfectiq; boni esse plenissimum. Sed perfectum bonum ueram esse beatitudinem constituimus. Veram igitur beatitudinem in sũ

(as I haue shewed a litel before) if ther be any felicitie or blessednes vnperfyte vayne or fraile, it may not be doubted but that there is some felicitie and blessednes that is hole and perfyt. Boe. I saye it is fyrmely and truely concluded Phil. But consider after this maner, wherein perfytte felicitie dwellethe. The common conceyte of mans mindes do proue, that God is the soueraygne and cheyfe good of al things. For whē nothyng maye be thought better then god, what man doutyth that thinge to be good when nothynge is better than it. Euen soo truelye, reason declareth that GOD is good, that it maye conclude also, that perfyt good is in him. For except it were soo, he canne not be pryncе and soueraygne of all thynges. For somethyng hauing perfytte good, shoulde be better then he, and it shulde seme that that same thing were before e of more antiquitie or elder then god. For all thynges perfytte, are manyfest and do appere to be fyrst, before things that be vnperfyt. Wherefore, that my reason goeth not fourth infynytely, or wythoute ende, we muste graunte the hyghe god to be full of soueraygne and perfytte good. And we haue confyrmed and establyshed before, that perfit good is true felicitie or blessednes. Therfore it muste nedes be, that treue felycitie, or blissednes: is set in the high God. Boe. I do graunt it, and it maye not be denyed by any meanes. Phylo.

But

But I beseche the, se howe symmelye, and howe holy thou mayst proue, that we haue sayde, that the hyghe almygh ty god, is full of soueraygne good.

Boe. Howe should I proue it. P. Dost thou thinke that the father of al things hath taken from any outwarde thinge the same soueraygne good, whereof it is sayde he is ful, or els thynkest thou that he hath it naturallye of hymselfe? As thoughe thou shouldyst thinke that god hymselfe and the blessednes of god be of dyuers distyncte substaunce and not vnite all in one or of one onely substaunce? For yf thou thynkest that god hath receyued the sayde good outwardlye of any other, thou mayst iudge and esteme the same that gaue it hym, better and more excellent then he that receyueth it. But I do confesse that god is ryght worthylye moste soueraygne and excellent of all thynges. And truelye yf soueraygne good be in GOD by nature, but yet by reason dyueres, when we speke of god the soueraygne pryncc of all thyng, let hym faine that can, who hath toyned together these di uers thynges, that is to say, god and soueraygne good. Farthermore the thinge that differeth from euery thing, the same is not the verye same thynge, that it differeth from. So that the thing that differeth from soueraygne good, is not by nature of it selfe, the same soueraygne good. But it were a wycked thynge or wronge so to thynke of that thinge

mo deo sitam esse necesse est. B. Accipio quam, nec est, quod contradici ullo modo queat. P. Sed quæso, inquit, te, uide q̃ id sãcte, atq; inuiolabiliter probes, quod boni sumi, sũmũ deũ diximus esse plenissimum. B. Quonam inquit modo? P. Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem, illud summum bonum, quo plenus esse perhibetur, uel extrinsecus accepisse, uel ita naturaliter habere præsumas, quasi habentis dei, habitæq; beatitudinis, diuersam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes, præstantius id quod dederit, eo quod acceperit existimare possis. Sed hunc esse rerum omnium præcellentissimum digni ssime confitemur. Quod si natura quidem inest, sed ratione diuersum, cum de rerum principe loquamur deo fingat qui potest, quis hæc diuersa coniunxerit. Postremo, quod à qualibet re diuersum est id non est illud, à quo intelligitur esse diuersum. Quare, quod à summo bono diuersum est sui natura, id summum bonum non est.

Quod nefas est de eo cogitare, quo nihil constat esse prestantius. Omnino enim nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit existere. Quare quod omniū principium sit, id etiam sui substantia summum esse bonū uerissima ratione concluserim. B. Rectissime inquam P. Sed summum bonum beatitudinem esse concessum est. B. Ita est inquā. P. Igitur, inquit deum esse ipsā beatitudinem, necesse est confiteri. B. Nec, inquam propositis prioribus refragari queo. Et ab illis hoc illatū consequens esse prospicio. P. Respice, inquit, an hinc quoque idem firmius approbetur, quod duo summa bona, quae à se diuersa sint, esse non possunt. Etenim quae discrepant bona, non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet. Quare neutrum poterit esse perfectum, cum alterutri alterum deest. Sed quod perfectum nō sit, id summū non esse manifestum est. Nullo modo igitur quae summa sunt bona, ea possunt esse diuersa. Atq; & beatitudinem, & deum summum bonum

thynge, that is to say: of god, that excelleth and passethe all other in goodnes. For alwayes the nature of nothynge maye be thought to be better then the begynnyng of the same thyng. Wherefore I shall conclude by good reason, that the thynge, that is, the begynning of all thynges is of hys owne substaūce soueraygne good. Boe. I saye it is well concluded. Phil. But it is graunted before that soueraygne good, is perfytte felycitie and blessednes. B. I saye no lesse but it is euen soo. Phil. Therefore it behoueth to confesse that God is the same soueraygne good. B. I saye I can not auoyde, the reasons before alledged. And I do perceyue that thys thyng shewed of them, is a very consequence to the thyngs. Phil. Beholde now whether thys thynge maye be proued hereafter more firmely, that two soueraign good thynges that dyffer one from another, may not be. For it apperethe that the goodes that dyffer of them selfe, can not be all one thynge: Therefore nether of them canne be perfytte when that one of them hath nede of the other But it is manyfest that the same, that is vnperfytte, is not soueraygne and perfytte. Therefore the goodes that be soueraygne, by no meanes may be dyuers or dyffer one from another. Soo then I haue proued and gathered that both blessednes and god, be soueraign good. Wherefore it behoueth that the soueraygne dyuinitie, is the same lyke

thyng

thyng, as soueraygne blessednes or felicitie. Boe. I saye that by thys meanes nothyng may be concluded more true, nor more firme by reasoning, nor more worthy, then god, Phi. Therefore vpon these thynges, (as the Geometricians are wonte to bryng in thynges, that they call apparaunces after they haue shewed their proposytions) euē so wyll I geue the as a corrolary or conclusyon, for bycause that men be made blessed by obteyning of blessednes, and that blessednes is the same dyuinitie, it is manyfest ỹ men be made blessed by optaining of the diuinitie. And as men be made iuste by optaynyng of Justice, and wyse by obteynyng of wysedome: So by lyke reson it behoueth that men ỹ haue gotten diuinitie, be made gods. Then is euery blessyd man a God: But certes by nature, there is but one God, albeit by participacion of dyuynitie, no thyng letteth, or prohibyteth, but there be many Goddes. Boe. I saye this is a gaye, and a precious thynge, whether thou woldest call it apparens, or a conclusion. Ph. And certes nothyng is fayrer, or more goodly then this thyng, that reason perswaded shulde be added to these forsayde thynges. Boe. I saye what thyng is it. Phy. When blyssednes semeth to contayne many thyngs, it is to doubte, whether all these thynges do ioyne togyther, as it were one body of blyssednes, by certayne diuersytie, or baryete of partes, or membres, or

The Prophet sayth. Dij estes & filij excelsi oēs. Ye be al gods, and the sōnes, or chyldren of the hyest.

bonum esse colleginus. Quare ipsam necesse est summam esse beatitudinē, quae sit summa diuinitas. B. Nihil, inquā, necesse ipso uerius, nec ratiocinatione firmius, nec deo dignius eō cludi potest. P. Super haec igitur, inquit, ueluti Geometrae solent, demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre, quae porismata ipsi uocant ita ego quoq; tibi, uel uti corollarium dabo. Nā quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati, beatitudo uero est ipsa diuinitas, diuinitatis adeptione fieri beatos, manifestū est. Sed uti iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientiae sapientes fiunt, ita diuinitatē adeptos deos fieri, simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus deus: sed natura quidem unus, participatiōe uero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos. B. Et pulcrum, inquam, hoc atq; pretiosum, siue porisma, siue corollariū uocari mauis. Atq; hoc quoq; pulerius nihil est, quod his annectendum esse ratio persuadet. B. Quid inquā? P. Cū multa inquit, beatitudo cōtinere uideatur, utrum ne

hec omnia unum ueluti corpus beatitudinis quadã partium uarietate commu gant, an sit eorum aliquid, quod beatitudinis substan tiam compleat, ad quod ue ro cetera referantur? Bo. Vellem inquam ad ipsarũ rerum commemoratione patefaceres. P. Nonne im quit beatitudinem bonum esse cẽsemus, B. Ac summũ quidem inquam. P. Addas imquit hoc omnibus licet. Nam eadem sufficientia summa est, eadem summa potentia, reuerẽtia quoq; claritas, & uoluptas, beatitudo esse indicatur. Bo. Quidigitur. P. Hec cine omnia bona, sufficiẽtia, po tentia, cæteraq; ueluti que dam beatitudinis membra sunt. An ad bonũ ueluti ad nerticem cuncta referun tur? B. Intelligo inquã, qd inuestigandum proponas, sed quid constituas audire desidero. P. Cuius rei dis eretionẽ sic accipe. Si hæc omnia beatitudinis mẽbra forent, se quoq; inuicẽ dis creparent. Hæc est enim partiũ natura, ut unũ cor pus diuersa cõponãt B. At q; hæc oĩa idem esse mon strata sunt. P. Minime igit

or whether there be any one thynge, of them that of it selfe accõplisheth the sub staunce of blysfednes, vnto the whiche all the other be referred. Boe. I saye, I wolde thou woldest open the same vn to me, by example of the same thynges. Phi. Haue I not iudged that blisfednes is good. Boe. I say we haue thought it souerayne good. Phi. It behoueth that thou adde souerayne good to all these thinges that folowe. For blisfednes, is sufferayne suffysaunce, the same is so ueraygne power, the same is soue ueraygne reuerence, the same is soue raigne clerenes, and the same is demed to be soueraygne pleasure. Boe. What then? Phy. Be all these thynges, that is to saye: suffysaunce, power, and the other thynges, as it were membres of blisfednes? or whether be they all refer red vnto good, as vnto the chyefe of them. Bo. I say, I perceiue well what thou purposyst to serch out, but I desyre to here what thou defynest or dost deter myne. Phy. Understande thou the so lucion of the questyon thus. If all these thynges, were membres of blysfednes: then shoulde they dysser one from ano ther. For suche is the nature of partes, that dyuers partes or mẽbres do make one bodye. Boe. Truely, all these thin ges haue ben shewed before, to be all one thinge. Phi. Then be they no mem bres, or els it shoulde seme, that blysfed nes were ioyned, or made al of one mẽ

dre, which can not be. Boe. I say it is, no doute, but I loke for the residue of thy question that remaineth. P. Truelye it is manyfest that all other things be referred vnto good. For therefore suffysaunce is requyred, by cause it is thought to be good. Therefore power, is desired, for it is thoughte also to be good. And lykewyse a man may coniecture of reuerence, noblesse, and plesure or delyghte. Then is soueraygne good theffecte and cause of all thynges that are to be desyred. For that thinge that hath no good in it self, nor symylytude or likenes of good, by no meanes ought to be desyred. And on the contrary wise those thynges also, that by nature be not good, yet yf they seeme to be as they were verye good, they be desyred: whereby it happethe that bountye or goodnes, is thought ryghtfully the verye effecte and cause of all thynges to be desyred or loked for. For that thyng semeth cheyfly to be desyred or wished, for the cause of loue, wherof any thing is desyred. As yf a man would ryde for cause of helth, he desyreth not so much the mouing to ryde, as the effect of his helth. Therfore when that all thyngs be desyred, for the cause of loue of good, they be not desyred rather of al mē, thē the same good. But we haue graunted that felicitie or blessednes is the thinge for the whych be all other thynges be desyred: wherefore onely felicitie or blessednes is sought for. Whereby it appereth

tur mẽbra sunt, alioqui ex uno membro beatitudo nisi debitur esse cõiũcta, quod fieri nequit. B. Id quidem inquã dubiũ non est, sed id quod rescat expecto. P. Ad bonũ uero cætera referri palã est. Idcirco enim, sufficientia petitur, quoniam bonũ esse iudicatur. Idcirco potentia, quoniã id quoq; esse creditur bonũ. Idẽ de reuerentia, claritudine iocunditate, coniectare licet. Omnium igitur expetendorũ summa atq; causa, bonũ est. Quod enim neq; re neq; similitudine ullum in se retinet bonum, id expeti nullo modo potest. Contraq; etiã quæ natura bona non sunt, tamẽ si esse uideãtur, quasi uera bona sint, appetantur. Quo fit ut summa cardo atq; causa expetendorũ omniũ bonitas esse, iure credatur. Cuius uero causa quid expetitur, id maxime uidetur optari. Veluti si salutis causa quispiã uelit equitare, nõ tam a qui tãdi motũ desiderat, q̃ salutis effectũ. Cũ igitur omnia, boni gratia petantur, non illa potius (quam bonum ipsum) desiderãtur ab omnibus. Sed

propter quod ceteram opetantur, beatitudinem esse cõcessimus, quare sic quos q; sola queritur beatitudo. Ex quo liquido apparet ipsius boni & beatitudinis unam atq; eandem esse substantiã. B. Nihil uideo cur desentire quispiam possit. P. Sed deum ueramq; beatitudinem unum atq; idem esse monstrauimus. B. Ita hquam. P. Secure igitur cõcludere licet, dei quoq; in ipso bono nec usquã alio sitam esse substantiam.

Metrum decimum P.

HVnc omnes pariter uenire captI,
Quos fallax ligat improbis catenis
Terrenus habitans libido mentes.
Hic erit uobis requies laborum,
Hic portus placida manẽs quiete,
Hoc patens unum miseris asylum.
Non quicquid Tagus aureis harenis
Donat, aut Hermus rutilante ripa,
Aut Indus calido propinquus orbi

reth clerely, that there is but one substaunce of the same good, and of blessednes or felicitie. Boe. I se nothyng why any man may contẽde or say any thing to the contrarye. Phil. But we haue shewed before that god and perfet blessednes or felicitie, is all one, and the selfe same thyng. Boe. I say the same. Phil. Therefore it is lawefull to conclude safelye and truelye, that the substaunce of god, is sette also in the same good, and not ells where, in any other thynge.

Philosophy.

COme hether to gether all ye that be taken wyth the wycked chaynes of decrytfull pleasure of erthlye thynges dwellyng in your myndes here, that is to say: in perfytte felicitie shalbe the rest of your labours. Here is the standing port or hauen for pleasaunt quyetnes, here is the onely open house of refuge for the carefull. That is as much to say, as all ye that be wrapped and tangled with temporal affections, come to god, whiche is perfyt felicitie. Where ye shalbe suffysed with al good thynges that canne be desidered. For what soeuer thynge the floude Tagus with hys golden grauell or sande geueth, or the floud Hermus with his shynnge banke, or the floud Indus, that is nerte vnto the hote part of the world and myngyth the grene precious stons with the whyte stones. Al these do not

Tagus is a flode in spayne that hath grauell or sand like golde.

Hermus is a flod in Asia hauing grauell & bãks lyke gold

Indus is a flode that rennyth to the red sea & hath in it much perle and grene precious stones.

make clere the sight or vnderstandyng of your myndes and thoughtes, but rather wrappeth vp your blynde myndes into their darkenes, making you to forget god, thus (whatsoeuer pleaseth and sterueth youre myndes here) the earthe hath norysshed the same in her lowe caucrnes. But the shynynge wherewith the heuen is gouernyd and continueth in strength and forse, putteth away the darke ruyne and decay of the soul, and whosoeuer may perceyue the same shining, he wyll denye, and refuse the resplendent beames of the son.

Candidis miscens uirides lapillos,
Illustrant aciem, magisq; cecos.
In suas conditt animos tenebras.
Hoc quicquid placet excitatq; mentes,
Infimis tellus aluit cauernis
Splendor quo regitur uigetq; cœlum.
Vitat obscuras aie ruinas
Hanc quisquis poterit notare lucem.
Candidos phebi radios negabit.

Boetius.

I Assent to all thy sayinges, for they all be knytt to gether with ryghte stronge reasons. Phil. Yowe muche wylte thou esteme it, if thou knowest what thynge the sayde good is?
Boe. I wyll esteme it abouc all things if it so happen that I maye knowe also there withall, God that is good.
Phil. Certes I shall open the same by very good reason, so that the thynges, that be concluded a lytle before, do yet remayne in thy mynde.
Boetius. I saye they shall remayne.
Philosop. Haue I not shewed the that the same thinges that be desyred of many folke, that is to say: suffysaunce, reuerence, power, and such other be not true, and perfyt goodes, by cause they vary

Prosa un decima.

Assentior inquam, cuncta enim firmis finis nexa rationibus constant. P. Tum illa, quanti inquit estimabis, si bonum ipsum quid sit agnoscas. B. Infiniti inquam, si quidem mihi pariter deum quoq; qui bonum est contingat agnoscere. P. Atq; hoc uerissima, inquit, ratione patefaciam, maneant modo quæ paulo ante concluſa sunt. B. Manebũt inq; P. Nonne inquit monstrauimus ea quæ appetuntur a plaribus? Idcirco uera perfectaq; bona non esset quoniam a se inuicem dis-

creti

creparent, eunq; alteri abesset alterum, plenum absolutumq; bonũ afferre nõ posse. Tum autem uerum bonum fieri, cum in unam uelut formam, atq; efficientiam colligũtur, ut quæ sufficientia est, eadem sit potentia, reuerentia, claritas, atq; iocunditas. Nisi uero unum, atq; idem omnia sint, nihil habere quo inter expectèda numerentur. B. Demonstratum est, inquam, nec dubitari ullo modo potest. P. Quæ igitur cũ discrepant, minime bona sunt, cum uero unum esse ceperint, bona fiunt, nonne hæc ut bona sint, unitatis fieri adoptione contingit? B. Ita, inquam, uidetur. P. Sed omne quod bonum est, boni participatione bonum esse concedis? an minime? B. Ita est. P. Oportet igitur idem esse unum atq; bonum, simili ratione concedas. Eadẽ namq; substantia est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diuersus effectus. B. Negare inquam nequeo. P. Nosti ne igitur inquit omne quod est, tã diu manere atq; subsistere, quam diu fit unum sed interire atq; dissolui

vary and dyffer one from another? and that when the one is without the other it may not bryng in suche good that is full and absolute, that is to saye, hauynge nede of nothyng? But we haue shewed before, that then it is trewe and perfyt good when that all the sayd thynges be gathered together, as into one forme, that is to saye into good, so that the same that is suffysaunce, is power, reuerence, nobleste, & delight. And truely except all the sayde thinges be one without diuersite, they haue nothynge in them whereby they shoulde be accountyd emongeste thynges that are to be desyred. Boe. I saye it is declared alredy, & no man maye doughte thereof. Phil. Then the thynges that do vary and dyffer, be no goodes. But when they haue begonne to be al one thynge then they be goodes. Do it not happen that these thynges be good by adoption or optaynyng of vnitie? Boe. So I saye it semeth. Phil. But al that is good, graunteste thou to be good by perticipation or partakyng, or not? Boe. It is so. Phil. Then thou muste nedes graunt by lyke reason, that one and good, be all one thynge. For there is but one substaunce of such thynges, whose effecte is not naturally dyuers. Boe. I saye I cannot denye it. P. Hast thou not knowen thẽ that euery thing that is, do so longe remayne and dwel together, as long as it is all one? And when it ceasethe and is not all one that

then

then it dyeth and dyssolueth together? Boe. By what meanes? Philo. As in beastes, when the soule or lyfe and the body, do ioyne together in one, and so remayn & dwel, it is called a beast. And when ỳ vnitie of them both is dissolued by seperacion of the one from the other then it appereth that it dyeth and is no longer a beste. And lykewyse the body of mankynde, when it remayneth in one forme by coniunction or ioynynge together of the mẽbers or lymmes, the fygure of man is sene, but yf the partes of the bodye (beynge distributed and seperated one from another) haue distroyed the vnitie, the body is not as it was before. And whosoeuer wouldе serche other thynges, after the same maner it wyl appere, ỳ euery thyng wyl remayn in his proper substaunce whyle it is all one. And when it is no more all one, it dyeth. B. When I consyder w̄ my self many thynges, yet it semeth that it is none other thyng, then thou hast saide. Phi. Therfore is there any thyng, that (in as moche as it worketh naturally) leueth the appetyte & desyre of beynge, or of substaunce, and desyreth to come to death and corruption? Bo. If I consyder the beastes that haue any nature to wyll or not to wyll: I fynde nothing (excepte it be compelled by outwarde vyolence) that forsaketh the intente or desyre to lyue, and hastyth of fre wyll to dye. For euery beaste labourethe to defend and kepe his lyfe and to eschew death

pariter, cũ unũ esse desiterit. B. Quonã modo? P. Vt in animalibus, inquit, eum in unum coeunt ac permanent anima corpusq; id animal uocatur. Cũ uero haec unitas utriusq; seperatiõe dissoluitur, interire, nec iã esse animal liquet. Ipsum quoque corpus, cũ in una forma membrorum coniunctione permanet, humana uisitur species. At si distributae, segregataeq; partes corporis distraxerint unitatẽ desinit esse quod fuerat. Eoq; modo percurrenti cætera, procul dubio patebit subsistere unũ quodq; dum unum est: cum uero unum esse desinit interire. B. Consyderanti, inquam, mihi plura minime aliud uidetur. P. Est ne igitur, inquit, quod in quantum naturaliter agat, relicta subsistendi appetentia uenire ad interitũ, corruptionem q; desyderet? B. Si animalia inquam, consyderem, quae habent aliquam uolendi, nolendiq; naturam, nihil inuenio quod nullis extra cogentibus abijciant manendi intentionẽ, & ad interitum sponte festinet. Omne nam q; animal tueri salutem la-

borat: mortem uero, perniciemq; deuitat Sed quid de herbis, arboribusq;, qd de animatis omnino consentiam rebus prorsus dubito P. Atq; nõ est quod de hoc poßis ambigere, cum herbas atq; arbores intuearis, primũ sibi conuenientibus innasci locis, ubi quantum earũ natura queat cito exarescere, atq; interire non possunt. Nam aliæ quidem campis, aliæ montibus oriuntur, alias ferunt paludes aliæ saxis herent, aliarum fœcundæ sunt steriles alie: quas si in alia quispiam loca transferre conetur, arescunt. Sed dat cuiq; natura quod conuenit, et nedum manere possunt, intereãt, elaborat. Quid dicã quod omnes uelut in terras ore demerso trahũt alimenta radicibus, ac per medullas, robur, corticemq; diffundunt? Quid quod nobilißimum quodq;, sicuti medulla est, in interiori semp sede recõditur: extra uero quadam ligni firmitate ultimus autem cortex aduersum cœli intemperiem, quasi mali patiens defẽsor opponitur? Iam uero

deathe and distruction. But I dought muche what I maye iudge of herbes, and trees, and of such things that haue no lyuynge soules, nor felynge at al as bestes haue. Phil. Certes thereof thou mayst not dout, when thou lokeste on the hearbes and trees, howe they do growe, and flowryshe in places, conuenient for them, wher they cannot lightly wyther nor drye so longe as theyr nature may kepe them. For some of them do growe and sprynge in the feldes, other in the mountaynes, other in the marish, and other do cleue to the rockes or stones, some be grosse and plentyful some be lene and baren, whych would drye awaye yf a man go aboute to conuey thẽ into any other places then such they be in al readie. For nature geueth to euerye thinge, that thynge that is conuenient, and laboureth to lyue and not to die, whiles they may haue strengthe to contynue. What shall I saye that they all do take there noryshynge from their rotes, as thoughe they had mouthes fastened in the earthe, and spredeth their nourishyng by the pyth, by the wod and by the barke? And what wylt thou saye: that the softest thynge suche as the pyth of tre is, in the myddest, is defended wyth a certayne hardnes of the wode, and the barke is sette vttermoste of all, agaynst the intemperaunce of the ayer, as a defender to sustayne the hurt that may fal? And thus thou mayst see howe greate is the dyligence

quanta

gence of nature, for all thinges be renued with multiplication of sede, whiche sedes who doth not know but that they be as certayne instrumentes not onelye to tary for a tyme, but also to remayne for euer, by generation or succession. And also the thynges that men do think haue no soules, do not euery of them desyre (by lyke reson) to kepe that is hys owne? wherfore els doth lightnes bere vpward the flames of the fyer, and grauitie or heuynes presse downe the erth but that the same places and mouings do best agree so, for euery of them. And farthermore euery thyng, kepethe that thynge, that is agreyng and according to it, ryght as the thynges that be contrarye, corrupteth and dystroyeth it.

Nowe truely the thynges that be hard as stones, do cleue so faste together, to theyr partes and defend them self, that they maye not be easylye deuided or broken a sonder. But veryly, the thynges that be soft and lyquyd, as the ayer and the water, do lyghtly geue place to any thyng that deuydeth them, but yet they do quyckely come together and ioygne vnto the partes, from the whyche they be deuyded. But the fyre wyll in noo wyse deuyded, but refuseth all dyuision. And I do not speke nowe of the voluntarye mouynges of the soule, that hath knowledge, but of the naturall intencion of thynges, euen as it is that we do digest meates, that we haue eten without thynkyng thereon howe it is digested

quanta est naturæ diligentia, ut cuncta semine multiplicato propagentur? Quæ omnia non modo ad tempus manendi, uerum generatim quoq; quasi in perpetuum permanendi, ueluti quasdam machinas esse, quis nesciat? Ea etiã quæ inanimata esse creduntur, non quod suũ est quæq; simili ratione desiderãt. Cur enim flammæ quidem leuitas sursum uehit, terras uero deorsum pondus deprimit, nisi quod hæc singulis loca motionesq; conueniũt. Porro autem quod cuiq; consentaneum est, id unumquodq; conseruat, sicuti ea quæ sunt inimica, corrumpũt. Iam uero quæ dura sunt ut lapides, adhærent tenacissime partibus suis, et ne facile dissoluantur resistant. Quæ uero liquentia, ut aër atq; aqua facile quidem diuidentibus cedunt, sed cito in ea rursus á quibus sunt abscisa, relabuntur. Ignis uero omnem refugit sectionẽ. Neq; nunc nos de uoluntarijs animæ cognoscentis motibus, sed de naturali intentione tractamus. Sicuti est quod

quod acceptas esca sine cogitatione transigimus, quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes. Nam ne in animalibus quidem manendi amor ex animi uoluntatibus, uerum ex naturæ principijs uenit. Nã sæpe mortem cogentibus causis quam natura reformidat, uoluntas amplectitur. Cõtraq; illud quo solo mortalium rerum durat diuturnitas, gignendi opus quod natura semper appetit, interdum coherceat uoluntas adeo hæc sui charitas non ex animali motione, sed ex naturali intentione, procedit. Dedit enim prouidentia creatis a se rebus hanc, id est maxime manendi causam, ut quo ad possunt, naturaliter manere desiderent. Quare nihil est quod ullo modo quæras dubitare, cuncta quæ sunt appetere naturaliter constantiã permanendi, deuitare perniciem. B Confiteor inq; nunc, me indubitato cernere quæ dudum incerta uidebãtur. P Quod autem inquit subsistere ac permanere appetit id unum esse desiderat. Hoc enim sublato, nec esse quidem cuiq; permanebit.

digested and as we do take wynde and breathe in slepe, not knowyng thereof. For certes, the loue in beastes to tary, or lyue, commeth not of the wyll of the soule, but of the begynnynges and instyncte workes of nature. For certes the wyll often tymes embraseth death, when that causes cõpelleth the same, whiche death nature feareth. And contrary wyse, other whyles the wyll compelleth vnto the thyng, that nature alwaies desireth, that is the worke of generacion, wherby onelye the contynuaunce of mortall thynges, endureth. And this loue or appetyte that euerye thynge hathe to it selfe, procedeth not, nor cõmeth of the mocion of the soule: but by naturall intencion. For the prouydence, or wysdom of god, hath giuen vnto thynges that he hathe creat this, that is to saye: a great cause to contynewe styll, in as moche as they desyre naturally to lyue as longe as they may. Wherfore there is nothynge that thou nedest to doubte in any maner, for all thynges that be: desyreth naturally stedfast dwellynge, and to eschewe distruction. Boe. I confesse that I do se nowe without any doubte, the thynges that of late, semed vncertayne vnto me.

Phy. Certes, the thynge that desyreth to be and remayne alwaies, desyreth to be one and not dyuers. For yf that one, were taken away and dystroyed: certes there shulde remayne no beynge to any thynge. Boecius. I saye, it is trewe.

Phi. Therfore al thinges desyreth one. Boe. I haue graunted. Phyl. Then I haue shewed that the same one thinge, is the thing that is good. Bo. Ye truly. Phy. Then all thynges desyreth good, and that thou mayst describe & decerne thus, the same good is the thinge that is desyred of all men. Boe. I saye nothyng maye be thought more true, for either al thyngs be brought to nothing and do wander withoute a gouernour or gyde destitute and spoyled of one, as of their head and beginning, or if there be any thinge whereunto all thynges, draweth, that thynge is the soueraign of al goodes. Phi. O my norished child I am glad of the, for thou hast fastened in thy mynde, and thought, the verye marke of perfette truthe, but in thys it appereth to the that thou saydist a lytel before that thou diddest not knowe, or were ignorant. Boe. What is it?

Phil. Certes thou saidest thou wist not what was the ende of al l thinges: surely the same ende is the thyng that is desired of all men. And forasmuch as we haue gathered that good is the thynge that is desired of all, it behoueth that we confesse and agree that good is the ende of all thinges.

B. Verũ est inquã. P. Omnia igitur inquit unum desiderãt. B. Consensi. P. Sed unum id ipsum monstrauimus esse quod bonum est. B. Ita quidem. Ph. Cuncta igitur bonũ petunt, quod quidem ita describas, licet ipsum bonum esse quod desideretur ab omnibus. Bo. Nihil inquam uerius excogitari potest. Nam uel ad nihilum cuncta referuntur & uno ueluti uertice destituta sine rectore fluitabũt, aut si quid est ad quod uniuersa festinent, id erit omnium summum bonorũ. P. Et illa nimium inquit, O alũne, letor ipsam enim medie ueritatis notam mẽte fixisti. Sed in hoc patuit tibi quod ignorare te paulo ante dicebas. Bo. Quid inquam. P. Quis esset inquit rerum omnium finis, is est enim profecto quod desideratur ab omnibus, quod quia bonum esse colligimus, oportet, rerum omnium finem, bonum esse fateamur.

Philosophy.

Whosoeuer seketh out the trueth with a profound mynde or thought, and coueteth to be compassed or deceyued with no false opynyons let

Metrum undecimum P

Quisquis profunda mente uestigat uerum,

Cupitq;

Cupitq; nullis ille deuijs falli,
In se reuoluat intimi lucem uisus,
Longosq; in orbem cogat inflectens motus.
Animūq; doceat quicquid extra molitur.
Suis retrusum posſidere thesauris.
Dudum quod atra texit erroris nubes,
Lucebit ipso perspicatius phœbo.
Non omne namq; mente depulit lumen,
Obliuiosam corpus inuehens molem.
Heret profecto semen introrsum ueri,
Quod excitatur uentilante doctrina.
Nam cur rogati sponte recta censetis,
Ni mersus alto uiueret fomes corde,
Quod si platonis musa personat uerum,
Quod quisquis discit, immemor recordatur.

let hym reuolue & thynke in hym selfe, the lyght of his inwarde syght, whiche is reson, and let hym turne againe the longe mouinges and operacions of the soule turning them into a circle or compasse, and let hym teche his mynde and thoughte, (after that it is retournyd, to his owne tresures or power) to holde all that he hath laboured for, outward lye, and then the thyng that the blacke cloude of ignorauunce hath hydde, shal appere more euident and clere then the sonne. For the bodye (bryngynge in the wayt of oblyuion or forgetfulnes) hath not put out of the mynde, all the lyghte of knowledge. For the sede of trweth that is styrred by the wynd of doctryne cleueth fast inwardely, to the mynde or thought. For els why do you iudge of your owne voluntarye mynde, things ryght to a man that doth aske you any thynge, excepte the norysshynge and grounde of ryght or reson lay hidde in your depe hart thought or mynde. And if the muse or wysedome of Plato sounde th truth, euery forgetfull man recordeth the thing that he lerned before.

Trew vnderstandynge is in the mynd, although it be made darke, by the affectes of the body, so longe as they both be ioyned together, but when the bodye is dede the mind or soule knowe eth al thynges without anye let. Lyke as a candell lyghte vnder a bushel can not lyghte any ferther the the bushel but when the bushell is taken away then the lyght of the candell lighteth al aboute.

Memorye and vnderstandyng be the tresures of the soule or mind.

The meanynge is this. He that wyll knowe the truthe let hym ioyne his reson of the inwarde mynde to the outewarde thinge, and let hym reuolue by deliberation the thyng that he hath conceyued, whether it be ryght or wrong, and then the reson that contaynethe in it supernaturally the rote of truth, shal open the same truthe of the outewarde

thinge. For Plato sayth, that mannes soule knoweth all thynges, but the bodye causeth it to forgette, and by studye and exercyse it commeth to perfyte knowledge agayne, & sayeth also that to knowe is nothyng els, but to remember a thyng that was forgotten which was knowen before, and saith also that the effectes of the bodye blyndethe the soule.

The thynges ỹ were remembred the secõd time were that god is the ende of all thynges and soueraign good whyche were forgottẽ by the darknes and affectes or desire of the bodye.

Boecius.

Tyẽ said I, I graunt wel vnto Plato. For thou remembrest me the secõd tyme of these thyngs. Fyrst ỹ remembrest me that I lost my memory, by the contagious coniunction of the body and soule, And after warde when I was oppressed wyth the bourden of my dolour and sorowe. Phil. If thou beholde the thynges before graunted, it shall not be farre of but thou shalt remembre the thyng that thou of late did dest confesse, that thou knewest not.

Boetius. What thinge was that?

Philosophy. By what gouernemente the worlde is gouerned. Boecius. I remember well that I confessed that I knewe it not, but althoughe I se now what thou purposest, yet I desyre to here it more plainely of the.

Phil. Thou thoughtest it no doughte, a lytle before that this worlde is gouerned by god. Boe. Certes I thynke it no doughte nor neuer wyll, and I wil shewe the shortly bywhat resones I am brought to it. Thys worlde colde neuer be brought

Prosa duodecima B.

TVm ego, Platoni, inquam, uehementer assentior, nam me horum iam secundo commemoras. Primum, quod memoriam corporea contagione, debinc cum mœroris mole pressus amisi.

P. Tũ illa, si priora, inquit concessa respicias, ne illud quidem lõgius aberit quin recorderis quod te dudum nescire confessus es. Boe. Quid inquam. P. Quibus (ait) illa gubernaculis mũdus regatur. B. Memini inquam, me iustitiam meam fuisse confessum. Sed quid asseras licet iam prospitiã planius tamen ex te audire desidero. P. Mundum hũc (inquit) deo regi paulo ante minime dubitandum putabas. B. Ne nunc quidem arbitror inquam, nec unq̃ dubitandũ puto, quibusq̃ in

In hoc rationibus accedam breuiter exponam. Mũdum hic ex tã diuersis cõtrarijs ꝑtibus in unam formam minime conueniſſet, niſi unus eſſet qui tam diuerſa coniungeret, cuncta uero naturarum ipſa diuerſitas inuicẽ diſcors diſſociaret atq; diuelleret, niſi eſſet unus qui quod nexuit coniungeret. Non tam uero certo nature ordo procederet nec tam diſpoſitos motus locis, temporibus, efficientijs, ſpacijs, qualitatibus explicaret, niſi unus eſſet qui has mutationũ uarietates manens ipſe diſponeret. Hoc quicquid eſt quo conſtita manent, atq; agitãtur uſitato cunctis uocabulo, deum nomino. P. Tum illa ũ hoc (inquit) ita ſentias paruã mihi reſecare operã puto, ut felicitatis compos pariã ſoſpes reuiſas. Sed quæ propoſuimus intueamur. Nonne in beatitudine ſufficientiã numeraauimus? Deumq; beatitudinem ipſam eſſe conſenſimus?

Bo. Ita quidem. Ph. Et ad mundum igitur, inquit, regendum nullo extrinſecis adminiculis indigebit: alioquin ſi quo egeat, ples

brought into one forme of ſoo dyuers contrarye partes, excepte that there were one that ioyned together ſuch dyuers thynges. And the ſame dyuerſitie of nature ſo varieng one from another woulde ſeperate and deuyde a ſunder, the thynges that be ioyned together, excepte ther were one that held together the thing that he hath knyt together. And the order of nature, ſhoulde not go fourth, ſo certainely, nor ſhewe ſo ordinary mouinges, in places, times, effect ſpaces, and qualities, excepte ther were one that remayned alwayes ſtedefaſt, and dyſpoſed and ordryd the ſame varietyes and chaunges of thyngs. And the ſame one whatſoeuer it be whereby al thynges that be made, do remayne and be moued, I call god, by a name that is commenly vſed of al folke. Phil. Then whyles thou art of that opinĩõ, I think I haue lytle els to do, but that thou be inge ſure of felycytye and bleſſednes, mayſt go ſe thy countraye fake & ſound: But let vs beholde the thynges that we purpoſed before. Haue I not nombred ſuffyſaunce in felycitie and bleſſednes? And haue we not agreed that the ſame felicitie and bleſſednes is God?

Boe. It is euen ſoo. Phil. And that he ſhall nede no outward help to gouerne the worlde? For yf he ſhoulde nede, he ſhoulde not haue full ſuffyſaunce.

Boe. It muſt nedes be ſo. Phil. Then he alone ordereth al thynges. Boe. It may not be denyed. Phil. And that god

is

Ordynary mouynges be taken for goyng of the ſon, nere or farre of from places whẽ he goeth in a croked circle and alſo the varyance of ỹ night and daye ſometyme long ſomtyme ſhort.

Effect is taken for the ebbyng and flowynge, of the waters.

Space is takẽ for the planettes, nere or farre of.

Qualities betaken, for heat, colde, drye, and moyſte.

is declared to be the same soueraygne good. Boe. I do wel remember it. Phil. Then he dysposeth all thyngs by the same good. And if he whō we haue agreed to be good, do rule al thynges, alone by hymselfe, then is he as a certaine key and sterne wherby the whole worlde is kept stedefast and withoute corruption. Boe. I say I agre fyrmely thereto, and I sawe a lytle before (that thou were aboute to saye so) althoughe it were by a sclender suspycion, or imagynacion. Phi. I do beleue, and certes I do thynke thou ledest nowe thy eyes more stedefastlye to beholde the truthe then before. But yet the thynge that I shall say, appereth no lesse to beholde. Boe. I saye what is that? Phil. When it is beleued fully and truly that god gouerneth all thynges wyth the keye of his goodnes, and that all the same thinges that I haue taught, do make haste by naturall intencion to come to good, maye it be doughted but they be gouerned wyllyngly? And do turne them self of ther fre wyl at the commaundement of there gouernor as thynges conueny-ent and obeying there gouernoure? Boe. I saye it muste nedes be soo, and that rule of God shoulde not seme blessed, yf there shoulde be a yoke of vnruly thinges that draweth peruersly backwarde, or stubbournelye, and no comforte of obedyent thynges, submytting them selfe to good order. Phylo. Then there is nothynge (that kepeth his own nature

nam sufficientiam non habebit. B. Id inquam, ita est necessariū. P. Per se igitur solum cuncta disponit. B. Negari, inquam, non potest. Ph. Atq; deus ipsum bonum esse monstratus est. B. Memini inquam. P. Per bonum igitur cuncta disponit. Siquidem per se regit omnia, quem bonum esse consensimus, et hic est ueluti quidam clauus, atq; gubernaculum, quo mundata machina stabilis, atq; incorrupta seruatur. B. Vehementer assentior, inquam, & te id paulo ante dicturā tenui licet suspicione, prospexi. P. Credo inquit: iam enim ut arbitror uigilantius ad cernenda uera oculos deducis. Sed quod dicam non minus ad contuendum patet. B. Quid inquam? P. Cum deus, inquit, omnia bonitatis clauo gubernare iure credatur, eadēq; omnia, sicuti docui, ad bonum naturali intentione festinent, num dubitari potest, quin uoluntarie regantur, seq; ad disponentis nutum, ueluti conueniētia, contemperataq; rectori sponte cōuertant? Ita inquam: necesse est: nec beatum regimen

esse uidetur, si quid detractantium iugum foret, non obtemporantium salus.
Ph. Nihil est igitur, quod naturam seruans, deo contraire conetur. B. Nihil inquam. P. Quid si conetur, ait, num tandem proficiet quicquam aduersum eum, quem iure potentissimum beatitudinis esse concessimus? B. Prorsus, inquam, nihil ualeret. Phi. Non est igitur aliquid, quod sũmo huic bono uel uelit, uel possit obsistere. B. Non inquã arbitror. P. Est igitur summum bonum, inquit, quod regit cuncta fortiter, suauiterq; disponit. B. Tum ego, quam inquam, me non modo ea, quæ conclusa sũma rationum, uerum, multo magis hæc ipsa, quibus uteris, uerba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stultitiã magna lacerentem sui pudeat. P. Accepisti (inquit) in fabulis lacessentes celũ gigãtes, sed illos quoq;, uti condignũ fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit. Sed uis ne rationes ipsas inuicem collidamus? Forsitã ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulcra quædam ueritatis scintilla dissiliat. B. Tuo inq̃ arbitra

nature) labourethe to resyste or god agaynste GOD.
Boe. It is trewe. Phy. What and yf any thynge dyd laboure agaynste God: myght it any thynge auayle, at laste agaynst hym, whom we haue graunted to be almyghtie by ryght of blyssednes? Boe. I say it could nothyng auayle him at all. Phy. Then is there nothyng that eyther wyll, or maye resyste this soueraygne good? Boe. I saye, I thynke not that any thynge maye resyst god.
Phy. Then it is the same soueraygne good, that ruleth all thynges stronglye and dysposeth them gently. Boe. I say, the same wordes that thou vsyste, do moche more delyght me, then the effect and ende of the reasons, that thou hast concluded, so that we fooles (that do reprehende and rebuke some tyme great thynges that toucheth goddes myghtie work) may be at the last ashamed of our folysshenes, as I that sayde a lytell before, that God refuseth the workes of men, and nothyng medleth therwith.
Phy. Thou haste harde in fables, that gyauntes haue ben aboute to assaute heauen, but the gentle strength of god, hath deposed and dystroyed them, as it was mete and worthy, but wylte thou that we knit togither the same resons? Perchaunce of suche conference, or dysputacion, some goodly sparke of trueth may procede and appere. Boe. Do at your pleasure. Phy. No mã doughteth that god is omnipotent? Boe. No man dough-

doughteth it, that is in his right mynd. Phy. Then he that is almyghtie, can do althynges. Boe. It is trewe.

Phy. May god do any euyll? Boe. No, truelye. Phil. Then euyll is nothinge when that he cannot doo it that canne do all thynges. Boe. I saye doest thou mocke me weyuynge or knyttynge together a meruaylous subtyle laborinth by thy reasons, that haue no ende lyke a rounde compas, by the whych subtill resons, thou goeste oute where thou dyddeste enter, and where thou diddest enter or goo in, thou goeste oute? And thou foldyst together maruaylous compassyng rounde resons of the symple or pure dyuinitie. For a lytel before thou begynnyng at blessednes saydeste that the same was soueraygne good, which blessednes thou saydest was set in god. And also thou saydest that God was soueraygne good and full of felycitie, or blessednes, wherby thou dyddest proue as a corrolarye, or conclusion that noman was blessed but God. And thou saydest also that the forme of good, is the substaunce of God, and of blessednes. And thou saidest that the same one thynge was the same good thyng, that was desyred by nature of all thynges. And thou dyddeste proue that God ruleth all thynges by the gouernaunces of hys bountiousnes, and that al thynges obeyeth hym, howe vyolent soeuer they be, and thou saydeste that there is no nature of euyll. And thou dyddeste proue these thynges by no oute warde

Laborinthus, is a hous made full of subtyll dores, or entres, that a mā being in, could not gette oute, for when he thought to go oute, he wente in. It was made by one Dedalus, for a pryson, to werye such as laboure to gette out of ẏ same.

Compassynge resons be such, that they depende, one vpō another, so that a proporcion cōcluded in one reason, is the begynnyng of the other conclusyon.

reasons

tu. P. Deum, inquit, esse omnium potentē nemo dubitauerit. B. Qui quidem (inq̄) mēte cōsistat, nullus prorsus ambigat. P. Quinero est, inquit, oīpotēs nihil est quod ille nō poßit. B. Nihil inq̄. P. Nū igitur deus facere malū potest. Bo. Minime inq̄. P. Malū igitur inquit nihil est cum id facere ille non poßit qui nihil non potest. B. Ludis ne (inquā) me, inextricabilē laborinthum rationibus texens? quo nunc quidē qua egrediaris introeas, nec quo uero introieris egrediare. Admirabilē quandā diuine simplicitatis orbē cōplicas. Etenim paulo ante a beatitudine incipiēs, eam sūmū bonū esse dicebas, q̄ in summo deo sitā loquebare, ipsū quoq; deū sumū esse bonū plenāq; beatitudinem discerebas, ex quo nemine beatū fore nisi qui pariter deus esset, quasi munusculū dabas. Rursus ipsā boni formam, dei ac beatitudinis loquebaris esse substantiam. Ipsūq; unum, id ipsum esse bonū dicebas quod omniū rerū a natura peteretur. Deū quoq; gubernaculis bonitatis unis

terſtrate regere diſputabas uolentiaq; cuncta parere illi, nec ullam mali eſſe naturā, atq; hæc nullis extrinſecus ſumptis, ſed altero ex altero fidem trahente inſitis domeſticisq; probationibus explicabas. P. Tum illa minime inquit ludimus, remq; omniū maximam dei munere quem dudum deprecabamur exegimus. Ea eſt enim diuine forma ſubſtantie, ut nec; in externa dilabatur, nec in ſe externum aliquod ipſa ſuſcipiat. Sed ſicut de ea Permenides ait, omnem ta circulo adducis ſponte multitudinem id eſt rerum orbem mobilem rotat, dum ſe immobilem ipſa conſeruat. Quod ſi rationes quoq; non extra petitas, ſed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitū collocatas agitauimus, nihil eſt quod admirere, cum Platone ſanciente dixeris, cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus, oportere eſſe ſermones.

Metrum duodecimum. Ph.

FElix qui potuit boni,
Fontem uiſere lucidiſ
mus
Felix qui potuit grauis.
Terre ſoluere uincula,

Quon-

reaſons, but by proues takynge auctoritie one thynge of another, and by inwarde and proper or kamplyer probation. Phi. Then I do not mocke ſaieth philoſophy, but I haue ſhewed the, the greteſt thing of all by the gyft of God, whome of late we prayed vnto. For certes ſuche is the forme of the diuine ſubſtaunce, that it falleth and flydethe not into outward or ſtraunge thynges nor receyueth any outward or ſtraung thynge into it ſelfe, but as the philoſopher Permenides ſaith of the ſubſtaūce of God. Thou ledeſt all the multitude of thynges in a cyrcle, that is to ſaye: the deuyne ſubſtaunce turnyth the mouynge worlde of thynges round lyke a compas whiles that the ſame ſubſtaūce kepeth it ſelfe ſtedfaſt and immouable. And if I haue ſtirred reſons, not taken from without, but ſet within the compas of the thynge that we treate of, there is nothynge that thou ſhouldeſte meruaile at ſince thou haſt lerned with Plato (ſaying) that the wordes ought to be conuenient and agreeing to the thinges, whereof they be ſpoken, or whereof men do ſpeke.

Euerye talke ought to be accordyng to the matter that is talked.

Phyloſophy.

HAppye or bleſſed is he that maye ſe the ſhynynge fountayne, or well of good, that is to ſay, god. And happye is he that maye vnbynde the bandes of the heuy earth, that is to

lay the bandes of worldly thynges.
The wise Orpheus of Trace that som tyme was sory for the death of his wife after that he had caused (with hys weping and dolorous songes) the renning waters to stand styll and the wodes to moue. And after that he had caused the hartes to ioyne their sedes to the cruell lyons withoute feare, to herken vnto his songe. And thereby had also made that the hare feryd not the sighte of the dogge being so well pleased with hys swete songe and his harpe. And when the brennyng loue, that he bare to hys wyfe broyled the inward partes, of his brest, or harte. And when that these swete songes that hadde ouercomen al other thynges, could not comfort there mayster Orpheus. He complaynynge vpon the cruell goddes, wente to the houses of hell, and there he tempering his melodius sōges, wyth ỹ swete sounding stringes of his harp syngeth mourninglyal that he had taken & drawē out of the cheyfe fountaynes of his mother the goddes Caliope. And he sange as muche as he coulde for weppyng, and as much as loue (that doubled hys sorow w) would permyt and suffer hym. And pitiously moued hell. And instantly desyred the lordes infernall with his swet and humble prayer to haue restitution of his wyfe agayne. The porter of hel, called Cerbarus with his three hedes, beyng ouercome with that new melodye

Orpheus was a harper, that played most swetely, as the Poetes do fayne, and his wyfe was named Eurydycen, whiche dyed vpon the stynge of a serpent, as she fled by a medo, from a sheperd named Aristeus that pursued her to deflower her, & she wente to hell, after she was dead, as the Poetes do fayne.

Quondam funera coniugis
Vates thraicius gemens
Postquam flebibus modis
Siluas currere mobiles
Amnes stare coegerat
Iunxitq; mitrepidum latus
Seuis cerua leonibus
Nec uisum timuit lepus
Iam cantu placidum canem
Cum flagrantior intima
Feruor pectoris ureret
Nec qui cuncta subegerat
Mulcerent dominum mo di
Immites superos quæreus,
Infernas adiit domos
Illic blandis sonantibus
Chordis carmina tempe rans,
Quicquid præcipuis dea
Matris fontibus hausera
Quod luctus dabat impo tens
Quod luctum gemminam amor,
Deflet, tenera commouens,
Et dulci ueniam præce
Vmbrarum dominos ro gat
Stupet ter geminus nouo
Captus carmine ianitor,
Quæ fontes agitant meta
Vltrices scelerum deæ
Iam mœste lachrimis ma dent
Non ixionium caput

Velox

Velox præcipitat rota
Et longa siti perditum
Spernit flumina Tantalus:
Vultur dum satur est modis
Non traxit Ticij iecur
Tandem uincimur arbiter,
Vmbrarum miserans ait.
Donamus comitem uiro
Emptam carmine coniugem
Sed lex dona coerceat
Ne dum tartara liquerit
Phas est lumina flectere
Quis legem dat amantibus.
Maior lex amor est sibi
Heu noctis prope terminos
Orpheus Euridicen suam,
Vidit, perdidit, occidit.
Vos hæc fabula respicit
Quicunq; in superum diem
Mentem deducere quæritis
Nam qui tartareum in specus
Victus lumina flexerit
Quicquid præcipuum trahit
Perdit, dum uidet inferos.

Finis libri tertij.

dye wondred greatlye. And the goddes infernall reuengers of synnes whyche do ber and torment synners with fear, being sory for Orpheus, wept for pitie of hym at the swet sound of the harpe. Then the turnynge whele dyd not cast downe the heade of Xion. Then Tantalus (that was almoste consumed, with longe thyste for lacke of drynke) regarded not the waters, to drynke. Then the grype called Vulter, whiles he was full of the melodye of Orpheus ceased tyrynge and rendynge of the maw of a man called Tycij. And at laste the iudge or lorde of soules infernall (hauynge compassyon) sayd, we be ouercome, let vs geue vnto Orpheus hys wyfe to beare hym companye that he hath well bought with his song. But a lawe or condition, shall restrayne our gyfte, that is to saye: vpon this condicion, so that it shall not be lawefull for hym ledyng awaye hys wyfe, to turne his eyes and loke backe vpon her vntill he be out of hell, for if he doe, his wyfe shal returne vnto vs againe. But who maye geue a lawe to louers, that is to saye: loue ought not to be constrayned by lawe. For loue is a greater lawe to it selfe then can be made by man. Alas when Orpheus and his wyfe were nye the endes of the nyght, that is to saye, nye the ende or entry out of hell, he lokynge backe vpon Euridicen his wife lost her, and kylled her, in leuyng her behynde in hell, for brekyng of the con-

Xion is tormented in hell with a turnynge whele, and of him came al gyaūtes, suche is the fable.

Tantalus is one that standeth in water to the chynne, and hath Apples hangyng at his mouthe, and yet is redy to die for lacke of meate, and drynke.

Ticius, is tormented with a Grype, euer terynge and fretyng his maw or lyuer.

diction aforesayde commaunded by the iudge infernall. Ye, whatsoeuer you be, that do seke to lede your soules vnto euerlastyng lyfe or blesse, this fable appertayneth to you. For whosoeuer beynge ouercome wyth the desyre of worldly thynges, doo turne theyr eyes of reson, and vnderstandyng from heuenly thinges to the caue or pit of hel: whatsoeuer good thyng he getteth by his labours in vertue and godly contemplacion at anye tyme, by lokynge backe (that is to saye by the loue and desyre of temporall and worldly thinges) he loseth it agayne.

Here endeth the thyrd boke.

Prosa prima. B.

Ec cū Philosophia dignitate cultus, & oris grauitate seruata, leniter, suauiterq; cecinisset, Tum ego nondum penitus insiei moeroris oblitus intentionem dicere adhuc diquid parantis, abrupi. Et O inquā, ueri prœuia luminis, quæ usq; adhuc tua fuerit oratio, tum sui speculatione diuina, tum tuis rationibus in uicta patuerunt, eaq; mihi, & si ob iniuriæ dolorem nuper oblita, non tamen ante hac prorsus ignorata dixisti. Sed ea ipsa est uel maxima nostri causa moeroris, quod cum rerum bonis rector existat, uel esse omnium mala possint, uel impunita prætereāt. Quod solum quanta dignum sit admiratione, profecto consydera. At huic aliud maius adiungitur. Nam imperante, florenteq; nequitia, uirtus non solum præmijs caret, uerumetiam sceleratorum pedibus subiecta calcatur, et in locum facinorum

Boecius

Then Philosophye (after that she had kept the reuerence, of her countenaunce and grauitie of her speking) had songe these thynges softly and swetely. Then I (that had not vtterly forgotten my inwarde greyfe and sorowe) had interrupte her intent and purpose beyng yet redy to speke some other thyng. And I sayd: O thou gyde and leder of the very true lyght of knowledge, euen the same thinges that thy owne wordes haue spoken hetherto, haue appered vnto me inuincible, aswell for there deuine speculation as for thy resons. And the same very thinges that thou shewedst me, although I had forgotten them for sorowis of the wronge that was done to me, yet for all that they were not vnto me vtterly vnknowen. But thys is the cheifeste cause of my greyfe and sorowe, that where as the ruler of all thynges is good, why be there any euiles, or why do euiles passe vnpunyshed? Whyche thynge alone well consydered, howe much is it worthy to be meruayled at? But yet ther is another greater thyng to be ioyned to thys, moreouer to be meruayled at. For whiles that wickednes ruleth and flourysheth, vertue is not only vnrewarded, but also subiect and troden vnder the fete of the wicked

and

and is ponyshed in stede of wicked offenders, whych thynges to be suffered in the kyngdom of God that knoweth all thynges, able to do al thinges, and willyng to do onely good thynges, no man maye thereat nether meruayle ynoughe, nor complayne ynoughe.

Phi. It shoulde be a greate infynite wonder and more horrible then all the monsters of the world, if it were so as thou takest it, that euyl men should be worshypped and that good men shuld be vyle or nothyng estemed in the well ordred house of suche a father of the howshold, but it is not so. For if those thynges that be concluded a lytell before, be kepte hole or vnbroken, thou shalt knowe (the same God of whose kyngedome now I speake, beynge the aucthor) that good mē be alwais mighty, and euyll men always abiect and vnmyghty or weke, and that vyces be neuer vnponyshed, nor vertue vnrewarded, and that felicitie and blessednes happeth to good folke, and myschaunces to wycked folke. And thou shalte knowe manye thynges of thys kynd which may strengthen the with stedfaste sadnes, when thou haste put awaye thy complayntes, agaynst euill fortune. And for by cause thou haste sene the fourme of true blessednes or felycitie, as I of late haue shewed the, and that thou haste knowen wherein it is set, all thynges omytted and ouer passed that I thynke mete to omit and passe

rum supplicial uit. Quæ fieri in regno scientis omnia, potentis omnia, sed bona tantummodo uolentis dei, nemo satis potest nec admirari, nec conqueri.

P. *Tum illa. Et esset, inquit infiniti stuporis, omnibusq; horribilius monstris, sicuti tu æstimas, in tanti uelut patris familias dispositissima domo uilia uasa colerentur, pretiosa sordescerēt. Sed nō ita est. Nā si ea quæ paulo ante conclusa sunt, inconuulsa seruātur, ipso decuius nunc regno loquimur, authore cognosces, semp quidem potētes bonos esse, malos uero abiectos semper atque imbecilles nec sine pœna unquam esse uitia, nec sine premio uirtutes: bonis felicia, malis semper infortunata contingere. Multaq; id genus, quæ sopitis querelis, firma te soliditate corroborent. Et quoniam ueræ formam beatitudinis me dudum monstrante uidisti, quo etiam sita sit agnouisti, decursis omnibus, quæ prætermittere necessariū puto, uiam tibi quæ te domū reuehat ostendam.*

dam. Pennas etiam tuæ mentí, quibus se in altum tollere possit, affigam, ut (perturbatione expulsa) sospes in patriam meo ductu, mea semita, meis etiam uehiculis reuertaris.

Metrum primum. Phi.

SVnt etenim pennæ uolucres mihi,
Quæ celsa conscendant poli.
Quæ sibi cum uelox mens induit,
Terras perosa despicit:
Aëris immensi superat globum,
Nubesq; post tergum uidet.
Quicq; agili motu calet æthe ris
Transcendit ignis uerticem
Donec in astriferas surgat domos,
Phœboq; coniungat uias:
Aut comitetur iter gelidi senis
Miles coruscí syderis:
Vel quocunq; micans nox pingitur
Recurrat astri circulum.
Atque ubi iam exhaustum fuerit

palle ouer, I wyll shewe vnto the, the waye that maye bryngethe home, to the knowledge of true blessednes and felicitie. And I wyll fasten fethers or resones in thy mynde, wherby it may ryse vp in heith, so that after thou hast cast a waye all trouble of worldly and temporall thynges, thou mayst reuert and turne into thy countrye safe and sounde, by my leding, by my path way and by my steppes.

As a bryde by the fethers flyeth in height, & riseth vp, so by vertue reason and wysdom, the soule, or mynde of man, ryseth into the contemplacion of good, whiche is God.

Philosophy.

CErtes I haue swyft fethers that is to say: vertue and wysedome, that astendeth vnto the hygh heuen. Wythe fethers when a swyfte mynde hath put on, it being disdaine full, dispiseth all earthly thynges and surmounteth the globe, that is to say: the grete body of the airy element, and seyth the cloudes behynde hys backe, and passeth the toppe of the fyery elemente that wareth hote by the swyfte mouinge of the firmament, vntyll it resylte into the houses or places of the sterres, and ioyneth her wayes wyth the sonne, or folowyth the iourney of the colde old man, that is to say, of the planet Saturne. And the sayde mind beyng a knyght of the shynynge sterre that is to say, of god by seking of truth that ledeth men vnto the true knowledge of god, passethe the circle of the sterres, that is to saye, of the sterry heuen, in all places, where as the shynyng

nynge nyght is paynted with sterres, and when the mynde hath bene dryed vp as voyde of the thynge that it seketh, whiche is god: Then it passeth higher vntyll it leueth the higher and vppermooste heuen or fyrmament. And presseth downe the backes of the swyfte ayry firmamente, optaynynge myght of the reuerend lyght, that is to saye: of god. There, that is to saye: beyonde the hyest firmament, the lorde of kynges holdeth his scepter, that is to saye: his empire, and temperith the rules or gouernementes of the whole worlde. And he beynge the shynynge iudge of thinges, alwayes firme and stedfaste, in hymselfe, ruleth the swifte carte, that is to saye: the mouynge rounde compas of the heuenly bodies.

We haue no contynunall dwellynge in this worlde, but in heauen from whense the soule came that god created.

O thou mynde of mankynde, yf the waye that nowe thou beyng forgetful of, doest seke for, would bryng the thither, that is to saye: vnto the knoledge of GOD, after thou hast forsaken all worldly thynges, thou wouldest saye vnto me I do remember this is my coũtraye, here was I borne, here wyll I fasten my steppe, that is to saye here wyll I rest. But yf thou list to loke vpon the darkenes of the earth that thou hast left behynde, that is to say: worldly thynges. Then thou shalte see these cruell tyrauntes, that is to saye: cruell prynces whome the symple and wretched people do fear, to be as men banished from the sayd countrey of God.

Boecius

fuerit satis,
Polum relinquat extimum,
Dorsaq; uelocis primat ætheris
Corpos uerendi luminis,
Hic regum sceptrum dominus tenet,
Orbisq; habenas temperat,
Et uolucrem currum stabilis regit
Rerum coruscus arbiter.
Huc te si reducem referat uia,
Quam nunc requiris immemor,
Hæc (dices) memini patria est mihi,
Hinc ortus, hic sistam gradum.
Quod si terrarum placeat tibi
Noctem relictam uisere,
Quos miseri toruos populi timent
Cernes tyrannos exules.

Prosa secunda. B.

TVm ego pape (inquam) ut magna promittis, nec dubito quin poßis efficere, tu modo quem excitaueris ne moreris. P. Primum igitur (inquit) bonis semper adesse potentiam, malos cunctis uiribus esse desertos agnoscas licebit, quorum quidem alterium demonstratur ex altero. Nam cum bonum malumq; contraria sint, si bonũ potens esse constiterit, liquet imbecillitas mali, at si fragilitas clarescat mali, boni firmitas nota est. Sed uti nostre sententie fides habundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam, nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans. Duo sunt quibus omnis humanorum actuum constat effectus, uoluntas scilicet, atq; potestas, quorum si alterutrum desit, nihil est quod explicare queat. Deficiente enim uoluntate, ne aggreditur quidem quisq; quod non uult. At si potestas absit, uoluntas frustra fit. Quo fit ut si quem uideas uelle adipisci quod minime adipiscatur, huic optinendi quod uoluerit defuisse

Boecius.

Then when Phylosophy had ended her tale, I sayde. O Phylosophy thou promisest gret thinges and I dought not but thou mayst perfourme them. And I praye the tarye not but tell me now, seing thou haste styrryd me to hete. Phi. Fyrst it behoueth the to knowe that good men be myghty, and wycked men be alwaies vnmyghtye and weke of all strength. of the whych the one is shewed by the other. For when that good and euyll be thynges contrary, yf good appereth to be myghty & stronge, then the wekenes of the euill is manifest. And when the frayltie of euyll shewethe it selfe, then the stedefastnes of good is perceyued. But to thintent that more credite shoulde be geuen to my saying, I will procede by both wayes (confyrmynge the thynges that be proposed) now on the one parte, and nowe one thother parte. There be two thynges or pryncyples, wherin standeth theffect of all menes actes and dedes, that is to say: wyl, and power. Of the whych if eyther of them fayle, there is nothynge that can be done. For if that wyl fayleth none effect is done. For no manne taketh in hand to doo the thynge that he will not do. And if power be away wyll is in vayne or voyde, whereby it commeth to passe that yf thou see anye man that would optayne, that he cannot get, thou mayst not dought, but he

Consideracio topica est propositum in proposito, Nopa positum in opposito.

wanteth power, to haue that he wold haue. Boe. It is verye clere and maye not be doughted in any maner.

Phil. Truelye yf thou se anye man to haue done that he woulde doo, doughtest thou that he lacked power to do it. Boe. No. Phil. Than that thing that a man maye doo, in that thynge, he is myghtye, and in that thynge that he cannot do, he is to be iudged vnmyghtye and weke. Boe. I saye I confesse the same. Phil. Remembrest thou by the former resones, that it is gathered or concluded, that al thentent of mans wyll maketh hast or tendeth vnto felicitie or blessednes, whyche is ledde by dyuers studies or wayes. Boe. I saye I do remember that the same was so shewed and declared before. Phy. And doest thou remember that the same felycitie or blessednes is the same good, and after the same maner desyred, of all men when felicitie is requyred?

To recorde, is to bynge to remembraunce a thynge that is forgotten.

Boe. I saye I doo not recorde it, for I holde it fixed in my mynd or memory. Phil. Then all men both good and also euyll doo laboure to come to good, without any difference of intent.

Boe. I say the same, it is a very consequence. Phi. Then it is certayne that men be made good by adoption or optaynynge of good. Boe. It is true. Phil. Then good men do optayne the thynge that they do desyre. Boe. So it semeth. Phil. Then truely if euel men should get and obtayne the good that they

se ualentiam dubitare non posis. B. *Perspicuum est inquam, nec ullo modo negare potest.* P. *Quem uero effecisse quod uoluerit uidemus, num etiam potuisse dubitabas?* B. *Minime.* P. *Quod uero quisq; potest, in eo ualidus, quod uero non potest, in hoc imbecillis esse censendus est.* B. *Fateor inquam.* P. *Meministi ne igitur inquit superioribus rationibus esse collectum, intentionem omnem uoluntatis humane quæ diuersis studijs agitur, ad beatitudinem festinare?* B. *Memini (inquã) id quoq; esse demonstratum* P. *Num recordaris beatitudinem, ipsum esse bonum, eoq; modo, cum beatitudo petitur ab omnibus desiderari bonum?* B. *Minime (inq̃) recordor, quoniam id memorie fixum teneo.* Ph. *Omnes igitur homines boni pariter ac mali indiscreta intentione ad bonum peruenire nituntur.* B. *Ita (inquam) consequens est.* P. *Sed certũ est adoptione boni, bonos fieri.* B. *Certum.* P. *Adipiscuntur igitur boni quod appetunt.* B. *Sic uidetur.* P. *Mali uero si adipiscerentur quod ap-*

pe-

petunt bonum, mali esse nõ possent. B. Ita est. P. Cum igitur utriq; bonum petunt si hij quidem adipiscatur, illi uero minime. Num dubium est bonos quidem potentes esse? qui uero mali sint imbecilles? B. Quisquis (inquam) dubitat, nec rerum naturam, nec consequentiam potest considerare ratiõ. P. Rursus inquit, si duo sint quibus idem secundum naturam propositum sit, eorumq; unus naturali officio idipsum agat atq; perficiat alter uero naturale illud officium minime administrare queat, alio uero modo quã naturæ conuenit, non quidem impleat propositum sum, sed imitetur implentem quemnam horum ualentiorẽ esse decernis. B. Etsi coniecto (inquam) quid uelis, plenius tamen audire desidero. P. Ambulandi inquit motũ secundum naturam esse hominibus, nũ negabis. B. Minime inquã. P. Eiusq; rei pedum officium esse naturale, nũ dubitas? B. Nec hoc quidem inquã. P. Si quis igitur pedibus incedere ualens ambulet, alius q; cui hoc naturale pedum desit officium manibus

they do desyre they myght not be euill. Boe. It is euen so. Phil. Then when that both the good and the euyll folke desyreth good, yf the good folke optayneth the good and the euil folk do not, Is it nowe anye doughte but that the good folke be myghty, & the euill folke weke and vnmyghtye? Boe. I saye whosoeuer doubteth of thys, cannot consyder the nature of thynges, nor the consequence of reson. Ph. And farther if there be two that haue one naturall purpose or intent, and the one of them worketh and perfourmethe the same thynge by offyce of nature or naturallye, and the other may not do the same by naturall offyce, or naturallye, but folowyeth hym that perfourmeth the offyce naturallye, but yet by a nother wayes, or meane, then is conuenyente for nature, and dooeth not fulfyll or perfourme the purpose, whych of these two iudgest thou to be moost myghtye? Boetius. Althoughe I do conjecture what thou woouldeste saye, yet I desyre to heare it moore fullye of the. Philosophy. Then, wilt thou denye that the mouing to walke or go is in men by nature, or that it is not naturall? Boe. I do saye I do not denye it. Philo. Then, doughtest thou that the acte of going is the naturall offyce of the fete? Boe. I saye I dought it not Phil. Then if a man beynge myghtye to go vpon his fete walketh, another that lacketh the naturall offyce of hys

fete labourcth to go vpon his handes, which of these may iustelye be iudged more strong or myghtye? Boe. I saye procede in thy other sayinges, for noo man doughteth but that he that maye go by naturall office of hys fete, is stronger, then he that maye not do the same. Phil. Euen soo the soueraygne good before spoken of is shewed indifferently, aswel vnto the cuyll folke as to the good folke, but the good doo optayne it by the naturall office of vertue, and the wycked folke do enforce themselfe to get it by sundry coueytous desyres of temporall and worldly thinges, whyche is not the naturall office or meane to obteyne good. Doist thou thynke it otherwyse? Boe. No truely for the thyng, that is the consequence is manyfest. And of these thinges that I haue graunted, it is necessarye, that good folke be myghtye and cuyll folke vnmyghtye and weake. Phil. Thou sayest right, and it is a sygne or iudgement that nature is recouered in the e resisteth the dyssease, as the phisicions be wonte to hope of the pacient and sycke folke. But for by cause I see the redy to vnderstand, I shall shewe the diuers and many sundry reasons. For see howe gretely the wekenes of wycked and cuyll folke appereth that cannot attayne vnto the thynge that ther natural intencyon ledeth, and in a maner almest compelleth the. And what yf that the same wycked folke shoulde lacke

nibus nitens ambulare conetur, quis iure horum ualentior existimari potest. Boe. Contexe (inquam) cetera, nam quin naturalis officij potens, eo qui idem neque at, ualentior sit, nullus ambigat. P. Sed summum bonū quidem, æque malis bonisq; propositum, boni quidē naturali officio uirtutum petunt, mali uero uarijs per cupiditatem quod adipiscendi boni naturale officiū non est, idipsum conantur adipisci, an tu aliter existimas? B. Minime inquam, nam etiam quod est consequens patet. Ex bijs enim quæ concesserim bonos quidem potentes, malos uero esse, necesse est, imbecilles. Ph. Recte inquit præcurris, id q (ut medici sperare solent) iudicium est erecte iam resistentisq; nature. Sed quoniam te ad intelligendum promptissimum esse conspicio, crebras coaceruabo rationes. Vide enim quanta uicioſorum hominum pateat infirmitas, qui nec ad hoc quidem peruenire quæunt, ad quod eos naturalis ducit, ac pene compellit intencio. Et quid, si hoc tam magno,

ac

ac pene inuicto precum is
naturæ deserentur auxilio.
Considera uero quanta scele-
ratos homines habeat im-
potentia. Neq; enim leuia
aut ludiera præmia petunt,
quæ consequi atq; optinere
non possunt, quæ circa ipsa
rerum summam uerticemq;
deficiunt, nec in eo misera
contingit effectus, quod so-
lum dies nocteq; moliuntur.
In qua re bonorum uires emi
nent. Sicut enim eum, qui pe
dibus incedens, ad eũ locum
peruenire potuisset, quo
nihil ulterius peruium iace-
ret incessui, ambulandi po-
tentissimum esse censeres:
ita eum qui expetendorũ fi-
nem, quo nihil ultra est, ap-
prehendit, potentissimum ne
esse est iudices. Ex quo fit
quod huic obiacet, ut idem
scelesti utribus omnibus uide
atur esse desertus. Cur enim
relicta uirtute uitia sectan-
tur, insciia ne bonorum? Sed
quid eneruatius ignorantiæ
cæcitate. An sectanda nouer-
unt, sed transuersos eos libi
do præcipitat? Sic quoq; in-
temperantia fragiles sunt,
qui obluctari uitio nequeũt.
An scientes, uolentesq; bo-
num deserunt, ad uitia des-
flectuntur?

lacke this so grete and almost inuyncl
ble helpe of nature. Consider also how
lytle power the wycked folke hath, for
they seke not lyght and vayne rewar-
des, whyth they can not folowe and
obtayne. But they fayle and cannot
attayne the chyefest and hyest thynges
that is to saye soueraygne good, nor
these wycked wretches, can gette the
effecte of soueraygne good, whyche
they go aboute onely to obtayne night
and daye, wherin the myghte of good
folke doth appere.

For certis, as thou woldest iudge hym
moste myghtie and stronge in goynge,
that may come to the place in going on
his feet, beyonde the which place there
lyeth no way farther to go: euen so it be
houeth that thou do iudge hym, moste
stronge and myghtie, that optayneth
the end of al thynges that be to be des
red, beyonde whiche ende, there is no-
thyng: whych ende, good folke doe op
tayne, whereby it folowe th that ther
is a thyng contrary to this, that is to
saye, that these wycked seme to be de-
solate, naked, or voyd of all strength.
But why do the wicked folke folowe
wyckednes and forsake vertue? is it
for that they be ignorannt of good thin
ges? But what is more feble then the
blyndnes of ignorannce? Do the wyc-
ked knowe that good is to be folowede
ye truely, but that coutousnes, euer-
throweth them being clene turnyd frō
good. And they be also fraple by intem

perannce

temperaunce of vice, that cannot resist vyce, and whether they (knowynge and wyllyng) do forsake the good and be turnyd vnto vyces? Ye truely, And by thys meanes they cesse not onelye to be myghtye and stronge, but also they cesse vtterly to be. For they that forsake the ende of al thynges that be, do cesse also to be, or haue no beinge, whych thyng perchaunce should seme to some man a meruayle, that I shuld say that wycked folke (whyche be the most part of men) be not, or haue no beynge. But it is euen soo. For they that be wycked (I doo not denye) but that they be wycked, but I denye that they be pure and symple. For as thou hast called a dede man a Corpus or carkes, and maye not call hym simply and purely a man, euen soo haue I graunted that vicious & wicked folke be wycked, but I cannot confesse that they be absolutely with out any dyuersitie as they were before they were vicious. For the thinge that kepeth order, kepeth nature, and is styll as it was, but the thing that varyeth from order and nature, forsaketh the thyng that is set in his natur. But thou wilt say that wycked folke may do things: Certes I wyll not deny, but that they may do. But I say that their power, commeth not by strength, but by wekenes. For they may doo euyll thynges which they might not do if they might remayne in the workes of good folke,

And

flectuntur? Sed hoc modo non solum potentes esse, sed omnino esse desinunt. Nam qui communem omniũ, quæ sunt, finem relinquunt, pariter quoq; esse desistunt. Quod quidem euipiam mirum forte uideatur, ut malos, qui plures hominũ sunt eosdem non esse dicamus: sed ita sese res habet. Nam qui mali sunt, eos malos esse non abnuo, sed eosdem esse pure, atq; simpliciter, nego. Nam uti cadauer hominem mortuum dixeris, simpliciter uero hominem appellare non poßis, ita uitiosos malos quidem esse concesserim sed esse absolute nequeam confiteri. Est enim quod ordinem retinet, seruat naturam. Quod uero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sui natura situm est, derelinquit. Sed possunt, inquies, mali, ne ego quidem negauerim, sed hæc quidem eorum potentia non a uiribus, sed ab imbecillitate descendit. Possunt etiam mala, quæ minime ualerent, si in bonorũ effitientia manere potuissent. Quæ poßibilitas, eos euidentius nihil posse demon-

monſtrat. Nam ſicut paulo ante collegimus, malum nihil eſt, cum mala tantummodo poſſint, nihil poſſe improbos liquet. B. Perſpicuū eſt P. Atq; ut intelligas quænā ſit huius potentiæ uis, ſummo bono nihil potentius eſſe paulo ante diffiniuimus. B. Ita eſt inquam. P. Sed idē inquit, facere malū nequit. B. Minime. P. Eſt igitur, inquit, aliquis, qui omnia poſſe homines putet? Bo. Niſi quis inſaniat, nemo. P. Atq; ijdem poſſunt mala. Bo. Vtinam quidem, inquam, non poſſent. Ph. Cum igitur bonorum tantummodo potēs, poſſit omnia, non uero queant omnia potentes etiam malorum, eoſdem, qui mala poſſunt, minus poſſe manifeſtum eſt. Huc accedit, quod omnem potentiam inter expetenda numerandam, omniaq; expetenda referri ad bonum, uelut ad quoddam naturæ ſuæ cacumen oſtendimus. Sed patrandi ſceleris poßibilitas referri ad bonū non poteſt. Expetenda igitur non eſt. Atq; omnis potentia

And the ſame pollybylitie or power of euyll folke, ſhewethe euidentlye that they maye do ryght nought. For as I haue gathered & proued a lytle before that euyll is nought or nothyng, whē that the euyll folke may onely do euil, It appereth a playne concluſion, that euyll folke may do ryght nought, and haue no power or myghte. Boeti. It is playne ſoo. Philo. Then, that thou mayſt vnderſtand what is the ſtrengthe of this power, that ỳ wycked may do nought, I haue deſyned and determyned a lytel before that nothynge is more myghty then ſoueraygne good. Boe. I ſaye it is ſo. Phil. But ỳ ſame ſoueraygne good can do no euyll. Boe. No forſoth. Phil. Then is there any man that thynketh that men can do all thynges. Boe. No man ſo thinketh, except he be mad. Phil. But yet wycked folke may do euyll. Bo. I ſay would to god they coulde not.

Phil. Now then when that he that is myghtye in good thynges may doo all thynges, but they that be myghtye in euyll thynges, maye not do al things, It is manyfeſt that they that may do euyl, may do leſſe or be of leſſe power. And ſoo it commethe to paſſe to proue thys concluſion, that I haue ſhewed before, that is, that all power is to be numbred emongeſt thynges that are to be deſyred. And all thynges ỳ ought to be deſired, are referred vnto good, that is to ſay, vnto god, as vnto a certayne

tayne perfection of theyr nature. But the power or possibilytye to doo euyll, may not be referred vnto good, that is to say, to god. Therfore euyll is not to be desyred. But all power is to be desyred. So therfore it appereth that the power of the wiked folk, is no power. By all whyche thynges before sayde, it appereth truely, that good folke be myghty, and the wycked folke without any dought, be vnmyghtye and weake. And it appereth that the same sentence or sayinge of Plato, is true, that sayd, that wyse men onely might do the thing that they desyred to doo. And that wycked folke myght doo the thyng, that accordeth to ther wycked pleasures, but they cannot fulfyll and do the thyng, that they desyre, that is to say, they cannot obtayne soueraign good, yet they do all thynges, whyles they do thynke to attayne vnto the soueraygne good that they desyre, by those thynges wherein they delite, but they cannot attayne therevnto. For wyckednes cannot optayne and come vnto felicitie and blessednes.

tentia expetēda est. Liquet igitur malorum possibilitatem non esse potentiam. Ex quibus omnibus bonorū quidem potentia, malorum uero minime dubitabilis apparet infirmitas. Veramq; illam Platonis esse sententiam liquet, solos, quod desyderent, facere posse sapientes improbos uero exercere quidem quod libeat, quod uero desyderent, explere non posse. Faciūt enim qualibet, dum per ea, quibus delectantur, id bonum, quod desiderant, se adepturos putant. Sed minime adipiscuntur, quoniam ad beatitudinem probra non ueniunt.

Phylosophy.

Metrum secundum. P.

Who so myght take away the coueryngе of the outward vaine apparell of proud kynges, that thou seist do syt in the hye tope of there prince-

Quos uides sedere celso
Solij culmine regis

Pur

Purpura claros nitente,
Septos triſtibus armis
Ore toruo comminantes,
Rabie cordis anhelos
Detrahat ſi quis ſuperbis
Vani tegmina cultus,
Lem uidebit intus artas
Dominos ferre cathenas.
Hinc enim libido uerſat
Auidis corda uenenis,
Hinc flagellat ira mentem
Fluctus turbida tollens.
Maror aut captos fatigat,
Aut ſpes lubrica torquet.
Ergo cum caput tot unum
Cernas ferre tirannos,
Non facit quod optat ipſe,
Dominis preſſus iniquis.

pryncely chayres, ſhynynge with faire purple, and ſet aboute with ſorowfull armoure, threteninge ſymple wretches with theyr cruell lokes and breathyng with cruell harte, he ſhould ſe ſuch lordes or tyrauntes bere inwardly in ther mynde ſtrayte chaynes or bondes of wickednes. For on the one parte lecherye caſteth downe theyr hartes, wyth her gredy venym or poiſō, on the other part the ragyng wrath or anger ſtereth vppe the floudes of veracion, tormenteth theyr myndes. Alſo ſorowe and heuines werieth them when they be caught or fallen into any miſchaūce or elles vayne ſlypperye hope greueth them. Therefore when thou ſeyſt one hed that is to ſay one prynce ſuffer ſoo many paſſions and trybulacions. Then doeth not he the thynge that he deſyreth, ſeyng ỹ he is ouerthrowen wō ſo many wicked lords that is to ſay: wō ſo many vyces, ỹ haue rule ouer him.

The meaning of thys myter is thys If that a man myght ſe and perceyue with his corporall eyes, the inwarde hartes and myndes of prynces, whom he ſeyth outwardlye ſyttynge in their chayres of eſtate and maieſtie garniſſhed with purple and gliſteryng gold, hauyng grete power and aucthoritie, in worldely and temporall thynges, yet he ſhould wel vnderſtand that ther hartes were troubled with muche anger, hope, feare and many other tribulacions and paſſions, ſo that they can-

not do that they would doo, whereby it appereth and it is a very consequẽce that they be vnmyghtye and weke.

The lecherous people be like a sowe ꝑ more delitith to swallowe in the myre then in a faire fountaine or water sprynge.

Philosophy.

SEist thou not than in howe greate fylth the wycked folke be wrapped, and with what clerenes the good folke do shyne. In whych thynge it is euydent and manyfest that good folke neuer want reward, nor wicked folke neuer lacketh there ponyshmentes. For of all thynges that be done, the thynge for the whych euery thynge is done, the selfe same thynge, semethe wel to be the reward of the same thing As yf a man do ren in a furlonge space for a crowne, the crowne is ꝑ reward for the whych the rennynge is. And in like maner I haue shewed before, that felicitie or blessednes is the selfe same thynge, for the whyche all thynges be done. Then is the same good, appoynted as a common reward for mannes actes and dedes, whyche good, maye not be seperated from good folke. And he shall not be called ryghtfully good, that lacketh goodnes, wherefore men well manered and vertuous, neuer loseth their rewardes. Therefore howe muche soeuer wycked folke ware mad agaynste good folke, yet for al that the wyse man shall neuer lose his crowne or reward, nor shal dryue vp or dymynyshe. Nor another mans wyckednes taketh not awaye the proper honoure from

Prosa tertia. Ph.

VIdes ne igitur quãto in cœno probra uoluantur, qua probitas luce resplendeat? In quo perspicuum est, numq̃ bonis præmia, nunquam sua sceleribus deesse supplitia. Rerum etenim, quæ geruntur, illud propter quod una quæq; res geritur, eiusdem rei præmium esse non imuria uideri potest, uti currendi in stadio, prepter quam curritur iacet præmium corona. Sed beatitudinem esse idipsum bonum, propter quod omnia geruntur, ostẽdimus, Est igitur humanis actibus ipsum bonum, uelut præmium commune prepositum. Atq; hoc à bonis non potest separari. Neq; enim bonus ultra iure uocabitur qui caret bono, quare probos mores sua præmia non relinquunt. Quantumlibet igitur sæuiunt mali, sapienti tamen corona nõ decidet, non aresect. Neq; enim probis animis proprium decus aliena decerpit improbitas

improbitas. Quod si extrin secus accepto lætetur, po terat hoc uel alius quispiam uel ipse etiam qui contulis set auferre. Sed quoniam id sua cuiq; probitas confert, tum suo præmio carebit, cum probus esse desierit. Postremo cum omne præmi um ideirco appetatur quo niam bonum esse credatur, quis boni compotem præmij iudicet expertem. At cuius præmij, omnium pulchęrri mi maximiq;. Meměto enim illius corolarij quod paulo ante præcipuum dedi, ac sic collige. Cum ipsum bonum beatitudo sit, bonos omnes eo ipso quod boni sunt, fieri beatos liquet. Sed qui beati sunt deos esse conuenit. Est igitur præmium bonorum quod nullus deterat dies, nullius minuat potestas, nullius fuscet improbitas, deos fieri. Quæ cum ita sint de malorum quoq; insepera bili pœna, dubitare sapiens nequæat. Nam cum bonum malumq;, ita pœna atq; præ mium aduersa fronte deside ant, quæ in boni præmio ui demus accidere, ea necesse est in mali pœna, contraria

frome good folke. And yf good folke should reioyse of any outewarde good that they haue receyued of anye other then of themselfes, truly he that gaue them such goodnes, or some other per son myght take it from them. But for asmuch as to euery man his owne pro per goodnes is his rewarde then euery man shall lacke his reward, when he ceaseth, and is not good. Furthermore when that all reward, therefore is de syred, bycause it is thought to be good who would iudge that he had noo re warde, that is good? But what is the rewarde of good folke? Truely the fai rest and greteste rewarde. But remem ber the same corrolarye or conclusyon that I gaue the as cheife a litle before, and vnderstand it thus. When ỹ sayd good is felicitie or blessednes, it appe reth that all good folke (in as muche as they be good) be made blessed or hap pye. And it behoueth that they that be blessed, be goddes. Therefore the re warde of good folke: is to be made god des, whiche rewarde, no daye consu meth, no power dimnisheth, & no wic kednes defaceth. And synce it is thus that good folke neuer fayle of reward, then a wyse man may not doughte of the contynuall and inseperable payne of wycked folke. For when that good and cuyll, payne and rewarde, be con trarye one to another, then the things that we se to happen as a rewarde of

good, the same thynges beyng contrarye must nedes be the ponyshmente of the euyll folke. For as goodnes is the rewarde of good folke, soo wyckednes is the ponyshmente of wicked folke. Nowe certes whosoeuer is tormentid with ponyshment, there is no dought but that he is tormented wyth euyll. Therefore if the same euyll folke will esteme and praise themselfe, may they seme to be without pontshmēt: which euyl folke not onely extreme wyckednes of all euyll troubleth, but also corrupteth vehemently. And se also of the contrarye part of the good folke, what payne folowethe the wycked folke. For thou hast lerned a litle before that euery thyng that is, is one. And the same one, is good, so the consequence to the same is, that euery thing that is certes the same semethe to be good. Therefore by this meanes, what soeuer thynge fayleth and is not good, it cessyth to be, or it is not. Whereby it comethe to passe, that euyll folke cesseth to be the same that they were. But the same other fourme of manes body sheweth yet that wycked folke, haue bene men, and certes beyng turnyd into malyce or wyckednes, they haue lost the nature of man. But whē that goodnes onely may exalte euerye man aboue the nature of men: It must nedes be, that wycked folke (whose wyckednes hath cast them oute from the condicion of man) do put them vnder

parte respondeant. Sicut igitur probis, probitas ipsa sit premiū, ita improbis nequitia ipsa supplicium est. Iam uero quisquis afficiter pena malo se affectum esse non dubitat. Si igitur sese ipse estimare uelint, poßūt ne sibi supplicij expertes uideri? Quos omnium malorū extrema nequitia non afficit modo, uerum etiam uehementer inficit. Vide autem ex aduersa parte bonorum, quæ imperbos pena comitetur. Omne namq; quod sit, unum esse, ipsumq; unum, bonum eße paulo ante didicisti. Cui consequens est, ut omne quod sit, id etiā bonū esse uideatur. Hoc igitur modo quicquid a bono desicit: esse desisit. Quo fit ut mali desinant esse quod fuerant. Sed fuiße homines adhuc ipsa humani corporis reliqua species ostentat. Quare uersi in maliciam humanam quoque amisere naturam. Sed cum ultra homines quenquam prouehere sola probitas poßit. Necesse est ut quos ab humana conditione deiecit, infra hominis meritum

ueritum detrudat improbitas. Euenit igitur ut quem transformatū uiciis uideas, hominem estimare non possis. Auaritia feruet alienarum opum uiolentius ereptor similem lupi dixeris. Ferox atq; inquies linguam litigiis exercet, cani comparabilis. Insidiator occultus, surripuisse fraudibus gaudet, uulpe culis exequetur. Ire intemperans fremit, leonis animū gestare credatur Pauidus ac fugax non metuenda formidat cerui similis habeatur. Segnis ac stupidus torpet, asinum uiuit. Leuis ac inconstans, studia permutat, nil ab auibus differt. Fœdis immundisq; libidinibus immergitur, sordide suis uoluptate detinetur. Ita fit, ut qui probitate destitutus homo esse desierit, cū in diuinam conditionē transire non possit: uertatur in beluam.

der the merite of man or cause them to be lesse estemed then men. Therefore it happeth that if thou seist anye man turned into vices or wickednes, thou mayst not thinke that he is a man. If any man brenneth in coutous and is a violente extorcioner or rauener of other mennes goodes, thou mayst saye that he is lyke a woulfe. And if a man be cruel, and troubelous, and exercyseth hys tounge with chydyng he may be lykened to a dogge. Also he that is a pryuye lyer in a waye, and reioyseth to stele by craft and soteltie, he may be compared to yong fores, or yong coubbes. And a man that is distempryd, & weyeth wode for anger, it semeth that he do beare the stomake of a lyon. If a man be fearefull and sleynge, and feareth thynges that he ought not to fere he is counted lyke vnto hertes. And if a man be sowr, astonyed, and wareth dull, he lyueth as an asse. If a man be lyght inconstant and often chaungeth his mynd and thought, he differith no thynge from bydes. And he that is drowned in foule and fylthy plesures, of lechery, is wrapped in the delight of the fylthy sow or hogge. So then it followeth, that he that forsaketh his goodnes, is no man. And when he cannot passe and turne into the condytyon of god, he is turnyd by his wycked condicions into a beste.

There be twoo vertues of knowlege in man, one is vnderstādinge wherby we be made like vnto god: the other is our senfys whiche when they obey not reson maketh men like vnto beasts.

The wynde named Eurus droue
ȳ sayls of Ulixes duke of Naryce
and hys shippes wanderynge in
the sea, to the Ile where as the fayre
goddes called Circes, daughter of the
sonne is dwellyng, that myngethe to
her newe gestes drynkes that be tow-
ched or turnyd by wordes of enchaunt-
ment. And after that her hand beynge
myghty and skylfull in herbes, hadde
chaunged the felowes of Ulixes into
dyuers figures of beastes, the one had
the face of a bore, another was chaun-
ged into a Lyon of Marmoryke, a cou-
trye so called, dyd growe wyth tethe &
clawes like a Lion. Another was chaū
ged into a woulf, and howled in stede
of weppyng. Another walked aboute
the house, as meke as a tigre of India
And although the power of Mercury,
the God, whych is called the bryde of
Archady, hauyng pytie vpon the duke
Ulixes, beyng compassed aboute with
dyuers euylles, hathe delyuered hym
from the mischeif of his hostes Circes,
yet for all that, the rowers and ma-
ryners, hadde dronke the sayde wyc-
ked dryncke. And they beyng turned in
to swyne, had there bread and meate,
turnyd into acornes, and nothyng re-
mayned hole of the fygure of man, but
they were all chaunged alwel in voice
as in bodye, sauyng that theyr mynde
remayned as it was first, vnchaunged
and bewayled the monstrus chaunge
of ȳ body. O light hand of the goddes
to

Circes was a
womā that by
enchauntment
made drynkes
with herbes ȳ
turned such as
dranke therof,
into dyuers for
mes of beastes
for the fygure
of the body on-
ly, but yet ther
myndes were
not chaunged.
but remayned
as they were
before.

Metrum tertium.

VEla Naricij ducis
Et uagas pelago rates
Eurus appulit insulæ
Pulchra qua residens dea
Solis edita semine
Miscet hospitibus nouis,
Tacta carmine pocula.
Quos ut in uarios modos
Vertit herbipotens manus,
Hunc apri facies tegit,
Ille marmaricus leo
Dente cresçit & unguibus,
Hic lupis nuper additus
Flere dum parat ululat:
Ille tigris ut indica
Tecta mitis obambulat.
Sed licet uarijs malis
Numen arcadis alitis
Obsitum miserans ducem
Peste soluerit hospitis,
Iam tamen mala remiges
Ore pocula traxerant
Iam sues cerealia
Glande pabula uerterant.
Et nihil manet integrum
Voce, corpore, perditis.
Sola mens stabilis, super
Mōstra quæ patitur, gemit
O leuem nimium manum,
Nec potentia gramina,
Membra quæ ualeant licet,
Corda uertere non ualent.
Intus est hominum uigor

Circes

Arce conditus abdita.
Hæc uenena potentius
Detrahunt hominem sibi,
Dira quæ penitus meant
Nec nocentia corpori
Mentis uulnere sæuiunt.

Circes that chaungeth the bodyes into the fourme of beastes, whyche is a smale thyng in respecte of the chaung that is of the soule of man from vertue to vyce, by misusyng of the body. And the herbes of Circes, be but weake, whych although they be able to chaũg the members of mans body, yet canne they not turne mens harts or mindes, for there in, is hyd the strength of men as it were in a secrete towre, that is to saye: the reason of man is enclosed in hys wytte or mynde. But the cruell vyces or synnes draweth menne vnto them more strongly, then the enchaũt mentes of Circes, and goeth thorowe or percyth mens hartes. And although they hurte not the bodye, they make a man wodde, and distroyeth hym wyth the wounde of the mynde or thoughte.

Prosa quarta, Bo.

TVm ego, fateor, inquam, nec iniuria dici uideo uitiosos, tametsi humani corporis speciem seruent, in beluas tamen animorum qualitate mutari. Sed quorum atrox, sceleratáq; mens, bonorum pernicie sæuit, idipsum eis licere noluissem. P. Nec licet, inquit, uti conuenienti monstrabitur loco, sed tamẽ si idipsũ quod eis licere creditur, auferatur, magna, ex parte

Boecius.

THen I saye, I graunt that thou haste sayde. And I perceyue that wycked folke maye be sayde ryght well to be chaũged into beastes, by ꝑ qualitie of their mind or thought, although they kepe the forme of mans body. But I wolde not that it were lefull for them to do the same wickednes or beestly thoughtes, whose mynde being cruell and wicked, wareth wode in destruction of good folk. P. Certes it is not lawefull for them, as it shalbe shewed in place conueniente. But yet if the selfe same thynge (that is thoughte to be lawefull for wycked folke, to

to do) be taken away from them, soo that they myght not hurte good folke a grete part of the payne of the wiked folke, shoulde then be reuealed and shewed. For it semeth perchaunce incredible to some folke, that it behoueth that wycked folke be more vnhappye when they haue accomplyshed ther desyres, then if they myght not performe and do the same, that they desyre. For if it be a wretched thyng to wyll to do euyll thynges, It is a more wretched thyng to haue myght to do it, without whych myght theffect and dede of the wicked will, should fayle. And nowe synce that euery of the sayde thynges, that is to say wyll, myght, and effect, hath his own mysery, it behoueth that the wycked (whome thou seyst to wyl and may do wyckednes) be greued wt three folde myscheyfe. Boeci. I saye I graunt the same, but I hertely desyre that the wycked folke (forsakyng the power to do euyll) maye sone lacke the sayde thre folde myschyfe. P. So shall they want peraduenture sooner then eyther thou wouldeste be sorye they shoulde, or that they themselfe wene, that they shall wante. For there is nothyng so durable in so shorte bonds of this lyfe, that the myndes (specially immortall) do thynke longe to abyde & endure. Of whyche forsayde wycked the gret hope and the gret compassing power of wyckednes, is oft distroyed with sodayne ende, and er they be ware

To wyll to do euyl is worse, then to haue myghte to do euyll. But when myghte is toyned to wyll, then followeth the effecte, and then the myghte is worse then the wyll.

parte sceleratorũ hominum pena releuetur. Etẽim quod incredibile cuiq; forte uidetur infeliciores esse necesse est malos, cum cupita perfecerint, quam si ea, quæ cupiunt, implere non possint. Nam si miserum est uoluisse prauа potuisse miserius est: sine quo uoluntatis misere langueret effectus. Ita cum sua singulis miseria sit, tripli ci infortunio necesse est urgeantur, quos uideas sceluelle, & posse perficere. Bo. Accedo, inquam sed uti hoc infortunio cito careant, patrãdi sceleris posibilitate deserti, uehementer exopto P. Carebunt (inquit) otiũ quam uel tu forsitan uelis, uel illi sese existiment esse carituros. Neq; enim est aliquid in tã breuibus uitæ metis ita serum, quod expectare longum, immortalis præsertim animus, putet, quorũ magna spes, & excelsa facinorum machina, repentino, atq; insperato sæpe fine destruitur. Quod quidem illis miseræ modum statuit. Nã si

si nequitia miseros facit, miserior sit necesse est diutur-
nior nequam. Quos infelicissimos esse iudicarem, si nō
eorum malitiā, saltem mors extrema finiret. Etenim si
de prauitatis infortunio uera conclusimus, infinitam li-
quet esse miseriam, quā esse constat eternam. B. Tū ego
mira quidem (inquam) ex concessu difficilis illatio, sed
hijs eam quæ prius concessa sunt, nimium conuenire cog-
noſco. P. Recte inquit æstimas. Sed qui conclusioni acce-
dere durum putat, equum est uel falsum aliud præces-
sisse demonstret, uel collationem propositionum non es-
se efficacem necessarie conclusionis ostendat. alioquin
concessis præcidentibus, nihil prorsus est quod de illa-
tione causetur. Nam hoc quoq; quod dicam, nō minus
mirum uideatur, sed ex hijs quæ sumpta sunt eque est
necessarium Bo. Quid nam inquam. P. Beatiores inquit
esse improbos supplicia luentes, quam si eos nulla iusti
cie pena coherceat. Neq; id nunc molior quod cuiuis ue-
niat

ware thereof: which forsayde sodden destructyon, truelye hathe appoynted them an ende of theyr wretchednes. For yf wyckednes maketh wycked folke then must he nedes be most wycked that longest is wycked. Whyche forsayde wycked folke I would iudge most vnhappye or caytyfe, if that extreme death at lest waye dyd not finish their wyckednes. For if I haue truely concluded of the myschyfe of the wycked folke, then it appereth that their wyckednes is without ende whyche appereth to be eternall or euer contynuyng. Boe. I saye this is a meruelous and a hard conclusion, to graunt: but I do knowe that the same doo wel agree to the thynges that were graunted before. Phil. Thou iudgest well in this, but he that thynketh it a harde thynge to agree to the conclusion, it behoueth hym to shewe eyther that some false thynge hath gone before, or ells he must shewe that the conferrynge of proposions is not effectuall or maketh no force of a necessary conclusion. Or els yf he graunt the thinges precedent there is no cause at all, whye that he should complayne vpon the argument For thys thynge that I shall say nowe shall no lesse seme maruaylous, but is soo necessarye to be concluded, of the thinges that be concluded before.

Boe. I saye, tell me what is it?

Phil. Certes the sayd wycked folke be more happye and blessed that be ponyshed for their desertes, then yf no po-

wyshment of right do chastyce them at all. And I do not intend thys now, for that any man myght thynke that the wycked maners of men be corrected by ponishment, and that they be brought to the ryght waye for feare of ponishment, nor for that their payne and ponyshment shoulde be an example to others, to eschewe vyce and wyckednes, but I doo iudge that the wycked folke that be iustlye ponyshed be more blessed after another maner, thē for ỹ sayd. ỹ. causes though no maner of correctyon nor respect of example be had. Boe. I saye what shalbe that maner besydes the sayd other. Phil. Haue we not graunted that good men be happy and blessed, and euyll folke wretched. Boe. I say it is so. Phil. Then yf anye good be added or put to the wretchednes of any man, is not he more happy then the man, whose myserye is pure without myxture of anye good wyth such mysery or wretchednes. B. I say it semeth so as thou sayest. Ph. What if some other euyll (besydes the euyl he hath alredi) were annexed vnto ỹ same wretche that wanteth al good, shoulde he not be demed more wycked then he a great deale whose euyll is tempered and mytigated with ỹ distribution or partakyng of suche good. Boe. I saye what ells. Phil. Then certes the wicked folke when they be ponished, haue some good annexed, That is to saye: they? payne and ponishment that they suffer

niat in mentem, corrigi ullis one prauos mores & ad rectum supplicij terrore deduci, cæteriſq; exemplum esse fugiendi culpanda: sed alio quodam modo felitiores esse improbos arbitror punitos tametsi nulla ratio correctionis, nullus respectus habeatur exempli. B. *Quis erit, inquam, præter hos alius modus.* Ph. *Et illa bonos inquit esse felices, malos uero miseros nonne concesimus?* Boe. *Ita est inquam.* Ph. *Si igitur inquit miseriæ cuiuspiam bonum aliquid addatur, nonne felicior est eo, cuius pura ac solitaria sine cuiusquam boni an mixtione miseria est?* B. *Sic (inquam) uidetur.* P. *Quid si eidem misero qui cunctis careat bonis, præter ea quibus miser est, malum aliud fuerit annexum, nonne multo infelicior eo censendus est, cuius infortunium, boni participatione releuatur?* B. *Quid ni inquam.* Ph. *Habeunt igitur improbi cum puniuntur quidem boni aliquid annexum, pœnam ipsam scilicet, quæ ratione iustitiæ bona est, ijdemq; cum supplicio carent, eis inest*

alis

aliquid alterius mali, ipsa impunitas, quam iniquitatis merito, malum esse confessus es. B. Negare non possum. P. Multo igitur infeliciores improbi sunt, iniusta impunitate donati, quam iusta ultione puniti. Sed puniri improbos iustum, impunitos uero elabi, iniquum esse manifestum est. B. Quis id neget? P. Sed ait, nec illud quidem quisq; negabit, bonum esse omne quod iustum est, contraq; quod iniustum est. malum liquet esse. B. Tum ego ista quidem consequentia sunt eis quæ paulo ante conclusa sunt. Sed quæso (inq̃) te, nulla ne animarum supplicia post defunctum morte corpus relinquis? P. Et magna quidem inquit, quorum alia penali acerbitate alia uero purgatoria clementia exerceri puto. Sed nunc de hijs disserere consilium non est, id uero hactenus egimus, ut quæ indignissima tibi uidebatur malorum potestas eam nullam esse cognosceres, quosq; impunitos querebare, uideres nunquam im pro-

suffer, whych is good, by reason of iustyce. And there is in the same wicked folke (when they be vnponyshed) some other euyll, that is to saye: the lacke of ponyshment, whyche lacke of ponyshmēt (for desert of wickednes) thou hast graunted to be euyll. Boe. I cannot denye it. Phil. Then such wycked folk be more wycked when they be wrong fullye perdoned and delyuered from ponyshment, then when they be ponyshed by iust iudgement. And so it is manyfest that it is ryght to ponyshe wycked folke, and that it is a wicked thing to let them escape vnponyshed.

Boe. Who wyll denye the same.

Phil. Certes no man can deni al thing to be good, that is iust and ryghte, and on the other syde the thyng that is vniust and false, appereth to be euyll.

Boe. I say Certes, that these thinges be consequences, to the thyngs that be concluded a lytell before. But I praye the tell me, dost thou thynke that any ponyshment is lefte for the soule after that the body is dede? Phil. Ye truelye and that very great ponishment, of the whyche soules I thynke that some be tormented with intollerable payne, and other be ponyshed by the meke paines of purgatorye, but I am not now mynded to speke of suche thynges.

But I haue spoken hytherto that thou myghtest know, ẏ the myght and power of wycked folke (that semed to the most vnworthy) is no myght nor power

er. And that the wycked folke that ẏ complaynest vpon that they were vnpunyshed, thou sawest dyd neuer wāt due ponyshment for their wyckednes. And thou dyddest praye that the power and myght, in malyce that the wicked folke had agaynst the good folke, shortelye to be ended. And that thou myghtest perceyue that it is not long, and that ẏ myght of the wycked were more vnhappye yf it were continuall or longe enduryng, and that it is most vnhappye if it were perdurable, and should neuer cese. And furthermore it is proued that the wycked folke that be let go without iust ponyshment, be more wycked then when they be ponyshed by iust iudgemente. And to thys sentence it is a consequence, that then at the last the wycked folke be turmented with more greuous ponyshments, when they seme to be vnponyshed.

Boe. When that I do consyder thy resones (I say) I do thinke that nothing is sayde moore true. But if I tourne agayne to the iudgementes of the comen people, what man is there that not onely semed to haue beleuyd these thynges, but at lest way to haue hard these thynges? Phi. It is euen so. For the commen people cannot lift vp their eyes (that be vsed to darkenes) vnto ẏ light of the very truth, but they be like vnto birdes whose sight the night doth lyghten and the daye doth blynde. For whyles the commen people do not beholde

By the lawe eternall all thnigs ought to be in dewe ordre as the good to be rewarded, & the euyll to be punysshed.

probitatis sue carere supplicijs: Licentiam, quam cito finiri præcabaris, nec longam esse disceres, infelicioremq; fore si diuturnior, infelicissimam uero si etiam eterna, post hæc miseriores esse improbos, iniusta impunitate dimissos, quam iusta ultione punitos. Cui sententie consequens est, ut tum demũ grauioribus supplicijs urgeantur, cum impuniti esse credũtur. Boe. Tum ego cum tuas (inquam) rationes considero, nihil dici uerius puto. At si ad iuditia hominum reuertar, quis ille est cui hec non credenda modo, sed saltem non audienda uideantur.

P. Ita est (inquit illa) Nequeunt enim oculos tenebris assuetos, ad lucem perspicue ueritatis attollere, similesq; auibus sunt quarum nituitũ nox illuminat, dies cecat. Dum enim non rerum ordinem sed suos intuentur affectus, uel licentiam uel impunitatem scelerum, putant esse

esse felicem. Vide autem quid eterna lex sanctiat. Melioribus animum si conformaueris, nihil opus est iudice præmium deferente, tu teipse excellentioribus addidisti. Si studium ad peiora deflexeris, extra ne ultorem quæsieris, tu teipse in deteriora detrusisti, ueluti si uicibus sordidam humum, cœlumq; respicias, cunctis extra cessantibus, ipsa cernendi ratione nunc sceno, nunc sideribus, interesse uidearis. At uulgus ista non respicit. Quid igitur, hijs ne accedamus quos beluis similes esse monstrauimus? Quid si quis amisso penitus uisu, ipsum etiam se habuisse obliuisceretur intuitum, nihilq; sibi ad humanam perfectionem deesse arbitraretur, num uidentes eadem, cecos putaremus? Nam ne illud quidem adquiescerent quod æque ualidis rationum nititur firmamentis, infeliciores esse eos qui faciunt quam qui patiuntur iniuriam.

Foe.

holde the order of thynges, but theyr owen affectes and desyres, they do iuge that eyther the power of the wycked agaynst good folke, or their escapyng from ponyshment is happy and blessed But se what Goddes lawe apoppynteth. If thou conformme thy mynde to the beste thynges, thou haste nede of no iuge that shal reward the, for thou hast applyed thy selfe to the most excellent and beste thynges. But if thou hast turnyd thy mynde vnto euyll thinges, as vnto vyce, seke not anye outewarde ponysher without thy selfe, for thou hast cast thy selfe into the worste thynges. Like as if thou shouldest loke vpon the foule erth and heuen in order (all outwarde thynges leyde apart for the tyme) then it should seme to the by reson of lokyng, that thou were now present in the sterres and now in the foule earthe. But the commen people beholde not these thynges. What than, shall we ioyne vnto these comen people whych (I haue shewed) be like vnto beastes? What woldest thou say yf that a man had vtterly lost his sight and also hadde forgotten that euer he sawe, and yet dyd thynke that he lacked nothing of the perfection of a man would not we that saw the same iuge that he were blynde. For the common people woulde not beleue the thynge that I shall saye, whyche is sustayned by as strong groundes of reason, that is, that they that do wronges be more wretched

The cõmon people do iudge farre from the trueth.

wretched thē they that suffer wrong. Boe. I saye I wold fayne heare these reasones. Phil. Wilt thou denye that all wycked folk be not worthy ponishment. Boeti. No. Ph. Truely it appereth diuers wayes that they that be euyll be wycked. Boe. I saye it is euen so. Phi, Then thou doughtest not that they that be worthye ponyshmente be wretches. Boe. I saye it behoueth so. Phil. If thou than satiste as a iudge, whether wouldest thou thynke hym worthy ponyshement that hathe done wrong, or he that hath suffered wrōg? Boe. I saye I woulde not doute but I would satisfye and contente hym that hath suffered wronge with the ponyshment of hym that dyd the wrong. Phi. Then it semeth the, that he that doth wrong is more wretche then he that taketh wronge. Boe. I saye it followeth well. Phi. Therefore for thys cause and for other lyke causes of the same sorte, it appeareth that syns of it self, by nature maketh men wretches. And it semeth to euerye man that the wronge that is done, is not the wretchednes of hym that taketh the wrong but of hym that doeth the wrong. Boe. Certes the orators do contrarye for they do labour to moue the iudge, to haue pitie vpon thē, that haue done some haynous and greuous offence, where as more pytie ought to be shewed vnto them that haue suffred wrong and it behoueth that they ỹ haue done such

B. Vellem inquam, has ipsas audire rationes. Ph. Omnem inquit, improbum num supplicio dignū negas? B. Minime. P. Infeliciores uero esse qui sunt improbi multipliciter liquet. B. Ita est inquam P. Qui igitur supplicio digni sunt, miseros esse non dubitas. B. Conuenit inquam. P. Si igitur cognitor, ait resideres cui supplitium inferendum putares? eine qui feciſſet, an qui pertuliſſet iniuriam. Boe. Nec ambigo (inquam) quin perpesso satisfacerē dolore facientis. P. Miserior igitur tibi iniuriæ illator, quàm acceptor esse uideretur. B. Consequitur inquā. P Hac igitur aliisq; de causis ea radice nitentibus, quod turpitudo suapte natura miseros faciat, apparet, cuilibet illatam iniuriam, non accipientis, sed inferentis esse miseriā. B. Atq; nunc, ait, contra facium oratores. Pro his enim, qui graue quid acerbumq; perpesi sunt, miserationem iudicum excitare conantur, cum magis admittentibus iustior miseratio debeatur: quos non abiratis, sed à pro

pi-

pitiis potius, miserantibusq; accusatoribus ad iudicium, ueluti ægros ad medicum, duci oportebat, ut culpæ morbos supplitio resecarẽt. Quo pacto defensorum opera uel tota frigeret, uel si prodesse hominibus mallẽt, in accusationis habitum uerteretur. Ipsi quoque improbi, si eis aliqua rimula uirtutem relictam fas esset aspicere, uitiorumq; sordes pœnarum cruciatibus se deposituros uiderent compensatione alipiscẽde probitatis, ne hoc cruciatus esse dicerent defensorumq; operam repudiarent, ac se totos accusatoribus, iudicibusq; permitterent. Quo fit ut apud sapientes nullus prorsus odio locus relinquatur. Nam bonos quis, nisi stultissimus oderit? malos uero odisse ratione careat. Nam sicuti corporum languor, ita uitiositas est quasi morbus animorum. Cum ægros corpore minime dignos odio, sed potius miseratione iudicemus, multo magis non insequendi, sed miseraudi

such offences should be brought (not with angre, but rather with mercifull accusers) vnto iudgemente, as sycke folke be brought vnto the physicion, that the iudge myght put awaye the syckenes, of the offence, with ponyshment, by whych meanes the dyligence of the orators should either holye cesse, or els if they would profyte offenders, their diligence shoulde be turned into the habyte of accusation, that is to say they shoulde rather accuse offenders, then excuse them or intreate for them. And so the offenders (if it were lawefull for them to se by any chyn or clifte the vertue and goodnes that they haue loste, and that they shoulde expulse the vylenes of theyr synnes, by tormẽtes of paynes, to optayne some recompence of theyr goodnes) woulde not esteme thys for ponyshments, but wold forsake the diligence of suche orators and defenders, and commyt them selfe holy to the accusars and to the iudges. Wherby it happeth that hatred hath no place emongeste wise mẽ. For who hateth good folk but he be a very fole? And he hath no wyt that hateth wicked folke. For lyke as syckenes is the dyssease of the bodye, euen so vyce and synne is as the syckenes of the mynde, or soule. And when we doo iudge that men that be sycke in their bodyes, be not worthy to be hated but rather worthy to be pytied, euẽ so much the more are they not to be hated, but to be pityed

wyse men ought not hate cupill men, but to studyto bringe theym to goodnes. As the Phisicion laboureth too make the sycke hoole.

tied whose myndes wickednes greueth, that is more fierse and cruell, than any syckenes of the body.

Philosophy.

What pleasure haue you, to stere vp so great hatred, and so busylye to seke for your death, with your owne hande? For if you aske deth, he draweth nye of his owne fre wyll, and steyeth not his swyft horses. Certes it is great meruayle that men do seke to kyl one another with the swerde, whom the Lyon, the Serpent, the Tygre, the Beare, and the Boore, do seke to kyll with theyr tethe. Do men moue vnryghtfull hostes, and cruell batell, and kyl eche other with dartes, bycause theyr maners be dyuers, and agre not togyther? Truly, the quarell and cause of crueltie is not sufficient and iuste. Then yf thou wylte gyue a conuenient reward for mens desertes: loue iustlye good folke, and haue compassyon and pitye vpon euyll folke.

Boecius.

By this I do perceyue what felycytie, or blyssednes is in the desertes of good folke, and of wycked folk. But in this commen fortune of the people, I doo conceyue that therein is some good or euyll. For no wise man hadde leuer be a banished manne, nedye, poore, and shamefull: then to be full of riches, reuerende in honoure, stronge

randi sunt, quorum mentes omni languore atrocior, iuget improbitas.

Metrum quartum Phi.

Quid tantos inuat excitare motus,
Et propria fatum sollicitare manu?
Si mortem petitis, propinquat ipsa
Sponte sua, uolucres nec remoratur equos.
Quos serpens, leo, tigris, ursus, aper,
Dente petunt, idem se tamen ense petunt.
An distant quia, dissidentes mores
Iniustas acies, & fera bella mouent?
Alternisq; uolunt pire telis
Non est iusta satis sæuitiæ ratio.
Vis aptã meritis uicem reddere,
Dilige iure bonos, & miserescе malis.

Prosa quinta.

Hic ego nidco (inq̃) quæ sit uel felicitas, uel miseria, in ipsis proborum, atq; improborum meritis cõstituta. Sed in hac ipsa fortuna populari, non nihil

nihil boni mali ue inesse per pendo. Neq; enim sapientum quisquam exul, inops, ignominiosusq;, esse malit, potius quam pollens opibus, bonore reuerendus, potentia ualidus in sua permanens urbe florere. Sic enim clarius testantiusq; sapientie tractatur officium sapientis, cum in contingentes populos regentium quodammodo beatitudo transfunditur. Cum præsertim carcer lex cætera q; legalium tormenta penarum pernitiosis potius ciuibus, propter quos etiam constituta sunt, debeatur. Cur hec igitur uersa uice mutentur, scelerumq; supplicia bonos præmant, premia uirtutum mali rapiant uehemẽter admiror, queq; tam iniuste confusionis ratio uideatur, ex te scire desidero.

Minus enim mirarer si misceri omnia fortuitis casibus crederem. Nunc stuporem meum deus rector ex aggerat, qui cum sepe bonis iocunda, malis aspera, contraq; bonis dura tribuat, malis optata concedat, nisi causa deprehendatur, quid est quod a fortuitis casibus differre uideatur.

stronge in power, and to dwell styll in his Cytie, and florysshe in welth. So certes after this maner, that is to say: by riches honour and power, the offyce of a wyse man, is estemed more clere, & more assured of wysdom, then when felycytie or blyssednes of gouernours or rulers, is scatered or deuyded, as it were emonges the commẽ people nert adioynynge as subiectes. Sythe that namely pryson, lawe, and other tormentes of lawefull paynes, do rather appertayne vnto myschiuous cytisens for whome they were ordeyned, then for good folke. Therfore I do greatly maruayle, why these thynges folowyng be turnyd clene contrarye, that is to saye: that ponyshmentes of wycked folke, do oppresse good folke. And that the wycked folke, do beare awaye the rewardes of vertue, that is to say, why they be exalted to honor and his estate. And I desyre to lerne of the what thou thynkeste to be the reason of suche a wrongefull confusion. For I woulde lesse meruail yf that I thought that al thynges were myngyd together with chaunce of fortune. But now god the gouernoure of all thynges incresethe my meruaylynge, syth that he geueth often tymes plesaunt thynges to good folke, and sharpe thynges to euil folke: and contrarye wyse he geuethe harde thynges to good folke, and to wycked folke they desyres, except the cause be knowen what difference is betwene

goddes doynges, and foztunes chaunces. Philoso. It is no mernayle at all thoughe people thinketh that there is somethinge folisshe and confuse, when the reason of gods ordynaunce is not knowen. But althoughe thou knowest not the cause of so grete a disposition, yet doute thou not but all thynges be well gouerned, forasmuche as god the good gouernor, attempereth and gouerneth the worlde vnyuersall.

deatur. Phil. Nec mirum inquit si quid ordinis ignorata ratione temerarium confusumq; credatur. Sed tu quãuis causam tãte dispositionis ignores, tum quoniam bonus mundum rector temperat, recta fieri cuncta ne dubites.

Philosophye.

He speaketh after ye maner of the Poetes faynynge, or after the sayeng of the ignorannt people, that doo thynke that ye sters do drowne theym selfe in the sea, whē they seme too fall.

HE (that knoweth not the sterres of arcture named the gret beare to be turned nyghe vnto the hyé banke called the northe pole. And why the slowe stere called Boetes, passeth the waynes that is vnderstand, the sterres of the great beare, and drowneth his late flames or beames in the sea, when he vnfoldeth his ouer swyft rynges) shall wonder at the lawe and course of the hygh firmament. And lik wyse he (that knowethe not whye the hornes of the full mone do ware pale, when they be infecte with the bondes of the dark night which is the shadow of the earth. And howe that the mone beyng confuse and darke in the tyme of the eclypse, discouereth the sterres ye she had couered with her clere lighte before) shall wonder at the same. The commen errour moueth the people e they do werye their brasynne vessels whych is there belles, with many strokes

Metrum quintum. Phi.

SI quis arcturi sidera nescit
Propinqua summo cardine labi,
Cur legat tardus plaustra boetes.
Mergatq; seras æquore flãmas,
Cum nimis cæleres explicet ortus,
Legem stupebit ætheris ahi
Pauleant plene cornua lune.
Infecta metis noctis opace,
Queq; fulgenti texerat ore,
Confusa phebe detegat astra
Commouet gentes publicus error,
Lassantq; crebris pulsibus era.
Nemo miratur flammiua chori
Littus frementi tundere fluctu.

Nec nimis durã frigore molem,
Feruente phebi soluier estu,
Hic enim causas cernere promptum est.
Illic latentes pectora turbãt
Cuncta quæ rara prouehit ætas,
Stupetq; subitis mobile uulgus
Cedat inscitie mobilus error,
Cessent profecto mira uideri.

kes or knockes at all the foresaid thinges. But no man wondrethe when ẏ the blastes of the wynde named Chorus, beteth vpon the sea banke, wyth ragyng floude. Nor no man wondereth when the great quantitie of snow (congelyd by colde) is dyssolued & molten with the feruent hete of the sonne, for in this it is euydent to perceyue the causes thereof. But in the former examples, the secret causes trobleth mẽs mynds. And the mutable commen people be astonyed and do meruayle at the sodayne chaunces of thynges, that fal in their tyme or age. But if thou wylt not wonder, let thy cloudye and derke erroure of ignoraunce cesse, and lerne the causes of suche chaunces. And thẽ certes, they shal no more seme meruailous vnto the.

In some countrye the common erroure of the people is ẏ the mone is in chaũted, by witchcraft whẽ she is in the Eclyps, & they make a noyse, betynge vpon basyns, or belles, thinking to rescue the moone therby.

The Prestes in Egipt meruaylynge at ẏ Eclips & such other meruaylus thynges, serched out ẏ causes therof, and so became Philosopers, and ceased to wondre anye more.

Prosa sexta. Bo.

Ita est inquam. Sed cum tui numeris sit latencium rerum causas euoluere, uelatasq; caligine explicare rationes, quæso utiq; hinc decernas, & quoniam hoc me miraculum maxime perturbat, edisseras. Ph. Tum illa paulisper arridens, ad rẽ me inquit omnium quæsitu maximam uocas, cui uix exhausti quidquam satis est. Talis namq; materia est, ut una dubitas

Boecius.

I saye it is euen so. But forasmuch as it is in thy goodnes to declare vnto me the hyd, and secrete causes of thynges, and to shewe me the darke reasones thereof, I pray the that thou wouldest dispute and iudg of the same secrete causes, for this wonder or meruayle troubleth me gretely. P. Then philosophye smylynge a lytle thereat, sayd: thou requyrest me to shewe the, the greteste thinge of all thynges that maye be requyred, wherevnto scarse any thinge is left sufficiente to resolue the same. For the matter that thou as-

It is the part of a wyse mã, too serche the causes of maruaylous thynges, & not to maruaile at them.

kest is such, that one dought beyng determyned, other doughtes innumerable do ryse vp thereof, as the heades of the serpent Hidra: And there shoulde be no ende of the same doubtes, except a man kept in, the same doutes wyth the quicke syer, or serche of the wytte. For in thys matter men be wont to inquyre of the symplicitie or puritie, of gods ordinaunce, of the order of destinye, of sodayne chaunces of fortune, of the diuine knowledge and predestination, and of the liberte of fre wyll. All whyche thynges, of howe greate wayte and difficultye they be of, for to determyne, thou thy selfe doeste verye well perceyue. But forasmuch as it is parte of thy medicine, for the to knowe these thynges, although I haue lytle leysure to do it, yet I wyl endeuor my selfe to declare somwhat thereof. But if the swetenes of the versys or metyr of musycke, do delyght the any thynge at all, thou must defer and put of a lytle that delyght, vntyll I shall forme certayne reasones ioyned in order, together for that purpose. Boe. I say do what it please the. Phil. Then spake phylosophy thus as one that began to speake by another principle. The generacion of all thynges, and the procedynges of natures mutabilitie, & all other thynge that moueth now taketh their rauses, order, and fourme by the stedfastnes of gods wyll and pleasure. And the same, that is to saye: goddes wyl

Hidra, was a serpent in marishe ground, in Lerna yhad many heades, & yf one were cut of, thre other heades sprange vp of the same, whiche serpente, Hercules slewe, as appereth in Cronycles.

The thynges that Philosophy spake before, were dyryued of this principle, that god is perfyte good, and the end of all thinges, & the thinges that Philosophy now entendeth to speake, be dyryued of this principle, that god is the begynnynge of of all effectes.

bitatione successa, innumerabiles alie uelut Hydræ capita succrescant, nec ullus fuerit modus, nisi quis eas uiuacissimo mentis igne coherceat. In hac enim de prouidentiæ simplicitate, de fati serie de repentinis casibus, de cognicione ac prædestinatione diuina, de arbitrij libertate, quæri solet. Quæ quanti oneris sint, ipse perpendis. Sed quoniam hæc quoq; te nosse quædam medicine tue portione est, quamquam angusto limite temporis septi, tū aliquid deliberare conabimur. Quod si te musici carminis oblectamenta delectāt hanc oportet paulisper differas uoluptatem, dum nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes, Boe. Vt libet inquam Phi. Tum uelut ab alto orsa principio, ita disserit. Omnium generatione rerum cunctosq; mutabilium naturarum, progressus & quies quid aliud mouetur modo, causas, ordinem, formas, ex diuinæ mentis stabilitate sortiur.

Hec

Hæc in suæ simplicitatis arce posita, multiplicem rebus gerendis modum statuit: qui modus, cum in ipsa diuinæ intelligentiæ puritate conspicitur, prouidentia nominatur. Cum uero ad ea quæ mouet, atq; disponit, refertur, fatum à ueteribus appellatum est. Quæ diuersa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusq; uim mente conspexerit. Nam prouidentia est ipsa illa diuina ratio, in summo omnium principe constituta, quæ cuncta disponit. Fatum uero, inherens rebus mobilibus dispositio: p quam prouidentia suis quæq; nectit ordinibus. Prouidentia namq; cuncta pariter, quamuis diuersa, quamuis infinita complectitur. Fatũ uero singula digerit, in motu, locis, formis, ac temporibus distributa: ut hæc temporalis ordinis explicatio, in diuinæ mentis adunata prospectu, prouidentia sit. Eadem uero adunatio digesta, atq; explicata temporibus, fatum uocetur. Quæ licet diuersa sint, alterum tamen pendet

wyll and plesure, beyng set fast in the towre, or profounde altitude of hys simplicitie or puritie, hath appoynted many maners or wayes, for thynges to be done: whych wayes or maners, when they be conceyued in the puritie of the dyuyne intelligence, it is named prouidence or ordynaunce. But when the sayde maner or wayes is referred by men vnto the thynge that mouethe and disposeth, it is called of olde folke, destinye. Whyche thynges, that is to say, prouidence and destenie, shal easely appere to be contrary thynges, yf a man wyll well consyder in hys mynde the strength of them both. For prouydence is the same deuyne or godly reason that is established in the soueraine hygh prynce of al thynges, which godly reso diiposeth & apointeth al thinge. But destinie is a disposicion, cleuyng vnto mutable or temporal thinges, by which dispositiõ, prouidẽce knitteth al thinges in order. For prouidẽce embrasethe all thynges together in one, although they be dyuers and infinite. But destynye deuydeth all thynges being distributed in mouing, places, formes, and tymes, as thus. Thys explycacion or declaracion of temporall order, that appertayneth vnto destynye, being vnite or knytte together, in the syght of gods thought, is called prouydence or ordynaunce. But the vniting of such ordynaunce temporall, beynge deuyded and shewed in successyon of tymes, may be called destinie. Which

The dyffynicion of prouidence.

The dyffynicyon of destynye.

destinie

destinie and prouydence, although they be dyuers, yet the one of them dependeth vpon the other. For the order of destinie proceedeth and commethe of the simplicitie or puritie of gods prouidence. For lyke as a workeman conceyuing in his mynde the forme or fashyon of the thyng that he is about to make, moueth and goeth aboute the effecte of his worke, and ledeth by temporal or bodily ordynaunces the thing that he had conceyued symply and presently in his thought, euen so certainelye god by his prouidence or ordinaūce disposeth and ordrythe singulerly and fyrmely al thynges that be to be done. But he mynystreth dyuersly and temporally the same thynges by destynye that he hath disposed or appoynted to be done. Then whether that destynye be exercised by certaine godly spyrytes, attendyng vpon gods prouidence, or by the soule, or by nature, holye seruyng god, or by the celestiall mouinge or constellacion of sterres, or by the vertue of Aungels, or by the dyuers crafftes and soteltyes of deuylles, or by anye of them, or by them all, the order of destinie is accomplyshed and done.

Prouydence ferther dyffyned.

Certes it is manyfest that gods prouidence is a stedefast and symple or pure forme or maner, of thynges to be done

Destynye ferther diffyned.

But destinye, is a mutable disposition and temporall order of the thynges that gods simplicitie or puritie hath appointed or suffered to be done. Wherehy it happeth

det exaltero. Ordo namq; fatalis ex prouidentiæ simplicitate procedit. Sicut enim artifex faciendæ rei formā mente percipiens, mouet operis effectum: & q; simpliciter, præsentarieque prospexerat, per temporales ordines ducit: ita deus prouidentia quidem singulariter, stabiliterq; faciēda disponit. Fato uero hæc ipsa, quæ disposuit, multipliciter ac tēporaliter administrat. Siue igitur famulātibus quibusdā prouidētiæ diuinæ spiritibus fatum exercetur seu āia, seu tota inseruiente natura, seu cœlestibus siderum motibus seu angelica uirtute, seu demonum uaria solertia, seu aliquibus horum, seu omnibus, fatalis series texitur, illud certe manifestum est, immobilem simplicemq; gerēdarū formā rerum esse prouidentiam. Fatum uero, eorum quæ diuina simplicitas gerenda esse disposuit, mobilem nexum atq; ordinem tēporalem. Quo fit ut omnia

quæ

quæ fato subsunt, prouidentiæ quoq; subiecta sint. Cui ipsum etiam subiacet fatum. Quædã uero quæ sub prouidentia locata sunt, fati seriẽ superẽt. Ea uero sũt quæ prime propinqua diuinitati stabiliter fixa, fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. Nam ut orbium circa eundem cardinem sese uertentium, qui est intimus ad simplicitatem medietatis accedit, ceterorumq; extra locatorum uelut cardo quidam circa quem uersentur existit, extimus uero maiore ambitu rotatus, quanto a puncti media indiuiduitate discedit, tanto amplioribus spacijs explicatur. Si quid uero illi se medio cõnectat, & societ, in simplicitatem cogitur, diffundiq; ac diffluere cessat. Simile ratione quod longius à prima mente discedit, maioribus fati nexibus implicatur, ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est, quanto illum rerum cardinem uicinius petit.

Quod si supernæ menti hæserit

happeth that all thynges that be vnder or subiect to destinie be also subiect and vnder gods prouidence and ordynaunce. To the whyche prouidence or ordynaunce destinye is subiecte it selfe. But some thynges that be subiecte and put vnder godes prouidence, and ordynaunces, doo excell and passe the order of destinye. Truely the thinges that be fixed and knyt faste nygbe to the godhed, do excell the order of moueable destynie, for as circles or wheles that do turne them selfe about one self centy; or poynte, the innermost circle nert vnto the centy; or poynt, cometh and ioyneth nert of al vnto that which is alone in the myddell, and is as it were a certayne centy; or points to the other circles or wheles, that be set and platyd aboute, and be turned without the centre or poynt. And the vttermost cyrcle that is turned wyth a greater compasse, is set fourth with so muche more large spaces as it is distant by diuision from the myddle of the centy;, or poynte. But yf there be any thinge that knyttethe and vnytethe it selfe, to the same myddell centy;, or poynte, it is driuen into simplicitie, that is to sai: into a thinge pure and alone of it self, constant and immouable, & ceasseth to be seperate or to go at libertye. And so by lyke reason the thynge that departeth or goeth awaye fertheest from the fyrst thought of god, is wrapped with greater bandes of destynye. And soo much

much more is any thyng free from diſtinye, as it is nere the ſame centyr, or poynte of thynges, that is to ſaye nere vnto god. And yf the thynge doo cleue firmely to the hygh thought of GOD without mouing, truely it paſſeth the neceſſitie and power, of deſtinie.

Therefore like compariſon or diuerſitie as is betwene reaſonynge, and vnderſtandynge, and betwene the thinge engendred and the thynge that is, and betwene tyme and eternitie, and betwene the circle, and the mid-dle centyr or poynt, euen ſo is the mouable order of deſtinye vnto the ſtedefaſt ſimplicitie or puritie, or gods prouidence and ordynaunce. The ſame order of deſtenye moueth heuen and the ſterres, and tempereth the elementes togethier emongeſt them ſelf and chaũgeth them by enterchaungeable mutacions. And the ſame order of deſtinye renueth all thynges, growinge, ſpringing and fallyng by lyke progreſſions of frutes and of ſeedes, that is to ſaye, of all beaſtes and growing thinges.

And thys order of deſtenye kepethe in and conſtraineth from liberty al mens actes and fortunes by a band of cauſes that can not be vndone or loſed, which cauſes when they do procede from the immouable begynnynges of gods prouidence and ordynaunces, it behoueth that they be immutable. And ſo al thinges be well gouerned, as longe as the ſimplicitie or the onelye ſtedefaſtenes abydynge

There be two maners of deſtynye, one conſyſteth in worldly thinges, that bee mutable, and the other dependeth vpon goddes prouydence, whiche is conſtaunt, and not mutable.

ſerie firmitati, motu eũrens, fati quoq; ſupergreditur neceſſitatem. Igitur uti eſt ad intellectum ratiocinatio ad id quod eſt, id quod gignitur, ad eternitatem tempus, ad punctũ medium circulus, ita eſt fati ſeries mobilis ad prouidentiæ ſtabilem ſimplicitatem. Ea ſeries cœlum & ſydera mouet, elementa in ſe inuicem temperat & alterna commutatione tranſformat. Eadem naſcentia occidentiaq; omnia, per ſimiles ſetuum ſeminumq; renouat progreſſus. Hæc, actus etiam fortunasq; hominum indiſſolubili cauſarum connexione conſtringit, quæ cum ab immobilibus prouidentiæ proficiſcantur exordijs, ipſas quoq; immutabiles neceſſe eſt eſſe. Ita enim res optime reguntur, ſi manens in diuina mente ſimplicitas indeclinabilem

cauſæ

causarum ordine promat. Hic uero ordo res mutabiles et alioquin temere fluituras propria incommutabilitate coherceat. Quo fit ut tamet si uobis hunc ordinem minime considerare uolentibus, confusa omnia perturbataq; uideantur, nihilominus tamē suos modus ad bonum diriges cuncta disponit. Nihil est enim quod mali causa nec ab ipsis quidem improbis fiat, quos ut uberime demonstratum est, bonum quærentes, prauus error auertit, ne dum ordo de summi boni cardine proficiscens, a suo quem quam deflectit exordio.

Quæ uero inquies potest ulla iniquior esse confusio, quam ut bonis tum aduersa, tum prospera, malis etiam tum optata, tum odiosa, contingant. Num igitur ea mentis integritate homines desunt, ut quos probos improbos ue censuerint, eos quoq; uti existimant esse, necesse sit. Atq; in hoc, hominum iudicia depungant, ut quos alij præmio, alij supplicio dignos ar-

abydyng in the dyuine thought, sheweth fourth the immouable order of causes. And truly this order of the deuine prouidence, kepeth in, by his stedefastnes, thynges mutable of them selfe, & that other wyse wold passe alwaye casually and rasshely, if that restrayned not: wherby it happeth that although all thyngs seme confuse, darke, & troublesome to you that be not able to consyder thys order of thinges: the proper maner of gods prouidence directynge it selfe to good, disposeth and ordereth all thyngs. For there is nothyng done for the entente of euil, not so muche of the same wicked folke. Which wicked folke (as it is shewed aboundauntlye before) do seke for good, but that wycked errour do peruert, and turne them from it; and not the order that cometh from the bosome of the high soueraign good, that is god, do turne anye man from his begynnynge, that is to saye from god. Certes what confusion may be more wycked, thē that other whiles aduersitie and other whiles prosperite do happen vnto good folke, and also to wycked folke sometyme what they desyre, and sometyme the thynges that they hate & abhorre. Do men now liue in such perfection of mynde that suche folk as they do iudge to be good or euil must nedes be suche as they doo iudge them: But mens iudgementes in this thynge do varye and not accorde. For the same folke that some mē do esteme

A mā that hyt leth hym selfe, pretendeth good to hym selfe, to auoyd the trouble of his mynd, este mynge a short deathe of the bodye, better then a troublesome life here

Mens iudgementes be vnperfyte to iudge the secrete causes of godes ordinaūce and workes.

worthy reward, other agayne do deme to be worthy of ponyshmente. But let vs graunt that some mã may discerne and knowe the good or the euyl folke, maye he than know and se the inward condicion of mans thoughte as it hath bene wont to be sayd of the bodyes? That is to saye: maye a man knowe a mans thought, as men may knowe the complexion or outeward condicions of the bodye? Certes is not this lyke a myracle vnto a man that knowethe not, whye that swete thynges agree well to hole folke, and bytter thinges to sycke folke? Also why some sycke folk be heled with gentle medicines, and other sick folke with sharp medicines. But the phisicion that knoweth bothe the maner and temperaunce of helthe and syckenes, meruayleth not therat. But what other thynge semethe to be the helth of mens myndes & thoughts, but onely vertue? & what other thynge semeth ỹ sicknes of mens myndes and thoughtes, then vyce & syns. Who els is the keper of good folk, and expulser or suppresser of wickyd folke, but only god the ruler and the healer of mennes soules, whych god, when he beholdeth and loketh downe from the high towre of his prouidence, he knowethe what is conuenient and meete for euerye man, and geueth to euerye manne the thing that he knoweth is mete for him Nowe hereof commethe thys notable myracle of the order of destinie, when that god (that knoweth all thynges)

God knoweth thee thoughte of man, and the Phisician knoweth the complection, And men knoweth not what is good, or euyll for men, bycause they knowe not who is good, nor who is euyll, as touchynge the Soule.

arbitrantur. Sed concedamus ut aliquis possit bonos malosue discernere. Num igitur poterit intueri illam intimã temperiem (ueluti in corporibus dici solet) animorum? Num enim dissimile est miraculum nescienti, cur sanis corporibus hijs quidem dulcia, illis uero amara conueniant? Cur ægri etiam quidam leuibus, quidam uero acribus adiuuantur? At hoc medicus, qui sanitatis ipsius atq; ægritudinis modum temperamentumq; dinoscit, minime miratur? Quid uero animorum aliud salus uidetur esse, quã probitas? quid egritudo quã uicia? Quis enim alius uel seruator bonorum, uel malorum depulsor, quam rector ac medicator mentium deus? Qui cum ex alta prouidentie specula respexerit, quid unicuiq; conueniat, agnoscit & quod conuenire nouit, accommodat. Hinc iam fit, illud fatalis ordinis insigne miraculum cum ab scientе geritur, quod stupeant ignorantes. Nam ut pauca quæ ualet ratio humana de deuina prosfuns

ſimãitate perſtringam, de hoc quem tu iuſtiſſimum, & equi ſeruantiſſimum putes, omnia ſcienti prouidentie diuerſum uidetur. Et ultricem quidem cauſam dijs, uictam uero Catoni placuiſſe familiaris noſter Lucanus admonuit. Hic igitur quicquid citra ſpem uideas geri, rebus quidem rectus ordo eſt, opinioni uero tue peruerſa confuſio. Sed ſit aliquis ita, bene moratus, ut de eo diuinum iudicium pariter humanumq; conſentiant, ſed eſt animi uiribus infirmus, cui ſi quid euenlat aduerſi, deſinet colere forſitan innocentiam, per quam non potuit retinere fortunã. Parcit itaq; ſapiens diſpenſatio, ei quem deteriorem facere poſſit aduerſitas, ne cui non conuenit, laborare patiatur. Eſt alius cunctis uirtutibus abſolutus, ſanctusq; ac deo proximus, hunc contingi quibuſlibet aduerſis nephas prouidentia iudicat, adeo ut ne corporeis quidem morbis agitari ſinat.

doeth the thynge that the ignoraunte people do wonder at. For to ſpeake a fewe thynges of the profounde depenes of the godhed that mans reſonne, may attayne vnto, the ſame man that thou demyſt iuſt and kepyng equitye, and ryght, ſemeth contrarye to Gods prouidence that knoweth all thynges. And certes my familier felowe Lucan declareth, that the cauſe victorius, pleſyth the gods, & the cauſe that is ouercome pleaſeth Plato. Therefore what ſoeuer thinge thou ſeiſt donne here in this worlde contrary to the knowledge and expectacion of the ignoraunt folk, it is the ryght order of thynges, but to thy iudgement, it is a peruers confuſion of thynges. But admyt that ſome man is ſo well learned or inſtructed, ỹ both gods iugement, & mãs iugement do agre in him together as one, but yet ỹ he is weke minded or harted, that yf any aduerſitie by chaunce happen vnto hym he wilbe clene turnyd from his vertue or innocencye, wherby he may not kepe his fortune, then the wiſe diſpenſacion or prouidence of God, ſpareth hym, whome aduerſitie and trybulacion myghte empayre and make worſe. And god wyll not ſuffer him to laboure that is not mete or able to laboure. Another man is abſolute perfit in al vertues, holy and nere vnto god, ſo that gods prouidence wouldē deme it wronge ỹ he ſhulde be touched with any aduerſitie, in ſo much that he will not ſuffer him to be vexed wt any infyr-

God fauered Job, that aduerſytie ſhuld not hurte his patience.

mitie or sycknes of the body. For as a certayne phylosopher (more excellente by me) hath sayde: certes a true preest ly man laboreth not, for vertues haue preserued the body of an holy mā from aduersitie. And often tymes it happith that the cheyf thynges ỳ be to be done, be geuen vnto good folke, that the wyc kednes aboundyng in euyl folke, shold be oppressid. And god dystributeth and geueth to some folke now we good, now euyil thinges, accordyng to the qualitie of theyr mind. And some good folke he greueth with aduersitie, lesse that they should ware proude, of long prosperitie. And other folke he sufferethe to be vexed with harde thynges, that thereby they may confyrme the vertues of their mynde, by the vse and exercyse of pacience. Some folke doo feare more then they ought to feare, ỳ thing that they maye well suffer. And other dispisethe more then they oughte, the thyng that they cannot suffer, and god ledethe them into experience of them selfe, that is to saye: makethe them to knowe themselfe by aduersities. And manye haue optayned a worshypfull fame of thys worlde by the meanes of a glorious deth. And some that coulde not be ouercome by ponishment, haue shewed example vnto other, that vertue cannot be ouercome by aduersitie. And there is no dout but that all these thynges be done ryghtfully, and ordynately, for the goodnes of them, for whome they seme to happen. For certes

The pacience of Job, was confyrmed by ponishement

S. Thomas fered to go preche in India.

Saint Peter sayd, he wold not forsake God, to dye therfore,

The martirs optayned a honorable name by theyr death and passyon.

Nam ut quidam me quoq; excellentior ait: Vir autem sacerdotalis uerus, non laborat, sancti uiri corpus autem sue edificauerunt uirtutes. Fit autem sæpe uti bonis summa rerum gerenda deseratur, ut exuberans retundatur improbitas. Alijs mixta quedam pro animorum qualitate distribuit. Quosdam remordet, ne longa felicitate luxurient, alios duris agitari, ut uirtutes animi, patientiæ usu atq; exercitatione confirment. Alij plus æquo metuũt, quod ferre possunt. Alij plus æquo dispiciunt quod ferre non possunt. Hos in experimentum sui tristibus ducit, Nonnulli uenerandum sæculi nomen glorioſæ præcio mortis emerũt. Quidam supplicijs inexpugnabiles, exemplum cæteris prætulerunt, inuictam malis esse uirtutem. Quæ quam recte atq; dispoſite ex eorum bono quibus accidere uidentur, fiant, nulla dubitatio

tio est. Nam illud quoq; quod improbis nunc tristia, nunc optata proueniunt, ex eisdem ducitur causis, ac de tristibus quidem nemo miratur, quod eos malo meritos omnes existimant: quorum quidē supplicia tum cæteros ab sceleribus deterrent, tū ipsos quibus inuehuntur emendant. Læta uero magnum bonis argumentum loquuntur, quid de huiusmodi felicitate debeant iudicare, quam famulari sæpe improbis cernant. In qua re illud etiam dispensari credo, quod forsan alicuius tam præceps atq; importuna natura est, ut eum in scelera potius exacerbare possit rei familiaris inopia, cuius morbo prouidentia collatæ pecuniæ remedio medetur. Hic sedatam probris cōscientiam spectans, & secum fortunam suam comparans, forsitan pertimescit, ne cuius ei iocundus usus est, sit tristis amissio. Mutabit igitur mores, ac dum fortunam metuit, omittere, nequitiam derelinquit.

Alios

tes where as sometyme aduersities, & other whiles thinges desired, doo happen vnto wycked folke, noo man meruayleth therat, but iudgeth that it commethe of the causes thereof, that is to saye, for theyr wyckednes. Lykewyse of the ponyshmentes that happen vnto wycked folke no man meruaylethe, for all men doo thynke that they haue well deserued the same, and that theyr ponyshmentes doth aswell feare other from wyckednes, as causeth them to amend that be ponyshed. And the prosperitie that happen vnto wycked folke in worldly goodes sheweth a great argument and prouse vnto good folke, what they ought to iudge of such prosperitie whych men doo se often tyme serue ỹ wycked folke. In whych thing I thynke also the same to be ordeyned by god, that some mans nature is perchaunce so ouerturnyng and importunate vnto wyckednes, that the powertie of his housholde may rather prouoke hym to stele, whose powertie the goodnes of god cureth and releueth, wyth the medycyne or remedy of mony, and ryches. And another man perceyuing his owne conscience corrupt with wickednes, and consyderynge wyth hym selfe his prosperitie and welth, feareth lest perchaunce the losse of the same prosperitie whiche is pleasaunt vnto hym, should turne hym to sorowe and heuines, and therfore he wyl chaunge his euyll maners and conditions, and

forsake

forsake his wyckednes, for fear to lose hys prosperitie and riches. Prosperitie and ryches vnworthelye gotten hathe ouer throwen other into full destruction accordelye. Some be permytted to haue power to ponyshe, for that it shuld be an occasion of continuaunce of exercyse in vertue to good folke, and a ponyshment to the wycked folke. For as there is no concorde or agremente betwene good folke and wycked folke, euen so the wycked folke cannot agree emongest them selfe. And why not? For all wycked folke do vary of them selfe by theyr wyckednes, that rendith their conscience, and doo often tymes suche thynges, that when they haue done, they themselfe do iudge that they oughte not to haue bene done. For whyche cause that hye prouydence of god, hath often shewed a gret myracle so that wycked folke, hath made wycked folke good folke. For when that some wycked folke do se that they suffer wronges of the wicked, they being moued with enuy and hatred of theyr wronges and hurtes, haue returnyd vnto the fruyte of vertue, that is to sai vnto goodnes, when they do studye to be vnlyke vnto the wicked whom they haue hated. Truely it is onely the power of god (to whome also euyll thyngs be good) when he in vsynge of those euyles, choseth oute the effecte of some goodnes, that is to say, when god turneth euyll to good. For order bindeth together

God causeth wickednes to make the wicked good.

Alios in eladē meritam præcipitauit indigne acta felicitas. Quibusdam permissum puniendi ius, ut exercitij bonis, & malis esset causa supplicij. Nam ut probis atq; improbis nullum fœdus est, ita ipsi inter se improbi nequeunt conuenire. Quid nit cum a semetipsis discrepantibus conscientiam uitijs, qui qui dissentiāt, faciantq; sæpe quæ cum gesserint, non fuisse gerenda decernant. Ex quo sæpe, summa illa prouidentia protulit insigne miraculum, ut malos mali, bonos facerent. Nā dū iniqua sibi a peßimis quidā perperi uidentur, noxiorū odio flagrātes ad uirtutis frugem rediere, dum se eis dissimiles studeut esse quos oderant. Sola est enim diuina uis, cui mala quoque bona sunt, cum eis competenter utendo, alicuius boni elicit effectū. Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur ut

ut quod ab adſignata ordinis ratione diſceſſerit, hoc licit in alium, tum ordinem relabatur: ne quid in regno prouidencie liceat temeritati. Fortiſſimus in mundo deus cuncta per egit cum omnia ſecula preuidit ac proſpicit. Neq; enim fas eſt homini cunctas diuine operæ machinas uel ingenio comprehendere, uel explicare ſermone. Hoc tantum proſpexiſſe ſufficiat, quod naturarum omnium proditor deus, idem ad bonum dirigens cuncta diſponat: dumq; ea quæ protulit, in ſui ſimilitudine retinere feſtinat, malum omne de reipublicæ ſuæ terminis per fatalis ſerien neceſſitatis eliminat. Quo fit, ut quæ in terris abundare creduntur, ſi diſponentem prouidẽtiam ſpectes, nihil uſquam mali eſſe perpendas. Sed uideo iam dudum te & ponderę queſtionis oneratum, & orationis prolixitate fatigatum, aliquam carminis exſpectare dulcedinem. Accipe igitur hauſtum, quo refertus, ſir-

together all thynges, ſoo that what thyng departeth from the reſon and order appointed to the wycked, the ſame thing muſt nedes fall into ſome other order, that is to ſaye: of the good, ſoo that nothinge be lefte to folyſhnes, or out of order in the kyngdome of gods prouidence or ordynaunce. The ſtrong god hath done al thynges in the worlde, when he ſawe and behelde before all worldes. And certes it is not lawfull for men eyther to comprehende with their wit, or to declare with ther ſpech all the cauſes of gods workes: It is ſufficient onely to behold thys that the ſame God, the maker of all natures, ordaynyng all things, diſpoſeth them to good. And whyles that he haſtethe to retayne and kepe the thynges that he hath made into his ſimilytude and lykenes, that is to ſaye: in goodnes, he excludeth all wyckednes from the bondes of hys communaltye of thys worlde, by order of neceſſite of deſtenie: whereby it happeth, that the euyl that men do thynke to abound in the worlde if thou conſidereſt Gods prouidence, that diſpoſeth all thynges, thou ſhalte percepue that there is no euyll at all any where. But I ſe well nowe, that thou being of late ſore burdned, wt the wayte of thys difficulte queſtion, and alſo wery̆ed with the prolixitie or length of my reaſon, lokeſt for ſom ſwetenes of verſes or metyr. Therfore take thys drafte, whereby when thou arte refre-

Many thynges ſeme euyl to mans iudgemẽt that be good to gods prouydence ꝑ dyſpoſeth all things for the beſte.

refreshed and stronger, thou mayst ascende into hier questions.

Philosophy.

IF thou wylt behold wyselye the ordynaunce of god in thy pure mynde and thought, loke vpon the altitude of the hygh heuen, for there the sterres do kepe their olde course and concorde by the iust bande of thynges. For the sonne moued with his redde fier & hete letteth not the cold cōpas of the mone, nor the sterre called the beare (that turneth his swift courses about the north pole, beyng neuer washed in the depe Ocean sea) couetethe to drenche hys flames in the same sea, seinge other sterres to be drowned therin. And the sterre Hesperus, that is to saye, Venus, sheweth alwaye by euen courses of tyme, the late darkenes, that is to saye, the nyghte. And the sterre called Lucifer, bryngeth agayne the cleare daye. Euen soo the loue euerlastynge of gods prouidence, maketh the enterchaungeable courses of the sterres. And by suche mutuall concorde, troublesome warre and varians, is expulsed from the mouths of the sterres, that is to saye: from the regions celestiall that beareth the sterres. Also this concord tempereth the foure elementes by equal maners that the moist elements that flyeth with the dry elementes, doo geue place and suffer the drye planetes

Phylosophye speaketh after the maner of the Poetes which do fain that the sters & sonne drowneth them selues in the seas

firmior in ulteriora concendas.

Metrum sextum. Phi.

SI uis celsi iura tonantis,
Pura solers cernere mente,
Aspice summi culmina cœli,
Illic iusto fœdere rerum
Veterem seruant sydera pacem.
Non sol rutilo concitus igne
Gelidum phœbes impedit astrum,
Nec quæ summo uertice mundi
Flectit rapidos ursa meatus,
Nunquam occiduo lota profundo,
Cætera cernēs sydera mergi
Cupit oceano tingere flāmas.
Sēper nicibus tēporis e quis
Hesperus seras nuntiat umbras,
Reuehitq; diem Lucifer altum.
Sic alternos reficit cursus.
Alternus amor, sic astrigerū
Bellum discors exulant oris,
Hæc concordia temperat æquis
Elementa modis ut pugnantia.
Vicibus cedāt humida siccis,
Iungantq; fidē frigora flammis,

Pens

Pendulus ignis surgat in altum
Terreq; grauis pondere sidat
Hisdem causis uere tepenti
Spirat florifer annus odores,
Æstus cererem feruida siccat,
Remeat pomis grauis autumnus
Hiemen defluus irrigat imber.
Hæc temperies alit ac profert
Quicquid uitam spirat in orbe,
Eadem rapiens condit & aufert
Obitu mergens orta supremo.
Sedet interea conditor altus
Rerumq; regens flectit habenas
Rex & dominus fons et origo.
Lex & sapiens arbiter æqui
Et qui cunmotu cõcitat ire,
Sistit retrahens, ac uaga firmat
Nam nisi rectos reuocans ictus
Flexos iterum cogat in orbes
Quæ nunc stabilis continet ordo
Dissepta suo fonte fatiscant

planetes at certayne tymes. And that the cold elementes agre with the hote planetes. And that the fier beinge the lyghtest elemẽt, haue the higher place and the heuye earth, the lower place, and rest beneth by the heuynes of the same. By the same concord and by like causes, the yeare florishyng with flowers geueth swete sauours. And ỹ hote sommer ripeth the corne. And the Autumne (loded wt appels) cometh again And the droppyng rayne moisteth the wynter. This temperans of gods prouidence, norysheth and bringeth forth all thynges, that beare the lyfe in the world. The same temperaunce taking awaye the thynges that be made, hydeth them and bereueth them of there beinge, and drowneth all thynges, that be brought forth and borne, with the last death. And whiles these thynges be doing, the hye maker of things that is to saye: almyghty god, sytteth vnmouable hymselfe, and ruleth all thynges, and turneth and moderateth the orders of thyngs, being of himselfe a kynge by his wyse gouernaunce, a lord by power of creatyng all thyngs, the fountayne of all goodnes, the begynnyng of al thynges, the lawe binding all thynges, and the wise iudge, of equitie and iustyce, rewarding euery man accordyng to his desert, which god moueth al thynges to go fourth, & likewise restraining al things stoppith thẽ from their course, & establysheth for

The sterres haue no bertue by theym selfe, but by god, and be as seruauntes obedyente at godd es wyll, and comaundemente.

In thynges be ruled & gouerned by god in compas, so that of seedes, spryngeth fourth herbes and of the herbes, seedes, & lykewyse of the fyre springeth ayre, and of the ayre fire agayne.

a tyme, thinges mutable and wanderynge by their nature. And except that god callyng backe the ryght progressions and groundes of thyngs, constrayneth and reuocateth al thyngs againe into a due compas and course, the thinges that the stedefast order of his prouidence nowe contayneth, beinge seperate from the fountayne of their begynnynge, shoulde fayle and come to nought. Thys fountayne is the continuall loue of all thyngs that haue life And all thinges desireth to be kept w the ende of good, for els they could not other wayes endure, excepte that all thynges being turned agayne by loue, do come agayne to the begynnynge, that is to say: to god that gaue them their being and made them.

Hic est cunctis continuum amor,
Repetuntq; boni fine teneri.
Quia non aliter durare queunt
Nisi conuerso rursus amore
Refluant causæ quæ dedit esse.

Philosophye.

SEist thou not nowe what folowethall these thynges that I haue sayd?

Boe. I say what thinge foloweth?

Phi. All fortune is good without dout

Boe. And howe can it be soo. Phi. Understande thus, that all fortune whether it be good or euyll is geuen either to rewarde or exercyse good folke, or for thintente to punyshe and correcte euyll folke. And so all fortune is good that appereth eyther to be iuste or profytable. Boe. I saye it is a verye true reason. And yf I do consider the prouidence of god, or destinye whych thou taughtest a lytle before, thy sentence is

Prosa septima. P.

IAm ne igitur uides quid hæc omnia quæ diximus consequatur? B. Quid nã inquam. Ph. Omnem inquit bonam prorsus esse fortunã. B. Et qui fieri potest. P. Attende inquit, cum omnis fortuna, uel iocunda, uel aspera tum remunerandi exercendi ue bonos, tum puniendi corrigendiq; improbos causa deferatur, omnis est bona quam uel iustam constat esse uel utilem. B. Nimis quidẽ (inq;) uera ratio, & si quam paulo

ante

ante docuisti prouidentiam, fatum ue considerem, fermis uiribus nexa sententia. Sed eam si placet inter eas quas inopinabiles paulo ante posuisti numeremus. P. Et quid inquit. B. Quia id hominum sermo communis usurpat, & quidem crebro quorundam malam esse fortunam. P. Vis ne igitur inquit paulisper uulgi sermonibus accedamus ne nimium uelut ab humanitatis usu recessisse uideamur? B. Vt placeat inquam. Ph. Nonne igitur bonum censes esse, quod prodest? B. Ita est inquam. P. Quæ uero aut exercet aut corriget, prodest. B. Fateor inquam. Ph. Bona igitur Boe. Quid ni. P. Sed hæc eorum est, qui in uirtute positi, contra aspera bellum gerunt, uel a uicijs declinantes, uirtutis iter arripiunt. B. Negare (inquam) nequæo. P. Quid uero iocunda quæ in præmium tribuitur bonis. Num uulgus malã esse decernit? B. Nequaquã, uerum uti est, ita quoq; esse optimam censet. P. Quid reliqua, quæ cum sit aspera & iusto supplicio malos coherceet. Num bonam populus putat? B. Immo omniũ (inquã) quæ

is knyt togethet with stronge resons. But let vs (if it please the) nomber this opinion or sentence, emongest those thynges that thou diddest allege a lytle before, were not to be thought of any man. Phi. And wherefore. Boe. For that the commen speche of men dothe muche mystake the talke of fortune, saying often that some mens fortune is very euyll. Phi. Wylt thou therefore that I returne a lytle to the speche of the commen people, so that I seme not to digresse ouermuch from the vse of the people. Boe. I saye do as it shall please the. Phi. Dost thou not iudge all thyng good that profyteth. Boe. Yes. P. The fortune that dothe exercyse or correct, doth good. Boe. I saye I graunt the same. Phi. Then is al fortune good. Boe. What ells? Philoso. But this fortune that exercyseth, is the fortune of such that be sette in vertus and do stryue agaynst vyce: but fortune that correcteth, is of suche that declyning from vyce, do chose and take the way of vertue. Boe. I cannot denye it. Philosophi. But what sayest thou, of plesaunte fortune, that is geuen to good folke for rewarde, doo the commẽ people iudge the same wicked fortune? Boe. No truelye, but iudgeth it good, as it is in dede. P. What sayest thou of the other fortune that is euyll and sharpe, and restrayneth wicked folke by iuste ponyshment, do the commen people esteme it good. Boe. I

All maner of fortune reward eth exerciseth or correcteth, & if it be referred to God, it is good, and yf it be referred to any other thig it is good or euell, according as it is felte & taken.

saye that they do iudge the same most wretched of all thynges that maye be thoughte. Phi. Take hede therefore lest that we folowynge the opinion of the commen people, haue not concluded a thyng gretely, not to be thought of them. Boe. What is that. Ph. Certes of these thinges that are graunted it fortuneth that of them that be other in professing of vertue, or in thencrese of vertue, or in optaynyng of vertue, al maner of fortune (what soeuer it be) is good. But all maner of fortune is euell to them that remayne in wickednes, whych thing the commen people do not so iudge and take it.

Boe. That is true, although no man dare confesse the truth thereof.

Phi. Why so? A wyse man ought not to be greued, whē misfortune happeth no more then a strong man to disdaine or to be moued with angre, when alarum or tumult of warre ryseth. For to bothe, the same difficultie to stryue agaynst fortune, is the matter, that is to saye: to the one whych is the strong man it is a cause to optayne renome, to the other, which is the wyse man, it is a cause to confyrme hys wisedom or vertue. For therefore it is called vertue, by cause it, stryuing agaynst vice, with all force, is not ouercome wyth vyce or aduersitie. For certes you that be set in the increase or wayes of vertue haue not come to abounde in pleasurs and to continue in lustes of the flesshe.

For

quæ excogitari possunt, iudicat esse miserrimam. P. Vide igitur ne opinionem populi sequentes, quoddam valde inopinabile confecerimus. Bo. Quid inquam. P. Ex bijs enim ait quæ concessa sunt, euenit, eorum quidē quisque uel in professione, uel in profectu, uel in adeptione uirtutis, omnem quæcunq; sit, bonam, in improbitate uero manentibus omnem pessimam esse fortunam. Bo. Hoc (inquam) uerum est, ita tametsi nemo audeat confiteri. Phi. Quare inquit ita, uir sapiēs moleste ferre non debet, quociens infortunę certamen adducitur, ut uirum fortem nō decet indignari, quotiens increpuit bellicus tumultus, utriq; enim, huic quidem gloriæ propagandæ, illi uero confirmandæ sapientiæ difficultas ipsa materia est. Ex quo etenim uirtus uocatur quod suis uiribus nitens, non superetur aduersis. Neq; enim uos in prouectu positi uirtutis, diffluere delicijs & emercessere uoluptate uenistis prælium cum omni fortu

na

na nimis acre conseritis. Ne uos aut tristis opprimat, aut iocundas corrumpat firmis medium uiribus occupate. Quicquid aut infra subsistit, aut ultra progreditur, habet & contemptum felicitatis, & non habet præmium laboris. In uestra est enim situm manu, qualem uobis fortunam formare malitis. Dum enim quæ uidetur aspera, nisi aut exerceat, aut corrigit, punit.

For then you do sowe and plant a verye sharpe conflyct or battell, with all fortune. Therfore lest that eyther wicked fortune oppresse you, or good fortune corrupte and hurte you, hold you the meane betwene both with fyrme, and stedefast power and strength. For certes al that is vnder the mene vertu or passeth the meane vertue, dispiseth vertue, or is vicious, and hath no rewarde of his trauell or laboure. For it lyeth in your owne power, what fortune you had leuer haue, that is to sai: to take what fortune ye wyll. For all fortune that semeth sharpe or euyll (yf it do not exercyse the good folke, or correct and chastyce the wicked folke) it greueth or ponysheth.

Vertue consisteth in ye myddle betwene. ij vices that be extreme, for aduersitie putteth a man in desperation, prosperite causeth presumption and boldenes.

Metrum septimum. Phi.

Bella bis quiuis operatus annis
Vltor Atrides Phrygiæ ruinis,
Fratris amissos thalamos piauit.
Ille dum Graiæ dare uela claßi
Optat, & uentos redimit cruore,
Exuit patrem, miserumq; tristis
Fœderat natæ iugulum sacerdos.
Fleuit amissos Ithacos sodales,

Philosophy.

Agamēnon the sonne of Atrydes beynge aduenger of wronges, done vnto his brother Menelaus the kynge, held warre tenne yeares together agaynste the Troyans, and the citie of Troye, and dyd reuenge (with destruction) the chambers of his sayde brother Menelaus defiled, that is to say: he reuenged the rauishynge of hys brothers wyfe, named Queene Helayne, that was taken awaye by Parys and by hym carnally knowen, whych Helaine was kept vp in his brothers chamber. Whyles that the said Agamēnon desired to sprede and sette fourth the Sayles and Nauye of the grekes,

Paris the son Kynge Priamus of Troy, stale awaye Quene Helayn, the wife of Kyng Menelaus, & kept her as his concubyne, for ye whiche began the battell betwixt the Grekes, and the Troyans, soo that Troye was distroied and the Troyans.

whē ꝑ wynd was agaynste the Grekes, & wolde not serue theyr shyppes: Agamēnon dyd sacrifyse his owne doughter, vnto Diana the goddes to haue a good & prosperous wind.

grekes. And bought or optayned prosperous wyndes (that before were contrarye vnto him) with the blood of his owne doughter, kylled for a sacrifyse vnto the goddes for the same, he putteth of the fatherlye loue, that he bare to hys sayde doughter, and the prycst being sad or sory, to sacrifyce her (as ꝑ custome then was) cutteth her throte for to haue a prosperous wynde of the goddes in ꝑ iourney or viage, against Priamus, and the Troyans.

Quos ferus uasto recubans in antro
Misit inani Poliphemus aluo.
Sed tamen æco furibundus ore
Gaudium mœstis lachrymis rependit.
Herculem duri celebrant labores.
Ille Centauros domuit superbos,
Abstulit sæuo spolium leoni,
Fixit & certis uolucres sagittis,
Poma cernenti rapuit draconi,
Aureo læua grauior metallo
Cerberum traxit triplici catena,
Victor immitem posuisse fertur
Pabulum sæuis dominum quadrigis.
Hydra combusto perijt ueneno:
Fronte turpatus Achelous amnis
Ora demersit pudibunda ripis,
Strauit Antheum Libycis arenis:
Cacus Euandri satiauit iras:
Quosq; cōpressos foret altus orbis

Ulixes a Greke commynge from the seage of Troy, was taken, & his felowes deuoured by Polyphemon a Gyaunte hauyng but one eye.

Ulixes named Itacus lamented that he had lost his felowes, whome the cruell gi-
aunt Poliphemus, lying in his greate
caue, or den, had deuoured & swalowed downe into his empty bely. Neuertheles Ulixes beynge wrothe for the
same, had some comfort agayne of his
sorowes when he had put out the saide
gyauntes eye, as he was in slepe. Her-
cules is accounted noble & renoumed,
for the great trauayles he toke in hys
tyme, for he ouercame the proude Cen-

The Centaures, were halfmen, half Beastes,

taures, he kylled the cruell Lyon, and
toke awaye hys skynne, he strake and
droue awaye the byrdes with hys ar-

The Byrdes were named Harpies hauynge Aygyns faces, & dystroyed the cōtrey about them.

rowes, he toke awaye the golden ap-
ples from the dragon, with the hed of
metall, that watched and kepte them.
He drue Cerbarus frō hel with a thre-

Cerbarus was porter of a place called

folde chayne. He ouercame Diomede
and gaue his flesh vnto his cart horse,
for meate, he slewe the serpent Hidra
and brent his venym, he toke awaye
the horne from the floude Achelous,

euen

Setiger ſpumis humeros notauit:
Vltimus cœlum labor irreflexo
Suſtulit collo, prætiumq; rurſus
Vltimi cœlum meruit laboris.
Ite nunc fortes, ubi celſa magni
Ducit exempli uia, cur inertes
Terga nudatis? ſuperata tellus
Sydera donat.

Finis libri quarti.

euen from his forehed, and made hym hide his face for shame within his bankes, he slew the gyaũt Antheus on the costes of Libie. And also Cacus ỹ gret monster, that trobled the kyng Euander. The same Herculus slewe ỹ huge brystled boze, that fouled the shoulders of hym with his fome, whych shulders had borne the fyrmament as the poets do fayne. And last of all he bare vppe with his shoulders (and neuer bowed his necke therat) the sayd fyrmamente And so he deserued heuen, as a reward of his laste labourte and trauell. Then go you now that be stronge thether as the hard and difficulte way of the gret example of Hercules ledeth you, that is to saye the waye of vertue. O you slothfull men brought vp or geuen vn to plesures or ease, whye do you turne your backes and forsake vertuous trauayle, to resist vice with vertue, for the man that hath ouercome the plesures, and desyres of the worlde, hath deserued heuen for his reward.

Here endeth the fourthe boke.

hell, and dyd hurte the cõtrye al about.

Diomede is a gyaunt that kylled men, & made his hors eate them.

Hydra was a serpente hauynge manye heades, & whã one was cut of, another sprange vp.

Achelous was a flood ỹ could chaũge it selfe into a Bull with one horne, & into dyuers other formes.

Antheus, was a gyaũt, that beynge werye with fightingwold recouer strengthe by touchyng ỹ grouñd

Cacus was a gyaunt that robbed, and dystroyed the countrye.

Philosophy.

Hen philosophy had spoken and turned the discourse of her talke to handle and intrete of other maters more expedient and mete to be knoen. Then Boecius sayde: O Philosophy, thy exortacion is rightelye made and by auctorittie most worthy. And I do proue and perceyue it true in dede, that the question of the deuyne prouydence (that thou spakest of a lytell before) is enterlaced wyth manye other questions. But I do aske the whether that thou thynkest that chaunce is any thing at all, and what it is? Phi. I doo make hast to persourme the dete of my promys and to open vnto the, the way wherby thou maist be brought againe vnto thy country, that is to saye, vnto blessednes or perfyt felicitie, but albeit that these thynges that thou askest of chaunce be very profitable to be knowen, yet they be turned a lytell from the way of our purpose. And it is to be feared lest that thou being wery ed by erronious wayes, or straunge questions mayst not be sufficient ne strong of thy selfe to attayne vnto the ryght way. Boe. Feare thou not that, for it shall be greate quietnes vnto me, to knowe those thynges that I chyefely delyghte in, and it is not to be doughted of the thynges that shall folowe, when that all

Prosa prima. Philo.

Dixerat, orationisq; cursum ad alia quæda tractanda, & expedienda uertebat. P. Tum ego, recta quidem (inquam) exhortatio tuaq; prorsus auctoritate dignißima: sed quod tu dudū de prouidentia quæstionem pluribus alijs implicatam esse dixisti, re experior. Quæro enim, an esse aliquid omnino, & quidnam esse causum arbitrere. P. Tum illa. Festino (inquit) debitum promißionis absoluere, uiamq; tibi qua patriam reuocaris aperire. Hæc aūt & si perutilia cognitu tamen à propositi nostri tramite paulisp aduersa sūt. Verēdumq; est ne deuijs fatigatus, ad emitiendum rectum iter sufficere non poßis. B. Ne id inquam prorsus uereare. Nam quietis mihi loco fuerit ea, quibus maxime deslector, agnoscere simul cum omne disputationis tuæ latus indubitata fide constiterit, nihil

nihil de sequentibus ambigatur. P. Tum illa morem inquit geram tibi, simulq; sic exorsa est. Si quidem inquit aliquis euentum temerario motu nullaq; causarum connexione productum casum esse definiat, nihil omnino casum esse confirmo, & praeter subiectae rei significationem, inanem prorsus esse uocem decerno. Quis enim (cohercente in ordinem cuncta deo) locum esse ullum temeritati reliquus potest? Nam nihil ex nihilo existere uera sententia est, cui nemo unquam neterum refragatus est, quamquam id illi non de operante principio sed de materiali subiecto, hoc est omnium de natura rationum quasi quoddam iecerint fundamentum. At si nullis ex causis aliquid oriatur id de nihilo ortum esse uidetur. Quod si hoc fieri nequit, nec casum quidem huiusmodi esse possibile est, qualem paulo ante diffiniuimus. B. Quid igitur inquam, nihil ne est quod uel casu uel fortuitum iure appellari queat? An est aliquid (tametsi uulgus lateat) cui uocabula ista conueniunt? Ph. Aristoteles meus

all the circumstaunce of thy disputacion shall therewithall appere vnto me, without any dought. Phi. I wyll consent to thy desire, and doe saye and affyrme that if any man wyl define that hap is a chaunce, comming of sodeine mouing, and by no certayne conjunction of causes, that then chaunce is no thing at al, and I do iudge that then it is but a vayne saying besydes the signification of the thing that we do spek of. For can there be left anye place to folye, or vanitie, where as god setteth all thinges wisely in good order? For it is a true saying, that nothynge, is of nought, whych saying no olde manne hath denied at any time, how be it they haue not put the same proposycion as a certayne grounde or foundacion, by god, the fyrste creator of thynges, but of a materiall subiecte, that is to saye: of the nature of all reason. For yf any thyng shold come of nothyng, it shuld seme to be rysen of nought. And if this thyng maye not be done, then is it not possible that happe or chaunce be anye such thing ỳ I haue defyned a lytle before, that is to say: that chaunce shuld come of sodayne mouing without any conjunction, or knytting of causes. Boe. I saye what than? Is there nothing that may iustely be called eyther chaunce or fortune? Or is there anye thyng (although the commen people, knoweth it not) whervnto these wordes of chaunce and fortune do agre.

Nothing commeth of nothinge, in comparyson to a perticuler cause that supposeth a matter, but in comparyson to God, whiche is the cause vniuersall of all thynges, it is otherwyse for he made al thinges of nothing

Phi. By Aryſtotle ſpeketh thereof, in his boke of phiſike, and defynethe the ſame both bryefely and nere the truthe, by reſon. Boe. I laye after what maner? Phi. As often as anye thinge is done for the cauſe and intente of ſome other thing, and thenhappeth another thinge for ſome other cauſes, then the thyng that was intended or that was loked for, the ſame is called chaunce or happe. As if a manne in diggynge the grounde for thentent to tyll the felde, fyndethe a pece of gold dygged vp, certes the ſame is thoughte to come by chaunce. But yet it commethe not of noughte. For it hathe proper cauſes, whereof the fyndynge thereof (beyng ſodayne and not loked for) ſemethe to haue wrought and made ſuch chaunce and happe. For if the digger or tyller, of the felde, had not digged the ground and the hider of the golde, or mony, had not hid the ſame in the ſame place the gold had not bene founde. Therefore theſe be the cauſes of fortunes hap or chaunce, by cauſe it commethe, by cauſes metynge and encountrynge or commyng together ſodenly and not by any meane, intent or erſpectation, of the worker. For nether he that hyd the gold, nor he that tylled the ground intented that the ſame gold ſhoulde be founde. But as I ſayde it happed and came ſo to paſſe, that he digged ther as the other had hyd the golde. Then it is lawefull to defyne chaunce and happe to

The diffinicio of hap or chaunce of fortune.

meus id inquit in phiſicis, & breui & ueri propinqua ratione diſiniunt. B. *Quonam inquam modo.* Ph. *Quocienscunq; ait, aliquid cuiuſpiam rei gratia geritur, aliudq; quibuſdã de cauſis quam quod intendebatur obtingit, caſus uocatur, ut ſi quis colendi agri cauſa fodiens humum deſoſſi auri pondus inueniat, hoc igitur fortuito quidem creditur accediſſe, uerum non de nihilo eſt. Nam propriæ cauſas habet, quarum improuiſus inopinatusq; concurſus caſum uidetur operatus. Nã niſi cultor agri humum fodiret, & niſi eo loco pecuniam ſuam depoſitor obruiſſet, aurum non eſſet inuentum. Hæ ſunt igitur fortuiti cauſæ cõpendij, quod ex obuijs ſibi & confluentibus cauſis, non ex gerentis intentione prouenit. Neq; enim uel qui aurum obruit, uel qui agrum exercuit, ut ea pecunia reperiretur intendit, ſed (uti dixi) quo ille obruit, hunc fodiſſe conuenit atq; concurrit. Licet igitur definire caſum eſſe inopinatum, ut ex confluentibus cauſis in hijs quæ*

ob

ob aliquid geruntur euentũ. Concurrere uero atq; confluere causas facit ordo ille ineuitabili connexione procedens, qui de prouidentiæ fonte descendens, cuncta suis locis temporibusq; disponit.

to be a thyng vnloked for, commynge of causes, that be done for some other thynge or purpose. But the same fatal order procedynge from the ineuytable knyttyng together, or coniunction of causes, that descendeth from the fountayne of godes prouidence, whych dysposeth and setteth all thynges in theyr places, and tymes, makethe that causes do runne together and come together accordyng.

Metrum primum. Ph.

RVpis Achemenie stopulis ubi uersa sequentum
Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax.
Tigris & Eufrates uno sese fonte resoluunt
Ex mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.
Si coeant cursumq; iterum reuocentur in unum:
Confluat alterni quod trahit unda uadi.
Conueniunt puppes & uulsi flumine trunci:
Mixtaq; fortuitos implicat unda modos.
Quos tamen ipsa uagos terræ decliuia casus,
Gurgitis & lapsi defluus ordo regit.

Sic

Philosophy.

THe floudes called Tygrys, and Eufrates do sprynge vp together as one fountayne, out of the holownes or rockes of the hylles, or bankes of the countrye of Achemenye called Perthie, where as the people doo fyght fleyng and do cast dartes backeward, and stycketh them in the brests of their enemyes that do pursue them. And a none they the sayde floudes doo deuide them self in sondre. And yf they do ioyne them selfe together agayne, into one course and mete, then muste those thyngs come together that both waters bryngeth with them at there metinge. And the shippes and blockes that be raised and plucked vp with the floudes wil mete together, & the waters being mixed together in flowyng wyll wrappe in such thynges as they haue founde by chaunce of fortune, whych beyng varyable, the low countrye, or ground, and the flurible order

of the rennyng or flowyng water, or streme ruleth. Euen so fortune that se meth to go at lybertye, without anye gouernment, suffreth rule, or is ruled and goeth by the selfe same lawe and order of goddes prouydence or purueyaunce.

Sic quæ promissis fluitare uis detur habenis
Fors, patitur frenos, ipsaq; lege meat.

Boecius.

I Do very well perceyue and knowe the same, that is to say: that chance and fortune standeth by gods prouidence. And I do graunt that it is euen so as thou sayest, But I would know whether there be anye lybertie of oure fre wyll in this order of causes, that cleueth so faste together in them selfe, or els whether that the chaunce or necessitie of destenye constraynethe and kepethe in the mocions or effectes of mans thought? Phi. Certes there is libertie of fre wyll and there was neuer any resonable nature, that is to saye: naturall vnderstandyng but it had lybertye of fre wyll. For the thyng that hath reson naturally, hath iudgement whereby it maye descerne euery thing and knoweth of it selfe thynges to be eschewed or desyred. And the thynge that any man demeth to be desired, he foloweth: But he escheweth the thing that he demeth to be eschewed. Wherfore in all thynges wherein reason is, therein is alsoo lybertie to wyll

Prosa secunda. B.

ANimaduerto inquam idq; uti, tu dicis, ita esse consentio. Sed in hac hærentium sibi serie causarum, est ne ulla nostri arbitrij libertas? an ipsos quoq; humanorum motus animorũ fatalis cathena constringit? P. Est inquit, neq; enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas aßit arbitrij. Nam quod ratione uti naturaliter potest, id habet iuditium quo quodq; discernat, per se igitur fugienda optanda ue dinoscit. Quod uero quis optandum iudicat esse, petit, refugit uero quod estimat esse fugiendum. Quare quibus inest ratio, ipsis etiam inest uolendi nolendiq; libertas

ras. Sed hanc non in omnibus
equam esse constituo. Nam
supernis, diuinisq; substanti-
is, & perspicax iuditium, &
incorrupta uoluntas, et effi-
cax optatorum presto est
potestas. Humanas uero ani
mas liberaliores quidem esse
necesse est, cum se in mentis
diuinæ speculatione conser-
uant, minus uero cum dila-
buntur ad corpora, minusq;
etiam cum terrenis artubus
colligantur, extrema uero
est seruitus cum uitijs dedi-
te, rationis propriæ possessi
one eeciderint. Nam ubi ocu
los a summe luce ueritatis ad
inferiora & tenebrosa de-
iecerint, mox insciciæ nube
caligantur, permitiosis tur-
bantur affectibus. Quibus
accedendo, consentiendoq;,
quam inuexere sibi adiuuat
seruitutem, & sunt quodam
modo propria libertate cap-
tiuæ. Quæ tamē ille, ab eter
no cuncta prospiciens pro-
uidentiæ cernit intuitu, &
suis

or not to wyll. What I doo not deter-
myne that thys lybertye to wyll,
or nyll is equall or lyke in al thynges.
For in hyghe and diuine substaunce,
that is to say in aungeles, is bothe in-
fallyble iudgemente, incorruptyble
wyll to euyll, and redye power to doo
thynges desyred, but it behoueth that
that mens soules be more free, when
they kepe them selfes in the contempla
cion of goddes mynde and wyll, and
they be lesse free when they slyde into
bodyes humayne, that is to saye, whē
they behold worldly thyngs. And they
be yet lesse fre, when they be gathered
together into erthly mēbers or affects
But yet the most extreme bondage of
the soules, is when they be geuen to
vyce and synne, and haue fallen from
the possession or grounde of their own
proper reason or vnderstandynge. For
after that they haue turned away ther
eyes of reason and vnderstandyng frō
the light of the hygh and perfyt truth,
to inferor & darke thynges, that is, to
worldelye, & carnall thynges, anone
they be blynded with the cloude of ig-
norannce, and be troubled with myf-
cheuous affectes and passions, where-
vnto when they do come, and thereto
consent, they do increase the bondage
that they haue brought them selfe into.
And they be in maner as prysoners,
kept from their owne proper libertie.
All whyche thynges, neuertheleſſe the
sight of goddes prouydence that seyth

and

and beholdeth all thynges, from hys eternitie or euerlastyng godhed, dispo seth al thyngs predestinate, accordyng to their desertes, seith all thynges and hereth all thynges.

suis quoq; meritis prædesti nata disponit, omnia uidet, & omnia audit.

Philosophye.

HOmere a man of swete eloquẽce discrybeth that the son is cleare, and pure of lyght. Which sonne neuertheleſſe cannot breake thorough and shyne into the depe bowels, of the earth, nor botome of the sea, with the light of his beames. The maker of the great worlde, whyche is god, is not, nor seith after that sort. For he (by his knowledge) percethe all thynges, lo kyng from aboue. And the earthe resy steth not hym by any gretnes thereof. The darke night letteth him not with her blacke cloudes. But in the instant or moment of a thought, he seith thyn ges present, thinges past, and thinges to come. Whyche god forasmuche as he seith and beholdeth al thyngs, thou alone mayste call hym the verye true sonne.

Boecius.

BEholde nowe am I confounded agayne withe a more difficulte dought then I was before.

Phi. What dought is that? truelye I do thynke that I doo perceyue nowe where withall thou art troubled.

Boe. I saye it semeth to repugne gret lye

Metrum secundum. Ph.

PVro clarũ lumine phœ bum
Melliflui canit oris Homerus:
Qui tamen intima niſcere terræ
Non ualet, aut pelagi, radi orum
Infima prorumpere luce,
Haud ſic magni conditor or bis.
Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti,
Nulla terræ mole reſiſtunt.
Non nox atris nubibus ob ſtat.
Quæ ſint, quæ fuerint, uenis antq;
Vno mentis cernit in ictu.
Quemq; reſpicit omnia ſo lus,
Verum poſſis dicere ſolem.

Proſa tertia. Boe.

TVm ego, En (inquam) difficiliore rurſus ami biguitate confundor.
P. Quenam (inquit) iſta eſt? Iam enim quibus perturbare coniecto. B. Nimiũ inquam aduer

aduersari, ac repugnare uidetur, prænoscere uniuersa deũ, & esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta prospicit deus, neq; falli ullo modo potest euenire necesse est, quod prouidentia futurum esse præuiderit. Quare si ab æterno non facta hominum modo, sed etiam cõsilia, uoluntatesq; prænoscit nulla erit arbitrij libertas. Neq; enim uel factum aliud ullum, uel quelibet existere poterit uoluntas, nisi quam nescia falli prouidentia diuina præsenserit. Nam si aliorsum, quam prouisæ sunt, detorqueri ualent, non iam erit futuri firma præsentia, sed opinio potius in certa: quod de deo credere nefas iudico. Neq; enim illam probo rationem, que sequidam credunt hunc questionis nodum posse dissoluere. Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse uenturum quoniam id prouidentia futurum esse prospexerit: sed econtrario potius, quam quod futurum est, id diuinam prouidentiam latere non posse. Eoq; modo necessarium est hoc in contrariam relabi partem.

lye, that god knoweth all thynges, before, and that there is anye libertie of fre wyll. For yf god seith all thynges before, and that he maye not be deceyued, then muste that thyng happen and come to passe, that godes prouidence, sawe before to come. Wherfore if that godes prouidence knoweth before by hys godhead, not onely menues actes, and dedes, but also their counsayles, and wylles: Then shal there be no lybertye, of frewyll nether can there be any other dede or any wyll, but sache as gods prouidence (that cannot be deceyued) hath before knowen and perceiued. For if they might be wrested or altred otherwyse then they be forsene or purueyed, then shoulde there be no syrme or stedefaste prescience or foreknowledge of god, of thynges to come but rather an vntertayne opinion. Whych thing to beleue and thynke of God, I iudge it vnlefull and wycked. For truely I allowe not that reason, that some men do thinke therby to dissolue or alloyle the knotte, and doughte of the sayde question. For they doo affyrme and saye, that somethynge is to come to passe therefore, for that the prouidence and foreknowledge of god, sawe before, that it is to come, but rather contrarye wyse, that the same thynge, that is to come, cannot lye hyd, and vnknowen vnto goddes prouidence. And by the same meanes it behouethe, that thys thynge, that is concluded of

chaunce

chaunce, slydeth into the cõtrary part, that is to say: that lyke is concluded of gods prescience or foreknowledge as of chaunce. For certes it is not of necessitie that those thynges do happen that be purueyed or foresene of god, but that it behoueth of necessitie that those thinges that ar to come, be purueyed or foresene of god. As though men serched for what cause prescience is, whether it be the cause of necessitie of euerye thinge to come, or whether the necessitie of thinges to come, be the cause of prescience or purueyaunce of god.

But I do laboure to declare the same thynge, that is to say: that the chaũce of thynges beforе knowen, is necessarye, howe soeuer the order of causes standeth. All thoughe that it semeth not, that prescyence or foreknowledge bryngeth in necessytie of betydyng, or happynge of thynges to come. For yf anye man sytteth, it behoueth that the opinion of hym is true that thinkethe that he sytteth. And lykewyse agayne on the other parte, yf the oppynyon be true of anye man, that for bycause he setteth it must nedes be of necessitie, that he sytteth, then is there necessytie in both. For in the one is necessitie to sytte, and certes in the other is necessitie of truthe. But anye man sytteth not therefore, for bycause the opinion of hys sytting is true. But rather the oppynyon of syttynge is trewe: for that it chaũced before that some man dyd

tem. Neq; enim necesse est contingere quæ prouidentur, sed necesse est quæ futura sunt, prouideri. Quæsiuero quærendo cuiusq; rei causa sit præscientia, ne futurorum necessitas sit, an futurorum necessitas causa prouidentie laboraretur. Ac nos illud demonstrare nitamur quoquo modo se habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse euentum præscitarum rerum, etiamsi præscientia futuris rebus euentiendi necessitatem non uideatur inferre. Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quæ eum sedere coniectat, ueram esse necesse est: atq; econuertio rursus, si de quospiam uera sit opinio, quoniã sedet eum sedere necesse est. In utroq; igitur necessitas inest. In hoc quidem sedendi, at uero in altero ueritatis. Sed non idcirco quisq; sedet quoniam uera est opinio. Sed hæc potius uera est, quoniam quempiam sedere præcessit.

ceſſit. Ita cum cauſa ueritatis ex altera parte procedat ineſt tamen cõmunis in utra q; neceſſitas. Similia de prouidentia futurisq; rebus ratiocinari patet. Nam etiam ſi ideireo quoniam futura ſunt prouidentur, non uero ideo quoniam prouidentur eueniunt, Nihilo minus tamen a deo uel naturæ prouideri, uel prouiſa euenire neceſſe eſt, quod, ad perimendam arbitrij libertatem ſolum ſatis eſt. Iam uero quam prepoſtrum eſt, ut æterne præſcientie temperalium rerũ euentus, cauſa eſſe dicatur. Quid eſt autẽ aliud arbitrari ideo deum futura quoniam ſunt eueniturapprouidere, quam putare quæ olim acciderunt cauſam ſummæ illius eſſe prouidentiæ? Adhæc, ſicuti cum quid eſſe ſcio idipſum eſſe neceſſe eſt, ita cum quid futurum noui id ipſum futurum eſſe neceſſe eſt. Sic ſit igitur ut euentus præſcire rei neq; at cuitari. Po-

dyd fytte. And ſo for as mothe as the cauſe of the truth, procedeth and commeth of the other parte, that is to ſay: of ſitting, and not of the true opinion, yet notwithſtandyng there is a commen neceſſitie in both. So then it apperyth to make lyke reaſons of gods prouidence and of thinges to come. For although thinges be therfore purueyed, bycauſe they be to come, yet certes they happen not therefore becauſe they be purueyed. Neuertheles it behoueth of neceſſitie that eyther things to come be purueied of god, or els that the thynges purueyed of god, do happen and come to pas. Which thing alone is ſufficient to deſtroye the lybertie of fre wyll. But howe peruerſe a thynge or erronious is thys nowe, that the chaunce of temporall things be thoughte or ſayd to be the cauſe of the high preſcience or fore knowledge of God. But what other thinge is it to thynke that god purueyeth thynges to come therefore, bycauſe they be to betyde or come, then to thinke that the thyngs, that ſometyme haue chaunced, be the cauſe of the high prouidence or purueyaunce of God. Herevnto I adde theſe thynges as for trample, when that I do knowe that there is any thing, it is of neceſſitie that ỹ ſame thing is. And ſo when I haueknowē that any thing ſhall happen, it behoueth of neceſſitie that the ſame thing come to paſſe. So then it folowethe, that the chaunce of

Origene, vpõ Saint Paule to the Romanes ſayth. Anye thynge ſhall not bee therfore, bicauſe God knewe it ſhuld be, but bicauſe it ſhuld be, therfore god knewe it before it was done.

thinges knowen before they chaunce, cannot be eschewed or auoyded. Fer thermore if any man esteme any thing to be otherwise then it is, it is not onelye no knowledge or science, but it is a false or fallible opinion, farre dyuers, and contrarye from the truth of knowledge or scyence. Wherefore yf anye thyng be so to come, that the chaunce thereof is not certayne and necessary, howe maye that thinge be knowen before that it shall come, for as scyence or knowledge, is not myngled wyth falshed, euen so the thynge that is conceyued by science or knowledge, may be none otherwyse then it is conceyued. For that is the cause that science or knowledge wanteth lyinge. For it behoueth that euery thyng be euen so as science or knowledge comprehendeth and affirmeth it to be. What shal I saye than? After what maner knoweth God all thynges before, to come, that be vncertayne? For yf he do think assuredlye that the same thynge shall come, that is also possyble not to come or happen, he is deceyued, which thing is not onely vnlawefull and wycked, to thynke, but also to speake of god. But if that god so knoweth, as things be, so they shal come to passe. And that he knoweth also eyther that the thynges may be done, or may not be done. What is that prescience or fore knowledge that comprehendeth nothyng certayne ne stable? Or what differethe thys

Postremo si quid aliquis aliter orsum quam sese res habet existimet, id non modo scientia non est, sed est opinio fallax ab scientie ueritate longe diuersa. Quare si quid ita futurum est, ut eius certus ac necessarius non sit euentus, id euenturum esse præsciri qui poterit. Sicut enim scientia ipsa impermixta est falsitati, ita id quod ab ea concipitur esse aliter quam concipitur nequit. Ea namq; causa est cur mendatio scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamq; habere necesse est, uti eam habere sese scientia comprehendit. Quid igitur? Quonam modo deus hæc incerta futura prænoscit? Nam si inenitabiliter euentura censet, quæ etiam non euenire possibile est, fallitur, quod sentire nō modo nefas est, sed etiam uoce proferre. At si ita uti sunt, ita ea futura esse decernit, ut æque uel fieri ea uel non fieri posse cognoscat quæ est hæc præscientia quæ nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit? Aut quid

hæc

hec refert ad illum illo ridiculo Tyresie, quicquid dicam aut erit, aut non? Quid etiam diuina prouidentia humana opinione præstiterit, si uti homines incerta iudicat, quorum est incertus euentus? Quod si apud illum verum omnium certißimum fontem, nihil incerti esse potest, certus eorum est euentus quæ futura firmiter illa præscierit. Quare nulla est humanis consilijs accionibusq; libertas, quas diuina mens sine falsitatis errore cuncta prospiciens ad unum alligat & constringit euentum.

Quo semel recepto, quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequatur, liquet. Frustra enim bonis, malisq; præmia, pœnæ ue proponuntur, quæ nullum meruit liber, ac uoluntarius motus animorum. Idq; omnium uidebitur iniquißimum, quod nunc æquißimum iudicatur, uel puniri improbos, uel remunerari probos, quos ad alterutrum non propria mittat uoluntas, sed futuri

this fore knowledge from the folyshe prophecy of Thiresy the prophysiar that sayd: whatsoeuer I shall say, eyther it shalbe, or it shall not be? Or els what is the dyuine prouydence better than mans opinion, if it demeth thyngs vn certayne as men doo, of whose iudgement the chaunce is vncertayne? But if nothinge maye be vncertayne wyth hym that is the moste sure fountaine of all thinges, then is the chaunce certayne of suche thynges, that he shall knowe before assuredly shall come.

Wherefore there is no libertie in the counsayles and actes of mankynde, that the deuyne thoughte (that loketh vpon all things without errour of falshed) knytteth and byndethe in, vnto one chaunce. Whyche thinge when it is once receyued and graunted, that is to saye: that there be no fre wyll, then it appereth howe great fall destructyon or hurt folowethe, of all humayne thynges, that is to saye, of thynges appertaynyng vnto mankynde. For thē in vayne, rewardes be ordeyned for good folke, and ponyshment, for wycked folke when that no fre and voluntary mouyng of mans thought, or corage hath deserued the same rewarde or payne. And the same thyng shoulde then seme moste wycked, that nowe is iudged most iust and best, that is to say ether to ponyshe wycked folke or to reward good folke, the whych folke ther owne proper wyll hath not enforcyd,

Thyresyas was .vij. yeres a man and .vij. yeares a woman, & knewe the pleasures of bothe. And Juno for his iudgemente of women, made hym blynde, & Jupiter made hym to prophesye.

The knowledge of God, is euer certain and trewe.

All vertues and vyces do sprynge of free electiō of good and euyll, and ponyshement & reward, cōmeth for ỹ free acte of good or euyll, & yf free wyll be taken away, then is there noo free election, nor act nor dede.

to eyther one or other, that is to saye: nether to good nor euyll, but the certayne necessitie of thynges to come, constraineth them therto. Then shuld there be nether vyces nor vertues, but rather a myrte and indiscrete confusyon of all desertes of the good and euyl folke. And nothyng may be thoughte more wicked then the same, whē that all order of thyngs is dyuised and taken of and from gods prouydence, & that it is lawefull for mans counsails or wylles to do nothyng, that is to sai that mankynde hath no power to wil or do any thyng but as it is constrayned. And so it cometh to passe that all our vyces be referred vnto god the author of al good thinges, that is to say, then god is to be blamed for our vyces sith that he constrayneth vs by necessity to do them. Therefore is there no reson or meane, why to trust in god or to prayre to god. For why should anye man eyther trust in god or pray to god when the order of destenye that cannot be altred knytteth together al thinges that men desyre. Therefore then the same onely reward betwene God and men shuld be taken away that is to saye, to hope and to praye. For truely by meanes of iuste humilitie we deserue the inestimable reward of gods grace, and that is onely the way that is to vnderstand, by hope and prayer, wherby it semeth that men may speke with god, and to be vnyte and knytte by

turi cogit certa necessitas. Nec uitia igitur, nec uirtutes quicquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorium potius mixta, atq; indiscreta confusio. Quoq; nihil sceleratius excogitari potest, cum ex prouidentia rerum omnis ordo ducatur, nihilq; fieri licet at consilijs humanis, fit, ut uitia quoq; nostra ad bonorum omnium referantur auctorem. Igitur nec sperandi aliquid, nec deprecandi ulla ratio est. Quid enim uel speret quisquam, uel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia indeflexa series connectit? Auferetur igitur unicum illud inter homines, deumq; commercium, sperandi scilicet & deprecandi. Siquidem iustæ humilitatis pretio, inæstimabilem uicem diuinæ gratiæ promeremur. Qui solus modus est, quo cum deo colloqui homines posse uidentur, illicq; imaccessæ luci prius quoque, impetrent, ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quæ si

recepta futurorum necessitate nihil uirium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo illi rerum principi connecti, atq; adherere possimus? Quare necesse erit humanũ genus (uti paulo ante cantabas) disseptum atq; disciunctum suo fonte fatiscere.

by reason of supplication and prayer, to the clere lyght, that is to say: to god before that they optaine theyr request. Whych hope and prayer beyng receyued & graunted, yf they seme to haue no strength, by necessitie of thynges to come, what thinge is there, whereby we may be knytte, and cleue faste, to that prynce of thynges, that is to saye to god? Wherefore it must nedes be that mankynde beyng seperate and vnioyned from hys fountayne or begynnyng whych is god, doo fayle and come to nought, as thou saydest a litle before.

Metrum tertium. Phi.

Quænam discors fœdera rerum
Causa resoluit? quis tanta deus
Veris statuit bella duobus?
Vt quæ carptim singula constent,
Eadem nolint mixta iugari.
An nulla est discordia ueris,
Semperq; sibi certa cohærent.
Sed mens cecis obruta membris
Nequit oppressi luminis igne,
Rerum tenues noscere nexus.
Sed cur tanto flagat amore
Veri tectas reperire notas?

Philosophy.

What varyable cause hath seperate the bands of thyngs, that is to saye of gods prouydence, and of fre wyl? what god hath appointed so great warres and strife betwene these two very true thynges, that they both be so deuyded in sundre that they beyng mynged will not be coupled together. Is there any discorde or varyance in true thynges. They do cleaue together certayne and fyrme one with another. But mans mynde, drowned and ouercome wyth the blynde members of the body, cannot (by the fyer or lyght of the soule oppressed by the bodye) knowe the subtyll coniunction or ioynyng together of things. But why burneth the soule with so great desyre to fynde the sygnes of truthe, that lye

hyd

hym. Do the myndes know the thynge, that she (beynge carefull) desyreth to knowe? Who desyreth or labowreth to knowe the thynges that he knoweth all redy? And if the mynde knoweth not the thynge that it desyreth, where fore seketh she beyng blynde and ignoraunt, that is to saye: why seketh she the thing that she knoweth not, when she seith it? What man knowyng nothyng, wisheth or desireth any thing Or who can folowe thynges that be not in his thought? And although he seke for suche thynges where shall he fynde them? What man can knowe the fourme of the thynge founde and is ignoraunt of the same? But when the soule loketh vpon the profounde hygh thought, that is to say: vpon god, then it knoweth the summe or effecte and all thynges together vnyuersall and perticuler. But nowe while the soule is hydde in the cloude or shadow of the body, and members of the same, it hath not holy forgotten it selfe, but kepethe the vniuersall knowledge of thyngs, & leseth ỹ perticuler knowlege of things Therfore wholsetier sercheth to knowe true thynges, he is in the habyte of nether of them, for nether he knoweth all thynges nor hath vtterly forgotten all thynges, or is not all ignoraunt, but remembreth the summe or effecte of all thynges. With hythe effecte he retaynyng, counsayleth with hym selfe, and calleth to remembraunce depelye by

Scit ne, quod appetit omnia nosse?
Sed quis nota scire laborat?
Et si nescit, quid cæca petit?
Quis enim quicquam nescius optet?
Aut quis ualeat nescita sequi?
Quoue inueniat? quis reperiam
Queat ignarus noscere formam
An cum mentem cerneret altam
Pariter summam & singula norat?
Nunc membrorum condita nube
Non in totum est oblita sui
Summamq; tenet singula perdens.
Igitur quisquis uera requirit.
Neutro est habitu, nam nec q; nouit.
Nec penitus tamen omnia nescit.
Sed quam retinens meminit summam.
Consulit, alte uisa retrus sans,
Vt seruatis queat oblita addere partes.

Pro

by ſtudye, thynges before ſene or knowen, to thintente that he maye ioyne the partes or thynges that he hath forgotten, to thoſe partes or thynges, that he hath reſerued and kept ſtyll in hys memorye.

Prosa quarta P.

TVm illa, uetus, inquit hæc eſt de prouidẽtia querela, a Marco; Tullio, cum diuinationem diſtribuit, uehementer agitata, tibiq; ipſi res diu prorſus multumq; quæſita, ſed haud quaquam ab ullo ueſtrum hactenus ſatis diligenter, ac firmiter expedita, cuius ea liginis cauſa eſt, quod humane ratiocinationis motus ad diuinæ præſcientiæ ſimplicitatem non poſſit admoueri. Quæ ſi ullo modo excogitari queat, nihil prorſus relinqueretur ambigui. Quod ita demum pateſacere, atq; expedire tentabo, ſi prius ea quibus moueris expendero. Quæro enim, cur illam ſolemnium rationem minus eſficacem putes, quæ quia præſcientiam non eſſe futuris rebus cauſam neceſſitatis exiſtis

Phyloſophy.

THen ſayd Philoſophi: this queſtyon of goddes prouydence is olde, and greatly moued, and diſputed of Marcus Tullius, when he deuydeth dyuynacion, that is to ſaye: in his boke of dyuynacions, & thou thy ſelfe haſt, long & vtterly ſought for the ſame but yet it hath not ben any wher ſuffycyently & firmely determyned of any of you at this day. And ỹ cauſe of ỹ darknes or difficultie therof, is for that the mouyng of mans reaſon can not be applyed vnto the ſymplicitie, or purenes of goddes prouydence, that is to ſaye: mans reaſon can not comprehend the thynge that god ſeyth. Whiche prouydẽce of God, yf it myght be thought, or compaſſed by mans wyt, then were it vtterlye without any doughte at all. The cauſe & reaſon of whiche dought, I wyll aſſaye and proue, at the laſte ſo to declare and open, when I haue fyrſt anſwered to thy reaſons, by the which thou art moued. For I aſke why thou thynkeſt that the reaſon of them that do aſſoyle this, is not good nor effectu all. The which reaſon, or ſolucion iudgeth that lybertie of fre wyll can not be let by preſcience or fore knowledge

for

for by cause it supposeth that prescyence is not the cause of necessytye in things to come, takest thou any other argumente of necessitie of thynges to come, els where, but that the thyngs that be knowen cannot fayle, but com to passe? Therfore yf prescience or fore knowledge of thyngs to come putteth no necessitye in thynges to come (as thou thy selfe diddest confesse a litle before) what, is there any cause that voluntarye determynacions or actes of thynges be compelled to certayne happes or chaunces? That thou mayst the better vnderstand by way of example what may folow, let vs suppose that there is no prescience, should therfore the thyng (in asmuch as belōgeth therto) that commeth of fre wyll, be constrayned to come by necessitye.

Boe. No. Phi. Then lette vs suppose agayne that there is prescience, but that it putteth no necessytie in thyngs to come, then (as I suppose) the same lybertie of wyll shall remayne hoole & fre from all necessytie. But thou wylt say that although presciēce is no cause of necessytie in thynges to come: yet it is a sygne that they be to come by necessytie. Therfore by this meanes althoughe prescyens had neuer ben: yet it may appere that chaūces of thinges to come be necessarie. For euery sygne sheweth the thyng onely whereof it is the sygne, but yet it makethe not the thing that it signyfyeth. Wherefore it

The sygne that wyne is in any place to sell, is not the cause of sellynge but a sygne of sellynge.

existimat, nihil impediri præscientia arbitrij libertatem putat? Num enim tu aliunde argumentum futurorum necessitatis trahis, nisi quod ea quæ presciuntur, non euenire non possūt? Si igitur prænotio nullam futuris rebus adijcit necessitatem (quod tu etiam paulo ante fatebare) quid est quod uoluntarij exitus rerum ad certum cogantur effectum? Etenim positionis gratia, ut quid consequatur aduertas, statuamus nullam esse præscientiam. Num igitur, quātum ad hoc attinet, quæ ex arbitrio eueniunt, ad necessitatem coguntur? Bo. Minime. P. Statuamus iterum esse, sed nihil rebus necessitatis iniungere: manebit, ut opinor, eadem uoluntatis integra atq; absoluta libertas. Sed præscientia inquies tametsi futuris eueniendi necessitas non est, signum tamen est necessario ea esse uentura. Hoc igitur modo etiam si præcognitio non fuisset, necessarios futurorum exitus esse constaret. Omne etenim signum tantū quid sit, ostendit, non uero efficit quod designat. Quare demon-

demonſtrantem prius eſt, non nihil ex neceſſitate contingere. Vt prenotionem ſignum eſſe huius neceſſitatis appareat, alioquin ſi hec nulla eſt, nec illa quidē eius rei ſignum poterit eſſe, quæ non eſt. Iam uero probationem firma ratione ſubnixam conſtat, non ex ſignis neq; peritis extrinſecus argumētis, ſed ex conuenientibus neceſſariisq; cauſis eſſe ducendam. Sed qui fieri poteſt ut ea non proueniant, quæ futura eſſe, prouidenturi quaſi uero nos ea quæ prouidentia futura eſſe prænoſcit, non euentura credamus, ac non illud potius arbitremur licet eueniant, nihil tamen ut euenirent ſui natura neceſſitatis habuiſſe, quod hinc facile perpēdas licebit. Plura enim dum fiunt, ſubiecta oculis, intuemur, ut ea quæ in quadrigis moderandis arq; flectendis facera ſpectantur aurige, atq; ad hunc modum & ceetera. Num igitur quicquam illorum ita fieri neceſſitas ulla compellit? B. Minime. Fruſtra enim eſſet artis effectus ſi omnia coacta mouerentur. P. Quæ igitur cum fiunt, carent neceſſi-

it behoueth to ſhewe before that ſome thing happethe by neceſſitie, that it maye appere that preſcience or forekno wledge, is the ſygne of thys neceſſytye or els yf there be no neceſſytye, the ſame preſcience maye not be the ſygne of the thyng, that is not.

But nowe it apperethe that the proofe of thys (ſuſtayned by ſtedefaſt reaſon) is not taken of ſignes and outewarde argumentes, but of conuenyente and neceſſarye cauſes. But thou mayſte ſaye howe maye it be that the thynges do not come, that be purueyed to com. As though we do beleue that the thinges ỳ gods prouydence ſaw before to come, ſhould not come. But that we ſhould rather iudge, though they happen or come, that they had no neceſſitie of their owne nature that they ſhoulde come. Whyche thynge thou mayſt eaſely perceiue by this example, we do ſe manye thynges with our eies whyles they are in doynge, as thoſe thynges whyche the carters ſeme to do in ordering and tempering of their cartes, and ſuch other voluntary acts after the ſame maner. Is there, therefore anye neceſſitie in oure eyes or lokyng, that compelleth any of the thinges ſo to be done? Boe. No truly. For theffect of a craft ſhould be in vayne if al thynges ſhould be moued by compulſion of our eyes, or by lokynge on.

Phi. Than the thinges whych (when

men doo them) haue no neceſſitie that men do them, And the ſame thynges be to come without neceſſitie, before they be done. Wherfore ther be ſome thinges to come whoſe commynge is quyte and fre from any neceſſitie. For certes I thynke no man will ſay thys that thoſe thinges that nowe be, were not fyxte before they were done. And the ſame thinges although men hadde knowen them before, yet haue they fre chaunces. For as the knowledg of thinges preſente, bringeth in no neceſſitie to thinges that men do, euen ſoo preſcience or fore knowledge of thinges to come, bryngeth in no neceſſitie to thoſe thyngs that are to come. But thou ſayeſt that the ſame thinge is to be doughted, whether there maye be anye preſcience or fore knowledge of ſuch thynges as haue none neceſſarye chaunces. For they ſeme to diſagree or barye, that is to vnderſtande of preſcience and thinges to come. For thou thynkeſte that yf thynges be knowen before they come, yt of neceſſitye, they muſt folowe to come. And yf there be no neceſſitie, they might not be knowen before. And thou thinkeſt that nothing may be comprehended, by preſcience, or foreknowledge of god, but it be certayne. And if thoſe thynges that haue vncertayne chaunces be purueyed as thynges certayne, thou takeſt that for to be ſome ambyguitie or doughte of opinion, and not for the truthe of ſcyence

ceſſitate exiſtendi, eadem priuſquam fiant ſine neceſſitate futura ſunt. Quare ſic quædam euentura, quorum exitus ab omni neceſſitate abſolutus ſit. Nam illud quidem nullum arbitror eſſe dicturum, quod nunc fiunt, priuſquam fierent futura non fuerint. Hæc etiam igitur præcognita, liberos habeunt euentus. Nam ſicut ſcientia præſentium rerum nihil hijs quæ fiunt, ita præſcientia futurorum nihil hijs quæ uenturæ ſunt neceſſitatis importat. Sed hoc, inquis ipſum dubitatur, an earum rerum, quæ neceſſarios exitus non habent, ulla poſſit eſſe prænotio. Diſſonare enim uidentur, putaque ſi prouideantur, conſequi neceſſitatem ſi neceſſitas deſit, uimine præſciri, nihilq; ſcientia comprehendi poſſe niſi certum.

Quod ſi, quæ incerti ſunt exitus, ea quaſi certa prouidentur, opinionis id eſſe caliginem, non ſcientiæ ueritatem.

tatem. Aliter enim, ac ſe ſe res habeat arbitrari, ab integritate ſcientiæ credit eſſe diuerſum. Cuius erroris cauſa eſt, quod omnia quæ quiſq; nouit, ex ipſorū tantum ui, atq; natura cognoſci eſtimat quæ ſciuntur, quod totum contra eſt. Omne enim quod cognoſcitur, non ſecundum ſui uim, ſed ſecundum cognoſcentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. Nam ut hoc breui liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem aliter uiſus, aliter tactus agnoſcit. Ille eminus manens, totum ſimul iactis radijs intuetur, hic uero coherens orbi atq; coniunctus circa ipſum, motus, ambitum, rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. Ipſum quoq; hominem aliter ſenſus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intelligentia contuetur. Senſus enim figuram in ſubiecta materia conſtituram. Imaginatio uero ſolam ſine materia iudicat figuram.

Ratio

ence or knowledge. For thou beleuest that it is agaynſte the hole effectes of ſcience or knowledge to iudge a thyng otherwayes then the thinge is, and in thys thou doest erre. The cauſe of whi the errour is that all thinges that any man hath knowen, he thinketh that it is knowen by the ſtrength and nature onely of thoſe things that be knowen, whych is all contrarye. For all thynge that is knowen is not knowen by the power of the thynge that is knowen, but is rather knowen, by the meane of the that knoweth it, as it may appere by thys ſhorte example. For the ſighte of the eye and the touchyng of the handes, knoweth one ſelfe roundnes of body not after one maner, but dyuerſly. For the ſyght without mouinge of it ſelfe, beholdith the hole body, together a farre of. But the touchyng, cleuyng together, & being ioyned to the rowndnes, and moued about the ſame roundnes, comprehendeth and holdethe the rowndnes thereof by the partes thereof. Alſo the outewarde ſenſys, beholdeth the manne hym ſelfe after one maner, imagination after another maner, reſon after another ſorte, and the deuine intellygence or vnderſtandynge, beholdeth hym farre otherwyſe. For the outwarde ſenſys as the eyes, iudgeth the ſygure or faſhion of the man, as it is made in the mater ſubiecte or ſenſyble. But the imagination determythe the ſygure of the man without anye

matter. But reſon palleth alſo imagi nation, and wayeth or conſidereth by vniuerſal cõſideracion the ſame kind and nature of man, that is in all perti culer partes, naturallye. But the eye of intellygence, or vnderſtandynge is hygher, for it palleth the vnyuer ſall compaſſe, and beholdethe wyth the ſyght of pure thoughte, the ſelfe ſame ſymple and pure forme of man perdurable. In whyche thynges, that is to ſaye, in the ſayde vertues of kno ledge, this ought to be ſpecyallye con ſydered, that the hyghe ſtrengthe for to comprehend thynges, cõprehendeth in it ſelfe the lower ſtrength. But the lower ſtrength can ryſe by no meanes vnto the hygher ſtrengthe, ſoo that it may comprehend the ſame. For certes the ſenſys of the eye or wyte, can com prehend any thing without ſome mat ter ſubiecte, nor the imagination be holdethe the kyndes vnyuerſall, nor reaſon taketh the ſymple or pure form as intelligence doth. But intelligence dyuyne as a thynge that loketh aboue or hath reſpecte to a hygher thynge, after it hath conceyued the fourme, it iudgeth and decerneth certaynelye all thynges that be vnder the fourme, that is to ſay, all thynges ẏ be in man. But yet it comprehendeth or knoweth the ſame forme after ſuch maner, ẏ it can not be knowen to any of ẏ lower pow ers, ẏ is to ſay, to the reſon, imagynaci on, or wit. For it knoweth the vniuer ſall

Ratio uero hauc quoq; tranſ cendit: ſpeciemque ipſam, quæ ſingularibus ineſt, uni uerſali conſyderatione pere pendit. Intelligentia uero celſior oculos exiſtit. Super greſſa namq; uniuerſitatis ambitum, ipſam illam ſimpli cem formam pura mẽtis acie contuetur. In quo illud maxi me conſiderandum eſt, nam ſuperior uis comprehendens di amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad ſuperiorem nullo modo conſurget. Neq; enim ſenſus aliquid extra ma teriam ualet, uel uniuerſales ſpecies imaginatio cõtuctur uel ratio capit ſimplicem for mam. Sed intelligentia, quaſi deſuper ſpectans, concepta formaq; ſubſunt cuncta dijudicat, ſed eo modo quo for mam ipſamq; nulli alij nota eſſe poterat: comprehendit. Nam et rationis uniuerſum, & imaginationis figuram et materiale ſẽſibile cognoſcit. Nec rationem utens nec ima

gina

giuationem nec ſenſibus, ſed illo uno ictu mentis formaliter (ut ita dicam) cuncta proſpiciens. Ratio quoq; cum quid uniuerſale reſpicit, nec imaginationem nec ſenſibus utens imaginabilia uel ſenſibilia comprehendit. Hec eſt enim quæ conceptionis ſue uniuerſale ita definit, homo eſt animal bipes rationale, quæ cũ uniuerſalis notio ſit: tamen imaginabilem ſenſibilemq; eſſe rem: nullus ignorat, quod illa non imaginatione uel ſenſu, ſed rationali conceptione conſiderat. Imaginatio quoq; tametſi ex ſenſibus uiſendi formandiq; figuras ſumpſit exordiũ ſenſu tamen abſente, ſenſibilia quæq; colluſtrat, non ſenſibili ſed imaginaria ratione iudicandi. Vides ne igitur ut in cognoſcendo cuncta ſua potius facultate quã eorum quæ cognoſcuntur utantur. Neq; id iniuria: nam cum omne iudicium iudicantis actus exiſtat, neceſſe eſt ut ſuam quisque operam, non

ſall reſon or fourme, the figure of imaginacion, and the ſenſyble matter conceyued by wyt, and vſeth nether reaſon nor imaginacion nor wit outward but beholdeth all thynges formallye (as a man would ſaye) by one inſtante thought of the mynd, without any diſcurſe or circumſtannce. And reaſon (when it beholdeth anye thynge vnyuerſall) vſethe nether imaginacion, nor outewarde wyt, yet it comprehendeth thynges imaginable and ſenſible For this reaſon is the thyng that defyneth the vniuerſal thyng, of the thing conceyued thus. Man is a two fotedde beaſt and reſonable, whych knowlege when it is vnyuerſall, yet euerye man knoweth that man is a thyng imagynable and ſenſyble. Whych thing reaſon conſidereth not, by imaginacion, or wytte, but by a reaſonable conceyuynge thereof. And alſo imaginacion (although it taketh begynning of wit to ſee and to make dyuers fygures, of thynges) yet it knoweth all thynges, ſenſyble wythout the wyt, not by ſenſyble reaſon of iudgynge, but by reaſon, imagynable. Seyſt thou not therfore that all thynges, in knowyng doo vſe rather theyr owne proper facultye and power, then the power or faculte of thynges, that be knowen. And that not without cauſe. For when euerye iudgement is the acte of hym that iudgeth, it behoueth that euery man performe hys worke and purpoſe, not by

any

any forayne or straunge power or facultie, but by his owne proper power, and strength.

non ex aliena, sed ex propria uoluntate parficiat.

Philosophy.

There was some tyme a gate or entre, that is to saye, a cytye called Athence, that brought vp old men, that is to say: philosophers, Stoicians, that were very darke or obscur in theyr sentences, the whyche Stoicians thought that reason and imaginacion of sensyble thynges, were imprynted in mens mindes, from the outward bodyes of thynges, after the fashyon as the maner is sometyme, whē a man in wrytyng with a swyft pen, do make letters in a playne and clene pagin or leafe of paper or perchement, that had no wrytynge therein before. But if the mynde hauynge full strengthe doth nothyng, or hath no power, in it selfe, but onely lyeth suffrynge & subiect to the symylytudes and impressions of outewarde bodyes. And yf it represent the vayne imaginacions of thynges, as ymages apperynge in a glasse that men do vse to loke in. From whence commethe thys knowledge in our myndes, that decerneth al thynges and beholdeth al thynges per tyculerlye? Or whence is the strength of our myndes that deuydeth al knowen thynges and gatherethe together thynges that be deuyded? And from whence

The powers of the soule be actyfe, or doynge and not passyue, or suffryng al thoughe they seme to be dull vntyl they be stered by outwarde thynges.

Metrum quartum. Ph.

Quondam porticus attulit
Obscuros nimium senes,
Qui sensus, & imagines
E corporibus extimis
Credunt mentibus imprimi,
Vt quondam celeri stylo
Mos est æquore paginæ,
Quæ nullas habeat notas
Pressas figere literas.
Sed mens si proprijs uigens
Nihil motibus explicat,
Sed tantum patiens iacet
Notis subdita corporum,
Cassasq; in speculi uicem
Rerum reddit imagines,
Vnde hæc sic animis uiget
Cernens omnia notio?
Quæ uis singula prospicit?
Aut quæ cognita diuidit?
Quæ diuisa recolligit?
Alternumq; legens iter
Nunc summis caput inserit,
Nunc desidit in infima.
Cum sese referens sibi
Veris falsa redarguit.
Hæc est efficiens magis
Longe causa potentior,
Quam quæ materiæ modo
Impressas patitur notas.

Præ-

Præcedit tamen excitans,
Acuires animi mouens
Viuo in corpore paßio,
Cum uel lux oculos ferit,
Vel uox auribus inſtrepit.
Tum mentis uigor excitus
Quæ intus ſpecies tenet
Admotis ſimiles uocans
Notis applicat exteris
Introrſumq; reconditis
Formis miſcet imagines.

whence commeth the power that choſeth both wayes, that is to ſay: to ioine and to deuyde: Or whence is the power that otherwhyles lifteth vp our hed or mynde to hygh thynges, and otherwhyles goethe downe or fallethe into inferior and lowe thynges, and at the laſt when it ſheweth it ſelfe as it is, repreueth and confuteth falſe thynges, with true thynges: Thys ſtrength of the mynde is the cauſe more efficiente or actyfe, whych is farre ſtronger then the cauſe pacient or ſufferyng, and receyueth more the fygurys and ſimylytudes of the matter imprynted in it, then the cauſe that ſuffreth, or pacient. Neuertheles ſome paſſion of the mind in a quyke lyuelye bodye, goeth before the operation, of the ſame mynde, ſteryng and mouyng the power, & ſtrength of the mynde, or wyt to worke. As when the lyght ſtryketh or touchethe the eyes, or a voice ſoundyng in ẏ eares, then the power of the mynde, beynge ſtered vp, callynge vnto lyke mouynges, the kyndes of thynges, that it holdeth within it ſelfe, applyeth and ioyneth the ſame kyndes to the ſayde outwarde Imagers, fygures, or ſymylytudes, to the fourmes of thinges that be hyd inwardely in it ſelfe, that is to ſay in the power of the wyt or mynde.

The mynde, or wyt is paſſiue by reſon of poſſible vnderſtanding, & yet more actiue in vnderſtanding then paſſiue of outeward bodyes. & the cauſe of vnderſtōdinge ought not to be attrybuted to outewarde thinges: as the Stoicience thoughte and intended.

Ibhi.

Yf mans mynde in knowynge, foloweth her owne mouyng, and not the mouing of the thyng that is knowen: moch more gods prouidence foloweth her owne proper mouynge in knowledge, & not the mouinge of the thing that it knoweth.

But yf in sensyble or kelynge bodyes, the obiecte, or outewarde qualyties, do moue and sterre the instrumentes of the sensys or wyttes, and that the passion or sufferynge of the body, goeth before the vigor or strēgth of the actyfe or worckynge mynde, which prouoketh and sterreth the acte or worke of the mynde in it selfe, and erciteth and moueth the meane season the fourmes of thynges that restethe within. And I say if in sensible bodies the mynde is not affected or taughte by passion or sufferyng of the bodye to knowe thynges, but iudgethe by hys owne proper strength the passion subiecte to the bodye, much more the thinges that be quyet, fre & seperate from all affectes or passyons of bodyes, that is to saye: god and his aungels, do not folowe in iudgyng, outwarde obiects or qualities, but do perfourme the acte of their mynde or thoughte without outward obiectes. So than by this menes or reason, many maners of knowledge haue come to dyuers and sundry substaunces. For the sensys or wytte beyng onely destitute or baren of other knowledge, commeth to lyuyng thynges immouable, as vnto oysters & such lyke shell fyshes of the sea, that be norysshed cleuynge vnto rockes. But imaginacion commeth to bestes moueable in whome there semeth to be some affecte

Prosa quinta. P.

Quod si in corporibus sentiendis, quāuis afficiant instrumenta sensuum forinsecus obiectæ qualitates, animiq; agentis uigorem passio corporis antecedat, quæ in se actum mentis prouocet, excitetq; interim quiescentes intrinsecus formas, si in sentiendis, inquam, corporibus animus non passione insignis ter, sed ex sua ui subiectam corpori iudicat passionem, quanto magis ea, quæ cunctis corporum affectionibus absoluta sunt, in decernendo non obiecta extrinsecus sequuntur sed actum suæ mētis expediunt. Hac itaque ratione multiplices cognitiones, diuersis, ac differentis bus cessere substantijs. Sensus enim solus, cunctis alijs cognitionibus destitutus, immobilibus animantibus cessit quales sunt conchæ maris quæq; alia saxis hærentia nutriuntur. Imaginatio uero mobilibus beluis, quibus iam inesse fugiendi, appetendiue

alis

aliquis uidetur affectus. Ratio uero humani tantum generis est, sicut intelligentia sola diuini. Quo fit, ut ea noticia cæteris præstet, quæ suapte natura non modo proprium, sed cæterarum quoq; noticiarum subiecta cognoscit. Quid igitur, si ratiocinationi, sensus imaginationiq; refragentur? Nihil esse illud uniuersale dicentes quod sese intueri ratio putet? Quod enim sensibile uel imaginabile est, id uniuersum esse non posse? Aut igitur rationis uerum esse iudicium nec quicquam esse sensibile, aut quoniam sibi notum sit plura sensibus & imaginationi esse subiecta, inanem conceptionem esse rationis, quæ quod sensibile sit ac singulare, quasi quoddam uniuersale consideret. Ad hæc si ratio contra respõdeat, se quidem quod sensibile & quod imaginabile sit uniuersitatis ratione conspicere. Illa uero ad uniuersitatis cognitionem aspirare non posse,

fecte or nature to flee or to couette and desyre some thing. But reason appertayneth onely vnto mankynde, as intellygence or vnderstandyng appertaineth onely vnto the deuyne nature. Whereby it folowethe that the same knowledge excelleth or is more noble (then other) that of her owne proper nature, knoweth not onelye her selfe, but also the subiecte of all other knowledges. But what than yf that wytte, and imaginacton doo stryue agaynste reason, saying that the same vnyuersall thyng that reason thynketh to see, and beholde in it selfe, is nothynge at all. For they do saye, that the thynge that is sensyble and imaginable, maye not be vnyuersall. Therfore eyther the iudgement of reason is true, and that nothynge is sensyble, or that because that reason knoweth that many thynges be subiect to wyt, and imaginacyon, a man would thynke that the conceyuyng of reason were false and vain whyche conceyuyng of reason consydereth the thynge that is sensyble and synguler, as a thyng vniuersall. And yf that reason would aunswere on the contrarye parte vnto these thynges, that is to saye: vnto wyt and imaginacion, saying that she beholdeth ỹ thing that is sensyble, and the thing that is imagynable, by the meanes of vnyuersall thynges, and that they, that is to say: wyt and imagynacyon maye not attayne vnto the knoweledge of the

wytte and imagination be inferiours to reason, & all thre be inferyours to diuyne intelligens.

The power of the soule that hathe moste knowledge is moste excellent

thing that is vniuerſall by cauſe theyr knowledge can not paſſe the bodylye fygures. And would alſo ſaye that for the knowledge of thynges, men ought to beleue and credyte rather the more fyrme and perfyt iudgement of things in ſtryfe. Than in ſuche controuerſy, would not we (that haue the power, aſwell of reaſon as imagynation and wyt) allowe rather the cauſe and ſtrengthe of reaſon, then the power of wyt, and imaginacion? A lyke thinge it is when that mans reaſon thinketh that the deuyne intellygence or knowledge cannot behold, and ſee thyngs to come but after the maner as the ſame reaſon of man knoweth. For (as thou diddeſt ſaye) if that ſome thynges ſeme not to haue certayne and neceſſarye chaunces, they cannenot be knowen before for certayne to come. Therefore by thys meanes, there is no preſcience or fore knowledge of the ſame thynges, whych preſcience if we do beleue to be in theſe thyngs, then is there nothing but commeth by neceſſitie. Therefore yf we maye haue ſuche iudgemente of the dyuyne mynde or thoughte, as we be partakers of reaſon, accordynge as we haue iudged, that imaginatiõ and wyt muſt geue place and be vnder reaſon, euen ſo woulde we thynke that it were ryght and mete, that mans reſon ſhould ſubmyt it ſelfe and geue place, to the deuyne thought. Wherefore yf we may, let vs be lyft vp or let vs ryſe

vppe

poſſe, quoniam eorum notio corporales figuras non poſſit excedere. De rerum uero cognitione firmiori potius perfectioriq; iuditio eſſe credendum. In huiuſmodi igitur lite nos quibus tam ratiocinandi quam imaginandi etiã ſentiendiq; uis ineſt, non ne rationis potius cauſã probaremus? Simile eſt quod humana ratio diuinam intelligẽtiã futura niſi ut ipſa cognoſcit nõ putat intueri. Nã (uti diſſeris) ſi qua certos ac neceſſarios habere non uideantur euentus, ea certo euentura præſciri nequeunt. Hac igitur rerum nulla eſt præſcientia, quam ſi eam in hijs eſſe credamus, nihil erit quod non ex neceſſitate proueniat. Si igitur uti rationis perticipes ſumus, ita diuine iuditium mentis habere poſſemus, ſicut imaginationem ſenſuumq; rationi cedere oportere iudicauimus, ſic diuine ſeſe menti humanam ſummittere rationem iuſtiſſimum cenſeremus. Quare in illius ſumme intelligentie cacumen ſi poſſimus, erigamur

mur. Illic enim ratio uidebit quod in se non potest intueri. Id autem est quonam modo etiam quæ certos exitus non habeunt, certa tamen uideat ac definita prænotio. Neq; id sit opinio, sed summe potius scientiæ nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas.

up by dilygente consideracion into the toppe of that hyghe dyuyne intellygence or knowledge, for there reason shall se that thynge that it cannot beholde in it selfe. And that certes is, after what maner the certaine and determinable prescience or fore knowledge of god, seith thinges that haue no certayne chaunces to come. And thys is not an opynyon, but rather the simplicitie or purenes of the hygh knowlege of god, that is closed or shutte vppe in no boundes, that is to saye: cannot be comprehended or compassed, for it is infynyte or without ende.

If knowledg should folow the power of the thyng that is knowen & not the power of the thynge that knoweth, then as mans reason, knoweth vncertayniy thynges to come: euen so shoulde the dyuyne intelygence. But byeause gods prouidence passeth mans intellygence, or reason: therfor it knoweth certayn that thynge, that mans reason can not attayne vnto but is vncertayne of.

Metrum quintum. P.

Quam uarijs terras animalia permeant figuris,
Namq; alia extento sunt corpore pluaueremq; uertunt
Continuumq; trahunt uestigia pectoris incitata sulcum.
Sunt quibus alarum leuitas uaga uerberetq; uentos:
Et liquido longi spatia æthe-
ris enatet uolatu.
Hæc præsisse solo uestigia gressibus gaudent.
Vel uirides campos transmittere uel subire siluas
Quæ uarijs uideas lieet omnia discrepare formis.
Prona tamen facies hebetes nalet ingrauare sensus.

Phylosophy.

By howe greate dyuersytie of shapes and figures, do the beastes go vpon the ground. For some haue straite bodies (as serpentes and al creppynge wourmes) and in creppyng they turne vp the dust and do make a contynuall forowe or prynt therein, by the strengthe of there breaste, when they crepe or slyde, as adders and snakes, or snayles. And there be other whose wanderyng lyghtnes of there wyngs do make a noyse in the ayer, in beting the wyndes, and passethe the space of the longe ayer, by their apparaunte flying. There be other beastes that delyghteth to go on the grounde and to wander eyther the grene feldes or els to go vnder the woddes, and to make the prynte of there fete on the ground, in goyng. All which beastes although

thou seyst that they do varye and dyf-
fer in theyr varyable fourmes & shapes
that is to saye: although they be of dy-
uers kyndes and fashyons, yet their
faces beynge bowed downewarde to-
warde the grounde, may shewe theyr
bestyall, heuy, and dul sences or wits.
But mankynde alone lyfteth vp hys
hye toppe or head and being light, stan
deth with a vpryght bodye and behol-
deth the earth vnder hym. Therefore
excepte thou beynge all worldly, arte
euyll aduysed, or oute of thy ryghte
mynde, the vpryght stature or fygure
of thy bodye warneth the, or putteth
the in remembraunce that thou seke
beauen with thy vpryghte counte-
nance, & that thou lyft vp thy forehed,
and beare thy minde on hie. That thy
mynde or thought beyng ponderous,
waytye or heuye, synke not downe to
the earth, that is to say: vnto tempo-
ral and worldly thinges, whyles that thy
body is lyfte vp and set soo hyghe as it
is by nature.

For as moche as mans body is straite vp to ward heauen, yf thee mynde therof should not be lyft vp in heuenly cõtẽplacion, the bodye shoulde seme more worthye then the soule.

Vnica gens hominum celsum leuat alterius cacumen.
Atq; læuis recto stat corpore despicitq; terras.
Hæc nisi terrenus male desipis annonet figura,
Qui recto celum uultu petis exerisq; frontem:
In sublime feras animum quo q; ne grauata pessum.
Inferior sidat mens corpore celsius leuato.

Phylosophy.

Therfore forasmuch as it is shewed a lytell before, that all that is knowen, is not knowen by the nature of the thing it selfe, that is knoen, but by the nature of them that knoeth, let vs vnderstand (as much as it is lawfull for vs) what is the state of the dyuine substaũce, that we may knowe what is the nature of the scyence or knowledge. Truely the comon iudge-
ment

Prosa sexta. Philo.

QVonam igitur (uti paulo ante monstratũ est) omne quod scitur non ex sua, sed ex comprehendentium natura cognoscitur, intueamur nunc (quantum phas est) quis sit diuine substantiæ status, ut quam natura scientiæ eius sit positimus agnoscere. Deum igitur

igitur eternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est. Quid sit igitur eternitas consideremus. Hæc enim nobis naturã pariter diuinam scientiamq; patefacit. Eternitas igitur est interminabilis uite tota simul & perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius liquet. Nam quicquid uiuit in tempore, id præsens a præteritis in futura procedit, nihilq; est in tempore constitutum, quod ultimum uite sue spatium pariter possit amplecti. Sed crastinum quidem non dum apprehendit, hesternum uero iam perdidit. In hodierna quoq; uita non amplius uiuitis quam in illo mobili transitorioq; momẽto. Quod igitur temporis patitur conditionem, licet illud (sicut de mundo censuit Aristoteles) nec ceperit unquam esse, nec desinat, uitaq; eius cum temporis infinitate tendatur, nõ dum tamen tale est ut eternum esse iure credatur. Non enim totum simul infinite, licet uite spatium comprehendit atq; complectitur, sed futura non dum transacta iam non habet.

ment or opinion of all reasonable creatures, is that god is eterne, let vs thẽ consyder what is eternitie. For ẏ shal declare openly to vs bothe the dyuyne nature, and also the dyuyne science or knowledge. Therfore eternitie is the possessyon of lyfe interminable, being hole and all together parfytte, whiche appereth more euydent by comparison of example of temporall thynges. For whatsoeuer thing lyueth in tyme, the same thing beyng present, procedethe and goeth fourth from thynges paste, vnto thynges to come. And nothynge is establyshed in tyme, that may comprehend together the last space of hys lyfe, for it hath not yet ouerturned the time of to morow, & it hath now lost ẏ tyme of yester daye. And truely ye liue no more in the lyfe of thys present day then in that same mouable and transitorye moment. Therfore whatsoeuer thyng suffereth condition or succession of time temporal although it neuer began to be nor ceaseth to be, (as Aristotle iudged of the world) & although the lyfe and the continuaunce thereof were extended or stretched forth wyth tyme infynyte, yet for all that it is no such thynge that by ryghte it maye be iudged eternall. For it dothe not enbrace altogether the space of hys lyfe, althoughe it endurethe infynitelye or time infinite, for it hath not the times to come that be not yet, nor the times paste that be done and gone. Therfore what

The dyffynycion eternitie.

Somethynge is eterne, and in eternytie, & the very eternytie as god.

Somethynge be eterne, and in eternytie, & be not ẏ same eternytie, as Aungelles, whiche be substaunces seperate.

Somethynge bee eterne, not in eternytie, nor be not eternytie, as mouing, time, & the worlde.

Quod

Another diffynicion of eternitie.

whatſoeuer thyng doth comprehende and poſſeſſe together all fulnes of life intermynable or without ende, to the whych nothing wanteth of the future or tyme to come, nor nothing of ỹ time paſt, hath eſcaped, the ſame thing maie ryghtfully be called eterne. And it behouethe that the ſame eterne thynge be alwayes preſente with it ſelfe, and myghtye or ſtronge alwayes to aſſiſte it ſelfe, wantyng nothynge, & to haue alwayes preſent the infynyte continuance of mouable tyme. Whereof ſome men do thinke a myſſe, whyche (when they do heare ỹ Plato thought that this worlde had no begynnynge of tyme nor ſhuld haue any ende) thought by thys meanes, the worlde to be made coeterne with god the creatoure thereof. For the worlde to be made by lyfe interminable (as Plato ſuppoſed that it was led) is one thing, and to embrace and comprehend together al the preſences of lyfe intermynable, is another thynge. Whyche thyng is manifeſte, proper, or appertaynynge to the dyuyne thoughte. For God ſemethe not older then thynges that be made, by quantitie of tyme, but rather by proſperytie of hys ſymple or pure nature. For this infynite mouynge of temporall thynges folowethe thys preſente ſtate of immouable lyfe, whyche is eterne. And when it may not fayne or counteruayle the ſelfe ſame, and be made

God is not older (thē thinges ỹ be made) by quantytie of time, but by proſperytie of pure nature alone. And ſo god is before ỹ worlde by his owne pure nature, and not by antiquitie of tyme.

Quod igitur interminabilis uitæ plenitudinem totam pariter comprehendit, ac poſſidet, cui neq; futuri quicquã abſit, ne præteriti fluxerit, id æternum eſſe iure perhibetur. Idq; neceſſe eſt & ſui compos, præſens ſibi ſemper aſſiſtere, & infinitatem mobilis temporis habere præſentem. Vnde quidam non recte, qui cum audiunt uiſum Platoni mundum hunc, nec habuiſſe initium temporis, nec habiturum eſſe defectũ, hoc modo conditori conditum mundum fieri coæternũ putant. Aliud eſt enim per interminabilem duci uitam, quod mundo Plato tribuit, aliud interminabilis uitæ totam pariter complexam eſſe præſentiam, quod diuinæ mentis proprium eſſe manifeſtum eſt. Neq; deus conditis rebus antiquior uideri debet temporis quantitate, ſed ſimplicis potius proprietate naturæ. Hunc enim uitæ immobilis præſentarium ſtatũ infinitus ille temporalium rerum motus imitatur. Cũq; eum effingere, atq; æquare non

non poßit, ex immobilitate deficit in motum, & ex ſimplicitate præſentiæ decreſcit in infinitam futuri ac præteriti quantitatem. Et cum totam pariter uitæ ſuæ plenitudinem nequeat poßidere, hoc ipſo, quod aliquo modo nunquam eſſe deſinit, illud quod implere atq; exprimere non poterit, aliquatenus uidetur æmulari, alligans ſe ad qualemcunq; præſentiam huius exigui, uolucriſq; momenti. Quæ, quoniam manentis illius præſcientiæ quandam geſtat imaginem, quibuſcunq; contigerit, id præſtat ut eſſe uideantur. Quoniam uero manere non potuit, infinitum temporis iter arripuit. Eoq; modo factum eſt, ut continuaret uitam eundo, cuius plenitudinem complecti non ualuit parmanendo. Itaq; ſi digna rebus nomina uelimus imponere Platonem ſequentes, deum quidem æternum, mundum uero dicamus eſſe perpetuum. Quoniã igitur omne iudicium ſecundum ſui naturam, quæ ſibi ſubiecta

made equall to it, that is to saye: vnto god by immobilitie, but wantethe the same immobilitie and decreseyth or dymynysheth from the simplicitie or puritie of the presence of god, into an infinite quantitie of tyme to come, and of tyme past, so that when it cannot posses together the hole fulnes of his life by this menes, because it neuer ceaseth to be, in some maner wayes, it semeth some what to folowe or to be lyke the same thyng, that it may not fulfyl, attayne vnto, nor expresse, but byndeth it selfe to some maner presence of thys lytle swyft and transytorye moments of tyme. The presence of thys instante tyme, for because it beareth a maner ymage or similitude of the euerlasting beinge of god, to whatsoeuer thinges it happeneth, it geueth the thing that they [illegible]. And for bycause the presence of the moment of tyme might not co...inue, it toke quyckely the infinite waye of tyme by succession. And by that meanes it is made that it should continue the lyfe, in goyng from one beyng to another, the fulnes whereof it could not enbrace and holde in taryeing. Therefore yf we (in folowynge Plato) wyll put worthy and conueent names to thinges, let vs say then that god is eterne, and that the worlde is perpetuall. Then for bycause that euerye iudgement comprehendeth ý thinges that be subiect to it after his owne nature that is to say, accordyng to the nature

The infinyte mouing of temporal thinges do folowe as much as they may the state of eternytye, but it can not folow it wholy, for temporal stat is successyuely and beholdeth the tyme past and ý time to com but the state of eternitie is present alwayes and not successyue.

nature of the knowen. Then is there alwayes in god an eterne and present state. And his scyence or knowledge, that ouer goeth all mouynge of tyme tempozall, remayneth in symplicitie, or purite of hys owne presence, enbzasynge and compassynge the infynyte spaces of the time past, and of the time to come, consydereth all thyngs in his symple or pure knowledge, as though they were nowe presentlye done. Soo than yf thou wilt way or consyder the prescience or forе knowledge of god, by the whych it knoweth all thynges, thou shalt not iudge it to be prescience as of thynges to come, but more right ly science or knowledge of thinges instaunt or present that neuer faylethe. Wherefore it is not called preuydence but rather prouydence, as establysshed farre of from lowe thinges, and beholdeth all thinges as it were from the highe toppe of all thynges.

Prouydence & prescience suppoſeth some thing to come.

Prouydence suppoſeth all thynges present in syghte.

Therefore what askeste thou that those thynges be doone by necessytie, that be apprehended in the syghte of God? When that men makethe not those thynges of necessytye that they se done in there sight? Doo thy syghte geue or inforce any necessitie to those thynges that thou seyst present before the? Boe. No. Phi. Truelye if there be any worthy comparyson of the deuyne sight, and of mans sight, in respecte of the thynge present, as you do see somethyng in thys youre presente tempo

All thynges to god be present and nothynge to com nor past as it is to men.

cta sunt, comprehẽdit est autem deo semper æternus ac præsentarius status, scientia quoq; eius omnem temporis supergressa motionẽ, in suæ manet simplicitate præsentiæ: infinitaq; præteriti, ac futuri spatio complectens, omnia quasi iam gerantur in sua simplici cognitione considerat. Itaq; si prescientiam pensare uelis qua cuncta dinoscit, non esse prescientiam quasi futuri, sed scientiam nunquam deficientis instantiæ, rectius æstimabis. Vnde non præuidentia, sed prouidentia potius dicitur, quod porro ab rebus infimis constituta, quasi ab excelso rerum cacumine cuncta prospiciat. Quid igitur postulas ut necessaria fiant, quæ diuino lumine lustrentur, cum ne hoc minis quidem necessaria faciant esse quæ uideãt. Num enim quæ presentia cernis aliquam eis necessitatem tuus addit intuitus? B. Minime. P. Atq; si est diuini, humanis q; presentis digna collatio, uti uos uestro hoc temporario presenti quædam uidetis

ita

ita ille omnia ſuo cernit eter no. Quare hæc diuina præ noscio, naturam rerum pro prietatemq; non mutat. Ta liaq; apud ſe præſentia ſpe ctat, qualia in tempore olim futura prouenient. Nec re rum iudicia confundit, unoq; ſue mentis intuitu tam neceſ ſarie quam non neceſſarie uentura dinoſcit. Sicuti uos cum pariter ambulare in ter ra hominem, & orire in cœ lo ſolem uidetis, quamquam ſit ſimul utrumq; conſpectu, tamen diſcernitis, & hoc uo luntarium, illud eſſe neceſſa rium iudicatis. Ita igitur cu ncta deſpiciens diuinus intui tus, qualitatem rerum mini me perturbat, apud ſe quidē præſentium, ad conditionem uero temporis futurarum. Quo fit ut hæc non ſit opi nio, ſed ueritate potius nixa cognitio, cum exiturum quid eſſe cognoſcit, quod idē exiſtendi neceſſitate carere nō neſciat. Hic ſi dicas, quod euenturū deus uidet, id non euenire non poſſe, quod autem non poteſt, non euenire, id ex neceſſitate cō tingere

temporall tyme, euen ſoo god ſeith all thynges preſent with his eterne ſight wherfore this dyuine preſcience, chaū geth not the nature and propertye of thynges, as touching neceſſite or chaū ce of them, but beholdeth ſuch thyngs preſente before hym as they ſhuld hap to you in tyme to come, that is to ſay, that god ſeith thoſe thinges that be to come to you, as preſently as you do ſe thoſe thinges that be done before your eyes. And he confoundeth not the iud gement of thynges, but by one ſyght of hys thoughte he knowethe thyn ges to come, aſwell neceſſarye, as not neceſſarye. In lyke manner, as when you do ſee bothe togethers, a man walke on the earthe and the ſon ryſe in the firmament, although both of them be ſene at once, yet you do per ceyue and iudge the one to be volunta rye, the other to be neceſſary. So than the deuyne ſight beholdyng all things troubleth not the qualitie of thynges, by neceſſitie, whythe thynges be pre ſent with hym by hys eternitie, but as to the condicion or ſucceſſion of tyme, they be to come and not preſent.

Wherby it foloweth that this is not an opinion, but rather knowledge cō fyrmed with truth, that when GOD knoweth any thing to be, he knoweth well that the ſame thing wanteth ne ceſſitie to be, that is to ſay: it is not of any neceſſitie to happe or be. Here yf thou ſayſt that the ſame thynge, that

god ſeith to come or hap, cannot other wyſe but muſte nedes come to paſſe, and that the ſame thyngs that canne not chouſe but come to paſſe, muſte betyde and chaunce by neceſſytye, and that thou conſtrayne and bynde me to thys name or worde of neceſſite: certes I do knowledge and confeſſe a thyng of perfytte truthe, but ſcarſelye any man ſhall attayne thereto but the beholder of the deuyne nature. For I wyll tell the that the ſame thinge that is to come, is neceſſary when it is referred to the dyuyne knowledge. But when it is taken and vnderſtād in his owne nature and kynde, it ſemeth fre and clerely abſolute from any neceſſytie. For ther be two neceſſities, ỹ one is ſymple, as that it is neceſſarye that all men be mortall, and the other is conditional, as yf thou knoweſt that any man do walke, it is neceſſary that he do walke. For the ſame thinge that anye man hath knowen to be, maye none other wyſe be, then it is knowen to be: But thys condicion draweth not with it, the ſame ſymple neceſſitie For the proper nature of thys condicyonall neceſſitie, maketh not thys neceſſitie, but the addyng to of the condicyon maketh it. For no neceſſitie cauſeth the man to go, that goeth by hys owne proper wyll, although when he goeth it is neceſſarye that he do go. Than after the ſame maner if gods prouidence ſeith any thyng preſente, it behoueth by

tingere, meq; ad hoc nomen neceſſitatis aſtringas. Fateor rem quidem ſolidiſſimæ ueritatis, ſed cui uix aliquis niſi diuini ſpeculator, accederit. Reſpondebo namq; idem futurum, cum ad diuinam notionem refertur, neceſſarium, cum uero in ſua natura perpenditur, liberum prorſus, atq; abſolutum uideri. Duæ ſunt enim neceſſitates, ſimplex una, ueluti quod neceſſe eſt omnes homines eſſe mortales, altera conditionis, ut ſi aliquem ambulare ſcias, eum ambulare neceſſe eſt. Quod enim quiſq; nouit, id eſſe aliter, ac notum eſt, nequit. Sed hæc conditio minime ſecum illam ſimplicem trahit. Hanc enim neceſſitatem non propria facit natura, ſed conditionis adiectio. Nulla enim neceſſitas cogit incedere uoluntate gradientem, quamuis eum tamen, cum graditur, incedere neceſſarium ſit. Eodem igitur modo, ſi quid prouidentia præſens uidet, id eſſe

neceſſe

neceſſe eſt, tametſi nullam habeat naturæ neceſſitatem. Atq; deum ea futura, quæ ex arbitrij libertate prouenis unt, præſentia contuetur. Hæc igitur ad intuitum relata diuinum, neceſſaria fiunt per conditionem diuinæ notionis: per ſe uero conſyderata, ab abſoluta nature ſue libertate non deſinunt. Fiunt igitur proculdubio cuncta quæ futura deus eſſe præno ſcit. Sed eorum quædam de libero proſiſcuntur arbitrio quæ quamuis eueniunt, exiſtendo tamen propriam naturam non amittũt, per quod priuſquam fierent etiam non uenire potuiſſent. Quid igitur refert non eſſe neceſſaria, cum propter diuinæ ſcientiæ conditionem modis omnibus neceſſitatis inſtar eueniant. Hoc ſcilicet per ea quæ paulo ante propoſui ſol oriens & gradiens homo, quæ dum fiunt, non fieri non poſſunt, eorum tamen unum priusquoq; quam fieret, neceſſe erat exiſtere, alterum uero minime. Ita etiam quæ præſentia

by neceſſytie that it is ſo, although he it haue no neceſſitie of nature. And god beholdeth and ſeyth thoſe thynges that be to come the whych do proceede by lybertye of fre wyll, as thynges al redye preſent. Therefore theſe things when they be referred to the diuyne ſyght, be made neceſſarye by the condycyon, of the deuine knowledge: but when they be conſidered by them ſelfe, without the deuyne ſight, they be abſolute and fre from neceſſytie, and ceſſe not from the libertie of their nature, that is to ſay: they haue the lybertye of their nature. And without dought al thynges ſhalbe done, whyche god knoweth before, be to come. But certayne of them do come of fre wyll, whyche although they do happen, yet they loſe not their owne nature in beyng, by the whyche (before they were done) they had power not to come. What matter or difference is it than to ſaye, that thinges to come be not neceſſarye, when for the condition of the deuine ſcience or knowledge, they doo happen by all maner waies in the likenes of neceſſitie, or as though they came of neceſſitie. This is the difference, ỹ is ſhewed by thoſe thinges that I declared a lytle before, that is to ſay, the ſonne ryſynge and a man goyng. Whych thinges whyles they be done, cannot beyndone. Neuertheles the one of them before it was done, it was of neceſſytye to be done, that is to saye: the ſonne ryſynge: but

not the other, that is to say: the manne goyng. Soo truelye those thinges that god hath prefete, without dought they be. But of them, the one, that is to say the son rysynge, commeth of necessitie of thyngs. The other that is to say the man goyng, commeth of power to do. Therefore haue we sayde ryghte well that those thynges be necessary if they be referred to gods knowledge. And if they be considered by them selfe, than be they absolute or fre from the bonds of necessitie. Euen so as al things that appereth to the wyt, yf thou refer it to reason, it is vniuersal, if thou refer it to it selfe, it is singuler. But yf ỹ wylte say, it is put in my power, to chaunge my purpose, I wyl auoyd gods puruei ans, whē I shal chaunge those things ỹ gods purueyance knew before shuld be: And I wyll saye that thou mayste chaunge thy purpose, but yet because the present verytie of godes prouidens beholdeth, that thou mayst chaunge it and whether thou dooste chaunge it, or whether thou turnest it, thou cannest not auoid the diuine prescience, or fore knowledge. Euen as thou cannest not fle from the syght of the present eye, ỹ lokyth on the, although thou turne thy selfe into dyuers accions or doynges, of thyne owne fre wyll. What wylte thou say now, mayst thou say vnto me shal not the deuyne knoledge be chaū ged after my disposition, or as I am chaunged, as when I wyll nowe this one

præsentia deus habet, procul dubio existunt. Sed eorum, hoc quidem de rerum necessi tate descendit, illud uero de potestate facientium. Haud igitur iniuria diximus, hæc si ad diuinam notitiam referan tur, necessaria. Si per se con siderentur, necessitatis esse nexibus absoluta. Sicut omne quod sensibus patet, si ad ra tionem referas, uniuersale est Si ad seipsa respicias, sin gulare. Sed si inquies, in mea potestate situm est mutare propositum, euacuabo pro uidentiam, cum quæ illa præ noscit forte mutauero, respō debo propositum te quidem tuum posse deflectere, sed quoniam & id te posse, & an facias, quo ue conuertas, præsens prouidentiæ ueritas intuetur, diuinam te præscis entiam non posse uitare, si cut præsentis oculi effugere non possis intuitum, quams uis te in uarias actiones li bera uoluntate conuertas. Quid igitur inquies? Ex me a ne dispositione scientia di uina mutabitur, ut cum ego nunc hoc, nunc illud uelim,

illa

illa quoq; noscendi uices alternare uideatur? Bo. Minime. P. Omne namq; futurum diuinus præcurrit intuitus, et ad presentiã propriæ cognitionis retorquet, ac reuocat: nec alternat, ut tu æstimas nunc hoc nunc illud præ noscendi uices: sed uno ictu mutationes tuas manẽs præuenit, atq; complectitur. Quam comprehendendi omnia, uisendiq; præsẽtiam non ex futurarũ prouentu rerum sed ex propria dei simplicitate sortitus est. Ex quo illud quoq; soluitur, quod paulo ante posuisti indignũ esse, si scientiæ dei causam futura nostra præstare dicantur. Hæc enim scientiæ uis præsentaria notione cuncta complectens, rebus omnibus modum ipsa cõstituit nihil uero posterioribus debet. Quæ cum ita sint manet immemerata mortalibus arbitrij libertas, nec iniquæ leges, solutis omni necessitate uolũtatibus præmia, pœnasq; proponunt.

Manet

one thynge, and now another thyng? semeth not the deuyne knowledge like wyse to alter and chaunge her courses and stedes of knowing: Boe. No soth. Phi. For the deuyne sight goeth before al thing to come, and returneth and calleth the same vnto the presence of hys owne proper knowledge, and chaungeth not (as thou thinkeste) hys stedes or courses, to know now thys, and now that, but allwayes remaynyng stedefast without chaungynge, seith before and comprehendeth at one twynckelyng of an eye, al mutations or chaunges. Which presence of gods syght to enbrase and se all thyngs, god hath not receyued of ỹ chaunce of thinges to come, but of hys owne proper simplicitie or pure nature. Whereby the same thing that thou putteste a lytle before is alloyled, that is to say that it is not mete, that our things to come be sayde to geue or bryng in the cause of gods knoweledge. For this power of knoweledge enbraseth all thinges, by his present knowlege hath estably-shed an order vnto al things, & oweth nothing to later thinges, that is to sai hath asmuch power in things to come hereafter, as in thynges present, or is not in dette vnto later thyngs, for any knowledge receyued by them. Which thinges before sayde, for asmuche as they be euen so, that is to say: that necessitie is not in things by dyuine fore knowledge, libertie of fre wyll remayneth

neth in all mortall men not corrupte nor constrayned by any meanes. And the wycked lawes do not set fourth rewardes or ponyshmentes, to the wils of men that be free from al necessitie. For god the fore knower and beholder of all thinges from aboue, and the present eternitie of his sight alwayes renneth together with the future qualitie of our actes & dedes, geuing rewardes vnto the good folke, and ponyshments to the wycked and euyll folke. And hope and prayers be not put in god in vayne, or as thynges of no force or effecte, whych when they be good, iuste and ryghtful, cannot be vnfruytfull, but meritorius and good. Eschewe therfore vyce, folow vertue, lift vp your mynde to perfyt hope, powre out your humble prayers to god aboue Greate necessitie of goodnes and rewarde is promysed and appoynted for you, yf you wyl not dyssemble, but cõtynue faythfull true and obedient vnto almyghty god, when you do althinges before the eies of the iudge, that is to saye: before GOD, that seith all thinges.

FINIS.

Manet etiam spectator desuper cunctorum prescius deus, uisionisq; eius presens semper eternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrit, bonis premia, malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positæ spes, precesq;, quæ cum recte sint, inefficaces esse non possunt. Auersamini igitur uitia, colite uirtutes, ad rectæ spes animum subleuate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite, magna uobis est, si dissimulare non uult necessitas indicta probitatis, cum auue oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernentis.

FINIS.

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